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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the role of culture, investigating to how China policy-research 
experts socially construct ‘American-ness’ through ‘China’ as the Other. I posit the 
following overarching research question: “How and why are social and cultural 
boundaries of ‘American-ness’ dialectically drawn by China policy-research experts 
within U.S. think tanks through their social construction of narratives on ‘China’ as 
the Other?” The empirical foundation is comprised of 40 face-to-face, in-depth 
interviews with China policy-research experts across 26 internationally leading think 
tanks in Washington, DC, and New York, USA, as well as four interviews with 
relevant experts (i.e. State Department and academia). Additional methods 
encompass participant observation, contextuality, triangulation, informal 
conversation, descriptive statistics/database, and collection of written material. The 
multimethod, ethnographic research strategy is coupled with a social constructionist 
epistemologically driven study, and deploys Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice and the 
embedded conceptual “thinking tools” as the theoretical framework (including cross-
tabulation and ethnographic/interpretivist contents analysis). The engagement with 
Bourdieu is also dialectic in its own right, herein allowing obtained field-data and 
‘native categories’ of the research subjects to unveil new lines of inquiries as well as 
to expand and nuance Bourdieu’s conceptual “thinking tools” themselves in a 
“bottom-up” fashion. This study contributes to the Bourdieusian sociological ‘turn’ 
in International Relations (IR) research (in particularly, making the non-state, 
individual level the focal point of the inquiry, in addition to contesting the 
assumptions concerning immateriality/construction innately preceding 
materiality/physicality – within the IR constructivism research programme), and to 
the specific think tank literature by propagating a third ‘school of analysis’, i.e. 
conceptualising the thinking of policy-researchers. More broadly, this study provides 
an important perspective on a key bilateral relationship (U.S.–Sino relations) in U.S. 
Foreign Policy (and for the world) as well as a prominent category of key players in 
U.S. Politics. 
 
Key words: Policy-researcher; expert; think tank; U.S.; China; culture; ‘American-
ness’; US.-Sino relations; Bourdieu; Theory of Practice; ‘field’, ‘capital’, ‘habitus’, 
‘doxa’, ‘strategising’, ‘interests’, ‘epistemic reflexivity’; social construction; Self; 
Other; Otherness; identity; conceptual boundaries; boundary-construction; boundary-
markers; sociological meso-level; dialecticality; relationality; narratives; 
International Relations research; Bourdieusian sociological ‘turn’; interview; 
ethnography; social constructionism; U.S Foreign Policy; U.S. Politics; 
transdisciplinary.  
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“The American difference, the ways in which the United States varies from the rest of the 
world (...) suggesting it is qualitatively different (...) The United States is exceptional in 
starting from a revolutionary event, in being “the first new nation”, the first colony, other 
than Iceland, to become independent. It has defined its raison d’être ideologically (...) The 
American Creed can be described in five terms: liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, 
populism, and laissez-faire.” 
 
- Seymour Martin Lipset1  
 
 “American identity has been a set of universal ideas and principles articulated in the 
founding documents by American leaders: liberty, equality, democracy, constitutionalism, 
liberalism, limited government (...) the American Creed.” 
 
- Samuel Huntington2  
 
“It has been our fate as a nation, not to have ideologies but to be one.” 
 
- Richard Hofstadter3  
 
                                                  
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION  
 
As a social phenomenon, ‘American-ness’4 relates to the meaning and substance of 
being American. The above quotes attempt to capture the very essence of an 
American identity. However, the collection of ideas portrayed above are neither 
identical, nor do they reveal if the depicted stances are constant or how they are 
indeed socially constructed. Many an American would find resemblance between 
their identity and the above statements – but not necessarily all of them or all the 
embedded elements. ‘American-ness’, then, is a contested concept where 
individuals’ varied meaning-production reflects divergence in what is manifested as 
                                                          
1 S.M. Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A double-Edged Sword (London: Norton & Company, 1996), 19; A.D. 
Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Chicago: University Press, 2000/1840), 36. 
2 S. Huntington, “The Erosion of American National Interests,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 5 (1997): 29. 
3 H. Kohn, “Review: The American Idea”, The Review of Politics 17, no. 3 (1955): 411; Lipset, ibid. 18.  
4 The distinguishing nature of the term ‘American-ness’ and ‘Americanism’ will be discussed later in this chapter. 
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‘American-ness’ – and what is not. This study investigates the influence of culture 
on how policy-research experts in China-related areas within U.S. think tanks 
located in Washington, DC, socially construct ‘American-ness’ as an embodiment of 
their identity within the context of ‘China’ as the Other. 
 
As Self (or Selves),
5
 however, ‘American-ness’ cannot be self-categorised, 
disentangled from an Other.
6
 In order to understand how one party perceives itself, it 
is de rigueur to understand Otherness.
7
 Otherness plays an indispensable role in 
constituting an identity due to retaining the potential of amassing knowledge about 
those who are constructing this particular Other. This is a result of that Otherness can 
only be realised within our own culture. 
 
The mutually constituted Self/Other constellation and the non-dichotomised 
relationship signals that ‘American-ness’ ought to be investigated as a contested 
phenomenon through the social construction of an Other. Additional questions in this 
endeavour encompass what does not constitute ‘American-ness’ and ‘China’ – and 
why.
8
 The study rejects notion of an ‘American-ness’ portrayed as identity(-ies) 
reducible to an observable and quantifiable, fixed and static physical entity, which 
can be measured or investigated taxonomically, ahistorically, acontextually, and 
detached from meaning. Exploring the interrelatedness of the Self/Other dialectic is 
therefore not only epistemologically and ontologically warranted, but also of 
                                                          
5 This multiplicity take on Self is briefly addressed in point 1.8.1 (this chapter). 
6 F. Barth, Ethnic groups and boundaries (Boston: Little Brown, 1969a). 
7 R. Shusterman, “Understanding the self’s others,” in Cultural otherness and beyond, eds. C. Gupta & D.P. 
Chattopadhyaya (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 107-114. 
8 See P. Bourdieu, Distinction: a Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (Harvard University Press, 1984a); see 
P. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: University Press, 1977); E. Goffmann, The 
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Anchor Books, 1959); see M. Lamont & V. Molnar, “The Study 
of Boundaries in the Social Sciences,” Annual Review Sociology 28 (2002): 167-195; I.B. Neumann, “Self and 
Other in International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 2(2) (1996): 139-174.  
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profound importance in grasping the changing essence of ‘American-ness’ through 
relations with an Other.
9
 
 
The relationship between Self and Other also implies that the nature of ‘American-
ness’, as an identity (Self), is intersubjectively constituted, and constituted by, the 
nature of the mirroring Other.
10
 This stricture permeates the overarching research 
question, posited as: 
 
How and why are cultural and social boundaries of ‘American-ness(es)’ 
dialectically drawn by policy-research experts in China-related areas within 
U.S. think tanks through their social construction of narratives on ‘China’ as 
the Other?  
 
Achieving a mere definitional understanding of ‘American-ness’ is neither an 
objective nor an end point of this academic inquiry. The dynamic nature of 
‘American-ness’ and ‘China’ as social phenomena explored above signals that 
attribution of meanings are ever-changing due to the boundary-production is based 
on individuals’ social construction. The overarching research question, rather, serves 
as a departure for problematising and deconstructing the conceptual dialectic of 
‘American-ness’ and ‘China’. The concepts displayed in the overarching research 
question will be introduced later in this Chapter, and discussed in depth in Chapter 
Two (i.e. theoretical framework). The latter Chapter will also address relevant social 
                                                          
9 See J. Butler, Bodies That Matter (London: Routledge, 1993); D. Campbell, Writing Security: United States 
foreign policy and the politics of identity (Manchester: University Press, 1992); J. Derrida, Positions (Chicago: 
University Press, 1981); see P. Du Gay, J. Evans & P. Redman, Identity: a Reader (London: Sage Publication 
Ltd., 2000); S. Hall, “Introduction: who needs identity?,” in Cultural Identity, eds. S. Hall & P. du Gay (London: 
Sage, 1996): 1-17. 
10 I am not using the word ‘mirror’ in a Lacanian fashion (i.e. the ‘mirror stage’ concept from Lacan’s 
psychoanalytical theory (see J. Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, trans. A. Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1977)) but 
simply as a metaphor: the mirror reflection of yourself cannot be separated from your own being. 
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theory for this study (section one), including the research philosophical and 
methodological approaches (section two). 
 
The overarching research question features an international research problem which I 
argue is relevant for being examined within the International Relations (IR) 
discipline. It will be examined in a transdisciplinary manner set within a broader 
investigatory frame. The study positions Pierre Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice in 
addition to the social theoretical concepts of ‘culture’ and ‘identity’ at the forefront 
of my research. It is tantamount to an international problem due research subjects 
are constructing their “China-narratives” based upon experiences and knowledge 
accumulated across country-borders (including intercultural encounters with Chinese 
and other international players). Furthermore, think tanks are a player in the sphere 
of public policy (regardless of being influential or impactful, or not) through policy-
research, advocacy, and/or consultancy).  
 
The investigation is transdisciplinary as it employs sociological and social 
anthropological concepts and theories, in particularly Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice 
and the associated conceptual “thinking tools” (i.e. ‘habitus’, ‘field’, ‘capital’, 
‘doxa’, ‘interests’, and ‘strategies’) – in addition to ‘reflexivity’.11 This 
                                                          
11 See Pierre Bourdieu 1984a, Distinction, op.cit.; see P. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: 
University Press, 1977); R. Jenkins, Pierre Bourdieu, revised edn (London: Routledge, 2002); A. Leander, 
“Staging International Relations Practicing Bourdieu’s Sociology” (paper presented at the International Studies 
Association panel “Practicing Pierre Bourdieu’s Sociology: A Different Reading of the International,” ISA, New 
Orleans, US, 2010); A. Leander, “Habitus and Field,” International Studies Association Compendium Project 
(Blackwell, 2009a); A. Leander, “Thinking Tools,” in Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist 
Guide, eds. A. Klotz & D. Prakash (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008): 11-27; V. Pouliot, “Putting Practice 
Theory in Practice,” (paper presented at Bourdieu in International Relations workshop, Copenhagen, December 
7-8, 2010); V. Pouliot, “The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities,” International 
Organization 62(2) (2008): 257-288; D.L. Swartz, “Bringing Bourdieu’s master concepts into organizational 
analysis,” Theory & Society 37 (2008): 45-52; M. Williams, Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics 
of International Security (London and New York: Routledge, 2007). 
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transdisciplinary nexus connects the study with the Bourdieusian sociological 
diffusive entry-point into IR research. This ‘turn’ entrenches my approach to explore 
culture and identity conducted within the frontier of the IR research agenda 
(hereafter, the Bourdieusian sociological ‘turn’ as argued by Leander12).  
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: It continues by unpacking the overarching 
research questions by elucidating key concepts. In its entirety, this chapter sets the 
scene of the study and the nature of the coupled academic investigation of the thesis. 
This includes briefly presenting a justification of the study, its purpose and aim, 
areas of literature, main arguments, research framework, potential contributions, in 
addition to reflecting on the surrounding contextuality of the research problem. 
 
1.1 Unpacking the overarching research question 
This section briefly introduces the employed terms and concepts displayed in the 
overarching research question. The highlighted social theory will be expanded and 
discussed in more depth in the theoretical framework chapter (Chapter Two).
13
 The 
below explanations allude to how the concepts are conceived to be applied in this 
particular study. In effect, the purpose of delimiting the scope in this chapter relates 
to both the boundaries of the investigation as well as the deployment of theory 
within the thesis. 
 
 
                                                          
12 A. Leander 2009, Habitus and Field, op.cit. 
13 In Chapter Two (theoretical-framework). The discussion focuses on achieving congruency with other applied 
social theories and the study’s research design as a whole. 
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1.1.1 Relationship between ‘American-ness’, ‘Americanism’, America, and the 
U.S. 
This study applies the term ‘American-ness’ in relation to what constitutes being an 
American. Thus, the former term is distinguished from the closely related expression 
‘Americanism’, albeit often appearing as interchangeable.14 This approach is aligned 
with the vocabulary in social theory: ‘American-ness’ (my italicisation) is 
predominantly associated with individuals (the main focus of this study, i.e. policy-
researchers affiliated with think tanks), and the “-ness” is aligned with the lexis of 
social theory’s conceptual boundary-production such as “we-ness”, “sameness”, and 
“Otherness (my italicisations). ‘Americanism’, however, is in the broader political 
science and IR research chiefly signifying non-individual, macro-level phenomena 
such as ‘national interests’ (the raison d’état of the nation, and special interest of 
dominating domestic sectors in policy-making)
15
 and ‘ideology’ (a set of dogmas 
about the nature of a good society, the Creed, and a civic national thesis about itself, 
which in the U.S. must be committed to in order to avoid being perceived ‘un-
American’ (my italicisation)).16 
 
In this study, ‘the U.S.’ relates to the national level – a nationality but without 
assuming the existence of only one culture contained by its country-borders. That 
would be an “ecological fallacy”,17 which entails the illogical notion that culture(s) 
                                                          
14 It is neither an aim to explore the nexus of the two aforementioned terms, nor to ascertain typologies in any 
hierarchy. 
15 N. Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for global Dominance (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 
29. 
16 A. Lieven, America, Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism (Oxford: University Press, 2004), 
36; Lipset 1991, op.cit. 31; see Katzenstein, P.J., and Keohane, R.O. (eds.), Anti-Americanism in World Politics 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007). 
17 ‘Ecological fallacy’ refers to the misconception that people situated in the same area share the same attitudes, 
and the assumption that a human being’s characteristics are corresponding to the average of a group (see D. 
Landis & J.H. Wasilevski, “Reflections on 22 years of the international journal of intercultural relations and 23 
16 
 
remains non-transformative, static, and fixed as a singular entity constrained to the 
physical spatie of the country.
18
 For the very same reason, ‘U.S.’ rather than 
‘American’ are pertained to in regard to ‘think tanks’ as a means to avoid implying 
that individuals working in the think tanks have internalised a singular, national 
culture. Nonetheless, ‘the U.S.’ predominantly relates to the “nationality” of the 
think tanks. Consequently, the study does not refuse an individual to become 
included as a research subject due to his or her nationality, ethnical, or cultural 
background.
19
 This stance relates to that an American national may possess vastly 
different socio-cultural backgrounds. Furthermore, it is very common that think 
tanks welcome visiting scholars from different countries around the world, and thus 
a part of the ‘social reality’ existing within the think tank scene.  
 
1.1.2 Conceptual (cultural, social, and symbolic) boundaries 
Conceptual boundaries comprise cultural, social, and symbolic boundaries, including 
cultural processes during boundary-production.
20
 It serves as the foundation of how 
social identities concerning being American are formed – a social categorisation 
process signifying an accentuated “us” and “them” which creates a sensation of 
“same-ness” and uniqueness from others.21  This evolves out from the interplay 
                                                                                                                                                                    
years in other areas of intercultural practice,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations 23(4) (1999): 535-
574. 
18 E. Leach, “Tribal Ethnography: past, present, future,” in History and Ethnicity, eds. E. Tonkin, M. McDonald & 
M. Chapman (London: Routledge, 1989). 
19 Surveying U.S. think tanks reveals that there are individuals working on China with a Chinese/Asian-American 
background. This underscores the social constructionist approach of this study, herein that ‘American-ness’ may 
divulge itself in many different forms.  
20 See Lamont & Molnar 2002, op.cit. 
21 F. Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference (Bergen: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1971); F. Barth 1969a, op.cit.; see R. Brubaker, “Ethnicity without groups,” European 
Journal of Sociology 43(2) (2002): 163-189; see R. Brubaker & F. Cooper, “Beyond ‘identity’,” Theory and 
Society 29(1) (2000): 1-47; R. Jenkins, Categorization and Power (England: Sage Publication, 1997); J.E. Stets 
& P.J. Burkes, “Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory,” Social Psychology Quarterly 63(3) (2000): 224-237. 
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between the construction of Self and ‘China’ as the Other.22 Self features a 
difference to Otherness.
23
 The difference is shaped by culture and contextuality.
24
 
Conceptual boundaries relate to how they are being drawn and what uphold them, 
attributed meanings to the boundaries, and what ensues inside them and what is 
excluded.
25
 ‘American-ness’ contains different meanings and operates at different 
“levels” (or spheres) through meaning and boundary-production. This emphasises 
the contested nature of both Self and the Other as a result of different boundary-
production processes.
26
 
 
1.1.3 Dialecticality (dialectic) 
Dialecticality is reflected in the way the overarching research question is 
constructed: How the conceptual boundaries of American-ness are drawn through 
the social construction of ‘China’ as the Other. The social construction of American-
ness(es) as Self/Selves and ‘China’ as Otherness(es) are inseparable, mutually 
constitutive phenomena.
27
 Here, Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice offers a dialectic 
middle-way between the thesis and antithesis of subjectivism and objectivism 
respectively.
28
 Importantly, think tank policy-research experts do not draw 
                                                          
22 See Campbell 1992, op.cit.; S. Harrison, “Cultural Boundaries,” Anthropology Today 15(5) (1999): 10-13. 
23 Bourdieu 1984, Distinction, op.cit. 
24 P.L. Berger & T. Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge 
(Garden City: Anchor, 1966); see M. Hammersley & P. Atkinson, Ethnography (London: Routledge, 2007); see 
Shusterman, 1998, op.cit. 
25 F. Barth, Manifestasjon og prosess (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1994); see Barth 1971, op.cit.; Pierre Bourdieu, 
“Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field,” Sociological Theory 12, (1) (1994): 1-18; 
Jenkins 1994, op.cit.; R. Jenkins, “Ethnicity etcetera: Social anthropological point of view,” Ethnic and racial 
studies 19(4) (1996a): 807-822; R. Jenkins, Social Identity (New York: Routledge, 1996b); Lamont & Molnar 
2002, op.cit. New introduced concepts, such as (social) identity and the different forms of boundaries, will be 
discussed in more details in Chapter Two (section one). 
26 “Levels” may reflect, for example, individual, organisational, national, and transnational ones. However, I am 
not applying this term in a taxonomic sense as my ontological stance acknowledges that individuals possess 
agency, at least partly, to change preconceived boundaries of ‘levels’ and to traverse them. This harmonises with 
approaching the research problem on the sociological meso-level. 
27 P. Bourdieu 1984, Distinction, ibid.; R. Jenkins 1996b, Social Identity, ibid. 
28 R. Jenkins 2002, op.cit.; P. Bourdieu 1984, ibid. 51. 
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conceptual boundaries dialectically, but the Self/Other constellation forms and 
functions as a dialectic intertwined in constitutive processes.
29
 It follows, 
dialecticality as the concept, is a mode of non-linear thinking inherent as an 
“ontological assumption” in all concepts making up the overarching research 
questions. It implicates all human conduct and relationships where the imagery is 
circular in a continual movement between the whole and its parts.
30
  
 
The dialectic identity-formation of think tank policy-researchers should be 
understood as produced and re-producing boundaries of Otherness (i.e. ‘China’) as 
opposed to a dualistic approach where the two elements of Self and the Other operate 
separately. Meaning-construction applied to ‘China’ as the external is internalised in 
‘American-ness’ as Self, and ‘American-ness’ is externalised in the accounts of what 
constitutes ‘China’.31 The dialectic relationship also makes ‘American-ness’ an ever-
transforming phenomenon in accordance to the nature of the mutually constitutive 
Other and its Otherness.  
 
1.1.4 U.S. think tank policy-research experts 
As stipulated above, ‘the U.S’ signifies the “nationality” of the think tank, defining 
the organisational form of ‘think tanks’ and establishing typologies remain a main 
issue in think tank research.
32
 Frequently applied definitions include “university 
                                                          
29 L. Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (Routledge: London, 2006), 37. 
30 T. Benton & I. Craib, Philosophy of social science: the philosophical foundations of social through 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001) 
31 See Barth 1971, op.cit.; Pierre Bourdieu, Logic of Practice, trans R. Nice (Stanford: University Press, 1990b); 
Bourdieu 1984, Distinction, op.cit.; Bourdieu 1977, Outline of a Theory of Practice, op.cit.; Campbell 1992, 
Writing Security: United States foreign policy and the politics of identity, op.cit.; Williams 2007, Culture and 
Security, op.cit. 
32 D.E. Abelson, A capitol idea: think tanks and US foreign policy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2006); D.E. Abelson, “The business of ideas: the think tank industry in the USA,” in Think tank traditions: Policy 
research and the politics of ideas, eds. D. Stone & A. Denham (Manchester: University Press, 2004); D.E. 
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without students”,33 the UNDP’s “[the] bridge between knowledge and power”,34 
and “relatively autonomous organizations engaged in the research and analysis of 
contemporary issues independently of government, political parties, and pressure 
groups”35. I am approaching think tanks in harmony with the latter definition as I 
find it to reflect the diverse nature of think tanks. U.S. think tanks are amongst 
themselves highly pluralistic (for example, ideological orientation, mission and 
objective, organisational forms, degree of transnational networks, degree of 
specialisations, balance between research contra policy-advocacy, varied amounts of 
influence, and independence). Differences may be greater when comparing with 
countries featuring other historical foundations, political cultures, and national 
identities. Nonetheless, to obtain a universal definitional understanding is not a focus 
of this study as it does not theorise about think tanks beyond operating as research 
sites for my present study.
36
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                    
Abelson, Do Think Tanks Matter? Assessing the Impact of Public Policy Institutes (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2002); D.E. Abelson, “Think tanks in the United States,” in Think tanks across nations, eds. D. 
Stone, A. Denham & M. Garnett (Manchester: University Press, 1998); J.G. McGann, “The Leading Public Policy 
Research Organizations In The World 2009,” (2010), Available from: 
http://www.ony.unu.edu/2009%20Global%20Go%20To%20Think%20Tank%20Rankings%20%28TT%20Index%
29%20last%20version.pdf; J.G. McGann, “The Leading Public Policy Research Organizations In The World 
2008,” (2009), Available from: http://www.fpri.org/research/thinktanks/GlobalGoToThinkTanks2008.pdf; Thomas 
Medvetz, “Think tanks as an emergent field,” The Social Science Research Council (2008), Available from: 
http://www.ssrc.org/workspace/images/crm/new_publication_3/%7Ba2a2ba10-b135-de11-afac-
001cc477ec70%7D.pdf; see National Institute for Research Advancements n.d., NIRA, Available from: 
http://www.nira.or.jp/past/index.html; see D. Stone, “Recycling Bins, Garbage Cans or Think Tanks? Three Myths 
Regarding Policy Analysis Institutes,” Public Administration 85(2) (2007): 259-275; D. Stone & A. Denham (eds.), 
Think tank traditions: Policy research and the politics of ideas (Manchester: University Press, 2004); D. Stone, A. 
Denham & M. Garnett (eds.), Think tanks across nations (Manchester: University Press, 1998). 
33 R.K. Weaver, “Changing World of Think Tanks,” PS: Political Science and Politics 22(3) (1989): 563-578. 
34 D. Stone, “Think Tanks and Policy Advice in Countries in Transition,” How to Strengthen Policy-Oriented 
Research and Training in Viet Nam (presented at the Asian Development Bank Institute Symposium, Hanoi, 
2005): 2. 
35 D. Stone, “Think Tanks,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, eds. N.J. Smelser 
& P.B. Baltes (Oxford: Pergamon, 2001), 68-71. 
36 See Medvetz 2008, “Think tanks as an emergent field,” op.cit. – for a discussion concerning defining the term 
‘think tank’. 
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It could plausibly be made the case that think tanks can be bestowed upon an elite 
status.
37
 The latter can be defined as: “A social group distinguished from other social 
groups by a particular kind of perceived power” (my italicisation).38 The argued and 
perceived influence of think tanks on a country’s politics and foreign policies, public 
opinion-shaping, and policy research, warrant labelling think tanks as elite 
organisations as well as those individuals working within them as ‘think tank 
elites’.39 The term ‘elite’ may operate at two inseparable levels. These levels entail 
the organisational level in terms of the arguable prominent position in policy-
network enjoyed by impactful think tanks, and secondly, the individual level (i.e. 
those conducting China-related research and/or policy-advocacy within such 
organisations) due to their professional affiliations, capabilities through education 
                                                          
37 See Abelson 2002, Do Think Tanks Matter, op.cit.; McGann 2010, op.cit.; McGann 2009, op.cit.; J.A. Smith, 
The Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite  (New York: Free Press, 1991). 
38 J. Scott, Sociology: The Key Concepts (Oxford: Routledge, 2006), 65. It seems to be an “ontological blindfold” 
in mainstream think tank research (see Stone 2004, op.cit., for a similar supporting argument). For example, 
most research revolves around those think tanks considered the most reputable and/or well-known. However, 
this pool of think tanks represents the minority and not a majority of the think tank population neither in the world 
(1815 in the U.S. alone (see McGann 2010, ibid. 15, 18) or within the U.S. Therefore, the degree of elite status 
may starkly vary, and thus challenged when contemplating questions such as ‘who decide what think tanks are 
holding an elite status or not’, and for whom’ and ‘in what area’ (the latter taking into account that most post-
1976s think tanks operate in specialised areas, also referred to as the fourth wave (McGann 2009, ibid.; J.G. 
McGann, “Academics to Ideologues: A Brief History of Think Tanks in America,” PS: Political Science and 
Politics 25(4) (1992): 733-740)). 
39 It should here be noted that the issue of ‘influence’, closely linked to the preceding point concerning ‘elite 
status’, relates to a major debate amongst practitioners as well as academic scholars (see D.E. Abelson 2002, 
ibid.; Stone 2004 op.cit.; Stone & A Denham 2004, Think tank traditions, op.cit.). There are examples of influence 
being exercised by think tanks in the literature (e.g. D.E. Abelson 2006, A capitol idea, op.cit.; Croft, Culture, 
Crisis and America’s War on Terror (Cambridge: University Press, 2006); McGann 2009, ibid.; A. Rich & R. Kent 
Weaver, “Think Tanks, the Media and the Policy Process” (paper presented at the American Political Science 
Association, Washington, DC, 1997); S. Schifferes, Battle of the Washington think tanks (2003). Available from: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2914969.stm; D. Shambaugh, Beautiful imperialist: China perceives 
America, 1972-1990 (Princeton: University Press, 2001) but in my opinion, to endeavour finding a tool for 
measuring influence will always be a case of attempting to “quantifying the unquantifiable” due to issues of power 
and perceptions (see Guttormsen 2010a, for an earlier discussion). The think tanks themselves either believe 
they have influence, or are forced to communicate that they do, in order to survive in the competitive marketplace 
of “business of ideas” (Abelson 2006, ibid.; D.E. Abelson, “The business of ideas: the think tank industry in the 
USA,” in Think tank traditions: Policy research and the politics of ideas, eds. D Stone & A Denham (Manchester: 
University Press, 2004)). 
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and research training, in addition to access to policy-networks.
40
 Without dismissing 
the above, this study rather makes use of the term ‘policy-research experts’ to reflect 
their actual core activities and their own vocabulary (i.e. areas of expertise). 
 
1.1.5 Social construction 
Social construction is the “spine” of the investigation concerning how U.S. think 
tank policy-researchers construct ‘China’ as the Other, and what constitutes 
‘American-ness’ through these “China-narratives”. The phenomenon of social 
construction branches out across the entire study, including the research 
philosophical stance to the format of interview questions. In essence, social 
construction relates to the policy-researchers’ ‘thoughts about reality’ (i.e. ‘China’ 
and themselves), and is evident in four aspects in the way the research is carried out.  
 
First, it relates to the research philosophical stance.
41
 In terms of a social 
constructionist epistemology (how do we know what we know), the inquiry 
acknowledges that people socially construct ‘reality’. Hence, it is not a given which 
exists as purely rationale where objective knowledge can be detached from 
individuals.
42
  
 
Second, the study makes a distinction towards social constructivism in the way that 
‘reality’ is constructed across a cultural group through public and social process 
                                                          
40 These elements are associated with Bourdieu’s various forms of capital, a key conceptual “thinking tool” in his 
Theory of Practice (see P. Bourdieu 1977, Outline of a Theory of Practice, op.cit.; A. Leander 2010, op.cit.; A. 
Leander 2009, op.cit.; A. Leander 2008, op.cit.; R. Jenkins 2002, op.cit.; M. Williams 2007, op.cit.). 
41 In the theory chapter (Chapter Two), I will discuss the philosophical grounding in more detail, as well as the 
notion of a subjective dominated ontology (my italicisation), and the distinction from social constructivism. 
42 M. Alvesson & K. Sköldberg, Reflexive Methodology: New Vistas for Qualitative Research (London: Sage 
Publications Ltd., 2009); P.L. Berger & T. Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the 
Sociology of Knowledge (Garden City: Anchor, 1966). 
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transcending one policy-researcher's mind.
43
 Thus, there may be multiple ‘social 
realities’, Selves, Othernesses, cultures, and indeed avenues for investigating 
potential contested and uncontested areas of ‘American-ness’.44  
 
Third, drawing conceptual boundaries is the mechanism for social construction. 
Moreover, in terms of dialecticality, the meanings of ‘American-ness’ and ‘China’ 
are not static but ever-transforming social phenomena. It follows that ‘meaning’ does 
not objectively exist “out there”, but rather, in an interplay between the individual 
policy-researcher (agent) and pre-existing cultural structures in society.
45
 
 
1.1.6 Narratives 
In this study, ‘narratives’ serves as cultural sites where policy-researchers interpret 
existing relationships amongst people and make sense of their reality.
46
 In the 
sociological tradition, narratives have come to be understood as story-telling 
activities integral to personal and collective life (i.e. about China and being 
American).
47
 It is, therefore, through their narratives which I can investigate social 
constructions of ‘China’ and ‘American-ness’. The dialectical inclination in my 
approach is evident when arguing there are no universals governing the structure of a 
narrative.
48
 Ontological and public narratives are the forms mostly focused upon, i.e. 
                                                          
43 See R.M. Keesing & A.J. Strathern, Cultural anthropology: A contemporary perspective, 3rd edn (Belmont: 
Thomson, 1998). 
44 See Hammersley & Atkinson 2007, Ethnography, op.cit. 
45 A. Giddens, The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Cambridge: Polity, 1984); D. 
Swartz, Culture & Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 
1997), 96; L. Wacquant, “Pierre Bourdieu,” in ed R Stones, Key Sociological Thinkers, 2nd edn (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 266-267. 
46 M. Patterson & K.R. Monroe, “Narrative in Political Science,” Annual Review of Political Science 1(1) (1998): 
315-331. 
47 D. Mains, “Narratives and Accounts,” in J. Scott, Sociology: The Key Concepts (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), 113-
117. 
48 See Derrida, cited in Patterson & Monroe 1998, op.cit. 
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making sense of who we are (the former). This depends on the institutions where the 
policy-researchers are embedded in (the latter).
49
 Narratives perform as discursive 
acts and a metaphor for social interactions conveyed as socially understood 
messages. Such speech acts are situated within and drawing upon ontologically prior 
discourse, herein structured collections of representations. The investigation extends 
beyond mere linguistic notions (i.e. words) and is therefore differentiated from 
‘discourse analysis’ 
 
The relationship between think tanks and individuals in terms of narratives are 
dynamic. Ongoing analysis of field-data may reveal if narratives operate on multiple 
levels. I am drawing upon Bourdieu’s hierarchical notion of ‘power’ as well as 
symbolic power/-violence in order to organise inter-relationships between potential 
multiple narratives, for example, externally between think tanks and/or within a 
think tank. The social construction of ‘China-narratives’ may include both 
immaterial and material faculties. 
 
1.1.7 ‘China’ as the Other, and Otherness 
China without the apostrophes designates the country of China as opposed to the 
social construction of ‘China’, which is denoted as the cultural Other. Otherness, 
however, is the ascribed qualities to that Other. As established in the introduction of 
this chapter, Self (aka ‘American-ness’) is mutually constituted through an Other.50 
                                                          
49 M. Pattersons & K.R. Monroe 1998, ibid.; Croft 2006, op.cit., highlights that a meta-narrative may develop, 
which manifests itself as “common-sense”. In accordance to the post-structuralist scepticism against 
“transcendent and universal truths”, I am not assuming any such meta-narratives to exist unless field-data 
informs me otherwise (see J-F. Lyotard, Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. G. Bennington & 
B. Massumi (Manchester: University Press, 1979)). What is more relevant in my study relates to interests and 
strategies associated with their narratives in regard to ‘China’. 
50 F. Barth I969a, Ethnic groups and boundaries, op.cit. ; R. Shusterman 1998, “Understanding the self’s others,” 
op.cit.  
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Investigating this particular Self/Other dialectic provides access into ‘American-
ness’ as social identity (aided by constructed boundary-markers).51 This does not 
mean that ‘American-ness’ and an epitomised social identity in regard to being 
American cannot be grasped in other ways of Self/Other constellations, for example 
mirrored through a vast range of other countries as Others. However, this is beyond 
the purview of this current study. 
 
The boundary-production relating to constituting an Other takes a social 
anthropological route, i.e. Othering. Accordingly, the focus is directed towards what 
qualities the policy-research experts perceive as distinctively different from ‘China’ 
as the Other. My research, therefore, realigns beyond the ‘differences’ and 
endogenous cultural traits of “us” and “them” as objectified categories which groups 
ascribe to.
52
 Therefore, it follows the Barthian ‘school’ of Otherness concerning how 
the production of conceptual boundaries are maintained (and reproduced) as a means 
of separating groups.
53
  
 
This echoes Bourdieu’s argument that micro-sociologists are “stopping where the 
real fun begins”, i.e. social constructionist studies precluding a focus on why people 
construct the boundaries the way they do, and how such boundaries functions as 
elements of social reality.
54
 In this sense, the theoretical inquiry moves beyond the 
                                                          
51 See J. Butler 1993, Bodies That Matter, op.cit.; D. Campbell 1992, Writing Security: United States foreign 
policy and the politics of identity, op.cit.; J. Derrida 1981, Positions, op.cit.; see P. Du Gay, J. Evans & P. 
Redman 2000, Identity: a Reader, op.cit.; S. Hall 1996, “Introduction: who needs identity?,” op.cit., 1-17. 
52 “Mere” representations of China are not dismissed in this study. The effort in categorising representations is 
only an initial step prior to making sense of the boundary-production of Self and Otherness. Representations of 
China will be analysed by applying an ethnographic contents analysis of written policy-research material 
produced by relevant policy-research experts (see the research-framework, Chapter Two, section two). 
53 F. Barth I969a, Ethnic groups and boundaries, ibid. 
54 M. Alvesson & K. Sköldberg 2009, Reflexive Methodology: New Vistas for Qualitative Research, op.cit. 37. 
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exploratory purview conveyed in the quote by the prominent scholar, Lipset:
55
 “it is 
impossible to understand a country without seeing how it varies from others. Those 
who know only one country know no country”. This is true, but only half of the story 
(i.e. only taking account the difference between two countries, but not based on 
relations between how the two countries are constructed). In my inquiry, I would 
argue, this harmonises with Bourdieu’s notions of ‘interests’ and ‘strategies’ as the 
aforesaid focus is not only placed on what is considered making us ‘different’ – but 
why and how. 
 
The study thus converges on boundary-markers
56
 where identity is not constructed 
solely endogenously but also from “the outside”.57 This study also opens up for 
addressing the phenomenon of fixating the Other.
58
  This should not be understood, 
however, as multiple ‘objectives’ of Otherness (such as China and multiple other 
countries) but different socially constructed meanings about ‘China’. 
                                                          
55 S.M. Lipset 1996, American Exceptionalism: A double-Edged Sword, op.cit. 17. 
56 This opens up for a very important discussion at the forefront of contemporary social theory debates, herein 
sociological relationalism (both in regard to boundary-markers but also Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice (for the 
latter, see D.L. Swartz, “Bringing Bourdieu’s master concepts into organizational analysis,” Theory & Society 37 
(2008): 45-52)). This theme will be addressed in the theory-chapter (Chapter Two). See also discussions 
concerning theoretical advancements in the subsequent literature review chapter. 
57 This approach to the Self/Other nexus is very different to Sartre’s nexus of two different and detached modes 
of beings, such as Man and Woman in Simone de Beauvoir’s take on it (see M. Crotty 2003, The foundations of 
social research, op.cit. 167) (J. Lauring & D.S.A. Guttormsen, “Challenges of Ethnicity in Organizational 
Interaction: The Role of Language Use in Expatriate Management,” in Race and Ethnicity: Cultural roles, 
Spiritual Practices, and Social challenges, ed. JK Crennan (New York: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 2010); I.B. 
Neumann, Uses of the Other. The 'East' in European Identity Formation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1999); I.B. Neumann, “Self and Other in International Relations,” European Journal of International 
Relations 2(2) (1996): 139-174). 
58 I will briefly discuss the issue of “fixating” images about ‘China’ as Otherness in more detail in the analysis 
chapters (see E. Said (Orientalism, London: Penguin Books, 1989), rebuttals by Irwin (R.G. Irwin, For Lust of 
Knowing: the Orientalist and their Enemies (London: Allen Lane, 2006a) and R.G. Irwin, Dangerous Knowledge: 
Orientalism and Its Discontents (New York: Overlook Press, 2006b)) and Lewis (B. Lewis, Islam and the West 
(Oxford: University Press, 1993)), as well as Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ (S.P. Huntington, The Clash of 
Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996)), Fukuyama’ ‘end of history’ 
proclamation (F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992)), and Chapman 
(M.K. Chapman, The Celts, The Construction of a Myth (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992)). It plays a 
significant role in upholding boundaries and may reveal why this is the case (see Neumann 1999, Uses of the 
Other, op.cit.; M. Williams 2007, Culture and Security, op.cit.). This phenomenon is also revisited in the analysis 
chapters. 
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1.2 The overarching research question: Revisited – The issue of 
boundary-production 
The overarching research question posits both how and why conceptual boundaries 
are being drawn as dialects. The former relates to the fashion of how conceptual 
boundaries are being drawn (including boundary-markers and impact of culture on 
the process of social construction), whereas the latter denotes the strategies and 
interest of think tank individuals as practice.
59
 Drawing upon Bourdieu’s Theory of 
Practice, these two elements signal the inclusion of culture and strategy into the 
‘constructivist vision’ of IR research.60 This translates into how U.S. think tank 
policy-research experts not only socially construct ‘China’, and consequently 
‘American-ness’, but how they are potentially able to advance their interest in 
addition to the underlying motivation for doing so without necessarily being fully 
conscious about it.  
 
In the overarching research question, the terms ‘culture’, ‘Self’, and ‘Otherness’ are 
designated in plural forms. As far as ‘culture’ is concerned, multiplicity relates to the 
aforementioned dialectic processes where culture change and that the boundaries of 
the country and cultures are not indistinguishable. In terms of ‘Self’ and ‘Otherness’ 
(and Selves and Othernesses), multiplicity here reflects the perspective that 
individuals in think tanks possess multiple Selves and imagine copious Othernesses. 
                                                          
59 See Bourdieu 1977, Outline of a Theory of Practice, op.cit.; V. Pouliot, “Putting Practice Theory in Practice” 
(paper presented at Bourdieu in International Relations workshop, Copenhagen, December 7-8, 2010); V. 
Pouliot, “The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities,” International Organization 
62(2) (2008): 257-288; M. Williams 2007, Culture and Security, op.cit. The differentiation from the conventional 
economistic, rationalist, or utilitarian avenues of explanation will briefly discussed in Chapter Two (P. Bourdieu 
1990b, Logic of Practice, op.cit.; Bourdieu 1977, Outline of a Theory of Practice, ibid.; Pierre Bourdieu & L.J.D. 
Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 25; M. Williams 2007, Culture 
and Security, ibid). 
60 Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice, a central theme of this study’s theoretical framework will be elaborated on in 
Chapter Two. 
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These phenomena may traverse hierarchical borders and boundaries as well the 
‘American-ness’/‘China’ constellation (aka Self/Other).61 For example, several 
Selves and Othernesses may exist in a think tank across research/policy fields, 
between individuals with different ethnic/cultural backgrounds,
62
 and different 
constructed narratives about various facets of ‘China’. The nature of this potential 
multiplicity will inform the research direction in accordance with how the think tank 
experts construct their ‘social realities’.63 
 
1.3 Empirical foundation & Scope 
‘American-ness’ is studied through the social construction of “China-narratives” by 
individuals conducting China-related policy-research, policy-advocacy, and/or 
consultancy in think tanks based in Washington, DC. The DC think tank landscape, 
as organisations, performs as the empirical foundation of the research (where data is 
collected from). This foundation can be understood as two different levels (or 
spheres) as narratives may apply to the macro-level (i.e. stance of the entire think 
tank), but also as multiple versions amongst one or more individuals (or groups of 
individuals). Organisationally, the individuals may work in different sections within 
the think tank and also have multiple affiliations within and/or beyond its 
organisational structure and hierarchy.  
 
                                                          
61 See G. Deleuze, Foucault (London: Athlone Press, 1986). This Nietzschean, anti-psychological notion of 
subjective perspectivism on ‘multiplicity’ relates to that an individual possesses multiple Selves but not separate 
in one body (or hexis, in Bourdieusian terms). 
62 As individuals partake in a web of social relations, different experiential and knowledge backgrounds are 
created, thus, resulting in the dynamism of multiple Selves and Othernesses (Gergen, cited in M. Sökefeld, 
“Debating Self, Identity, and Culture in Anthropology,” Current Anthropology 40(4) (1999): 417-447;  Hammersley 
& Atkinson 2007, Ethnography, op.cit.). 
63 See P.J. Buckley & M.K. Chapman, “The Use of Native Categories in Management Research,” British Journal 
of Management 8(4) (1997): 283-299. This facilitates for exploring construction of contested conceptual 
boundaries applicable to both Self and Otherness (and boundary-markers) as coexisting phenomena in a 
Self/Other dialectic, which is less explored in social theory within IR research. 
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As a result, this study does not theorise about think tanks, U.S.-Sino relations (or 
cultural foundation of U.S. foreign policies towards China), Self/Other from a 
Chinese perspective, institutionalising think tank narratives or their influence/impact, 
or attempting to statistically generalise and inferring conclusion to the wider think 
tank environment in the U.S., or beyond. The boundaries of the study, however, 
should not be misapprehended or confused with fixed boundaries of the direction of 
the actual academic inquiry within this space. 
 
Principally, the study is carried out at the individual level but observed and 
interacted within organisations. I am, however, not assuming the two levels as 
nomenclature. I argue that it would be both an epistemological (knowledge are 
accumulated across learning processes) and an ontological fallacy (think tanks do not 
operate in isolation as a Weberian model of bureaucracy of complex organisations – 
but in interaction with others where learning take place). Any organisational place is 
a fluid and dynamic ‘space’.64  
 
 
 
                                                          
64 See Z. Gille & S.O. Riain, “Global Ethnography,” Annual Review of Sociology 28(1) (2002): 271-295; Leach 
1989, op.cit. 34-47); G.E. Marcus, “The end(s) of ethnography: Social/Cultural Anthropology’s Signature Form of 
Producing,” Cultural Anthropology 23(1) (2008), 1-14; G. Marcus, “Ethnography in/of the World System: the 
Emergence of Multi-sited Ethnography,” Annual Review of Anthropology 24 (1995): 95-117; P. Metcalf, “Global 
‘Disjuncture’ and the ‘Sites’ of Anthropology,” Cultural Anthropology 16(2) (2001): 165-182; U. Hannerz, “Being 
there ... and there ... and there! Reflections on multi-site ethnography,” Ethnography 4(2) (2003): 201-216; M.C. 
Rodman, “Empowering Place: Multilocality and Multivocality,” in eds. S.M. Low & D. Lawrence-Zuniga, The 
anthropology of space and place: locating culture (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003): 204-223 – for various 
stances concerning methodological issues of ‘space’ and place in regard to multivocality and social 
disembeddedness. Implications will be discussed in Chapter Two (theory-chapter). I have also earlier discussed 
these issues in D.S.A. Guttormsen, “Unlocking Complexity with Simplicity: A Social Constructionist take on the 
‘Ethnographic Interview’ in Multilingual and Intercultural ‘Multi-site’ field research,” Proceedings of the 9th 
European Conference on Research Methodology for Business and Management Studies (2010b), 157-165. 
Available from: ISBN: 978-1-906638-65-8 (CD), ed. J. Esteves, I.E. Business School, Madrid, Spain; D.S.A. 
Guttormsen, International and Intercultural Experiences of Expatriates in Hong Kong: an Ethnography (MPhil 
thesis, University of Leeds, 2010c). 
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1.4 Degree of significance  
I am arguing that the research features significance in six areas. First, to the best of 
my knowledge, in terms of novelty, there are no prior ethnographic studies of think 
tanks in IR research (or beyond), including the China policy-research environment. 
The study, therefore, provides a “testing ground” for the methodological relevance. 
Second, extending on the above point, the study also facilitates for increased focus 
on the applicability of Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice and the embedded conceptual 
“thinking tools” in a Bourdieusian sociological take on IR research.65 Drawing upon 
Bourdieu’s social theory in this regard also provides a transdisciplinary facet to the 
research, herein sociological and social/cultural anthropological oriented social 
theory and concepts into IR research. In effect, the study contributes to the research 
vocabulary in the pluralistic constructivist research programme within the IR 
discipline.  
 
Third, as far as the specialised think tank literature is concerned (and part of the 
wider interest group literature), previous studies concerning think tank policy-
researchers’ conceptualisations of ‘China’ have not been identified (as a cohesive 
‘school of thought’). In fact, the subject-field in regard to think tanks is a recent 
phenomenon but experienced an upsurge in scholarly attention at the turn of this 
                                                          
65 As an example of this advancement, there is a research project relating to the Bourdieusian sociological ‘turn’ 
of IR at the Centre for Advanced Security Studies (CAST), University of Copenhagen, Denmark, lead by Dr Trine 
Villumsen (see Research, 2010, Available from: 
 http://polsci.ku.dk/english/staff/Academic_staff/publikationsliste/?personid=121276, n.d.; Trine Villumsen, 2010, 
Available from: http://cast.ku.dk/people/researchers/tv/, n.d. (see R. Adler-Nissen, ed., Bourdieu in International 
Relations: Rethinking key concepts in IR (Oxon: Routledge, 2013)). In actual fact, Copenhagen (not to be 
confused with the ‘Copenhagen school’ in (critical) security studies) emerges as a prominent intellectual capital 
in regard to Bourdieu in IR research, contemplating on Professor Anna Leander (Copenhagen Business School) 
(Anna Leander 2011. Available: uk.cbs.dk/staff/ale), Dr Stefano Guzzini (Danish Institute for International 
Studies) (Stefano Guzzini, 2010. Available from: http://www.diis.dk/sw11172.asp), and Dr Rebecca Adler-Nissen 
(Rebecca Adler-Nissen, n.d. Available: http://www.cep.polsci.ku.dk/english/people/dokument3/.) (see B. Buzan & 
M. Albert, “Differentiation: a sociological approach to international relations theory,” European Journal of 
International Relations 16(3) (2010): 315-337).  See the literature review (Chapter Three) for details concerning 
the usage of Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice in IR. 
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Millennium.
66
 Fourth, by positioning the study in the IR discipline, a study 
entrenched in culture and identity as well as think tanks and individuals working 
within them – also contribute to the significance of the study through “talking to” IR 
research which predominantly and historically has focused on the state-level.
67
 
Consequently, IR research’s intentionality has been to marginalising the role of 
culture.
68
  
 
Fifth, investigating the particular Self/Other nexus in the U.S.-China context is 
interesting in its own right. For the former, the epitome of being American revolves 
around ideas rather than socio-biological traits, the latter being common in non-
settler states. As suggested by the U.S. Department of State – “American Identity: 
                                                          
66 See Stone and Denham 2004, op.cit. – who provide some contemporaneous examples of PhD researchers 
and young scholars. Other recent examples include, for example (listed alphabetically), Lepont’s (“The Think 
Tanks in Washington: Allies or Enemies of the American Political Parties?” (paper presented at the ECRP 
Graduate Conference, Dublin, 2010) research about US think tanks and perceptions of universal health reform, 
Medvetz’ (2008, ‘Think tanks as an emergent field’, op.cit.) research on US think tanks and knowledge 
production applying Bourdieu, van Efferink’s (“Polar Partner or Poles Apart? How two US think tanks represent 
Russia?” (paper presented at the PSA Graduate Conference, Oxford)) study of US think tanks representations of 
Russia, van de Wetering’s (“In the Eye of the Beholder: Comparing U.S. and Indian Think Tanks' Views of Each” 
(paper presented at the PSA Graduate Conference, Oxford, 2010)) comparisons of US and Indian think tanks 
(2010), and Samaan’s research concerning U.S. think tanks’ corporate strategies in the post-Cold War era – and 
as an auxiliary interest; I. Medina-Iborra and D.S.A. Guttormsen, DSA (forthcoming 2014) 'Visibility and Activity: 
Foreign Affairs Think Tanks in the United Kingdom', in Contemporary Knowledge Production of Think Tanks: An 
International Perspective, China Social Science Press; D.S.A. Guttormsen (“Think Tanks: Taking Stock of What 
We Know, and How We Know It? A Thematic, Methodological and Research Philosophical Exploratory Review” 
(paper presented at the PSA Graduate Conference, Oxford, 2010a)), Iborra Medina and Guttormsen (“Who 
Thinks for Me? Think Tanks’ Visibility and Activity in Contemporary Britain” (paper presented at the PSA 
Graduate Conference, Oxford, 2010), and Villumsen (“Think tanks in Europe: Shaping Ideas of Security,” Militært 
Tidsskrift 136(2) (2007): 143-160).  
67 See E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919–1939: an Introduction to the Study of International Relations 
(London: Macmillan, 1939); S. Guzzini, Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: 
The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold (London and New York: Routledge, 1998); M. Morgenthau, Politics 
Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948); K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw 
Hill, 1979). I recognise that my research equally could have been positioned in the emergent field of Cultural 
Sociology. Albeit that many aspects of my research do resonate with such a discipline/subject-field, it is a 
subjective decision to look at the applicability of sociology (the Bourdieusian variant in particular) into IR as the 
latter discipline is the disciplinary position I have chosen to work from. 
68 J.T. Checkel, “The constructivist turn in international relations theory,” World Politics 50 (1998): 324-348; J.T. 
Checkel, “International norms and domestic politics: bridging the rationalist constructivist divide,” European 
Journal of International Relations 3 (1997): 473-495; P. Katzenstein, The culture of national security: norms and 
identity in world politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996a); P.J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of 
National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996b); T. Risse-
Kappen (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures, and 
International Institutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
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Ideas, Not Ethnicity. Since the United States was founded in the 18
th
 century, Americans 
have defined themselves not by their racial, religious, and ethnic identity but by their 
common values and belief in individual freedom.”
 69
 
 
Moreover, it is not the question of merely being ‘different’, but the belief of being 
exceptionally different – a core idea in American Creed.70 According to McCrisken, 
there exists a “belief that the United States is an extraordinary nation with a special 
role to play in human history; a nation that is not only unique but also superior.”71 
On the other hand, China as the Other is especially relevant to juxtapose ‘American-
ness’ with when considering the country’s profoundly impactful role in the 
international system and indeed for the U.S. foreign policy decision-makers. This 
point was encapsulated by the Director of East-West Centre, Washington DC, Satu 
P. Limaye, who expressed that the strategic importance of China to the U.S. is 
evidently reflected by that most U.S. governmental directories need to be involved in 
any policy-negotiations involving China.
72
 Furthermore, in the words of the 
prominent China scholar, Professor Gordon Redding:
73
 
 
I am not sure how many of us fully realise the extent of the privilege we enjoy by 
being witness to, and participate in, the greatest societal transformation ever 
attempted: moreover, to be in the nerve centre, the research and development 
laboratory, perhaps even the revolutionary cell, from which will come, if it comes at 
all, the gradual rejuvenation of an ancient, and still pre-modern civilization. 
                                                          
69 M.J. Friedman, “American Identity: Ideas, Not Ethnicity” (2008). Available: 
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/publication/2008/03/20080307154033ebyessedo0.5349237.html#axzz2
sffqhNQx. 
70 See B. Buzan, “American exceptionalism, unipolarity and September 11: understanding the behaviour of the 
sole superpower,” Guoji Guancha (International Review) 38 (2005); J. Lepgold & T. McKeown, “Is American 
Foreign Policy Exceptional? An Empirical Analysis,” Political Science Quarterly 110(3) (1995): 369-84; S.M. 
Lipset 1996, American Exceptionalism, op.cit.  
71 T. McCrisken, “Exceptionalism,” in eds. A. DeConde, R.D. Burn & F. Logevall, Encyclopedia of American 
Foreign Policy, 2nd edn, vol. II (Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2002), 63-80. 
72 Satu Limaye, 14 May 2009, pers. comm. 
73 S.G. Redding, “Culture and business in Hong Kong,” in Dynamic Hong Kong: Business & Culture, eds. G. 
Wang & S.L. Wong (Centre for Asian Studies Occasional Papers and Monographs No. 127, 1997), 85. 
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Sixth, drawing upon Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice facilitates for employing an 
ethnographic study which assigns primacy to field-research in terms of informing me 
about the relevance of the different conceptual “thinking tools” and indeed the 
relationality between them. Conventionally, these concepts tend to be researched 
separately or being pre-conceived, albeit Bourdieu produced his practice theory 
where the aforementioned concepts are working in tandem.
74
 This positions the study 
at the frontier of sociological research as far as Bourdieu is concerned due to the 
potential to comment on relationality of the “thinking tools” in an empirical sound 
setting integral to Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice.75 
 
1.5 Main arguments 
The main arguments purported in this section relates to the overarching research 
questions as well as the identified literatures. The main findings and associated 
arguments will be presented in the thesis’ conclusion, i.e. Chapter Seven. In the latter 
chapter, the main arguments below will be explored in more depth. 
 
As far as the overarching research question is concerned, the main argument consists 
of four elements. First, ‘American-ness’ is constituted through an Other, hence 
depending on how ‘China’ is being perceived. The Self/Other dialect, therefore, 
comprise multiple Selves and Othernesses, and the cultural influence is evident in 
how the boundaries and meaning-attribution is socially and culturally constructed. 
Second, ‘American-ness’ is a contested socially constructed phenomenon where 
                                                          
74 Bourdieu 1984, Distinction, op.cit; Bourdieu 1977, Outline of a Theory of Practice, op.cit; Leander 2010, 
Staging International Relations Practicing Bourdieu’s Sociology, op.cit.; Leander 2009, Habitus and Field, op.cit.; 
Leander 2008, Thinking Tools. op.cit. ‘Relationality’ will be discussed in Chapter Two as an unfolding social 
theoretical aspect relating to conceptual boundaries, Otherness, and relationships between Bourdieu’s 
conceptual “thinking tools”. 
75 See Swartz 2008, “Bringing Bourdieu’s master concepts into organizational analysis,” op.cit. 
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some boundary-markers are shared whereas others are distinct for a particular 
produced boundary. Third, the contested nature of ‘American-ness’ depends on the 
think tank’s (including the individuals working within them) association on the 
domestic political and ideological spectrum in the U.S. (and/or other dynamisms). 
Subsequently, fourth, in essence, this is the basis for identity-formation. 
 
Additional research themes concern each of the identified strands of literature 
depicted in Chapter Three (i.e. literature review). For the first strand (Bourdieu in IR 
research), I argue that Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice is highly relevant for achieving 
deeper and richer understanding of social phenomena. Its application therefore 
enriches the conceptual and methodological vocabulary in IR research and achieves 
more rigorous meaning and context-based studies – in addition to a way of 
presenting data and the analysis. Culture plays a profound role in these processes. 
The study also facilitates for a more empirically sound exploration where the field-
research informs the relevance for the various “thinking tools through deploying 
Bourdieu in conjunction with ethnography. The study elucidates the interplay and 
relationality between the various conceptual “thinking tools”, which is shown to be 
much underexplored.
76
 
 
For the second strand (analytical schools in the specialised think tank literature), I 
am arguing that the research has shown the plausibility and relevance for a third 
analytical school, which makes conceptualisations of the thinkers (aka policy-
research experts) its focal point. Moreover, in terms of think tanks in the IR 
literature, I argue it has the potential to widen the platform of non-state key players 
                                                          
76 See M. Emirbayer, “Manifesto for a Relational Sociology”, American Journal of Sociology, 103(2) (1997): 281-
317; Swartz 2008, op.cit. 
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in the international system, such as on the organisational and individual levels (think 
tanks and think tank policy-researchers as individuals respectively). Similarly, 
positioning think tanks as non-state actors within the context of U.S.’ relations with 
China links the think tank literature with the constructivist research programme in 
IR. Furthermore, it also marries the perspectives of policy-researchers with U.S.-
Sino relations and especially U.S.’ foreign policies towards China. 
 
1.6 Potential contributions 
This study, I argue, has the potential to contribute to knowledge through three 
generic ways.
77
 First, the study contributes with novel theoretical synthesis. 
Employing Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice, and additional social theory from 
Sociology and Social Anthropology, combines different bodies of literature in a 
rather unconventional way in IR research. It further explores the Bourdieusian 
sociological ‘turn’ in IR as well as increasing transdisciplinary IR research. At the 
same time, though, it facilitates for “testing” the relevance and credibility of the 
Bourdieusian theoretical approach. Synthesis is also made between think tanks and 
IR literatures.  
 
Second, the research has also elicited new primary data collection (in-depth 
interviews), which cannot be replicated due to changing contextuality and 
intersubjectivity. Third, the research endeavour also facilitates for developing 
propositions which can be investigated in future research. These propositions can 
emerge during the ongoing analysis of collected data. This study is also, to the best 
                                                          
77 I am here making use of Professor Matthew Watson’s (University of Warwick) ‘list of ten’ ways to make a 
contribution. 
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of my knowledge, the first ethnographic study carried out inside think tanks, and 
specifically in relation to policy-researchers (within a China policy-research expert 
environment) in International Relations and Political Science research, with a focus 
on conceptualising “China perceptions”. 
  
1.7 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to introduce the study by unpacking the overarching 
research question as a means to communicate how these elements are understood and 
employed in this thesis (i.e. investigatory scope). The empirical foundation, main 
arguments and potential contributions were then presented. The framework of the 
investigation will be expanded in the following chapters: the subsequent Chapter 
Two comprises two sections; the scope of the applied social theory, and second, the 
research framework (aka methodology). The literature review constitutes Chapter 
Three and addresses, principally, Bourdieusian research in the IR discipline and the 
specific think tank literature. 
 
In concert, Chapters One to Three comprise the theoretical Part A of this study. This 
does not only encompass terms and concepts portrayed in this introductory-chapter – 
but indeed, signalling a limited body of the social theoretical literature deemed 
relevant to employ conjunctionally. Practically speaking, the theoretical framework 
is consolidated by drawing upon social theory in a consistent manner. This usage 
also identifies the delimitations of the usage in this study, in the pursuit to answer the 
overarching research question. A secondary focus is to position the terms and 
concepts within the relevant debates in the IR discipline.  
36 
 
Part B of this thesis is devoted to the analysis chapters – Chapters Four to Six. This 
set of chapters present derived main themes from the ‘total universe of data’78 based 
on what matters the most to the research subjects (i.e. ‘native categories’79 and their 
construction of ‘social reality’). Main themes are also unveiled based on the 
inductive, iterative, hermeneutical analysis process. These processes entail 
juxtaposing data obtained in the field with a selected body of literatures, in addition 
to engaging with new areas of literature sources depending on the direction of the 
analysis (warranted by the field-research). The application of Bourdieu’s Theory of 
Practice operates as a common-thread across the analysis chapters.  
 
In short, in Chapter Four, the China policy-research environment will be positioned 
within think tanks as a Bourdieusian social field. Bourdieu’s concepts of field, 
capital as well as interests and strategies (and to some extent habitus and doxa) will 
appear as the explanatory framework of various dynamics which have substantial 
influence on the manoeuvrability of both the “China-thinking” and China-related 
activities of relevant policy-researchers. Both Chapter Five and Chapter Six draw 
particularly on Bourdieu’s doxa when propagating various separate but interrelated 
elements of ‘American-ness’ within the context of ‘China’ as the Other. Chapter 
Seven will conclude the thesis by pinpointing main arguments, findings, and 
contributions to original knowledge – in addition to highlighting limitations, 
theoretical and practical implications, as well as proposals for future research. 
 
                                                          
78 See M.B. Miles & A.M. Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis: an Expanded Sourcebook, 2nd edn (London: 
SAGE Publication, 1994).  
79 See P.J. Buckley & M.K. Chapman, “The Use of Native Categories in Management Research,” British Journal 
of Management 8(4) (1997): 283-299. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETCAL FRAMEWORK: THE INVESTIGATORY 
SCOPE 
 
2.0 Chapter Introduction 
This chapter serves as the theoretical statement of the thesis. Its purpose is to delimit 
the scope concerning the theoretical application of the academic investigation. In 
essence, the chapter explicates how the overarching research question stipulated in 
Chapter One will be responded to and how it has been researched. Additionally, this 
chapter provides the theoretical vocabulary of the analysis conducted in Chapter 
Four to Six. The present Chapter precedes the literature chapter for two particular 
reasons. First, this study adheres to the ‘cyclic’, “bottom-up” research process which 
assigns primacy to field-research (and not theory). Second, as an extension of the 
foregoing point, the study has been justified on the basis of its degree of significance 
in its own right. 
 
The engagement with Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice and the embedded conceptual 
“thinking tools” in particularly, reflects the focal area of the analytical inquiry. The 
purpose of this chapter is achieved by unpacking the purpose and aim statement 
established for this study, followed by elaborating the analytical as well as the 
overarching frameworks (i.e. U.S.-Sino relations and U.S. think tanks as a socio-
political phenomenon). Collectively, the first section of the present Chapter Two 
stipulates how selected areas of social theory will be applied in addition to depicting 
relevant contextuality in which the analysis is conducted. The second section 
38 
 
presents the research framework (aka methodology) of the study. It elucidates the 
research praxis of the investigation – theory as method – and is thus relevant to 
include in the present Chapter. Throughout the study, I strive for “methodological 
fit” which signifies that the philosophical underpinning of the study exhibits 
congruency between all components within the research framework, as well as 
between the research framework and its ontological and epistemological 
foundations.
80
 
 
The reason for deploying Bourdieu’s social theory as the theoretical framework is as 
follows. First, I argue that employing Bourdieu is interesting and relevant in its own 
right. His social theory is underused in IR literature but reflects a new strand of the 
sociological ‘turn’ in IR (i.e. Bourdieusian sociological ‘turn’). Applying Bourdieu, 
in this regard, increases the focus on including praxis, habit and un-reflexive 
behaviour, empirical and multi-method research, relationality, strategising, culture 
and context.
81
  
 
Second, his practice theory also provides a conceptual framework which can be 
operationalised
82
 – being ‘irreverent’ rather than ‘corpus’.83 As a researcher, it 
provides me with a holistic “vocabulary” – a mode of thinking – for investigating the 
research problem and presenting the analysis. Third, Pouliot illustrates for me the 
                                                          
80 A.C. Edmondson & S.E. McManus, “Methodological fit in management field research,” Academy of 
Management Review 32(4) (2007): 1155-1179; T. Zalan & G. Lewis, “Writing About Methods in Qualitative 
Research: Towards a More Transparent Approach,” in Handbook of Qualitative Research in International 
Business, eds. R. Marschan-Piekkari & C. Welch (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004), 507-528. 
81 See F. Merand, “Strategizing about Strategy” (Seminar, Bourdieu in International Relations, 2010); V. Pouliot, 
“Putting Practice Theory in Practice” (paper presented at Bourdieu in International Relations workshop, 
Copenhagen, December 7-8, 2010); Swartz 2008, “Bringing Bourdieu’s master concepts into organizational 
analysis,” op.cit. 
82 See A. Leander 2006, op.cit. 
83 A. Leander 2006, ibid. 9-10. 
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most important point in this regard, moving away from only focusing on text (what 
is being said) and behaviour (a heritage from positivism, behaviourism, and social 
psychology), but also un-reflexive behaviour (doxa, as reflected in this thesis’ main 
arguments, proposed in the analysis chapters). I find this particularly interesting 
when examining the influence of culture on the social construction of narratives 
concerning ‘American-ness’ and ‘China’ – aspects which in the words of the social 
anthropologist Agar often are located outside our “personal frame of references”.84 
 
2.1 Purpose & Aim statement 
Having established the overarching research question, this section spells out the 
research scope – and in effect – the design: 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine social constructions of contrasting 
narratives about ‘China’ by expert policy-researchers in U.S. think tanks within the 
overarching framework of U.S.-Sino relations and think tanks as a socio-political 
phenomenon. The research focuses on the impact of American culture(s) and the 
boundary- and meaning production in regard to what constitute ‘American-ness’ as 
Self(-ves) and China as the Other, in addition to how such China-narratives are 
manifested in work-activities. The study has important implications on the role of 
culture, identity, practice, and context in the constructivism research programme 
debates in International Relations research.  
 
I aim to investigate this international problem on the sociological meso-level by 
conducting a Bourdieusian-inspired ethnography of aforementioned experts who are 
conducting China-related policy-research in Washington, DC based think tanks. I 
will focus on think tanks which reflect divergent positions within the domestic U.S. 
political and ideological spectrum in order to obtain rich, context-based 
understanding. 
  
The employed concepts not already addressed in the introductory-chapter will be 
addressed below. 
 
                                                          
84 M. Agar, “The Intercultural Frame,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 18(2) (1994): 221-237. 
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2.1.1 Contrasting narratives 
The meaning of narratives was explicated in Chapter One. The notion of contrasting 
narratives, however, relates to ‘American-ness’ and ‘China’ as contested social 
phenomena. As think tanks often associate themselves with a particular political 
and/or ideological allegiance, this study uses this spectrum as a starting point for 
exploring contrasting narratives. I am not assuming, however, that the boundaries of 
contrasting narratives equate to the organisational boundaries of a think tank. 
 
2.1.2 Overarching framework: U.S.-Sino relations & U.S think tanks as a socio-
political phenomenon 
The overarching framework performs as a macro-structure of how the policy-
researchers’ “China-narratives” in U.S. think tanks can be understood within. In this 
study, I have assumed that U.S.-Sino relations as well as U.S. think tanks as a socio-
political phenomenon
85
 are particular relevant surroundings in this regard. The 
rationale relates to that policy-researchers are immediately affected by the nature of 
U.S.’ standings with China.86 Furthermore, the interplay between U.S. think tanks 
has also imminent potential to significantly influence a think tank’s ability to 
contrive in the competitive markets of ideas (which includes possible constrains on 
the evolving “China-thinking” and production of policy-research within think tanks).  
                                                          
85 I am purposefully applying the combined term ‘socio-political’ in order to signal that “all events, processes, and 
practices” (see Colin Hay, Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 3) within the 
political and social spheres are not separable. I thus disagree with Hay’s stance (analytical level), who 
promulgates that a political analysis is different from a cultural analysis due to the former is “concerned with the 
distribution, exercise and consequences of power” (Hay 2002, ibid., 3). For example, power is not uniquely dealt 
with by the realist tradition but rather outdone by post-structuralism (S. Guzzini, Realism in International 
Relations and International Political Economy: The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1998)). 
86 ‘Standings’, here, denotes what is deemed relevant (contextually) by research subjects and the analysis of the 
China policy-research environment in Washington, DC – for example, bilateral and multilateral relations, 
domestic politics in the U.S. and/or China, and perceptions and dealings beyond the formalised state-to state-
encounters. 
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2.1.3 Culture(s) 
The concept of culture is a focal point in this investigation. Defining culture is a 
tricky one, which anthropologists ironically try to evade.
87
 Social anthropologist, 
Radcliffe-Brown stated “I should like to invoke a taboo on the word culture”.88 I 
draw upon Bourdieu’s sociology and social anthropological advancements consistent 
with the former. Bourdieu’s notion of the culture concept has been ambiguous 
indeed. Consequently, various authors are unsolved on where to place him due to the 
uncertainty in what ways Bourdieu himself conceptualised ‘culture’.89 For now, three 
assertions can be ordained. First, I follow Lizardo’s notion of Bourdieu, as a post-
culturalist, reconceptualising the need for a conceptual understanding of ‘culture’. 
Through the focus on practice, this stance allows for the following dialectic: mental 
structures as well as social structures as a system of action and perception that is 
acquired in a tacit state through tacit mechanisms. In this space, actors execute 
practices in accordance to the tenants of such a system.
90
 This epistemologically 
diverts from Geertz’ stance on anti-mentalism and anti-psychologism as well as with 
structuralism – but rather incorporates public culture.91 This relates especially to 
Geertz’ notion of ‘thick description’.92 Grenfell sensibly illuminates that one way 
Bourdieu sensed culture was as “language, traditions, characteristics and beliefs”.93 
                                                          
87 Agar 1994, “The Intercultural Frame,” op.cit. 221-237. Kroeber and Kluckhohn identified 164 ways of defining 
‘culture’ in British social anthropological literature (A.L. Kroeber & C. Kluckhohn, Culture: A Critical Review of 
Concepts and Definitions (New York: Vintage Books, 1952)). 
88 R. Radcliffe-Brown, A Natural Science of Society (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957), 53. 
89 Omar Lizardo, “Pierre Bourdieu as a Post-cultural Theorist,” Cultural Sociology 5(1) (2011): 2. 
90 Lizardo 2011, ibid.; L. Wacquant, Body and Soul: Notes of an Apprentice Boxer (Oxford: University Press, 
2004). 
91 This diversification, albeit a minor point, is interesting as Geertz has become an “intellectual household name” 
in IR research when transdisciplinary inquiries into culture have been made by IR scholars and into other social 
science disciplines such as sociology and social anthropology (see L. Wedeen, “Conceptualizing Culture: 
Possibilities for Political Science,” The American Political Science Review 96(4) (2002): 713-728). Applying 
Bourdieu, therefore, also reflects an opportunity to expand on this tradition (aka ‘Bourdieusian sociological 
‘turn’’). 
92 J. C. Alexander, The Meanings of Social Life: A Cultural Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
93 Grenfell, cited in O. Lizardo 2010, op.cit. 3. 
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The void of an explicit conceptualisation of ‘culture’ on the part of Bourdieu is at the 
core of Lizardo’s ‘post-culturalist’ argument, which cannot be compartmentalised 
into the field of cultural sociology, where;  
 
(…) his significance as an intellectual figure is perceived to lie in having abandoned 
the traditional parameters of cultural explanation in anthropology. He did this by 
developing a radically different conceptualization what culture ‘is’ and of how 
‘culture works’ (as well as how it is transmitted and acquired).94 
 
Language is a central facet of a cultural analysis which draws upon Bourdieu’s social 
theory and sociology of language. Language operates a sub-system of culture and 
can neither be distinguished, nor be analysed detached from cultural contextuality 
and social conditions warranting the production and reception of the former. This 
also encompasses Bourdieu’s emphasis on linguistic practice rather than a mere 
execution performance as a critique against formal linguistics featuring an abstract 
domain of language such as Saussure and Chomsky.
95
  
 
Language is linked to Bourdieu’s conceptual ‘thinking tools’ in multiple ways. The 
‘linguistic habitus’ contains a cultural propensity to express certain things – a 
combination of competence in speaking ‘properly’ and employ this social capacity 
appropriately. The ‘linguistic market’ features sanctions and censorship relating to a 
doxa – herein what cannot be said.96 The use of language is consequently part of the 
competitive struggles in the field of U.S. think tanks (as well as China policy-
research experts more specifically).  
 
                                                          
94 O. Lizardo 2011, ibid. 4. 
95 R. Jenkins 2002, op.cit. 152-153; R.M. Keesing & A.J. Strathern, Cultural anthropology: A contemporary 
perspective, 3rd edn (Belmont: Thomson, 1998). 
96 P. Bourdieu, Language and symbolic power (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), 138. 
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Second, reflecting on the first point above, I exploit a social constructionist 
standpoint of ‘culture’ (as opposed to a social constructivist slant). The ideational 
system embodied in social anthropology emphasises systems of shared ideas as part 
of public and social processes, which underlie and are expressed by the conduct of 
human lives.
97
 Learning processes are the basis for culture as a system of shared 
meaning that transcends the realisation within one individual’s mind – not “only” 
being an outcome of cognitive processes within one person’s construct of social 
reality.
98
 This facilitates for talking about an “American culture” without stating it 
being a “national culture”.99 Arguably, culture cannot be understood by separate 
values and behaviour, or biological, psychological processes and social existence – 
all are in fact integral components in development of Man.
100
  
 
Harmonising with social constructionism, Bourdieu supported a conceptualisation of 
culture as a system, i.e. consisting of durable transposable dispositions or organising 
actions.
101
 Thus, ‘habitus’ becomes culture, and it follows that the former develops 
into both the research praxis as well as the modus operandi. The ambiguity 
concerning Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of ‘culture’ makes it appropriate to also 
incorporate the social constructionist facet in this study. The approach of studying 
culture is thus aligned with ethnography embedded in a social anthropological 
                                                          
97 R.M. Keesing & A.J. Strathern 1998, Cultural anthropology, op.cit. 
98 E. Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, A Study in Religious Sociology (London: Allen & Unwin, 
1912); Keesing & Strathern 1998, ibid. 
99 There is an array of epistemological, ontological, ecological, and methodological issues related to the notion of 
a ‘culture’ being “national”. It would be an “ecological fallacy” to assume a “national culture” as boundaries of a 
‘culture’ are not equal to those boundaries of a ‘nationality’. Social categorisation makes it unviable according to 
Jenkins (Categorization and Power (England: Sage Publication, 1997)). Such fallacy denotes that people located 
in the same area share the same attitudes, and the assumption that a human being can be characterised as 
corresponding to the average of a group (D. Landis & J.H. Wasilevski, “Reflections on 22 years of the 
international journal of intercultural relations and 23 years in other areas of intercultural practice,” International 
Journal of Intercultural Relations 23(4) (1999): 535-574). 
100 C. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), Ch 1. 
101 P. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: University Press, 1977). 
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tradition in addition to social constructionism. Furthermore, the above-mentioned 
anti-psychologism elucidates the importance of positioning the study at the 
sociological meso-level, which includes identifying relevant overarching 
frameworks. In effect, the study distances the academic inquiry from comprehending 
‘culture’ as an independent “variable” where culture is merely a part of cognitive 
processes associated with epistemological constructivism – evident in social 
psychology.
102
 
 
Third, as a consequence of the above, ‘culture’ in this study is not to be understood 
as ‘high culture’ or cultural artefacts.103 The latter indicates one out of two senses 
which Bourdieu applied the term ‘culture’.104 Furthermore, neither Bourdieu’s 
enterprises relating to the seditious effort to dissipate the classical boundaries 
between ‘Culture’ and ‘culture’ in addition to his work on boundaries of the cultural 
field, class, sociology of cultural consumption, the arts and aesthetic, cultural taste
105
 
nor the French intellectual milieu in which Bourdieu’s work was heavily moulded 
by
106
 – are not a focus in this study. 
 
 
                                                          
102 For example, the Hofstedeian paradigm is prominent. See S.P. Bate, “Whatever Happened to Organizational 
Anthropology? A Review of the Field of Organizational Anthropology and Anthropological Studies,” Human 
Relations 50(9) (1997): 1147-1175; M. Chapman, “Social Anthropology, Business Studies, and Cultural Issues,” 
International Studies of Management & Organization 26(4) (1997): 3-29; G. Hofstede, Culture's Consequences: 
International Differences in Work-related Values (London: Sage Publications, 1980). 
103 See O. Lizardo 2011, op.cit. 3. This is not to say that materiality or objectives are deemed irrelevant in this 
cultural analysis. The field-data will indicate the relevance for any such inclusions. This point also signals an 
important juncture between the post-structuralist Bourdieu and IR’s constructivism where the latter levies a 
primacy of ideas/construction and where materiality is (merely) contingent upon the former (Ramon Pacheco-
Pardo, “Review article - Beyond Power Transition: Sino-American Relations in the 21st Century,” Fudan Journal 
of Chinese Studies, 5. See also Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It,” International 
Organization 46(2) (1992). 
104 Grenfell, cited in O. Lizardo 2010, ibid. 3. 
105 See R. Jenkins 2002, 128-137. 
106 H. Joas & W. Knöbl, Social Theory, trans. A. Skinner (Cambridge: University Press, 2009). 
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2.1.4. Work-activities 
This element relates to the research subjects’ in-house activities concerning China-
related activities within the think tanks. It provides an additional opportunity to 
identify contextualised “China-narratives” in various in-house venues and settings 
with subsequent prospects for participant observation and triangulating data. In this 
study, this is inhibited to interview-contextualities as well as seminars and 
conferences available for the public.
107
  
 
2.1.5. Identity 
Identity is an inescapable facet of being.
108
 Furthermore, it relates to essential 
questions such as “who am I” and “which groups do I belong to?”  In concert with 
Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice and ‘culture’, ‘identity’ comprises the core of this 
study. ‘American-ness’ is in this regard studied as identity-formation and 
construction as well as representations of the Other. In addition, identity-negotiation 
will also be included when empirically warranted. I am drawing upon post-structural 
sociological and anthropological perspectives in terms of identity rather than social 
psychology (i.e. focusing on what individuals find making them distinctive and how 
this is positioned within a culture rather than solely exploring self-image).  
 
According to Bourdieu, ‘identity’ is constituted by the production and reproduction 
of the internalised habitus which people unconsciously uphold.
109
 Furthermore, 
                                                          
107 See section two (research framework, this chapter), under ‘limitation’, for additional elaborations and 
justifications. 
108 D. Campbell, Writing Security: United States foreign policy and the politics of identity (Manchester: University 
Press, 1992). 
109 P. Bourdieu, In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990a; P. 
Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, trans. R. Nice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990b). 
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identities are not determined by social positions or geography.
110
 For example, one 
think tank policy-researcher is not solely a woman or solely a member of a U.S. 
think tank. Rather, Lizardo’s ‘post-culturalist’ labelling of Bourdieu can also be 
traced in regard to ‘identity’. Bourdieu and Wacquant re-position ‘identity’ into 
‘socialised subjectivity’111 as a notion of dispositional terms situated within “the pre-
reflective, embodied nature of practical activity”.112 In this discursive approach for 
capturing ‘identity’, policy-researchers would have an embodied ‘sense’ of how to 
behave and a ‘feel for the game’ (i.e. practical schemes) derived from agents’ early 
formative years (which are reinforced from the group) as opposed to conscious 
calculation and constant rules.
113
  
 
To continue the anti-structuralist approach to identity, identity and action are coupled 
and not identifiable, but partly constructed by contextual social structures and 
sources of power.
114
 This approach stands opposite to recent cultural research from a 
constructivist perspective in the IR discipline, which seems trapped in a relatively 
structuralist line, as was the case with social and cultural anthropology – but three 
decades ago.
115
 A statement of identity guiding behaviour reflects both a separable 
factor, a fixed entity, and a material persona which indeed resonates with a more 
positivist inclined social psychological behaviourist tradition. 
 
                                                          
110 W. Bottero, “Intersubjectivity and Bourdieusian Approaches to ‘Identity’,” Cultural Sociology 4(1) (2010): 3-22. 
111 P. Bourdieu & L.J.D. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 126. 
112 W. Bottero 2010, op.cit. 4. 
113 See W. Bottero 2010, ibid., 4; P. Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990),12; P. 
Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: University Press, 1977), 15; P. Bourdieu 1991, Language 
and symbolic power, op.cit. 235; P. Bourdieu, Practical Reason (Cambridge: Polity, 1998). 
114 M. Williams, Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2007). 
115 For example, A.M. Klotz & C. Lynch, Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations (New 
York: M.E. Sharpe, 2007). 
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Identities are accessed through “China-narratives” (which includes observed 
behaviour – including through research subjects’ own narratives) of the policy-
researchers. Identity-construction is based on formation of social groups through 
social categorisation.
116
 The various think tanks as organisations as well as 
individuals working within them possess multiple identities depending on the Other, 
and they might not be coinciding.
117
 Building further on Barth, focus should be 
moved beyond comparing identities according to a set of categories, but rather 
investigate why and how conceptual boundaries are constructed and maintained 
differently (reflected by boundary-markers).
118
 This study focuses mostly on the 
latter. 
 
2.1.6 Context (contextuality) 
The concept of context can be defined as “the surroundings associated with 
phenomena which help to illustrate that [sic] phenomena”.119 A conceptualisation of 
context highlights two important processes, namely contextualisation of the 
phenomenon (level) being studied (construction of “China-narratives”), which is 
integral to the second aspect; that of the research process (and thus the role of the 
researcher).
120
 Contextuality may be played out traversing several levels (such as 
individual policy-researchers, think tanks as organisations, and external levels as 
                                                          
116 R. Brubaker, “Ethnicity without groups,” European Journal of Sociology 43(2) (2002): 163-189; C.J. Calhoun 
(ed.), Social theory and the politics of identity, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1994), 13. 
117 ‘Multiplicity’ was discussed in the previous chapter one. Consequently, I am acknowledging the Nietzschean 
subjective perspectivism in regard to ‘multiplicity’: A person’s identities cannot be detached from each other. 
Hence, the opposition to structuralism is evident also because identity is not thought of as an identifiable entity, 
but instead integral to behaviour, thought, culture, personality and so forth as a representation. Also see 
preceding point on identity. 
118 F. Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference (Bergen: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1971). 
119 Capelli and Sherer, cited in P. Marschan-Piekkari, C. Welch, H. Penttinen & M. Tahvanainen, “Interviewing in 
the Multinational Corporation: Challenges of the Organisational Context,” in Handbook of Qualitative Research in 
International Business, eds. R. Marschan-Piekkari & C. Welch (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004), 245. 
120 Marschan-Piekkari et al. 2004, op.cit. 
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interdependent, interwoven, and mutually influencing levels such as varying aspects 
of American culture)
121
 as well as methodologically (conditionality concerning the 
selected research approach) and substantively (i.e. organisational conditions and 
constrains affecting the research process).
122
 Context is also evident in terms of 
geographic, temporal, and cultural dimensions of context,
123
 and that ‘text’124 should 
be understood within its historical-cultural surroundings.
125
  
 
All definitions lead to an understanding of contextuality being non-static. Field-
research governs to some extent the nature of contextuality in which data is analysed 
and re-analysed within. Two such main areas were highlighted in point 2.1.2 (this 
Chapter); U.S.-Sino relations and think tanks as a socio-political phenomenon. 
American culture(s) and organisational facets within think tanks are highly relevant 
– so are national identity and domestic political culture (depending on the empirical 
relevance). 
 
2.1.7 Constructivism research programme debates in IR research  
Constructivist research in IR research is not a theoretical focus of this study. My 
research does, however, have the potential to comment on its position within the IR 
discipline and its various strands. IR relates here to the discipline (or subject-field) 
(“the study of the political and social interaction of state, non-state actors, and 
                                                          
121 Marschan-Piekkari et al. 2004, ibid. 
122 See G. Johns, “In praise of context,” Journal of Organizational Behavior 22(1) (2001): 31-42. 
123 D.M. Rousseau & Y. Fried, “Location, location, location: contextualizing organizational research,” Journal of 
Organizational Behaviour 22(1) (2001): 1-13. 
124 ‘Text’, here, does not only entail written words but also spoken words and figurative (see M. Alvesson & K. 
Sköldberg, Reflexive Methodology: New Vistas for Qualitative Research (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 2009).  
125 M. Alvesson & K. Sköldberg 2009, ibid. 
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individuals”).126 These debates are prospectively dealt with through aligning the 
inquiry with the Bourdieusian sociological ‘turn’ in IR research.  
 
Practically speaking, this entails potential contribution (depending on the analysis of 
field-research data) of Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology for nuancing debates in the IR 
constructivist camp.
127
 This relates particularly to the roles of practice, culture, and 
identity, in addition to research philosophical and social theoretical standpoints – and 
to some extent ethnography as methodology.
128
 The constructivist research camp, a 
social theoretical ontology rather than a theory of IR I would argue, can be broadly 
divided into ‘conventional’ and ‘critical’ constructivism.129 They share, nonetheless, 
the focus on how ideational forces play out.
130
 
                                                          
126 M. Griffiths, O’Callaghan, T. & S.C. Roach, International Relations: The Key Concepts, 2nd edn (London: 
Routledge, 2008), vii. 
127 See S.J. Barkin, “Realist Constructivism and Realist-Constructivisms,” International Studies Review (2004): 
348-352; J.T. Checkel, “The constructivist turn in international relations theory,” World Politics 50 (1998): 324-
348; R.N. Lebow, “Constructive Realism,” International Studies Review (2004): 346-348; J.B. Mattern, “Power in 
Realist-Constructivist Research,” International Studies Review (2004): 343-346; J. Sterling-Folker, “Realist-
Constructivism and Morality,” International Studies Review (2004): 341-343; P. Jackson Thaddeus (ed.), 
“Bridging the Gap: Towards a Realist-Constructivist Dialogue,” International Studies Review 6 (2004): 337-352; 
P. Jackson Thaddeus & D.H. Nexon, “Constructivist Realism or Realist-Constructivism?,” International Studies 
Review (2004): 337-341; M. Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality 
(Cambridge: University Press, 2002) – for review texts of constructivist research in IR, as well as Guzzini, S. & 
Leander, A. (eds.), Constructivism and international relations: Alexander Wendt and his critics (Oxford: 
Routledge, 2006) for an evaluation of Wendt and social theory in IR. See also D.S.A. Guttormsen and M. Jacoby, 
“Bridging a ‘Gap’?: Academia and the Realist – Constructivism Debate” (paper presented at the LSE Millennium 
annual conference, October 22-23, 2011) (short-listed for special issue, Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies), for an in-depth discussion concerning the IR discipline and multi-paradigmatic dialogues. 
128 B. Buzan & M. Albert, “Differentiation: a sociological approach to international relations theory,” European 
journal of international relations 16(3) (2010): 315-337. 
129 See T. Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International Security 23(1) 
(1998): 171-200. ‘Conventionalists’ include eds Adler, E. & Barnett, M. (Security Communities, Cambridge: 
University Press, 1998), 29-66), Finnemore, M. (The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of 
Force (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2003)), Hopf, T. (Social Construction of International 
Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002)), 
Katzenstein (ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996b)), Reus-Smit (“The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of 
Fundamental Institutions,” International Organization 51(4) (1997): 555-589), Ruggie (Constructing the World 
Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (London and New York: Routledge, 1998)), and Wendt (Social 
Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: University Press, 1999)) (rejecting that objective truths can be 
achieved but tend to claim this for their own research subjects, and that a Weberian (‘verstehen’) interpretation is 
necessary in order to grasp social action). ‘Criticalists’ feature, for example, Campbell (1992, Writing Security, 
op.cit.), Der Derian, J. (On Diplomacy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987)), Tickner, J.A. (Gender in International Relations 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1992)), and Walker, R.B.J. (Inside/Outside: International Relations as 
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2.1.8 Sociological meso-level 
This approach is aligned with Bourdieu’s ‘constructivist structuralism’, or 
‘structuralist constructivism’, where agency (microindividual) and structure 
(macrostructural) always operate dialectically in an inseparable fashion.
131
 At this 
level, policy-researchers would collectively form large social structures (for example 
organisations and communities such as a new think tank or luncheon seminars), 
influenced by interaction and negotiation concerning ‘social reality’ amongst the 
individuals, but depending on a situational context/structure.
132
  
 
In the conducted research, these processes operate by American culture(s) 
influencing how U.S. think tank policy-researchers negotiate about what constitutes 
‘China’, and consequently ‘American-ness’, in their narratives. Contextual influence 
may also come from organisational cultures within the particular think-tank and/or 
policy-networks/communities during interaction (for example, meetings and seminar 
in the U.S. or in China) in addition to relations between the two countries. The meso-
level is therefore a merged and intermediate sphere for problem-solving between 
macro- and micro (face-to-face human interaction) levels which are not merely 
abstractive, but indeed ‘reality’ to be analysed.133  
                                                                                                                                                                    
Political Theory (Cambridge: University Press, 1993)) where truth-claims are rejected due to lack of common 
ground, and concentrates on rendering truth and power.  
130 J.T. Checkel, “Social Constructivisms in Global and European Politics,” in Review of International Studies 30 
(2004): 229-244; J.T. Checkel 1998, “The constructivist turn in international relations theory,” op.cit.; M. 
Finnemore & K. Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and 
Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science 4(1) (2001): 391-416; A.M. Klotz & C. Lynch 2007, 
Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations, op.cit.; A. Klotz & D. Prakash (eds.), Qualitative 
Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); J. Ruggie 1998, 
Constructing the World Polity, op.cit.; A. Wendt 1992, “Anarchy is what states make of it,” op.cit .; A. Wendt 
1999, Social Theory of International Politics, op.cit. 
131 P. Bourdieu 1977, Outline of a Theory of Practice, op.cit.; R. Jenkins, Pierre Bourdieu, revised edn (London: 
Routledge, 2002). 
132 J.G. Bruhn & H.M. Rebach, “Problem Solving at the Mesolevel,” in Sociological Practice: Intervention and 
Social Change, 2nd edn (Springer, 2007), 115-145. 
133 Also see the corresponding point about field. 
51 
 
2.1.9 Bourdieusian-inspired ethnography 
The nature of the methodology and data-collection methods employed in this study 
is depicted in section two (this chapter). For now, it can be stated that the study 
makes use of ethnography as its research strategy (aka methodology) with in-depth 
interviews, participant observation, ethnographic/interpretivist contents analysis of 
research subjects’ written policy-research (and collection of written material) in 
addition to triangulation as the research methods. The use of Bourdieu’s Theory of 
Practice and the embedded conceptual “thinking tools” are what makes the study a 
‘Bourdieusian-inspired’ endeavour. This exploration of Bourdieu’s social theory 
reflects the main focus of this thesis, and thus the principal area from which 
contributions will be proposed.  
 
Bourdieu in some respects personifies the linkage of Sociology and Anthropology 
with the IR research agenda (i.e. the Bourdieusian sociological ‘turn’ in IR). In IR 
and Political Science, ethnography has often mistakenly been considered solely as an 
observation-technique detached from social theory and the participating element of 
participant observation such as in Research Methods in Politics.
134
 On the contrary, 
ethnography emerged as a uniquely distinct feature of the Social/Cultural 
Anthropology discipline entrenched with more than 100 year of intellectual 
history.
135
 
 
                                                          
134 P. Burnham, K.G. Lutz, W. Grant & Z. Layton-Henry, Research Methods in Politics, 2nd edn (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). See W. Vrasti, “The Strange Case of Ethnography and International Relations,” 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 37(2) (2008): 279-30;  J.P. Rancatore, “Strange: A Reply to Vrasti is 
It,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 39(1) (2010): 65-77; L. Wedeen, “Reflections on Ethnographic 
Work in Political Science,” Annual Review of Political Science 13 (2010): 255-272; W. Vrasti, “Dr Strangelove, or 
How I Learned to Stop Worrying about Methodology and Love Writing,” Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies 39(1) (2010): 79-88. 
135 Keesing & Strathern 1998, op.cit. 
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2.2 Analytical framework 
In this sub-section, I shall elaborate on Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice as the 
principal explanatory framework. Importantly, my particular engagement with his 
sociology of sociology entails opting for three different – but highly interlinked – 
paths in terms of how to “read” Bourdieu’s practice theory – and how to deploy it. 
First, I am approaching Bourdieu through the lenses of relevant experts in the area – 
professors Anna Leander and Richard Jenkins; a Leanderian and Jenkinsian 
reading,
136
 which find it unproblematic not being able to pin down Bourdieu as an 
ethnographer, social anthropologist or sociologist – or as a structuralist or post-
structuralist. In fact, he might, to various extents, be labelled as any of these 
“categories”.  
 
This harmonises well with my pursuit of a transdisciplinary inquiry, in addition to a 
“bottom-up” oriented ethnographic study which accommodates for epistemological-
driven research – predominantly informed by the nature of the research problem and 
its contextuality. Specifically, as part of the Bourdieusian sociological ‘turn’ of IR 
research, I am aligning the study with Leander’s efforts to discuss the employability 
of Bourdieu rather than merely descriptively explaining his “thinking tools”. This 
coincides with my endeavour to make use of the undertaken research as a case to be 
theoretically and conceptually “tested” in terms of its relevance and capability to 
unveil new layers of information and subsequently knowledge.
137
  
 
                                                          
136 See A. Leander 2011, “The Promises, Problems, and Potentials of a Bourdieu-Inspired Staging of 
International Relations,” International Political Sociology 5: 294-295; Swartz, “Bringing Bourdieu’s master 
concepts into organizational analysis,” Theory and Society 37 (2008): 45-02; R. Jenkins 2002, Pierre Bourdieu, 
op.cit. – respectively. 
137 A. Leander 2011, op.cit. 295. 
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Second, as indicated in the main argument (preceding chapter), I am approaching 
Bourdieu’s conceptual “thinking tools” with a focus on theoretical advancements as 
far as the employment of his social theory within IR research is concerned. This 
effort encompasses two elements – applying a broader set of the “thinking tools” 
simultaneously, in addition to illuminating the relationality between them.
138
 Third, 
aligned with the ethnographic research strategy, the employment of the “thinking 
tools” is based on the field-research rather than pre-conceptions. As my study does 
not aim to investigate Bourdieu’s social theory within the broader social science 
landscape, I shall not focus on positioning his work in the broader theoretical 
debates. 
 
2.2.1 Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice and embedded conceptual “thinking tools” 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice serves as the theoretical framework of this study. This 
approach includes various conceptual “thinking tools”, i.e. ‘habitus’, ‘field’, ‘doxa’, 
‘capital’,’ interests’, and ‘strategies’.139 Bourdieu’s practice equation reads as 
follows:
140
  
 
Practice = ((Habitus) (Capital) + Field).  
 
                                                          
138 See Swartz 2008, “Bringing Bourdieu’s master concepts into organizational analysis,” op.cit. 
139 Bourdieu 1984, Distinction, op.cit.; P. Bourdieu 1977, Outline of a Theory of Practice, op.cit.; Jenkins 2002, 
Pierre Bourdieu, op.cit.; A. Leander, “Staging International Relations Practicing Bourdieu’s Sociology” (paper 
presented at the International Studies Association panel: “Practicing Pierre Bourdieu’s Sociology: A Different 
Reading of the International”, New Orleans, 2010); A. Leander, “Habitus and Field,” International Studies 
Association Compendium Project (Blackwell, 2009a); A. Leander, “Thinking Tools,” in Qualitative Methods in 
International Relations: A Pluralist Guide, eds. A. Klotz & D. Prakash (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 
11-27; V. Pouliot, “The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities,” International 
Organization 62(2) (2008): 257-288; M. Williams 2007, Culture and Security, op.cit. I have earlier discussed the 
above applicability specifically for my research (D.S.A. Guttormsen, “Applicability: Pierre Bourdieu's social theory 
and American elites’ social construction of 'China’,” (paper presented at European Consortium for Political 
Research (ECPR), Dublin, August 30 – September 1, 2010d). 
140 P. Bourdieu 1984, Distinction, op.cit. 101. 
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Importantly, the above summarised formula of Bourdieu’s practice theory 
underscores the interrelationships between the concepts where practices are 
produced by the combined performances and not by independent effects of either 
“thinking tools”.141 Thus, treating the concepts below separately does not indicate an 
approach or understanding of them as having the faculties to operate in isolation.  
 
With his practice theory, Bourdieu sets out to solve the struggle of structural 
anthropology of Lévi-Strauss and existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre. Bourdieu’s own 
exertion was to synthesise the subjectivist and objectivist epistemologies.
142
 He 
furiously rejected determinism but also ventured out to avoid explaining social life 
where conscious and deliberate action would suffice as explaining how people act. 
His overarching endeavour was to construct a theory of social practice and 
society.
143
 Bourdieu also dismissed grand theories as well as theorising for its own 
sake, and rather focused on “(…) a set of thinking tools visible through the results 
they yield (…)”.144 This is at the core of how his practice theory is applied in this 
study.  
 
I am, thus, less engaged with Bourdieu’s epistemological critique of social research – 
the main source of motivation for elaborating the Theory of Practice.
145
 Furthermore, 
                                                          
141 D. Swartz, Culture & power: the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu (London: Chicago University Press, 1997), 141. 
142 R. Brubaker, “Rethinking Classical Theory. The Sociological Vision of Pierre Bourdieu,” Theory and Society 
14(6) (1985): 745-774; P. Jackson, “Pierre Bourdieu, the ‘cultural turn’ and the practice of international history,” 
Review of International Studies 34(1) (2008): 155–181; R. Jenkins, “Pierre Bourdieu and the Reproduction of 
Determinism,” Sociology 16(2) (1982): 270-281; R.W.K. Lau, “Habitus and the Practical Logic of Practice: An 
Interpretation,” Sociology 38 (2004): 369-387; J.J. Sallaz & J. Zavisca, “Bourdieu in American Sociology, 1980-
2004,” Annual Review of Sociology 33 (2007): 21-41.  
143 P. Jenkins 2002, Pierre Bourdieu, op.cit. 66-67. 
144 L.D. Wacquant, “Towards a Reflexive Sociology: A Workshop with Pierre Bourdieu,” Sociological Theory 7 
(1989): 50. 
145 The critique involved a theoretical shift from cultural rules constituting analytical models which effectively 
governed behaviour (structuralism) to an “emphasis upon the generation and pursuit by actors of strategies” 
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I am consequently also less concerned with the economistic and deterministic 
criticism of Bourdieu’s work, as well as with building methodological contributions 
relating to the ethnographic research strategy, as the latter plays a lesser role than the 
devised Bourdieusian theoretical framework in this study (herein ‘theory as 
method’). 
 
2.2.1.1 Reflexivity 
Bourdieu’s reflexivity is at the core of his epistemological reflections.146 Reflexivity 
is, however, not one of his conceptual “thinking tools” per se. It does, though, play a 
crucial role in the ability to practice his praxis in regard to knowledge claims.
147
 In 
Bourdieusian terms, reflexivity here takes a radically different form than 
“narcissistic reflexivity” which is constrained to take notice of its own presence (as 
the researcher) in discourses.
148
 Later in this Chapter, I will provide a self-reflexive 
account as a ‘theoretical posture’ to the China policy-research environment in DC – 
the social world in question.
149
  
 
In this study, I am pertaining to two central features in this regard – imparted as a 
self-reflexive account concerning the undertaken research: ‘participant objectivation’ 
and ‘the objectification of objectification’.150 The former relates to detachment of 
research and the notion of objectivism, whereas the latter entails being reflexive of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
(Jenkins 2002, ibid. 45). Bourdieu’s ethnographic field-research in Algeria and France played a significant role in 
this transformative move – as well as in this realisation of reflexivity (P. Bourdieu 1990a, In Other Words, 8, 
op.cit.) 
146 Brewer 2000, Ethnography (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000), 37-55. 
147 Lender, A 2006, ‘The ‘Realpolitik of Reason’: Thinking International Relations through Fields, Habitus and 
Practice’, CBS, Institute of Intercultural Communication and Management Working Paper (83), 26. 
148 Leander 2006, ibid. 18. 
149 Jenkins 2002, op.cit. 47. 
150 See Jenkins 2002, ibid. 68. 
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the social categorisations being in play as well as employed research methods.
151
 
This is necessary, in Bourdieu’s eyes, in order to establish appreciation of my 
accounts as an ethnographic researcher, and involves two steps: to move away from 
the situation itself (my encounters with policy-researchers, think tanks, and 
American culture(s), and second, to take a step back from the actual act of 
observing.
152
  
 
2.2.1.2 Habitus 
‘Habitus’ is the key mediating concept for Bourdieu, which he uses to bridge the 
‘explanatory gap’ in understanding practice: between the extremes of an aggregate of 
individual behaviour and individual decision-making or constituted by ‘supra-
individual structures’.153 It is a product of social conditionings – and easily 
transformable.
154
 This concept functions as our semi-conscious orientation about the 
world,
155 and reflects taken for granted and unreflected ways of thinking and acting 
formed by accumulated experiences in different fields.
156
  
 
Bourdieu defines the concept as “a system of lasting transposable dispositions 
which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment at a matrix of 
perceptions, appreciations, and actions and makes possible the schemes permitting 
the solution of similarly shaped problems, and thanks to the unceasing corrections of 
the results obtained, dialectically produced by those results.”157 
                                                          
151 Jenkins 2002, ibid. 52. 
152 P. Bourdieu 1990a, In Other Words, ibid., 59-60; L.D. Wacquant 1989, op.cit. 32-35. 
153 R. Jenkins 2002, ibid. 74. 
154 P. Bourdieu 1990a, ibid. 
155 M. Williams 2007, Culture and Security, op.cit. 
156 A. Leander 2009, “Habitus and Field,” op.cit. 3. 
157 Bourdieu 1977, Outline of a Theory of Practice, op.cit. 82-83 
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In order to obtain a better grasp with Bourdieu’s appropriation of the term (i.e. 
‘habitus’), his definition in Outline of a Theory is stipulated: “an acquired system of 
generative schemes objectively adjusted to the particular conditions in which it is 
constituted.
158
 Both the dispositions and generative schemes are located in the body 
(i.e. human beings)
159
 – inside the head of policy-researchers, only existing through 
interacting social actors and their practices as integral to behaviour, in addition to 
‘practical taxonomies’ at the core of the generative schemes based on sensory 
experiences.
160
 
 
‘Dispositions’ are not merely attitudes – but can plausibly be thought of as thinking 
(cognitive) and feeling (affective).
161
 The ‘generative basis’ of practices equates to 
the aforementioned dispositions which consolidates the habitus. Jenkins pinpoints 
that “the habitus disposes actors to do certain things, it provides a basis for the 
generation of practices” which are “produced in and by the encounter between the 
habitus and its dispositions, on the one hand, and the constrains, demands and 
opportunities of the social field or market to which the habitus is appropriate or 
within which actor is moving, on the other”.162 The dispositions are transposable 
which can be translated to the logical of another field.
163
 Moreover, the dispositions 
are being durable which underpin their foundation for social experiences and 
learning experiences which have been adjusted to objective conditions of being.
164
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Bourdieu also refers to this embodiment as ‘hexis’ as the demeanour of the 
embodied person. It is here where the personal (idiosyncratic) and the social 
(systematic) are combined as a mediating nexus of social actors’ subjective worlds 
and cultural worlds.
165
 Social performance becomes generated as routines rather than 
learned rules and principles. And it follows, not necessarily being fully aware of the 
actions – dispositions are beyond consciousness, but not separated from it: “(…) 
subjects do not, strictly speaking, know what they are doing, that what they do has 
more meaning than they know”.166 
 
On the other hand, Elster points out the lack of a causal link between Bourdieu’s 
habitus and what people do.
167
 Jenkins elucidates also the resemblance to Talcott 
Parson’s structural functionalism: “social stability is the product of the 
internationalisation of shared values, beliefs and norms” – and where habitus is the 
source for ‘objective’ practices but isolated being as ‘subjective’ principles produces 
by objective patterns of sociality echoing determination or an elevated version of 
functionalism.
168
 However, the criticisms of determinism in his intellectual thinking 
were dismissed by Bourdieu – for example, because of the exhibited dynamic 
interplay explicated above (i.e. the field). Additionally, habitus disposes actors to 
carry out particular actions as a basis for where practices are (re)produced between 
habitus and its dispositions (e.g. practical taxonomies) as opposed to a deterministic 
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or mechanistic fashion.
169
 Furthermore, change is not denied due to treating habitus 
“as the site of the internalization of reality and the externalization of internality”.170  
 
2.2.1.3 Doxa 
Doxa is a taken for granted viewpoint of the world, and operates on an unconscious 
level.
171
 Policy-researchers are not operating separate to their circumstances – but 
indeed integral to the latter through acquiring practical cultural competences. This 
makes them blind to the arbitrariness of social reality other than the way things are 
which confirm their being as a result of taking themselves and the social world for 
granted.
172
 Bourdieu termed this as a practical sense and practical logic – but mostly 
known as ‘a feel for the game’ – where a person masters the logic of the 
metaphorical “game” by acquiring experiences with it.173  
 
When addressing it as a ‘doxic experience’, the link to social constructionism is 
evident:  
 
(…) the coincidence of the objective structures and the internalized structures which 
provides the illusion of immediate understanding, characteristic of practical 
experience of the familiar universe, and which at the same time excludes from that 
experiences and inquiry as to its own conditions of possibility( (my italicisation).
174
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Being an illusion, social reality is not fixed and not always true. Bourdieu’s doxa 
concept exhibits here similarities with Goffman’s social life as a theatre metaphor:175 
although policy may create history and define the standing in U.S.-Sino relations, 
policy-researchers cannot choose their own circumstances. This alludes clearly to the 
importance, and relevance, of manoeuvring this study at the sociological meso-level 
and incorporating overarching frameworks in this study as macro-structures. 
Moreover, it underscores practice as an art of necessary improvisation, as it does not 
exist a rule for every situation a policy-researcher encounters in social life – nor is 
there time to have subjective expectations for every conceivable situation (‘objective 
probability’) in routine social life. Thus, actors improvise.176 Doxa is also pivotal in 
grasping the ‘logic of practice’ and illuminate the links to reflexivity due to 
knowledgability is derived from experience.
177
 
 
Doxa, therefore, I find particularly relevant for examining the social construction of 
‘American-ness’ on the one hand, and ‘China’ as habitus in interplay. Doxa becomes 
visible in the Self/Other constellation – ‘American-ness’ as doxa – through China as 
the Other, traceable in policy-researchers’ narratives which serve as cultural sites.178 
This transpires because both the real as well as the thought world are structured 
inseparable and acknowledged as self-evident.
179
 This is especially relevant when 
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investigating policy-researchers, because their scholarly doxa is heavily ingrained 
through instituted practices in language and educational systems.
180
 
 
2.2.1.4 Field 
‘Field’ is a twin concept of ‘habitus’,181 and can be understood as a ‘social space’ 
with an embodied spatial element and its own logic shaping action.
182
 Bourdieu 
defined the concept of field in many different ways, for example – in an interview 
with one of his prominent protégées (Loïc Wacquant):
183
  
 
I define a field as a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between 
positions objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations they 
impose upon their occupants, agents, or institutions, by their present and potential 
situation (situs) in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) 
whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the 
field, as well as by their objective relations to other positions (domination, 
subordination, homology, etc.). Each field presupposes, and generates by its very 
functioning, the belief in the value of the stakes it offers. 
 
This “structuring structure” shapes a human’s conduct and is formed based on 
accumulated experiences across fields.
184
 Thus, there exist multiple fields including 
the ‘meta-field’185 which has the most power to shape other fields – a “structural 
homology”.186 The structured system reflects that policy-researchers and institutions 
such as think tanks possess different social positions where power relations make up 
the internal structure of the field. This also shows the interrelationship with the 
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concept of capital. A field configurates social roles, positions of agents (including 
institutions) and imposing structures, in addition to historical processes leading to 
giving different roles.
187
 Moreover, these fields have rules where the important 
“stake of stakes” relates to monopolising the right to define “the legitimate principles 
of the field”.188 The social field of think tanks – and the China policy-research 
environment specifically, is defined by the particular “stakes at stake”.189 There is 
always a struggle about the stakes (a field of struggles, by definition)
190
, where 
policy-researchers would pursue maintaining or improving their positions of 
exercising the above right to define ‘legitimate principles’.  
 
In this thesis, Chapter Four will particularly engage with the perspective of think 
tanks and the China policy-research environment being a social field. Furthermore, 
the aforesaid chapter reflects the sociological meso-level positioning of this study. 
This is highly relevant considering the ‘field’ is a meso-level concept itself where 
individuals conduct actions in the social world in which they are embedded. It is 
therefore natural to position this study in its entirety at the sociological meso-level. 
Consequently, the inclusion of the overarching frameworks is helpful and relevant. 
This is a result of the importance to understand the relationship between the field in 
question and the meta-field – or ‘field of power’ (politics) which distributes 
hierarchal power relations and thus structuring all other fields.
191
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Bourdieu emphasised that “to think in terms of field is to think relationally.192 
Indeed, in such thinking, social relations are at the core.
193
 Within the context of the 
underlying enterprise of this study (i.e. the Bourdieusian sociological ‘turn’ of IR 
research), the aspect of relationality is an important one and serves as an area of 
potential theoretical advancement.
194
 The concept of field is entwined with the 
remaining “thinking tools” in Bourdieu’s theory of practice. Habitus and field are 
integral: A habitus is only in play with a field, thus, generated practices will vary 
depending on the nature of the field.
195
 The commonalities between habitus and the 
stakes in the field equates to Bourdieu’s concept of ‘capital’ which is competed 
about in the particular field
196
 – an economic metaphor which I shall present in the 
subsequent sub-section below. The boundaries of the field are not fixed – but rather 
transforming. This elevates the relevance of employing ethnography as the research 
strategy as such boundaries can only be determined by empirical research. The 
locations of such boundaries are warranted where the fields of policy-researchers 
cease to impinge on their practices.
197
 Their behaviour is acted in accordance with 
the habitus of the field. It served as one of Bourdieu’s responses to the critique of 
alleged determinism.
198
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2.2.1.5 Capital 
Habitus partly constitutes capital, the effective power based on what resources the 
agent possesses.
199
 This is the predominant focus in my approach to this “thinking 
tool” as opposed to Bourdieu’s meta-theoretical work where capital is utilised to 
understand a society’s class structure as a model.200 Capital itself comes in different 
consolidations, as goods or resources, which are at stake in a field. On a few 
occasions, Bourdieu highlights ‘political capital’ which indicates a variation of social 
capital as “the source for observable differences in patterns of consumption and 
lifestyles”.201 It can be either delegated or be individual which would cease to exists 
with the disappearance of the person holding this institutionalised power.
202 The 
position in the field depends on an actor’s relationship to the type of capital being 
valued in the particular field (their ‘objective definition’).203  
 
Social capital entails valued relationship networks with significant counterparts, 
which Bourdieu defined as:
204
  
 
Social capital is the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an 
individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.
205
 
 
The cultural form may relate to competence or legitimate knowledge in an area of 
practice deemed to be of social value.
206
 Albeit being an economic metaphor, the 
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usage of capital seems not to follow this trail of thoughts. In Bourdieu’s work on 
education, cultural capital is not transacted in a monetary way: when a think tank or 
policy-researcher has exercised its cultural capital it does not necessarily disappear. 
As long as there is a struggle about it, cultural capital can be bestowed upon others 
or itself in future actions.
207
 Cultural capital can also be institutionalised within 
institutions.
208
 
 
Economic capital takes form as monetary and wealth.
209
 Expanding on the above 
notion of cultural capital being transferred to younger generations, in Distinction, 
Bourdieu employs Weber’s social stratification model which hints of capital being 
part of a zero-sum game.
210
 Less evident in Bourdieu’s thinking, is the notion of 
linguistic capital – that words do have power. When possessing the dominant 
language, if recognised, signals a speaker’s distinction (and the profit produced by 
discourse).  
 
Symbolic capital is deemed a critical source of power (for example honour or 
prestige):
211
 
 
Symbolic power is that invisible power which can be exercised only with the 
complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to it or even that 
they themselves exercise it.
212
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This symbolic power, or symbolic violence, is in play if recognised by others and as 
a result of when “power or capital becomes symbolic, and exerts a specific effect of 
domination, which I call symbolic power or symbolic violence (...).”213 If unequal 
distribution of any capital is judged legitimate, the agent possesses symbolic 
capital.
214
 This is a central point as capital also constitutes the stake which actors in 
the field constantly struggle about. Capital can be accumulated with the outlook of 
securing a better position and advancing interests in the field – or several fields. 
Only participants, through their habitus, can understand the objective structures of 
the field. Thus, outsiders may not fully understand the nature of it, which results in 
that strategies for success employed in one field, may work less effectively in 
another (i.e. less transposable).
215
 This is also a crucial reminder about the 
importance of a reflexive approach as the researcher.  
 
The link to the field is signalled by that the chances for winning the stake in the 
(aforesaid metaphor) ‘game’ are defined by those agents controlling the various 
forms of capital, in addition to not only being a ‘field of struggle’ and for “power 
amongst the holders of different forms of power”.216 Collectively, the different forms 
of capital make up social resources which warrant actors’ social positions.217 They 
can be distinguished, however, by their reducibility to assist disguising the economic 
aspects during transmissions where there is also a risk for a loss.
218
 Cultural and 
social forms of capital can only be derived from “root capital”, herein economic 
capital – but at a cost: to produce the relevant and effective power in the given 
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field.
219
 Social and cultural capital carries also the faculty of convertibility on certain 
conditions – the cultural form into economic capital institutionalised as educational 
qualifications, and social capital convertible into the economic form institutionalised 
as a title of nobility.
220
 
 
Bourdieu employed capital in various forms predominantly in regard to class. In this 
study, however, I am deploying these key concepts as “thinking tools” rather than an 
analysis of ‘class’.  
 
2.2.1.6  Interests and strategies 
Interests and strategies make up the practice theory, but are not used in an 
economistic, rationalist, or utilitarian form but rather gives agency. This must be 
understood in the interrelationship between habitus, field, and capital – socially 
constituted in a dialect with a field. Strategies relate to how policy-researchers in 
think tanks would pursue such interests,
221
 in an ‘organising framework of cultural 
dispositions (the habitus)’ rather than understanding social practice based on rules 
which govern and/or produce behaviour.
222
 This stance is also intertwined with 
Bourdieu’s epistemological critique of social knowledge (moving beyond Lévi-
Strauss’ structuralist anthropology) which emerged during his early ethnographic 
studies of Berber peasantries in Algeria.
223
 This is theoretical advancement at its 
best, and aligned with the “bottom-up” process in ethnographic research: where 
ethnographic field-research not only provided him with access to a more credible 
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‘social reality’ of his research subjects, but also undoubtedly laying the foundation of 
Bourdieu’s entire social theoretical enterprise.224 
 
2.3 Overarching frameworks 
This section highlights two overarching dynamics argued to be particularly 
influential in terms of achieving understanding of policy-researchers’ social 
constructions: U.S.-Sino relations as well as think tanks as a socio-political 
phenomenon as two overlapping Bourdieusian fields featuring separate “stakes at 
stake”.225 These frameworks are engaged with throughout the thesis when 
appropriate and relevant. In essence, these subjectively selected frameworks 
constitute the situational context/structure element at the sociological meso-level.
226
 
The below sub-sections are by no means intended to be a review of the actual 
literature on U.S.-Sino relations and U.S. think tanks – but, rather, to briefly 
highlight some main features and characteristics of the actual social phenomena. 
 
2.3.1 U.S.-Sino relations 
Arguably, U.S.-Sino relations are the most important bilateral relationship in the 
world.
227
 The Director of the East-West Centre, in Washington, DC, Satu Limaye 
pinpointed the strategic importance of China to the U.S. as reflected in that all 
governmental directories tend to be involved in any dealings with the Chinese 
government.
228
 The ‘rise of China’ (whatever that might mean to different policy-
                                                          
224 See Jenkins 2002, ibid. 41. 
225 See Jenkins 2002, ibid. 85. 
226 J.G. Bruhn & H.M. Rebach 2007, “Problem Solving at the Mesolevel,” op.cit. 
227 A.I. Johnston & R.S. Ross (eds.), Engaging China: the management of an emerging power (London: 
Routledge, 1999); Z. Zhu, US-China Relations in the 21st Century, Power Transition and Peace (Routledge: 
London, 2006). 
228 Seminar 14th May 2009, Chatham House. 
69 
 
researchers and their analyses and judgements), as a phenomenon and concept, 
reflects unprecedented prospects of a power-shift with the U.S. hegemony as well as 
a global shift between the West and East. It has become one of the dominant areas 
for discussion in the public domain
229
 and scholarly IR research
230
 – in particularly 
in regard to international security.
231
 The two countries are deeply and intensely 
engaged with each other across a vast range of policy-areas and exceedingly 
interdependent. These gargantuan complexities are reflected in the very diverse 
research being conducted and numerous events on China on offer at DC think tanks. 
Moreover, the nature and direction, as perceived, more than any other contextual 
factor arguably have an impact on the manoeuvrability in research and work-
activities for policy-researchers as well as in their potential ability to defining the 
topical agenda.  
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By drawing upon secondary literature – in addition to surveying research and policy 
profiles of China policy-research experts in U.S. think tanks – I shall highlight 
examples of the array of issues which they frequently engage with.
232
 For example, 
in the financial sphere, in a Congressional hearing (15 Sep 2011), Bergsten of the 
Peterson Institute elucidated the overshadowing issue of China undervaluing its 
Renminbi artificially low through intense intervention in the foreign exchange 
markets. Subsequently, this augments its international competitive strength as well 
as the trade surplus.
233
 However, think tanks are not in unison when it comes to the 
implications for the American job market.
234
 In the economic realm, Nathaniel 
Ahrens states in a Carnegie paper that “Indigenous innovation has become the 
greatest immediate source of economic friction between the United States and 
China”.235 This signifies Chinese stimulating domestic innovation in their 
procurement preferences in a protectionist fashion in order to excel upwards in the 
industrial value-chain.236 It is of concern at the state-to-state level, being one of the 
key issues on the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue talks in May of 
2010.237 In terms of security issues, there are several areas which prevail within 
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policy-communities and public discourses. This includes, for example, the meaning 
of the expansion and modernisation of the Chinese military,
238
 China’s intentions 
and behaviour in Mainland-Taiwan relations as well as the South-China Sea,
239
 and 
cyber-security.
240
 Prominently on the agenda, are also technology and energy 
issues,
241
 environmental concerns,
242
 and human rights issues and democracy.
243
  
 
Having touched very briefly on some of the key issues in U.S.-Sino relations (and a 
very limited list of sources – predominantly published by my interviewees in the 
field), such surroundings also play an evident role in the U.S. domestic political 
debate – often heatedly debated within think tanks as well as policy-communities 
more broadly. This relates to sensitive and politicised debates evolving in the U.S. – 
for example if America is declining – linked with U.S. soft power and its humongous 
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budget deficit,
244
 the plausibility of job losses to China which became a mantra in the 
last mid-term election, in addition to Chinese direct foreign investment into the 
U.S.
245
  
 
2.3.2 Think tanks as a socio-political phenomenon 
The varied nature of think tanks and the relations between them also represent a 
central and influential contextuality regarding what policy-researchers think about 
China – as well as how they think and the China-related work they engage with. 
Think tanks, as with most other organisations, do not operate in isolation. Hence, 
factors such as the media cycle, domestic political agenda, organisational factors, 
and the very individuals themselves are all in concomitant play. As organisations, 
think tanks have grown rapidly during the last three decades and have now become a 
global phenomenon with a modus operandi increasingly transnational in nature.
246
 
According to prolific writers in the area, Abelson and McGann, the evolvement of 
U.S. think tanks reflects different generations differentiated by key markers such as 
the degree of policy-advocacy focus, specialisation, ideological foundation as well as 
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donors’ preferences.247 The American context has proved particularly fertile for the 
growth of think tanks, contemplating on the 
 
(…) highly decentralized nature of the American political system, combined with 
the lack of strict party discipline and the large infusion of funds from philanthropic 
foundations, have contributed greatly to the proliferation of think tanks in the past 
quarter-century.
248 
 
Think tanks, also known as policy research institutions,
249
 have become prominent 
actors in policy processes in several countries.
250
 This is particularly the case with 
the U.S. – the global capital of think tanks heavily ingrained in the political 
consciousness, that when posing the question of its relevance to Mr Samuel 
Sherraden of the New American Foundation – it became a quintessential question of 
its being and his livelihood.
251
 In 2009, Washington, DC, was housing nearly a 
quarter (393, 22%) of the country’s total number of think tanks, i.e. 1815.252  
 
Various precursors of the contemporary form of think tanks have emerged since the 
late nineteenth century, such as the Boston Conclave of 1865 – an assemblage of 
amateurs advocating for public health and sanitation in reforms of prisons, insane 
asylums, orphanages, and schools.
253
 Moreover, the Institutes of International Affairs 
(IIA) evolved in the early 1920s in the aftermath after the First World War taking on 
an ad-hoc state role in liaising “unofficially” with counterparts in sensitive issues 
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abroad as well as assisting their nation’s foreign policy elites in rallying the public 
behind various governmental policy-initiatives.
254
 Higgott and Stone highlight the 
paramount importance of this period where the Chatham House and Council for 
Foreign Affairs (established in the UK and the U.S. in 1920 and 1921, 
respectively),
255
 for the inspiration for forming IIAs as a world-wide movement.
256
 
Also in the early 1900s, the academic-based pure policy-research establishments 
were pushed forward by leading industrialists and philanthropists such as Andrew 
Carnegie and Robert Brookings.
257
 It is, thus, a misconception that think tanks 
represent a new phenomenon – they have, rather, taken new forms and identities.258 
 
Illuminating this development provides important understanding of the workings of 
this socio-political phenomenon as contextuality. Prominent scholars portray the 
development of think tanks as evolving in multiple ‘waves’ – often as a response to 
international upheavals in the political and economic environment. Different scholars 
typologies think tanks into different waves, but can broadly be depicted as follows: 
the first wave evolved in the early 1900s encompassing the developments explicated 
above, which;  
 
(…) helped build and maintain an informed domestic constituency for global 
engagement, keeping the internationalist flame flickering during the years between 
the American repudiation of the League of Nations and the coming of the Second 
World War.
259
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The focus on applying scientific expertise to engage with an array of policy issues 
corresponds well with Kent Weaver’s definition on think tanks: “universities without 
students”.260 The second wave reflects the bi-polar strategic environment emerging 
after the Second World War where American policy-makers sought independent 
advice to an even greater extent. RAND Corporation, government contractors funded 
by government departments and agencies, signals a new generation of think tanks. 
The Hudson Institute and the War on Poverty are other examples (post-Vietnam 
war).
261
 The third wave sets the scene for advocacy think tanks – this epoch 
witnessed the biggest increase in specialised and ideologised-based think tanks
262
 – 
also accounting for two-thirds of the current flora of think tanks.
263
 The Heritage 
Foundation, CATO and the Center for International and Strategic Studies serve as 
prominent examples. According to Abelson, a fourth wave appears to revolve around 
legacy-based think tanks of former presidents, such as the Carter Center in Atlanta 
and Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom in Washington, DC.
264
   
 
2.4 Research Framework 
This section comprises various sub-sections explaining the methodological effort 
conducted as part of this study. This entails consolidating the research design, i.e. 
research philosophical underpinnings, research strategy, research methods, in 
addition to field-research matters. The research framework stipulates the body of 
practices concerning how data has been collected in order to answer the overarching 
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research question in the present study. This sub-section is strongly linked with the 
preceding section through the deployment of Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice. 
Bourdieu adamantly encouraged his readers to avoid scholastic theorising and rather 
approach his texts as methods.
265
 Thus, the operationalisation of his conceptual 
“thinking tools” should be considered as a method. Thus, this bridges sections one 
and two in this chapter together – and consequently between theory and methods. In 
fact, Bourdieu propagated that theory, epistemological reflections, and empirical 
research operates in tandem
266
 – in order to avoid a ‘scholastic fallacy’ of not being 
capable to reflect social reality.
267
 
 
The research framework is also closely linked with the other theoretical aspects 
featuring in the first chapter as well as the analysis chapters in this thesis through the 
aim of “methodological fit”, i.e. when the philosophical underpinning of the study 
exhibits congruency between all components within the research framework, and 
between the research framework and its ontological and epistemological 
foundations.
268
  Researching a particular phenomenon warrants to employ the most 
suitable empirical research techniques.
269
 In the deliberations below, I am also 
striving to achieve transparency and self-reflexivity. The former relates to an open 
deliberation seeking accountability for decisions made relating to methodology 
throughout the thesis. This allows readers to evaluate the chosen premise and 
promulgated findings on my part as the researcher. 
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In terms of self-reflexivity, awareness of my relationships with the research problem 
and research subjects may contribute to enhancing my awareness of potential biases 
in how I analyse obtained data. The exercise of “reflexive sociology” is a focal point 
in Bourdieu’s universe.270 Thus, I shall commit to a “systematic exploration of the 
unthought categories of thought which delimit the thinkable and predetermine the 
thought”271 – ‘epistemic reflexivity’ beyond “reflection of the subject on the 
subject“.272 In concert, such efforts assist in enhancing the rigorous of the research 
through establishing a stronger fundament for internal validity, credibility, and 
trustworthiness that exercise the utmost importance in ethnographic research.
273
 This 
is vital in interpretivist research because the researcher’s subjectivity is inevitably 
integral to knowledge-production and thus performing as an ‘instrument of 
analysis’.274 
 
2.4.1 The think tanks: selection criteria 
The decision to design the study as an inquiry into the DC think tank landscape (in 
general) and DC think tank experts conducting China-related policy-research/China 
policy-research community (specifically), is based on the following assumptions and 
premises. First, the study endeavours to investigate contrasting narratives. Hence, the 
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think tanks have been carefully selected in order to reflect divergent positions on the 
domestic U.S. political and ideological spectrum. It is widely recognised in academic 
and journalistic accounts that think tanks exhibit ideological footholds, palpable in 
their practice in policy-networks/communities,
275
 perceptions in the political milieu, 
as well as think tanks’ own mission-statements. According to Richardson, think 
tanks seek relevant policy-communities in order to disseminate their ideas into 
policy-debates.
276
 As an example, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) is known 
for its (neo) conservative penchants, whereas Brookings is associated with a centre(-
left) position as well as being more neutral and academic inclined.
277
  
 
Second, on a methodological note, I was not granted sufficient access to a think tank 
in order to investigate them from “the inside” longitudinally and to carry out 
multiple interviews with several policy-researchers within a particular organisation. 
It should here be mentioned that many think tanks have a limited number of 
individuals conducting China-related policy-research.
278
 Furthermore, the data 
obtained in the field also warrants such an approach. For example, research subjects 
themselves would often contemplate and talk about some kind of ‘community’ 
amongst policy-researchers conducting China-related work and research. This was 
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further manifested in their practices – for example the frequent engagement between 
them and appearances at think tank China events.  
 
Third, the think tanks are comparable in the following ways: The sheer volume of 
included think tanks is ranked amongst the ten or 30 most influential think tanks in 
the U.S. as well as globally.
279
 Moreover, all think tanks are conducting China-
specific policy-research with extensive networking, including across country 
borders.
280
 In addition, research philosophically, the selected think tanks also reflect 
the complexities and nuances existing in the “world out there” and how this is 
perceived by research subjects, including: on the organisational/individual level – 
strongly ideologised (for example, Heritage Foundation), conservative (for example, 
American Enterprise Institute), “centrist” (for example, Brookings, Atlantic Council) 
centre-right (for example, Hudson), libertarian (for example, Cato), centre-left (for 
example, Center for American Progress), academically inclined (for example, SAIS 
John Hopkins University), “leftist” (for example, Institute for Policy Studies), 
congress supported (for example, US Institute for Peace and Woodrow Wilson 
Center for International Scholars), highly ranked (the aforementioned and for 
example New America Foundation) and lower ranked (for example, American 
Council for Foreign Policies), with multiple overseas offices (for example, Carnegie) 
or domestic (for example, Asia Society), with activist and/or programmes seeking 
change on the ground (for example, National Endowment for Democracy, US 
Institute for Peace, Institute for Policy Studies), reputation of vast governmental 
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– many to a very high extent and some to a lower degree – but nevertheless having listed ‘China’ as an area of 
expertise or specialisation in their publically available research profiles. 
80 
 
contacts (for example, Center for Strategic and International Studies), area-specialist 
think tanks (for example, East-West Center), government-based (for example, 
RAND, Institute for National Security Studies), policy-research being a secondary 
activity (for example, National Endowment for Democracy), and recently established 
(for example, Stimson). 
 
Contemplating on the individual/organisational level – the pool of interviews 
represents both sexes, holding various positions in the hierarchy from Vice 
Presidents to Programme Assistants, possessing different educational 
backgrounds/specialisations (such as, economists, human rights, environment, 
strategy, security/military, U.S.-Sino relations generalists, Taiwan-specialist, naval 
and maritime issues), policy-researchers conducting various degrees of policy-
research relating to China (ranging from “China-hands” to secondary focus), 
different nationalities (including Norway, Canada, New Zealand, Dutch/American, 
French/British) and cultural backgrounds (Asian-American and dual citizenships), 
being affiliated with different sectors (e.g. academia, private sector, State 
Department, and the media), as well as an approximately 50-year age variance.  
 
2.4.1.1 ‘Unit of Analysis’ (UoA) 
According to Craig and Douglas, it is particularly important to delimit the ‘Unit of 
Analysis’ (UoA) in qualitative research.281 I am drawing upon the following 
congruent definitions: “The phenomenon under study, about which data is collected 
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2005).  
81 
 
and analysed”,282 and “... objects (...) focus of attention”.283 The research subjects 
were selected based on the following “characteristics”: individuals affiliated with 
think tanks based in Washington, DC
284
 (their predominant area of work),
285
 a degree 
of expertise (at least self-proclaimed) in regard to conducting China-related policy-
research, policy-advocacy and/or policy–advice, in addition to any nationality and 
cultural background(s). Moreover, secondary data will be collected from contextual 
sources in order to prevent having to rely on self-referential accounts only (for 
example, the media, private sector, as well as the academe). The contextuality of the 
research subjects is also pivotal to grasp in order to understand impactful cultural 
structures. 
 
2.4.1.2 Sampling and sampling “size” 
The non-probability sampling approach is derived from the above ‘Unit of Analysis’ 
(policy-researchers as individuals).
286
 ‘Purposeful sampling’ involves capturing the 
diversity amongst research subjects.
287
 Additionally, “snowball-sampling”, which 
involves securing interviewees through other respondents, was employed principally 
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for secondary data-sources.
288
 I coin the term “reflexive sample” as further 
delimitations depend on the direction of the research in the field (and during analysis 
if returning to the field). Importantly, the “sample” needs to reflect the very nature of 
evident categories (as taxonomical categories in fact do exist) as well as dynamics in 
the social reality which is being examined. This would be unveiled in the ongoing 
and simultaneously data collection and analysis during the field-work and post-field 
research stages of the study.  
 
To establish a “sample size” is not required in qualitative research. This is because 
the aim is not to compare findings statistically with the demand to infer a conclusion. 
As the purpose is to understand a social phenomenon, ‘reflexive sampling’ will in 
fact dictate the size but only in regard to when new and relevant information can be 
added to the analysis. Theoretically, purposeful “sampling” will override. In this 
study, I have prioritised to include a pool of individuals which collectively feature 
the following characteristics: China-specialists, reflect the range of policy-areas (to 
facilitate for multivocality), the opportunity to conduct multiple-interviews (i.e. 
follow-up interviews), and both genders (if applicable). 
 
2.4.2 Research philosophy (aligned with Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice) 
The focal point of ‘American-ness’ and ‘China’ being socially constructed resembles 
a social constructionist epistemology (how we know what we know),
289
 and a 
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predominant subjectivist ontology (our world-views).
290
 Policy-researchers’ 
comprehensions of ‘American-ness’ through their construction of ‘China’ transpire 
through social processes whereby humans make sense of their world.
291
 Thus, there 
are multiple ‘social realities’ due to human beings partaking in a web of social 
relations.
292
 
 
Bourdieu explicates that social reality is composed of an ontological overlap
293
 – “of 
a set of relations and forces that impose themselves upon the agents, ‘irrespective of 
their consciousness and will’’ and features the “innumerable acts of interpretation 
whereby people jointly construct lines of (inter)action”.294 Meaning-production and 
knowledge about social reality is produced, and re-produced, between the individuals 
and their social interaction with their world.
295
 Perceptions of an Other should be 
understood within this dialectical and dynamical interplay between agents (i.e. 
American policy-research experts) and structure (e.g. American culture(s)). 
 
2.4.3 Research strategy: Ethnography 
Ethnography has been employed as the research strategy (aka methodology). This 
choice signals the direction and a system of how to employ research methods as a 
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Handbook of Qualitative Research in International Business, eds. R. Marschan-Piekkari and C. Welch 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004). 
292 M. Hammersley & P. Atkinson 2007, Ethnography, op.cit. 
293 I. Marcoulatos, “John Searle and Pierre Bourdieu: Divergent Perspectives on Intentionality and Social 
Ontology,” Human Studies 26(1) (2003): 67-96. 
294 L. Wacquant, “Pierre Bourdieu,” in Key Sociological Thinkers, 2nd edn, ed. R. Stones (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008): 266-267; see Marcoulatos 2003, op.cit. 67-96.  
295 See P.L. Berger & T. Luckman 1966, The Social Construction of Reality, op.cit.; M. Crotty 2003, The 
foundations of social research, op.cit. 
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means to obtain plausible answers to the overarching research question of this 
study.
296
 The empiricist Bourdieu himself very much championed the ethnographic 
research approach.
297
 In his view, theory and data are inseparable without the 
capability to separately reflect social reality.
298
 The employment of ethnography in 
this study resonates with the social anthropological influenced ethnographic 
literature. This reflects what was pinpointed earlier, that Bourdieu’s operationalised 
conceptual “thinking tools” (as part of his Theory of Practice) is what composes the 
methodological effort in this study a Bourdieusian-inspired ethnography. Thus, this 
particular organisation of the methodological approach also signals Bourdieu’s social 
theory as method as the prevailing application of ethnography in this thesis. 
 
Brewer defines ethnography as:
299
 
 
(…) the study of people in naturally occurring settings or ‘fields’ by methods of data 
collection which capture their social meanings and ordinary activities, involving the 
researcher participating directly in the setting, if not also the activities, in order to 
collect data in a systematic manner but without meaning being imposed on them 
externally. 
 
This involves describing the cultures of the Other.
300
 A focal point in my study is the 
aim to describe (in parts) the culture of the policy-research experts in U.S. think 
tanks as the Other (from my own point of view as the researcher), which in this study 
revolves around the phenomenon of ‘American-ness’ and ‘China’. 
                                                          
296 T. Zalan & G. Lewis 2004, “Writing About Methods in Qualitative Research,” op.cit. See research question in 
Chapter One. 
297 R. Brubaker 2002, “Ethnicity without groups,” op.cit.; H. Joas & W. Knöbl 2009, Social Theory, op.cit.; L. 
Wacquant 2004, Body and Soul, op.cit.; P. Bourdieu & L.J.D. Wacquant 1992, An Invitation to Reflexive 
Sociology, op.cit. 
298 P. Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000). He framed this as a ‘scholastic fallacy’ 
299 J.D. Brewer 2000, Ethnography, op.cit. 10. 
300 M.B. Miles & A.M. Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis: an Expanded Sourcebook, 2nd edn (London: SAGE 
Publication, 1994). 
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Ethnography can take many forms. In this study, it is chiefly applied as a research 
process – closely linked with Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice and a social 
constructionist epistemology as the main vehicle of interrogation. Nevertheless, this 
study seeks to provide ‘thick description’,301 i.e. to achieve triangulated rich 
knowledge of a social phenomenon by incorporating various elements of ‘the total 
universe of data’302 (for example, the interviewees’ oral accounts, additional sources 
such as academic research, policies, reports, statements, observations, other in-depth 
interviews, conversations, as well as American culture(s) as research subjects’ 
ingrained contextuality). And because the comparative element is superficial and 
because of the focus on contrasting narratives, I emphasise the argument that a 
polyphony of “China-narratives” uttered by think tank policy-researchers are played 
out as an integral part of the enmeshed contextuality.  
 
I predominantly employ in-depth interviews as the principal data-collection 
method.
303
 In addition, I make use of participant observation at think tank events, 
incorporating physicality and relevant political developments in the U.S. as 
influential contextuality,
304
 as well as collecting written material as a means to 
                                                          
301 I am not implying that I pursue the ethnographic methodological base of naïve realism (i.e. the notion, 
originating with Malinowski and upheld by Geertz) of the ability of the researcher to impart that there is one truth 
which can be told in one way, and to be a mere conduit of uncontaminated and non-biased data, non-theoretical, 
non-reflexive, and detached from the text and research process (Brewer 2000, op.cit. 37-55; see D. Marsh & G. 
Stoker, Theory and Methods in Political Science, 2nd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002)). ‘Thick’ in 
the thesis, rather, denotes ‘in-depth’ through the ability to also observe research subjects and relevant work 
activities with the potential to unveil unlocked information, triangulate data, and making sense of complexity.  
302 Miles & Huberman 1994, op.cit. 
303 P.J. Buckley & M.K. Chapman, “The Use of Native Categories in Management Research,” British Journal of 
Management 8(4) (1997): 283-299; R.G. Burgess, In the Field: An Introduction to Field Research (London: 
Routledge, 1984); D.S.A. Guttormsen, “Unlocking Complexity with Simplicity: A Social Constructionist take on 
the 'Ethnographic Interview' in Multilingual and Intercultural 'Multi-site' field research” (paper presented 
at Proceedings of the 9th European Conference on Research Methodology for Business and Management 
Studies, 2010a): 157-165. Available from: ISBN: 978-1-906638-65-8 (CD), ed. J Esteves, IE Business School, 
Madrid, Spain; M. Mehmetoglu 2004, op.cit.; Spradley, JP 1979, The Ethnographic Interview, Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, London; Thomas 2004, op.cit.  
304 Brewer 2000, op.cit; Sanday 1979, op.cit.  
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conduct an interpretive/ethnographic contents analysis.
305
 Additional data-methods 
encompass personal field-notes,
306
 descriptive statistics, triangulation,
307
 self-
reflexivity, and incorporating my understanding of contextual structures taking 
advantage of seminars, symposia and other relevant events within the wider think-
tank, academic and political community in DC.
308
  
 
2.4.3.1 Field-research 
Field research is the main feature of ethnographic research – an aspect which has 
made social anthropology unique amongst other social science disciplines.
309
 As part 
of my doctoral research endeavour, I spent three months researching the China 
policy-research environment in U.S. think tanks anchored in Washington, DC. The 
output in terms of collected data will be relayed in the below sub-sections 
corresponding to the research method in question. 
 
This study does not claim any methodological contribution to knowledge as far as 
the ethnographic approach is concerned. Nonetheless, it moves beyond a modus 
operandi as a mere ‘empiricist data-collection machine’,310 and rather illuminate the 
relevance for ethnographic research in IR including the important role of self-
                                                          
305 See A. Ahuvia, “Traditional, Interpretive, and Reception based Content Analyses: Improving the Ability of 
Content Analysis to Address Issues of Pragmatic and Theoretical Concern,” Social Indicators Research 54(2): 
139-172; D.L. Altheide, “Reflections: Ethnographic Content Analysis,” Qualitative Sociology 10(1) (1987): 35-71; 
Bryman 2008, Social Research Methods, op.cit.; H-F. Hsieh & S. Shannon, “Three approaches to qualitative 
content analysis,” Qualitative Health Research 15 (2005): 1277-1288; D. Silverman, Doing qualitative Research 
(London: Sage Publications, 2004). 
306 R.G. Burgess, Field Research: A sourcebook and Field Manual (London: Routledge, 1991), 191-194; R. 
Emerson, R. Fretz & L. Shaw, Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). 
307 Brewer 2000, ibid.; J. Wolfram Cox, “Triangulation,” in The Sage dictionary of qualitative management 
research, eds. R. Thorpe & R. Holt (London: Sage Publications, 2008), 222-224; R.K. Yin, Case Study Research: 
Design and Methods (London: Sage, 2003). 
308 P.L. Berger & T. Luckman 1966, The Social Construction of Reality, op.cit.; A. Giddens 1984, The 
Constitution of Society, op.cit. 
309 Keesing & Strathern, op.cit. 
310 W. Vrasti 2008, “The Strange Case of Ethnography and International Relations,” op.cit. 279, 295. 
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reflexivity and theorising in a “bottom-up” fashion, in addition to ‘theory as method’ 
(i.e. Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice, in particular). Moreover, the methodological 
effort in this study, as with Bourdieu’s early ethnographic ventures, is closer aligned 
with the social anthropological tradition when it comes to theoretical construction. 
This ethnography does not simply “report on the inner workings of social words 
based on close-up observation (…)”311 but allows for building theories “bottom-up” 
as well as engaging with a body of theoretical work (i.e. Bourdieu’s Theory of 
Practice and social constructionism). This diverges with the Geertzian strand of 
cultural anthropology often relied upon by the sociological intellectual sphere (as 
opposed to, for example, British traditions and social anthropology) and the 
sociological Chicago School.
312
 In essence, it provides a case for IR research to 
traverse divides between sustained theoretical work and fieldwork.
313
  
 
2.4.4 Research methods 
The primary research method in this ethnography is in-depth interviews. As I am not 
seeking to purport a methodological contribution, the focus rests on explaining the 
scope of deployment of each specific research method depicted below rather than 
problematising them. 
 
2.4.4.1 In-depth interviews  
The in-depth interview constitutes the chief research method in this ethnography. 
The present study is, indeed, an interview-based ethnography drawing upon 
Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice. This research method has been employed, primarily, 
                                                          
311 B.H. Hancock, “Following Loïc Wacquant into the Field,” Qualitative Sociology 32(94) (2009). 
312 B.H. Hancock 2009, ibid, 94 
313 B.H. Hancock 2009, ibid. 93. 
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to collect data from China policy-research experts within U.S. think tanks – but also 
of contextual interviews from relevant experts not affiliated with think tanks in order 
to solicit non-self referential perspectives (i.e. affiliations such as academia, the U.S. 
State Department, and the business-sector).  
 
During my three-month fieldwork, located in Washington, DC, I conducted in total 
44 in-depth interviews. Table 1 below depicts the ‘universe of data’314 as far as the 
interviews are concerned (interviewee and principal affiliation). 
 
                                                          
314 Se Miles and Huberman 1994, op.cit. 
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Table 1 – Interviewees and affiliations 
  Interviewee Principal Affiliation 
1 Ms Ellen L Frost Peterson Institute for International Economics 
2 Ms Louisa Greve National Endowment for Democracy 
3 Mr Samuel Sherradan New America Foundation 
4 Prof Andre Laliberte Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars 
5 Dr Bryce Wakefield Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars 
6 Ms Sue Levenstein Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars 
7 Dr Philip Levy American Enterprise Institute 
8 Mr Dan Blumenthal American Enterprise Institute 
9 Prof Stein Tønnesson US Institute for Peace 
10 Dr Adam Hersh Center for American Progress 
11 Mr Peter Marsters Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars 
12 Mr Seth Cropsey Hudson Institute 
13 Mr John Feffer Institute for Policy Studies 
14 Dr Andrew Scobell RAND Corporation 
15 Dr Satu Limaye East-West Center 
16 Dr Robert Hathaway Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars 
17 Mr Dale Swartz American Enterprise Institute 
18 Dr Charles Horner Hudson Institute 
19 Mr Nathaniel Ahrens Formerly, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
20 Mr Walter Lohman The Heritage Foundation 
21 Dr Douglas H. Paal Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
22 Mr Iskander Rehman German Marshall Fund 
23 Ms Debra Liang-Fenton US Institute for Peace 
24 Dr Banning Garrett Atlantic Council 
25 Mr Alan D Romberg Henry L. Stimson Center 
26 Dr Paragh Khanna New America Foundation 
27 Male policy researcher World Resources Institute 
28 Dr Keith Crane RAND Corporation 
29 Dr Kenneth G. Lieberthal Brookings Institution 
30 Mr Kevin Tu Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
31 Mr Ed Paisly New American Foundation 
32 Ms Bonny Glaser Center for International and Strategic Studies 
33 Ms Sandy Pho Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars 
34 Mr Pieter Bottelier SAIS John Hopkins and Carnegie 
35 Dr Jamie Metzl Asia Society 
36 Mr Leland Miller America Foreign Affairs Council 
37 Mr Dan Rosen Peterson Institute for International Economics 
38 Female policy researcher Institute for National Strategic Studies 
39 Ms Malou Innocent Cato Institute 
40 Mr Justin Logan Cato Institute 
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Table 2 shows the distributions between primary and contextual (secondary) 
interviews.  
 
Table 2 – Primary and contextual (secondary) interviews 
Primary (think tanks) Contextual (affiliation) 
  Dr Steven Balla (George Washington University) 
  Prof Bruce Dickson (George Washington University) 
  Dr Deepa Ollapally (George Washington University) 
  Prof Hugh Gusterson (George Mason University) 
  
 Total: 40 Total: 4 
 
Table 3 presents the average duration of the interviews as well as number of think 
tanks and average number of interviewees per think tank.   
 
Table 3 – Average duration (interviews) 
Primary 
Interviews 
Contextual 
Interviews 
No. Think 
Tanks 
Per think 
tank 
57 minutes 55 minutes 26 1.5 
 
The in-depth interviews were conducted in a semi-structured, thematic fashion with 
open-ended questions aligned with the research philosophical foundation of the study 
– the constructionist symbolic interactionist model.315 It was similar to what Burgess 
calls ‘a conversation with a purpose’.316 The interviews focused on respondents’ 
construction of meaning and ‘social reality’ in regard to ‘China’ and effectively 
‘American-ness’. This is diametrical to the positivist stimuli model (evolved from 
behaviourism) where the aim is to compare or achieve statistically generalisation 
                                                          
315 J.P. Spradley 1979, The Ethnographic Interview, op.cit. A.B. Thomas 2004, Research skills, op.cit. 152-154. 
316 R.G. Burgess 1984, In the Field, op.cit. 102. 
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based on testing hypotheses, and assumes that people respond in the same way on 
physical stimuli.
317
  
 
Interviewing is acknowledged to be a powerful technique to elicit in-depth 
understanding of context,
318
 and thus a particular advantage when the aim is to 
obtain rich and deep knowledge about a little understood social phenomenon. 
Furthermore, it facilitates for improved understanding of how respondents construct 
meaning and social reality, and being constructed by it. Importantly, this included 
allowing myself to be informed “bottom-up” – for example, I would not set any 
parameter for what I considered to be an ‘expert’ on China policy-research. 
Consequently, if they identified themselves as one – he or she was included in the 
“sample”. “Prompts” were frequently used, i.e. seeking a more extensive response,319 
as well as improvised follow-up questions in order to capture the ‘native categories’ 
of respondents and central lines of inquiry amongst the policy-researchers. Identical 
questions would only distort the rigour of the data collection due to respondents’ 
constructions and narratives do not fit into the same set of pre-decided taxonomic 
categories. I have also assumed there to be an “observational element” integral in 
interviewing, herein policy-researchers’ own observations imparted through their 
oral accounts and personal narratives. 
 
All interviews were audio-digitally recorded, except for two respondents who 
requested otherwise (placing significant inhibitions of what the individual would feel 
comfortable to convey in an interview), and one wanting to be “off-the-record” due 
                                                          
317 Thomas 2004, op.cit. 
318 Marschan-Piekkari et al. 2004, op.cit. 
319 Atkinson, cited in A.B. Thomas 2004, Research skills, op.cit. 163-164. 
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to returning to a federal department. Most interviews were solicited via email contact 
based on my perusal of all policy-researchers across more than 50 think tanks based 
in Washington, DC. I used McGann’s ranking as well as general directories.320 I also 
benefited from personal introductions and interacting with policy-researchers at 
think tank events. In total, I invited close to 130 policy-researchers whom I had 
identified as relevant research subjects. The main reason for unsuccessful requests 
were time constrains – in addition to a few declining reporting back due to the 
following: not agreeing with the premise of my study (relevance of culture) 
including misunderstanding of the scope (i.e. culture as explanation of Chinese 
economic development), not stationed in Washington, DC (for example working at a 
sub-office abroad and/or living elsewhere), and my inability to showcase that my 
study would contribute to “world peace”! Approximately, 15 interviews did not 
materialise due to changing schedules and/or not having sufficient with time whilst I 
was located in Washington, DC. 
 
2.4.4.2 Participant observation 
Non-covert, participant observation has also been employed as a research method – 
where the researcher cannot be separable from what is being observed and 
discussed.
321
 In addition to the “observational element” during interviews 
(highlighted in the previous point), this particular method entails think tanks events, 
                                                          
320 J.G. McGann 2010, “The Leading Public Policy Research Organizations In The World 2009,” op.cit.; J.G. 
McGann 2009, “The Leading Public Policy Research Organizations In The World 2008,” op.cit.; Think Tanks 
Directory 2008, Available: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/library/research/guides/think-tanks-directory.htm; FPRI 
Security and International Affairs Think Tank Directory 2007-9, Available: http://thinktanks.fpri.org/; NIRA’s World 
Directory of Think Tanks 2005, Available: http://thinktanks.fpri.org/.  
321 I argue that it is an “ontological fallacy” of many positivists, objectivist inclined researchers to equate non-
participating observation with ‘objectivity’. The mere physical presence of somebody, or just the notion of the 
possibility that somebody is present, is indeed participation as exhibiting no reaction is a reaction too. It is a 
‘binary opposition’, a researcher cannot be present and not present. For example, how many would really believe 
you if you stand in a room and state “I am not here”? 
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the interview-setting and sites (body-language, physical environment in offices, 
buildings and other surroundings), and contextuality (such as material culture and 
physical surroundings in the city, ideas purported in the media). The selection of 
events is somewhat biased as I was only able to attend those I had access to (i.e. 
RSVP available for the general public). Table 4 showcases attended events. 
Table 4 – Attended events 
Date Time Event title Location 
Tue 3 May 10.30-
11.30AM 
Asia – Foreign Minister Kevin 
Rudd 
Brookings 
Wed 4 May 12noon Asia regionalism EastWest Center 
Mon 9 May 5.30-6.30PM Conversation with Power – Brian 
Till 
New America Foundation 
Tue 24 May 1-2PM America in the World - Secretary 
of Defense R Gates 
AEI 
Mon 13 June 1-5PM Can the United States remain 
united 
New America Foundation / 
National Press Club 
Mon 13 June 4-5.15PM Will Religion Challenge the 
Chinese State? (Prof Andre 
Laliberte) 
Wilson Center 
Wed 15 June 2-3.45PM China: New type of superpower Brookings 
Thur 16 June 12.15-
1.45PM 
Friend, Foe, or Fallacy: How to 
Think about China’s Rise  
New America Foundation  
Fri June 17 2-3PM The Civilizing Mission: How 
France Sees Its Role in the World  
Elaine Sciolino (Wilson 
Center) 
Mon June 20 9AM-2PM Global Shift – How the West 
Should Respond to the Rise of 
China 
The German Marshall Fund 
of the United States 
Tue 21 June 10AM-2PM Chinese Foreign Direct 
Investment: Is it a Threat to the 
United States, Domestically or 
Globally? (Derek Scissors, Daniel 
Rosen, Stapleton Roy) 
Wilson Center with Asia 
Society 
Thur 23 June 12noon-2PM Giving USA 2011  Hudson Institute 
Mon 27 June 6.30-8PM India and China: Today and 
Tomorrow 
Asia Society 
Wed 29 June 9-11.30AM The China Challenge: Mixing 
Economics and Security 
The Heritage Foundation 
Tue 12 July 2-3.30PM The New Imperial China: A US-
Japanese Strategic Response 
Dr. Masako Ikegami 
(Stockholm University) 
EastWest Center 
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Open observation of people in their natural setting is central in social research,
322
 and 
mere observation does not qualify as ethnography. It plays an important role in a 
Bourdieusian-inspired ethnography as it facilitates for engaging with research 
beyond mere text. A self-reflexive dialogue will assist me to become more aware of 
my own preconceptions and ‘native categories’ as a researcher. Subsequently, this 
directs the focus towards the primacy of the social constructions of the individual 
policy-researcher rather than my own. Field-notes (written and electronic) were used 
as assistance – and thus not considered a method on its own (containing description 
but also about my own thinking). 
  
2.4.4.3 Collection of written material 
This research method involves collating written material published by the research 
subjects on topics relating to their “China-narratives” and views on America within 
this context. ‘Published’, here, indicates material made public, such as written 
documents (reports, articles, opinion-editorials), uploaded on a website; ‘text’ as part 
of multimedia broadcasts, material distributed at events, and to a smaller extent, 
books. It also includes relevant contextual information, such as commentaries about 
think tanks and U.S.-Sino relations in the media. In concert, the above constructs 
part of the contextuality in which narratives are constructed within. This process is 
thus continuous (before, during and after fieldwork). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
322 J.D. Brewer 2000, Ethnography, op.cit. 
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2.4.4.4 Triangulation 
The inherent multi-method nature of ethnography provides an opportunity for data 
triangulation.
323
 This increases the rigour and internal validity of the research 
findings.
324
 Triangulation involves using multiple sources of evidence. In the present 
study this involves in particularly juxtapositioning interviews, observation and 
written material. Developing such “converging lines of inquiry” makes the proposed 
findings and conclusion more convincing.
325
 Triangulation is an analytical tool 
which becomes a research method due to the interpretations of diffused data may 
lead to new understanding of data. 
 
2.4.4.5 Descriptive statistics 
This research method has been diminutively employed in this study, and relates to 
tables containing background details of the policy-researchers as research subjects. 
These can be used to cross-tabulate data and to assist with the “mapping of the field” 
in Bourdieusian-terms as a means to pinpoint think tanks’ positions in a social 
field.
326
 Bourdieu himself made use of descriptive statistics, which is also relatively 
normal in ethnographic research in the wider social sciences.  
  
2.5 Research process and design – a reiteration 
Both the research process and research design reflect the social constructionist 
research philosophical underpinning and methodology established for this study. In 
terms of the former, the ethnographic study adheres to the ‘cyclic’ research process 
where data collection and data analysis occur simultaneously during all stages of the 
                                                          
323 J.D. Brewer 2000, Ethnography, op.cit. 
324 D. Silverman 2004, Doing qualitative Research, op.cit. 
325 R.K. Yin 2003, Case Study Research, op.cit. 98. 
326 This is one of the undertakings in the first analysis chapter. 
96 
 
investigation. Furthermore, the academic inquiry commences with field-research (i.e. 
the policy-researchers situated within their natural context) rather than identifying 
theoretical “gaps” in a pre-established body of literature. This is radically contrasting 
the ‘linear’ or hypothetico-deductive model embedded in positivist informed 
quantitative research. Here, the inherent aim is to test hypotheses and compare 
hypothetical expectations – and where empirical generalisations are either accepted 
or rejected.
327
 The ‘cyclic’ research design, rather, is also reflected in how this study 
engages with literature. 
 
As far as the research design is concerned, I argue that this study achieves adequate 
“methodological fit” by means of consistently consolidating this study governed by 
the epistemology of social constructionism – as recommended by Klotz and 
Prakash.
328
 This approach is very much in the spirit of Bourdieu – contemplating on 
him being a forerunner at the onset of the 1990s in bringing theoretical motivated 
research design coupled with empirical research.
329
 
 
2.6 Analysis 
In the preceding text, I have presented the frameworks of how data has been 
collected (ethnography and social constructionism) and will be presented in this 
thesis (Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice and embedded conceptual “thinking tools”). In 
this particular sub-section, I shall briefly describe the ways data has been analysed. 
As already mentioned, these processes are neither taxonomic nor taking place in 
distinguished sequences.  
                                                          
327 Ghauri & Grønhaug 2005, op.cit.; A.B. Thomas 2004, Research skills, op.cit. 25. 
328 A. Klotz & D. Prakash (eds.) 2008, Qualitative Methods in International Relations, op.cit. 
329 M. Lamont, “Looking back at Bourdieu,” in Cultural Analysis and Bourdieu’s Legacy: Settling Accounts and 
Developing Alternatives, eds. E. Silva & A. Warde (London: Routledge, 2010). 
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Data is analysed as part of a deliberate and systematic inquiry which is an ongoing, 
inductive, iterative hermeneutical process where theory can be established in a 
“bottom-up” process.330 This ‘cyclic’ research design is the main aspect which this 
study takes from its ethnographic research strategy. These processes entail 
generalising and explaining on the one hand, and natural field data on the other.
331
 
Findings are juxtaposed with relevant body of literatures to support, modify, or build 
new theories based on empirical findings (the latter assigned primacy in the research 
process). In the present study, Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice as the analytical 
framework, and the elements in the practice equation performing as the required 
“tools” (i.e. habitus, field, doxa, practice) – also known as the FIPH approach332 – 
constitutes the (discourse) analysis of data as something you do rather than a 
separate method (or just text). 
 
The hermeneutic approach underscores the relevance of the prevalence of 
interviewing in this study: to interpret meaningful human actions from the 
perspective of the agent within his or her context (and its structural conditions, i.e. 
‘native categories’ of U.S. think tank China policy-research experts)333 where 
‘subjective’ meanings are produced.334 What constitutes meaningful data is not 
always known prior to engaging with it iteratively during data analysis processes. In 
a Derridean sense, interpretations or meanings cannot be fixed due to the 
‘hermeneutical circle’ is ever-transforming. Readers, including researchers, redefine 
                                                          
330 J.D. Brewer 2000, op.cit.; M.B. Miles & A.M. Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis: an Expanded Sourcebook, 
2nd edn (London: SAGE Publication, 1994). 
331 C. Davies, Reflexive ethnography: a guide to researching selves and others (London: Routledge, 1999). 
332 See A. Leander 2008, “Thinking Tools,” op.cit. 
333 P. Eriksson & A. Kovalainen, Qualitative Methods In Business Research (London: Sage, 2008). 
334 N.G. Noorderhaven, “Hermeneutic Methodology and International Business Research,” in Handbook of 
Qualitative Research in International Business, eds. R. Marschan-Piekkari & C. Welch (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2004), 84-106. 
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and reinterpret with our own frames of references.
335
 This includes adding questions 
in subsequent interviews based on what I interpreted to be relevant to inquiry about 
based on what is expressed by previous interviewees or cues from germane 
contextual surroundings. The process elaborated above differentiates ethnographic 
research from mere “common sense”. 
 
2.6.1 Establishing main themes: Subjectivity, Mind-mapping and 
Interpretive/Ethnographic contents analysis  
An important process in this study, as with all interpretivist research, relates to 
establishing main themes which are portrayed in the analysis chapters based on the 
theoretical foundation. Carrying this out in a transparent manner is particular 
important in an ethnographic study, which has no pre-specified methodological 
route. First of all, I acknowledge that the decisions made in this regard contains 
elements of subjectivity – but justifiable as this process is aligned with the 
subjectivist ontology. Subjectivity is played out in two interrelated ways: main 
themes have been chosen based on my interpretation of what matters the most 
(‘native categories’) to the policy-researchers, and secondly, that decisions 
concerning the main themes are taken within the stricture of the research questions 
(i.e. social constructions of ‘American-ness’ and ‘China’).  
 
In this endeavour, I am employing key elements from interpretive/ethnographic 
contents analysis and the activity of mind-mapping. I have used this approach 
successfully for my previous MPhil research in International Business.
336
 As far as 
                                                          
335 Scott, cited in A.B. Thomas 2004, Research skills, op.cit. 
336 Approved MPhil thesis deemed of very high quality by the external and internal examiners, where my former 
MPhil Lead Supervisor, Dr Malcolm Chapman (trained social anthropologist with a DPhil in the discipline and 
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the former approach is concerned, this process entailed the following features. First, 
each audio-recorded interview was listened to in its full length at least four times. 
The first round reflects the ‘cyclic’ research process in this study, herein utilising the 
relayed oral accounts from interviews in order to alter the interview-questions in 
subsequent interviews (during the field-work).  
 
The second round of listening, post-fieldwork, facilitated for noting down keywords 
from the oral accounts in accordance to main elements embedded in the overarching 
research question: ‘American-ness’, ‘China’ – in addition to the emerging themes 
during the course of interviewing: the nature of the “China-thinking” and China 
policy-research environment within U.S. think tanks as a Bourdieusian social 
field.
337
 The notations on a plain sheet of paper took form as mind-maps where 
related topics were linked with arrows. The size of the circles around a topic-heading 
would be larger or smaller in accordance to the degree of significance. The notions 
also included the time when the topics were discussed (as well as quotes) in the 
recording.  
 
The third and fourth round of listening continued the process described above and 
reduced the risk of important sequences of information being overlooked. During the 
four rounds of listening, I also summarised/transcribed the interviews and 
thematically coded them in accordance to both emerging main themes as well as pre-
selected main areas of inquiry. Furthermore, in the mind-maps, the final listening 
focused chiefly on the application of Bourdieu’s conceptual “thinking-tools” – not 
                                                                                                                                                                    
who has carried out substantial amount of fieldwork) deemed this approach as sufficiently rigorous for research 
degrees. 
337 The latter elements of obtained field-research data probed the relevance for the first analysis chapter in this 
thesis. 
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how to fit  them to the imparted information, but allowing the ‘text’ to inform me 
about the relevance of such application. Self-reflexive contemplations took place 
parallel to these processes, herein critically reflecting on how I analysed the data. 
 
The above-explicated mind-mapping echoes the functioning of coding data. I chose 
the former due its visual faculties, such as linking different circled texts with other 
areas. Thus, I found transcribing all interviews and coding with software 
programmes such as NVivo not to offer my analysis any particular advantages. 
Rather, I find the mind-mapping approach to facilitate for more creative thinking and 
allowing me to observe how various elements of information might be linked. And 
very importantly, this approach is aligned with an interpretive and contextual-based 
ethnographic investigation, as main themes subjectively (by myself) derived from 
each interview – and traversing them – are not mirrors of neither frequency of topics 
being discussed in an interview nor without being subjected to the process of 
interpreting the implied meanings of the policy-researchers’ contextualised 
utterances. Furthermore, the juxtapositioning between literature/theory and field-
research data also accommodates to explore new lines of inquiry and/or reading the 
interviews from new angles. Ultimately, it is the direction of the data analysis in 
tandem with the stricture of the overarching research questions which govern the 
categorisation of how data is presented in the three analysis chapters. 
 
The second feature of the analysis approach relates to what is known as 
interpretive/ethnographic contents analysis. The interpretive version of contents 
analysis entails counting interpretations of contents rather than quantification of the 
contents of text. It differs from traditional contents analysis (quantitative) in the way 
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the coding is done and how the quality is assessed – for example how different parts 
of a text may influence sense-making of other parts when taking context into 
account.
338
 This aspect involves also written material in addition to interviews. Here, 
the aim is to make sense of written material (including electronic communications, 
newsletters and podcasts uploaded on websites) in regard to what constitutes 
‘American-ness’ and ‘China’ in the narratives as cultural sites amongst China policy-
research experts affiliated with U.S. think tanks. 
 
Importantly, analysis encompass identifying patterns in the ‘total universe of data’, 
which consequently governs how main themes and arguments are derived through 
the processes of informing the researcher (me) in a “bottom-up” fashion. Aligned 
with the methodological and research philosophical underpinnings of this study, the 
above decision as far as analysis is concerned signals that data is not applied in order 
to support pre-conceived arguments.  
 
2.6.2 Cross-tabulation 
In this study, to a low extent, cross-tabulating was employed to seek patterns 
between the background data (i.e. policy-researchers) on the one hand, and their 
narratives and other obtained data on the other, as well as with organisational 
boundaries of think-tanks. Cross-tabulation is mostly associated with quantitative 
research.
339
 However, during the analysis the notion of frequency distribution can be 
transferred to qualitative research (i.e. juxtaposing numbers with meaningful data).  
                                                          
338 See A. Ahuvia, “Traditional, Interpretive, and Reception based Content Analyses: Improving the Ability of 
Content Analysis to Address Issues of Pragmatic and Theoretical Concern,” Social Indicators Research 54(2) 
(2001): 139-172. 
339 I.e. making patterns based on juxtaposing two variables analysed simultaneously where at least one is a 
nominal variable depicted as a frequency distribution table (A.B. Thomas 2004, op.cit. 209-210). 
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2.7 Methodological limitations 
The rationale for highlighting methodological limitations relates to acknowledging 
that no research design can be perfect. Any methodological approach features 
potential for remedying short-comings and even flaws, in addition to recognising the 
unavoidable influence of subjectivity when I, as the researcher, am integral to the 
data analysis.
340
 This study cannot be replicated, due the unique nature of 
intersubjectivity. As mentioned in point earlier, in this study, subjectivity relates 
particularly to how I interpret relayed information as well as sense-making of 
observations and contextuality. Furthermore, subjectivity also influences which 
particular elements of the ‘total universe of data’ are focused upon – or not – in 
accordance to the premise and stricture of the overarching research question which 
has been constructed with particular interests in mind. The above, however, is argued 
not to alter the justification of the employed research framework.  
 
Below, I shall briefly depict, in random order, a main methodological limitation for 
the various elements in the consolidated research design/research framework. I am 
not, however, including criticisms which stride beyond the premises of qualitative 
research (i.e. what qualitative research is supposed to achieve).
341
  First, in addition 
to what has already been mentioned regarding subjectivism – aligned with the social 
constructionist epistemology, the study is less adept to examine policy-researchers’ 
cognitive thinking process as the study focuses more on meaning and identity-
                                                          
340 See Sanday 1979, op.cit. 
341 This might come across as a bit superficial within the IR discipline – however, my background from 
conducting ethnographic research in a starkly positivist research environment (MPhil) within the area of 
International Business, reminds me about this “battle” of the ‘great divide’ (epistemology) where qualitative 
research often found itself in a stampede surrounded by statements such as “but you are interpreting what they 
say in the interview – that is not research”, “meaning do not change”, and “do not research it if you cannot 
measure it and generate universally applicable theories”. A bold and consequent attitude is thus a must to 
develop. Eventually, I found it best to defend my approach by not falling into the trap of explaining my research 
on the positivists’ terms (i.e. academic vocabulary and research philosophical foundation).  
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construction shared as a group. Second, in terms of theoretical framework, the 
“reading” and presentation of data are closely aligned with Bourdieu’s Theory of 
Practice and to permeate the concepts of culture and identity as well as methodology 
with Bourdieu’s take on these aspects. This does not indicate a belief that Bourdieu’s 
sociology of sociology is superior to all other social theoretical approaches.  
 
Third, in the methodological realm, being an interview-based ethnography constrains 
opportunities for elaborate triangulation (for example, with observational data). 
However, the multi-method nature of the research design moves beyond an 
interview-only type of study and thus provides additional avenues for inquiry into 
social constructions of ‘American-ness’ and ‘China’. Furthermore, the purposeful 
and snowball “sampling” techniques do lead to marginalising particular voices 
within the China policy-research environment. However, again, as the study is not 
seeking to compare think tanks, test hypotheses, or deduce inferences from statistical 
generalisations – 44 in-depth interviews still provides a significant foundation of 
qualitative empirical data. This, I find, to position me well to theoretically generalise 
– to derive theoretical propositions and concepts about policy-researchers as a fluid 
environment.
342
 This stance can be substantiated by referring to the highly 
appropriate “reflexive sampling”: engagement with research subjects who reflect 
(not represent) the empirically sound and broad dynamics relevant for the academic 
inquiry.
343
 
                                                          
342 See A.B. Thomas, op.cit. 132. I agree with Thomas, this equally valid procedure ought not to be referred to as 
‘generalisation’ as it creates expectations of replication in the strict quantitative sense of the word. As he very 
appropriately states: “it is as well to be aware (…) of falling into methodolatry: in research, slavishly following 
procedures is no substitute for applying imaginative intelligence” (ibid. 133) 
343 I discussed ‘reflexive sampling’ extensively in my MPhil thesis (D.S.A. Guttormsen, “International and 
Intercultural Experiences of Expatriates in Hong Kong: an Ethnography” (unpublished MPhil thesis, University of 
Leeds, 2010b), 82-83, 94-95). 
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2.8 A self-reflexive account: Thinking with the ‘Thinker’ against the 
‘thinker’ 
As a starting point, Bourdieu emphasised a reflexive epistemological pluralism but 
without privileging a form of knowledge as representations of reality.
344
 Self-
reflexivity is an essential element in Bourdieu’s sociology of sociology – and 
arguably ought to be included in any qualitative research endeavour. His obsession 
with this feature (‘objectification of objectification’)345 has placed Bourdieu at the 
forefront of the social sciences in this regard. It serves as a self-analysis of the 
researcher (me, the ‘thinker’ in lower case) as a cultural producer through the 
conducted research within sociohistorical contextuality.
346
 Reflexivity concerns the 
opposing idea of objectivity and neutrality of knowledge.
347
 In the spirit of Bourdieu, 
I find it sensible to turn the “thinking tools” which I employ in this study (those of 
Bourdieu, the ‘Thinker’ in higher case) against myself (‘thinker’ in lower case).348  
 
Importantly, albeit presented as a separate sub-section in this thesis, the self-
reflexive dialogue is not intended to be a one-off exercise aiming to produce one, 
fixed account. The dialogue juxtapositioning Bourdieu’s sociology of sociology and 
my own critical reflections have ensued throughout the entire research endeavour – 
as it is the actual thinking on my part which is the essential activity.
349
 I purport that 
                                                          
344 See R. Jenkins 2002, Pierre Bourdieu, op.cit. 59-60. Prominent examples in Bourdieu’s work include his early 
studies on marriage patterns in Algeria (which also was paramount in the emerging critique of structuralism) (P. 
Bourdieu 1990a, In Other Words, op.cit. 8), cultural tastes (Bourdieu 1984, Distinction, op.cit. 503-518), and 
French academia (Pierre Bourdieu, Homo academicus (Paris: Les éditions de Minuit, 1984b), 69-72).  
345 R. Jenkins 2002, ibid. 61. 
346 L.J.D. Wacquant, “Sociology as Socio-Analysis: Tales of ‘Homo Academicus,” Sociological Forum 5(4) 
(1990): 677-89. 
347 Hammersley & Atkinson 2007, Ethnography, op.cit. 
348 See A. King, “Thinking with Bourdieu against Bourdieu: A 'Practical' Critique of the Habitus,” Sociological 
Theory 18(3) (2000): 417-433. 
349 A.L. Cunliffe, “Social poetics as management inquiry: A dialogical approach,” Journal of Management Inquiry 
11(2) (2002): 128-146. 
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this exercise has an interlinked two-fold advantageous output: it enhances 
transparency allowing the reader to assess my judgements and decision-making as 
far as research design and analysis are concerned. Furthermore, it assists in 
decreasing distortion of internal validity of the research.
350
 Turning the ‘Thinker’ 
(i.e. Bourdieu) against the ‘thinker’ (me – the researcher) moves beyond a mere 
“interpretation of interpretation”,351 or solely dealing with the relationship between 
the researcher and subject of the research.
352
 With this effort, I move beyond mere 
“epistemological prudence” and towards ‘epistemic reflexivity’ as propagated by 
Leander.
353
  
 
Wacquant highlights that Bourdieu’s perspective on reflexivity encompasses a focus 
on the social and intellectual unconscious embedded in the analysis process rather 
than the researcher as individual – the burden lies on the collective enterprise, and 
maintaining epistemological security of sociology.
354
 Bourdieu’s focus on potential 
bias of the researcher due to the intellectual position in the academic field is 
particular original within the social sciences.
355
 It involves the danger to fail 
investigating “the differentia specifica of the logic of practice” and subsequently 
failing to offer systematic critique of “presuppositions inscribed in the fact of 
thinking of the world”.356 In practice, my reflexive dialogue entails contesting my 
intellectual positions in subject-areas such as American politics and think tanks, U.S. 
                                                          
350 A. Bryman & E. Bell, Business research methods, 2nd edn (Oxford: University Press, 2007); A.L. Cunliffe 
2002, op.cit. 128-146. 
351 M. Alvesson & K. Sköldberg 2009, Reflexive Methodology, op.cit. 
352 M. Easterby-Smith, R. Thorpe & P. Jackson, Management Research, 3rd edn (London: Sage, 2008). 
353 A. Leander 2008, “Thinking Tools,” op.cit. 
354 L.J.D. Wacquant & P. Bourdieu 1992, op.cit. 36. 
355 Wacquant & Bourdieu 1992, ibid. 39. Examples on theoreticians of intellectual practice include Garfinkel, 
Clifford, Marcus, Tylor, David Bloor, Steve Woolgar, Platt, Ashmore, Gouldner, Bennett Berger, Giddens, and 
John O’Neill (see Wacquant & Bourdieu 1992, ibid. 36). 
356 Wacquant & Bourdieu 1992, ibid. 39. 
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Foreign Policy, U.S.-Sino relations, policy, and sociology of knowledge – but also 
personal opinions about American culture and the intersubjective nature with 
encountered policy-researcher and think tanks in the U.S. 
 
As far as disciplines are concerned, I embarked on this doctoral research project 
searching for a disciplinary identity as a researcher. My educational trajectory 
reflects my profound motivation to establish an international and intercultural 
profile, and in effect, traversing the International Business and International 
Relations disciplines. In my formal education, however, I have not obtained degrees 
which offer a “professional” or “vocal” identity connected with a discipline (e.g. 
historian): I am not a sociologist or anthropologist, and not a political scientist. 
Having studied two IR degrees, the positioning of the present study as looking 
“outside” from IR was a choice of both convenience – but also being conscious 
about establishing a research profile in alignment with a discipline. Furthermore, 
drawing upon experience with ethnographic and, to some extent, transdisciplinary 
research as an evident facet of my MPhil International Business degree, I also would 
like to label myself as an ‘international transdisciplinarian’. In essence, falling 
between multiple chairs – so to speak – also reflect lacking a “full” body of social 
theoretical knowledge in disciplines interfacing with my study. This slight sensation 
of “inferiority” in this regard, might be a result of my national background: a 
Norwegian system where professionalised titles are strongly upheld and legally 
protected in addition to a more firm trajectory where PhD students in principal can 
only conduct doctoral research within the discipline where they obtained their MPhil 
(and often reflecting the undergraduate major).    
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Before commencing the present research, intellectually, I was profoundly influenced 
by my experiences as a postgraduate research student in International Business. A 
“corporatised” milieu heavily entrenched in positivist embedded quantitative 
research agendas where the ‘qualitative’ and ‘interpretive’ occur at the peripheral of 
the business academe and often considered inferior. If not explicitly uttered – it was 
often felt working as a “disciplinary doxa” embodied as the modus operandi in 
mainstream research. It is here, where I developed an adverse “epistemological 
allergy” towards positivism. Not necessarily within its own paradigm, but rather in 
the way it was practiced in cultural research, the neglect of tapping into decades of 
social theoretical advancements, in addition to the symbolic power it held and 
symbolic violence it exercised when monopolising what warranted “common-sense”, 
“research proper”, and what ought to matter (defining the “stake at stakes” and what 
capital which had any value in the field of business-academia).  
 
This is perhaps evident in my overly interest in methodology and research 
philosophy as far as research design is concerned. To remain only accountable for 
the firmly delimited research scope became a way of “sensing the game” – and to 
survive through gaining some capital by questioning their underlying assumptions – 
an exposure many of them (i.e. positivists) had little familiarity with. Ultimately, this 
has likely made me particularly sympathetic of Bourdieu’s epistemological critique 
underlying his Theory of Practice. Coupled with my drive for researching the 
international and intercultural, a dialectical approach to understand Self/Other 
constellations, identity and culture seem destined. Fair to say, my “allergy” has also 
made me wary of the Political Science degrees which flourish in the think tank 
environment.   
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For my MPhil, however, where I conducted an ethnographic investigation of 
Scandinavian expatriates in Hong Kong drawing upon social anthropology and 
sociology, I was supervised by a rarity in business-schools: a trained social 
anthropologist. The applied focus on theory, fortunately, gave me a relaxed 
viewpoint on labels and taxonomic categorisation. Thus, Barth appeals to me as I am 
more interested in why and how we consider “us” and “them” differently, not the 
différence alone. My thinking has increasingly becoming rooted in giving primacy to 
the epistemological drivers for research as well as the social conditionings. My entry 
point into constructivism research programme debates in IR research is therefore not 
if “ideas matters” but instead the unavoidable reality of intersectionality between 
physicality and construction – an Achilles heel for the social sciences. It follows – it 
is not an ultimate objective to be either a structuralist or post-structuralist. 
Consequently, I consider ethnographic research (“bottom-up”) a line of intriguing 
inquiry rather than a potential minefield or mystery of inconvenience.  
 
My international outlook and embrace of grappling with Self/Other constellations 
caused a challenge and possibly bias when a sheer volume of my American 
interviewees exhibited (in my view) little interest (perhaps even capabilities) to 
reflect upon and contest their perceptions (i.e. ‘American-ness’) – which Cunliffe 
refers to as an unquestioning culture.
357
 Coming from a small country (Norway), I 
am used to looking inside-out with little experience in being immersed in a national 
contextuality where a “whole world” is contained within the country borders. 
Furthermore, being from a country where “everyone are social democrats”358 and 
                                                          
357 Ann Cunliffe, “Assessing Reflexivity in Professional Doctorate Practice and Research” (paper presented at a 
The Higher Education Academy event, University of Bedfordshire, Luton, 14 March, 2014). 
358 See Guttormsen 2010c, op.cit. 
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where the political continuum is eschewed far towards the political left in an 
American context – I certainly easily read oral accounts and utterances through 
social democratic lenses. It dawned upon me, whilst located in Washington, DC, as 
opposed to Norway (a middle-power state at the best – regionally), the U.S. need to 
respond to an array of challenges only due to its sheer size. Due to being very 
interested in world affairs, and thus U.S. foreign policies, I do have biases relating to 
how I perceive Americans (as a generalisation) are perceiving and understanding 
“the world”. I only see one ‘social reality’ out of the myriads which exist – and I 
need to remind myself about that none are superior. For example, my discontent with 
Fox News could easily influence my thinking about policy-researchers in The 
Heritage Foundation as this channel was projected on a large TV-screen in the lobby. 
This serves also as a good reminder that my research objective is not to “speak for” 
an interviewee or justify their utterances. The aim, rather, is to understand them on 
their own terms (‘native categories’) and impart this to readers – albeit not with the 
belief that I can preserve “uncontaminated data” but my interpretation of such oral 
accounts and other obtained data.  
 
Thus, in sum, I was in a way a “Frenchman in America”, as with Bourdieu, doing 
“European” research (read: qualitative). A constant self-reflexive dialogue with 
myself during all aspects of the research endeavour demands, as well as creates, a 
healthy, creative inquisitive mind which are required when the researcher is to such a 
high degree intertwined in the research process. Again, this written output is not 
major significance, but the advantages from immersing myself with these thinking 
processes, are. This type of gaze is something all researchers, particularly those 
110 
 
wedded to the qualitative, interpretivist domain, should vigorously engage with, as 
well as across the aisle with the positivists.  
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CHAPTER 3 
AN EXPLORATORY LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.0 Chapter Introduction 
This chapter has a two-fold purpose. Principally, it reviews two selected bodies of 
literature in order to justify the relevance of the present study by elucidating how the 
research contributes to original knowledge. The selected literatures are reviewed as 
part of an exploratory literature review, i.e. a focus on identifying trends (breadth) in 
the literature rather than depth.
359
 This review addresses the literatures from the 
disciplinary position of International Relations (IR).  
 
The first strand of literature surveys the application of Bourdieu in IR research. This 
inquiry is delimited to his Theory of Practice and the associated conceptual “thinking 
tools” including ‘habitus’, ‘field’, ‘capital’, ‘doxa’, ‘interests’, and ‘strategies’. This 
particular review section does not include Bourdieu’s meta-theoretical work. This 
undertaking links directly to the underlying enterprise of this study: to enlarge a 
recent research trend labelled as the Bourdieusian ‘sociological turn’ in IR 
research.
360
 This pursuit places my study at the very core of IR’s interface with 
Bourdieu’s social theory. The prominent Bourdieu and IR scholar, Anna Leander, 
highlights a “flurry of publications, conference panels and collaborative research 
projects inspired by Bourdieu” which she argues “has made a basic understanding of 
his mode of thinking part of what is expected from “mainstream constructivist” IR 
scholars”. Consequently, she calls for inquires to move beyond descriptively 
                                                          
359 A.B. Thomas 2004, op.cit. 72-73. 
360 See A. Leander, “Habitus and Field,” International Studies Association Compendium Project (Blackwell, 
2009a), 8 
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introducing his “thinking tools” and towards assessing the promise of Bourdieusian 
thinking in IR.
361
 
 
The second strand engages with the specialised think tank literature. It proposes a 
new ‘analytical school’ which focuses on conceptualisation and analytical 
investigation beyond mere description – a common characteristics in the pre-21st 
century literature.
362
 This strand of literature also connects with two secondary 
inquires which deepens the argument as far as relevance of this study is concerned. 
First, the discussion highlights the lack of focus on think tanks as organisations in IR 
research and as key players in U.S. foreign policies towards China. In effect, these 
aspects consequently contribute to hoist awareness of non-state players in IR – a 
discipline predominantly and conventionally preoccupied with the ‘state’ as the 
acknowledged, dominant and solitary key player in the international system.
363
 
Second, this strand also reviews studies relating to ideational aspects and U.S.-Sino 
relations, in particularly U.S.’ perceptions of China. Collectively, these two 
secondary inquiries are in point of fact contributing to diffuse think tanks into IR 
research and U.S.’ China-policies as non-state actors explored from the individual 
level (i.e. policy-researchers). Both literature strands are utilising, principally, 
policy-researchers (within China-related areas) as the ‘unit of analysis’ and their 
affiliated Washington, DC, based think tanks as the empirical foundation.  
 
                                                          
361 Anna Leander, “The Promises, Problems, and Potentials of a Bourdieu-Inspired Staging of International 
Relations,” International Political Sociology 5: 294-295. 
362 Personal conversation with Professor Diane Stone, 6 April 2010 (leading international expert on think tanks – 
amongst other areas). 
363 See Guzzini 1998 op.cit.; Morgenthau 1948, op.cit.; Waltz 1979, op.cit. 
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Importantly, in terms of the second purpose of the review, this chapter also identifies 
opportunities for theoretical development. In brief, this endeavour relates to the 
simultaneous deployment of Bourdieu’s “thinking tools” and a focus on the dynamic 
relationality between them – a multiple usage of Bourdieu’s concepts which lacks 
across the social sciences.
364
 The second reviewed section on think tanks, however, 
rather accommodates for submitting an empirical contribution to the specialised 
think tank literature, the IR research agenda in addition to U.S. Politics and Foreign 
Policy. 
 
A study based on theoretical gaps in the literature is not required – as opposed to the 
traditional research process where theory is assumed to have primacy.
365
 The role of 
literature, in this study, reflects the ‘cyclic’ research process aligned with 
ethnography where field-research (data/field-research) is granted (predominantly) 
ascendancy. The research problem as a social phenomenon – not specific theoretical 
“gaps” in the literature – serves as the epistemological and ontological driver of the 
inquiry in this study. 
 
This is carried out in order to potentially support, confirm, modify, or build new 
theories through verification and validation of findings.
366
 In the present study, this 
                                                          
364 Swartz 2008, op.cit. 45-52. The sheer volume of Bourdieu-inspired studies tends to employ the concepts 
separately. 
365 See Burnham et.al, Research Methods in Politics, 2nd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 45-46 
for an example of the latter. On epistemological and ontological grounds, I disagree with this depiction, which for 
me, appears as a result of assuming that what constitutes research proper in Political Science equates to what 
behaviourism and positivism dictate as “true” through institutionalisation of what is portrayed as “common-
sense”. In fact, I argue that these theoretical strands reflect the ‘native categories’ of political scientists as a 
Bourdieusian ‘doxa’.  See also D.S.A. Guttormsen and M. Jacoby 2011, op.cit. 
366 J.D. Brewer, Ethnography (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000), 107; G. Gobo, Doing Ethnography 
(London: Sage, 2008), 227; Hammersley & Atkinson 2007, 21, 159; Mehmetoglu 2004, op.cit. 38, 119, 126; A.B. 
Thomas, Research Skills for Management Studies (Routledge, 2004), 26. See R.M. Keesing & A.J. Strathern, 
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occurs particularly through support (relevance of Bourdieu in IR research), modify 
(the applicability of Bourdieu in IR research), and build new theories (think tank 
policy-researchers’ perceptions of China and Bourdieu’s sociological sociology as 
explanatory framework).
367
 I acknowledge that the identified areas of literatures are 
indeed intertwined in a subjective process, which subsequently influences the actual 
selection of what literatures I aim to contribute to.  
 
The search of literature has been employed, principally, as part of five approaches. 
One approach relates to database searches (ABI Global/Inform and ESCBO) by 
using various strings of keywords. The second approach entails to browsing through 
a set of influential and relevant IR journals (hence not only using impact-factor 
based rankings as a parameter), and by using the similar/same strings of keywords as 
search words within these particular journals. Third, the keyword-strings were also 
applied in various searches making use of the Google Scholar search engine. Fourth, 
authoritative review articles are drawn upon,
368
 and finally, I applied the same 
approach for academic journals and databases in books searches. 
 
3.1 Literature strand 1: Bourdieu in International Relations (IR) research 
The first strand of literature relates to the deployment of Bourdieu’s social theory in 
International Relations (IR) research. The main enterprise of this study coincides 
with the underlying endeavour of the research, i.e. contributing to bring more of 
Bourdieu thinking into the IR discipline (and subsequently adding to the body of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Cultural anthropology: A contemporary perspective, 3rd edn (1998); J. van Maanen, Qualitative Methodology 
(Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983). 
367 The ‘confirm’ aspect plays a more diminutive role as I am not “testing” pre-established 
hypothesis/propositions, neither in a quantitative nor qualitative sense. 
368 This encompass in particularly A. Leander, “Habitus and Field,” International Studies Association 
Compendium Project (Blackwell, 2009a). 
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studies associated with the Bourdieusian ‘sociological turn’ of IR research). Thus, 
the literature review is principally directed to this strand more so than the successive 
one. In particularly, this relates to the use of Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice and 
associated conceptual “thinking tools”.  
 
3.1.1 “Outside-In” perspective 
According to the prominent Bourdieu-scholar Anna Leander, Bourdieu’s concepts of 
‘habitus’ and ‘field’ entered the lexis and purview of the IR research agenda during 
the various ‘turns’ of the 1980s.369 It transpired, however, foremost amongst scholars 
outside the IR discipline who researched what ensues to be the core of the 
discipline’s intellectual activity - ‘international problems’. These developments also 
elucidate an important facet of IR within the broader context of the classical social 
science landscape. IR has not been a frontrunner in intellectual advancements as far 
as social theory is concerned. For example, Bourdieu’s core work was published in 
the early 1960s,
370
 and furthermore, social constructionism was already a household 
name in classical social science disciplines, for instance Berger and Luckman who 
prominently dominated this stage in the mid-1960s.
371
 Moreover, Social 
Anthropology had dealt with identity since the 1930s and immersed itself with 
                                                          
369 For example, ‘reflectivist’, post-modernist, and “sociological” ‘turns’ (Leander 2009a, ibid. 13). 
370 This point also illustrates the strong Anglo-Saxon nature of IR as a discipline, for example contemplating on 
the later publication dates of Bourdieu’s work in the Anglophone-world (sometimes a decade later) and the fact 
that Bourdieu really never fitted in within a strongly departmentalised and non-interdisciplinary focus in US 
research culture (D. Swartz, “Pierre Bourdieu and North American Political Sociology: Why He Doesn't Fit In But 
Should,” French Politics 4(1) (2010): 84-99, and see Ole Wæver, “The Sociology of a Not So International 
Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations,” International Organization 52(4) 
(1998): 687–727)  
371 See P.L. Berger & T. Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge 
(Garden City: Anchor, 1966). An important note on IR’s poor relationship with research philosophy (in this case 
epistemology) was touched upon in Chapter Two: the discipline’s dealing with the different premises of 
constructivism (and its social psychological intellectual heritage) and constructionism (and the predominantly 
social anthropological theoretical camp) with distinctive variations and implications on how to study the world, 
culture as well as identity. This may amount to, at worst, 2-3 decades which have results in an unconscious use 
of the social psychological heritage through constructivism which consequently evolves into a conflictual 
relationship with a constructionist epistemology. 
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meaning-production inquiries and a retreat from the notion of being an objectivist 
science in the 1960s.
372
  
 
Returning to Bourdieu, the focus on these particular concepts also reflects the 
dominant research paradigm in IR: A permeating structuralism (in social theory) and 
the state-centric focus within the realist ‘school of thought’ in IR and cognate 
subject-fields. Two lines of inquiries evolved within this “outside-in” perspective, 
namely the international preceding the national (where international elements are 
shaping the national of whatever being studied), and the inverse notion – the national 
shaping the international or transnational (for example how the logic of the field 
moulds internationalisation strategies and being structured by the relevant 
habitus).
373
  
 
As part of the first line of inquiry, studies engaged particularly with power-relations 
and elite’s capital accumulation. For the former, for example, Bourdieu’s study of 
the Kabyle society during the 1970s encapsulates the above juncture by showing that 
colonialism and worker migration were key sources of societal change.
374
 His 
exposure in the field also led to his departure from the heavily dominating theoretical 
orientation of structuralism – in particularly championed by his mentor, French 
social anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss. In the Kabyle House, amongst Berber 
peasantry in Algeria experiencing their marriage patterns, Bourdieu discovered the 
lack of predictive power of the structuralist rules when investigating what people 
                                                          
372 M. Chapman, “Social Anthropology, Business Studies, and Cultural Issues,” International Studies of 
Management & Organization 26(4) (1997): 4. 
373 A. Leander 2009a, “Habitus and Field,” op.cit. 12-15. 
374 P. Bourdieu, Algeria 1960: The Disenchantment of the World: The Sense of Honour: The Kabyle House or the 
World Reversed: Essays, trans. R. Nice (Cambridge: University Press, 1979).  
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actually do (practices). The rules dictated that marriage ought to be between partial 
cousins (ideology). However, he found that this form of marriage only represented 3-
6% of the cases. Thus, he replaced such rules of marriage rituals with a model of 
social practice where strategies are integral to cultural disposition (i.e. habitus).
375
   
 
Similar findings have been identified by various other scholars. Boltanski identified 
the reinforced internationalisation of the French economy in the 1950s through 
Americanisation of the international economy.
376
 Lebaron pinpointed how French 
economists possessed dominating positions making it possible to renegotiate their 
status and the logic of the “French field of economics” through the transformation of 
the international field (i.e. from qualitative Keynesian economists to one dominated 
with neo-classical underpinnings creating the capital (diplomas and titles) into a 
valuable form of capital).
377
 Swartz argues that important hurdles for a breakthrough 
for Bourdieu in American Political Sociology and Political Science are strongly 
related to the distinctive nature of Bourdieu’s work. This was evident, for example, 
through his French nationality and the “leftist” label, and arguably the firm 
disciplinary boundaries in the American academe whereas Bourdieu’s work often 
fell between two stools.
378
 In a similar review paper, Chen and Zhang showcase the 
usage of Bourdieu in Chinese academic literature and research in regard to China. 
The authors argue that Chinese scientist have learnt, very recently, about Bourdieu 
via their North-American colleagues rather than from Europe.
379
 
                                                          
375 R. Jenkins, Pierre Bourdieu, 1992, op.cit. 38-41. 
376 L. Boltaniski “Visions of American Management in Post-war France,” Theory and Society 12(3) (1983): 375-
403. 
377 Lebaron, “La dénégation du Pouvoir. Le champ des économistes français au milieu des années 1990. “ Actes 
de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales 119 (1997): 3-27. See Leander 2010, “Habitus and Field,” 13. 
378 D.L. Swartz 2009, op.cit. 94. 
379 N. Chen and X. Zang, “Bourdieu and Chinese Sociology,” Sociologica: Italian Journal of Sociology (2009).  
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‘Habitus’ and ‘field’ have been used in studies revolving around elites accumulating 
capital in the international sphere which subsequently position them to renegotiate 
their status and nature of capital in their home countries. Examples include 
internationalisation of Brazilian elites,380 Bolivian elites,
381
 Latin-America as a 
region in general,
382
 as well as in Bourdieu’s own backyard – French institutions 
such as grandes écoles,
383
 public administration,
384
 and political career paths in 
France.
385
 
 
Reversely, in the second line of inquiry, Leander identifies the national 
‘habitus’/’field’ shaping the international/transnational fields. She depicts how the 
logic of the field shapes internationalisation strategies and structured by the relevant 
‘habitus’ promoted by different actors at the national level.386 Studies include, for 
example, humanitarian law (lawyers playing an intermediate role between law and 
diplomacy as a keystone in innovating European law),
387
 international legal 
orthodoxy and consensus (the authors refer to a ‘social habitus’),388 European 
integration (a common culture amongst European officials which enables them to 
                                                          
380 M.R. Loureiro. “L'Internationalization des milieux dirigeants au Brazil.” Actes de la recherche en sciences 
sociales 121/122 (1998): 42-52. 
381 F. Poupeau. “Sur deux formes de capital international. Les “élites de la globalisation“ en Bolivie.” Actes de la 
Recherche en Sciences Sociales 152 (2004): 126-133. 
382 Y. Dezalay & B.G. Garth. The Internationalization of Palace Wars: Lawyers, Economists and the Contest to 
Transform Latin American States (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2002). 
383 G. Lezuech. “L’Internationalization des grandes écoles francaises.” Actes de la recherche en sciences 
sociales 121/122 (1998): 66-67. 
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385 N. Kauppi, “European Union Institutions and French Political Carrées. “ Scandinavian Political Studies 19(1) 
(1996): 1-24; N. Kauppi, Democracy, Social Resources and Political Power in the European Union (Manchester: 
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386 Leander 2009, op.cit. 14.  
387 M.R. Madsen, “From Cold War Instrument to Supreme European Court: The European Court of Human 
Rights at the Crossroads of International and National Law and Politics,” Law and Social Inquiry 32(1) (2007): 
137-159. Madsen refers, however, to a ‘collective habitus’ rather than a ‘national habitus’ (pp. 149, 151). 
388 Y. Dezalay & B.G. Garth. The Internationalization of Palace Wars: Lawyers, Economists and the Contest to 
Transform Latin American States (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), 69. 
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effectively embody the interests of the Community),
389
 transnational professional 
field of economics (through application of global (predominantly US) standards 
concerning work and professional practices also at local levels which reproduces 
transnational mechanisms into their economic professional identity),
390
 European 
level immigrant policy (using Bourdieu’s convertibility of capital to understand 
different immigrant groups),
391
 transnational policing networks,
392
 and transnational 
anti-corruption discourse.
393
 
 
3.1.2 Within IR: “Constructivist structuralism”394 
From the onset of the 1990s, the IR community witnessed a somewhat closer 
engagement with ‘habitus’ and ‘field’ inside the discipline. It reflects a time when IR 
scholars enlarged their inquiries into broadened trodden areas of the social sciences, 
humanities, and political sciences. The focus nevertheless was theoretical-driven, 
hence not in dialogue with the aforementioned international studies.
395
 One stream of 
research relates to the very core of Bourdieu’s research, as well as social theory in 
general – to transcend the divide between subjectivism and objectivism. 
                                                          
389 D. Georgakakis, “European Civil Service as Group: Sociological Notes about the ‘Eurocrats’ Common 
Culture,” in The European Dimension of Administrative Culture, eds. J. Beck & F. Thedieck (Baden-Baden: 
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391 V. Guiraudon, “De-Nationalization control: analyzing state responses to constraints on migration control,” in 
Controlling a New Migration World, eds. V. Guiraudon & C. Joppke (London: Routledge, 2001). 
392 D. Bigo, Polices en Réseaux. L'Experience Européenne (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1996). 
393 M. Coerdray, “Le double jeu de l'import-export symbolique. La construction d'un nouveau discours sur la 
corruption,” Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales 152 (2004): 81-90. 
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and non-Lévi-Strauss tradition. But rather, when it came to ‘structuralism’ or ‘structuralist’, he argues that it exist 
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“Social Space and Symbolic Power,” Sociological Theory 7(1) (1989): 14-25). 
395 Leander 2009a, “Habitus and Field,” op.cit. 15. 
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“Constructivist structuralism” relates to the dialectic relationship between agency 
and structure as never separate and constantly transforming.  
 
Bourdieu’s ‘habitus’ and ‘field’ have been used to investigate the inside/outside 
division by Ashley (specific norms existing in different regional practices, hence any 
conceptualisation of a universal culture is a practice of imposing a particular 
international order)
396
 and Bigo and Tsoukala (actors with agency operating and 
moving between different Bourdieusian fields).
397
 
 
Several cognate studies can be included, including power in Guzzini’s study of 
realist thought, the IPE dimension in particularly, as an evolution of a paradigm 
arguing that its historical evaluation must be understood between the internal and 
external history – the latter encompassing both the intellectual environment where 
power plays out due to theories are constructed within this realm as well as 
occurrences in world affairs.
398
 Holzscheiter presented the use of non-material power 
in transnational discourse by non-state actors such as NGOs.
399
 In the field of 
security, Leander applied Bourdieu’s ‘structural power’ and shifts of power from 
public/state to private/market. This has become evident contemplating on private 
military companies (PMC) as a player, i.e. from the civil to the military sphere.
400
 
Pouliot establishes a bridge between practical and theoretical relations to the world 
                                                          
396 R.K. Ashley, “Imposing International Purpose: Notes on a Problematique of Governance,” in Global Changes 
and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s, eds. E-O. Czempiel & J. Rosenau 
(Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989), 251-290. 
397 D. Bigo & A. Tsoukala (eds.), Terror, Insecurity and Liberty: Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes (New York 
and London: Routledge, 2008). 
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by addressing practices/logic of practicality in security communities where “peace 
exists in and through practice when security officials’ practical sense makes 
diplomacy the self-evident way to solving interstate disputes”.401 Jackson debates the 
role of culture in regard to social orientations of social actors and the structural 
environment,
402
 and Mérand and Pouliot reflect on the International Studies subject-
field.
403
 
 
3.1.3 Within IR: Interfacing with IR/IPE theories 
Leander reports that ‘habitus’ and ‘field’ were increasingly engaged with at the start 
of the 1990s, and more so in relation to specific IR (and International Political 
Economy (IPE)) theories. In this instance, the conceptual “thinking tools” provided 
avenues for contesting traditional aspects of inter-state relations, such as an 
international society of states constituting a field with its own “stakes at stake”, 
power positions, and habitus.
404
 Götze conducted research in this style by employing 
‘habitus’/’field’ in her research on democratic peace.405 
 
Büger and Villumsen followed suit by applying the same topic as an empirical case 
in order to show how the gap between IR theory and practice should be avoided and 
rather focus on their interconnectivity. The authors drew upon Bourdieu’s Practice 
Theory in order to grasp IR as social practices and where democratic peace theory 
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was established as the anti-thesis (binary) to war. They call upon increased 
reflexivity of researchers’ activities, and that self-reinforcing “truth-claims” in a web 
with U.S. foreign policy makers, think tanks, NATO bureaucrats and politicians in 
regard to what issues warrants the label ‘security issue’, or not, during complex 
science-politics interactions, need to be studied in a relevant context and actors.
406
 
 
Furthermore, along these lines, ‘habitus’ and ‘field’ were deployed by Hopf in the 
area of foreign policy. He applies constructivist lenses on foreign policy motivation 
and interests, and how ‘habitus’ reproduce practices into regularities.407 In the area of 
European security and defense policy, Mérand argues that power struggles including 
symbolic aspects do matter as actors have structure-induced dispositions towards 
understanding the world. Ideas and interests are integral of such processes. He 
showcases how a culturally shared ‘professional habitus’ is being induced by NATO 
assisted internationalisation of European armed forces through military convergence 
which becomes increasingly more difficult to escape due to being invested in the 
‘illusion’ of “the EU game”.408  
 
Adler-Nissen tackles European diplomacy using Bourdieu to understand the Council 
of Ministers and diplomacy as fields. The latter features a discrepancy between 
theory and diplomatic practice which is surrounding formal protocol when an EU 
member-state opts out of a major policy area. And further, exclusionary outcomes 
may be reduced or enhanced based on the particular diplomatic opt-out strategy. The 
                                                          
406 C. Büger & T. Villumsen, “Beyond the Gap: Relevance, fields of practice and the securitizing consequences of 
(democratic peace) research,” Journal of International Relations and Development 10 (2007): 17–48 
407 T. Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 31. See Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 78. 
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diplomatic habitus is a disposition to act, perceive and think in accordance to 
internalised rules and values – dependent on the more power-providing and less 
visible political power derived from social capital.
409
  
 
Additionally, Hassdorf utilises ‘habitus’/’field’ in the area of financial markets. He 
approaches international finance as a field which has developed in a very volatile 
and politicised field of economic struggle. He applies Bourdieu’s symbolic power to 
show how the state imposes social meaning through authority as a means to direct 
authority-dependent international financial markets. This is made possible by its 
intersubjective nature based on social capital, and as a result of lacking economic 
capital as the latter source was negatively associated with “macho” policymaking 
during conservative Major and Thatcher governments in Britain.
410
 
 
Williams engages more comprehensively and rigorously with Bourdieu’s Theory of 
Practice when laying out his “cultural security” approach. He argues for the 
significance of international security as a “cultural field”. Moreover, cultural 
strategies are highlighting struggles of symbolic power in international security as an 
explanatory framework. In effect, the approach breaks with central ontological tools 
within constructivism as well as mainstream IR research by linking the power 
struggles to the survival/transformation of NATO as well as disciplinary research 
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practice regarding liberal democratic peace perspectives and the growing authorial 
position of neo-conservative thinking in U.S. policy decision-making.
411
   
 
3.1.4 Within IR: Linking with non-traditional IR/IPE research avenues 
IR scholars have also used ‘habitus’ and ‘field’ to investigate IR/IPE areas in novel 
fashions.
412
 ‘Novel’, in this regard, alludes to an analytical level other than the 
conventional ontological tools of realists, in addition to players operating at non-
state levels. Leander explores the ability to govern and shape security through their 
public and private networks.
413
  In her 2005 article, the novelty relates to how issues 
concerning private military companies (PMC) are neglected to be addressed as they 
fall outside the ontological awareness of the reigning ‘school of thought’ of realism. 
She argues that power has shifted from the public (state) to the private (market) 
including the military sphere trumpeting the public arena – subsequently giving 
agency to the former. Leander uses Bourdieu to explain how PMCs hold the power 
to shape the security agenda through manifesting their interests and preferences as 
“common-sense” in terms of how to understand security. In turn, this has enabled 
PMCs to militarise the discourse on security in addition to being conceived as 
legitimate security experts due to their ‘structural power’ – dependent on their 
position in the field of security.  
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Moreover, Leander elaborates and explores ‘practices’ and why they are offering an 
important line of inquiry – one which she argues is significant due to different forms 
of capital. Such capital (i.e. economic, social, cultural and symbolic) warrants whose 
activities matters and that the reasons why practices work in the way they do are a 
result of dispositions (‘habitus’) and granted views (‘doxa’). The private 
military/security business is used as an empirical case to show the relevance of 
employing Bourdieu in order to entice thinking concerning governance. This 
includes in particular change – taking benefit from what is being expressed and 
exercised, mapping hierarchy of importance of activities as well as inclusion of 
context (i.e. how practices relate to other practices).  
 
Neumann highlights the void of studying the body in IR although having received 
increased focus in the wider social sciences. He draws upon Bourdieu’s meta-theory 
on class (relative rather than absolute as with Marx, and consumption rather than 
production). Further, he illustrates the importance of gendered bodies and classed 
bodies within the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) as a constitutive 
factor of how the MFA hierarchical order has an impact on diplomats differentiated 
life chances.
414
 In accordance with Bourdieu, class is constituted not only by style 
and taste, which is frequenting in the world of diplomacy (over material and social 
aspects, including gender performativity).
415
 
 
Epstein shows how international policy agendas can be reshaped through NGO-state 
relations with ‘habitus’ and ‘field’ in discourses on whaling. She focused on practice 
                                                          
414 I.B. Neumann, “The Body of the Diplomat,” European Journal of International Relations 14(4) (2008): 671-
695. See p. 647. 
415 Also see Bourdieu 1984, Distinction, op.cit. 
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such as states being competitively “socialised” through interacting with other players 
in a particular playing field and from a particular position (what people do, and not 
only say) – where interests are not pre-determined. This breaks up with the 
individualist-utilitarian model of ‘interests’.416 Götze explains how social hierarchies 
in China were reshaped by civil society creating new forms of symbolic power 
through struggling over social hierarchies which should be understood within 
cultural structures which are conditioning practices.
417
  
 
Lastly, Pop provides an explanation of democratic transition in former communist 
East-European countries. Different categories of actors mobilise symbolic capital, 
and the desire to save face and avoid open conflicts result in practices aiming to 
reproducing power hierarchies. ‘Habitus’, ‘field’, and practices are used to traverse 
both macro and micro dimensions of the domestic/international interaction in regard 
to Romania’s relationship with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) during the 
1990s where macro-structures constituted possible interaction on the micro level as 
different fields. Pop elucidates that the epitomes of ‘field’ (i.e. “(...) identifiable 
actors, the distribution of their assets, the structural relationship between the 
positions of the actors in the field, the stakes of field-specific struggles, the 
boundaries that separate out the insiders from the outsiders ...”) are evolving 
processes. Pro-market reforms were played out by Romanian political parties on the 
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Press, 2008). 
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international arena in an effort to be reintegrated into the global political economy as 
resistance was played out at the national level.
418
  
 
3.1.5 Within IR – and beyond: advancements through diffusion of Bourdieu 
The review in this sub-section (i.e. Bourdieu in IR research strand) is being brought 
to an end by reiterating the initial encouragement by prominent Bourdieu-scholar, 
Professor Anna Leander: to assess the promise of Bourdieusian thinking in IR rather 
than merely describing his theory.
419
 This statement, presented in a 2011 
International Political Sociology article, reflects a bold move to advance the 
application of Bourdieu in IR research. Leander progresses with this mission by 
addressing, and indeed incorporating, posited criticism of Bourdieu’s “structuralist 
constructivism”.420 This new milestone also underscores the very timely aim to 
examine the relevance of deploying Bourdieu’s conceptual “thinking tools” in my 
own study – and the relationality between them even more so. Furthermore, in my 
study, the focus on collecting new data through ethnography as the methodology 
enhances this properness as it accommodates for both “testing” the relevance of 
Bourdieu’s “thinking tools” as well as functioning as a sounding-board for exploring 
further advancements.
421
  
 
The criticism has increased in strength proportional to the broader engagement with 
Bourdieu, hinting that “the promise is a false lure”.422 Main threads of such criticism 
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relate to the evident traces of structuralism featuring Bourdieu’s social theory,423 and 
the diverse group of (predominantly) French “pragmatic” stances having been staged 
against Bourdieu’s “critical” sociology.424 Leander advances Bourdieu in IR research 
by moving Bourdieu’s sociological thinking in a direction which incorporates key 
criticisms by the “pragmatists” in order to be able to paint a different 
‘international’.425 This approach of reading Bourdieu has augmented the interface 
with this social theory, and moved the inquiry from an interdisciplinary modus 
operandi (“merely” borrowing from Bourdieu) and rather into altering the very 
practices of conducting IR research in studies applying his thinking (i.e. diffusion) – 
what I would label transdisciplinary research.
426
  
 
3.1.6 Bourdieu in IR research: Synthesising and theoretical development 
To reiterate, the purpose of this literature review chapter is two-fold. It aims to 
identify trends in a delimited area of literature in addition to seeking opportunities 
for theoretical development by juxtaposing the aforementioned trends with the 
established research study. Before embarking on this exploration, it should be noted 
that the surveyed publications are by no means an exhaustive body of literature 
published by Bourdieu – nor does it include all studies where his Theory of Practice 
has been applied. Following Leander, I am focusing on research centering on 
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international research problems as the focal point, and being associated with the IR 
discipline.
427
   
 
Based on the above survey – relevant to the stricture of my study – I argue there are 
five identifiable trends in regard to the application of Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice 
in IR research. First, in terms of the scope of Bourdieu’s conceptual “thinking tools”, 
it can be noted that ‘habitus’ and ‘field’ are the most frequently deployed concepts 
followed by ‘capital’ and the Bourdieusian approach to grapple with ‘power’. It 
follows, importantly, that marshalling the various conceptual “thinking tools” in 
tandem (more than two) appears infrequently. Even more so is the lack of focusing 
on the relationality between them albeit being fundamental to Bourdieu’s practice 
theory.
428
 Part of this argument relates to that concepts such as ‘interests’, 
‘strategies’, and ‘doxa’ have been underused.  
 
Moreover, self-reflexive deliberations are hardly non-existent in published work, but 
are nevertheless central to Bourdieu’s sociology of sociology.429 From the 
perspective of the researcher, this calls for the worthwhile exercise to harness 
Bourdieu’s “thinking tools” on myself – to use the thinker (Bourdieu) against the 
thinker (me).
430
 This undertaking has the potential to augment transparency, 
trustworthiness, and credibility of the research. This can be achieved by attempting 
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to become more aware of my own biases which inexorably exist due to the 
subjective processes in play when a researcher is integral to the analysis.  
 
Second, following from the previous point, a majority of papers are conceptual. 
Collectively, they are seldom contributing with new empirical field-research.
431
 
Subsequently, this precludes the research inquiry to espouse a “bottom-up” 
approach. This could better inform the investigation regarding the relevance of 
which concepts are warranted to employ (depending on the field-research) as well as 
the relational nature between them. Third, the interlinked lines of inquiries of think 
tanks and their policy-researchers as well as China in concert reflect a substantial 
space for where Bourdieu’s sociology scarcely has been applied.432 Fourth, 
contemplating on geographical areas, it is also prevalent that there is a lack of 
applying Bourdieu in a North-American context or, alternatively, which ensues to be 
performed in a very disjointed manner.
433
 
 
As far as theoretical development is concerned, the above review of Bourdieu in IR 
research reveals potential for achieving advancements in two interrelated lines of 
inquiries. First, in terms of the scope of deploying Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice, I 
am not endeavoring to extract one conceptual “thinking tool” and afterward test it 
empirically. According to Swartz, this has been the common appropriation of 
                                                          
431 Indeed, this point coincides with the claimed contribution relating to new empirical data-collection 
(contemplating on aforementioned Professor Watson’s ‘list of ten’). Also, I am very sympathetic to the argument 
that IR research inherently is ‘empirical’ as research address unfolding world events. With the lack of empirical 
research, in this context, I am more thinking of collecting data from research subjects rather than providing yet 
another analysis. This is a very evident trait of IR research – without implying at all that benchmark and 
innovative work do not materialise in this manner. See D. Bigo & M.R. Madsen 2011, op.cit. 219. 
432 See also Guttormsen 2010a. 
433 See Swartz, op.cit. 47. 
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Bourdieu in the American academe in their familiarisation with his social theory.
434
 
Quite the opposite, I shall operationalise several of the “thinking tools” 
conjunctionally as the composition of the overall framework (i.e. Bourdieu’s Theory 
of Practice). This process would be governed by the nature of the obtained field-data 
and the evolving direction of the “bottom-up” analysis.  
 
As a result, theoretical development is accomplished through launching more, and 
underused, “thinking tools” in concert. Employing them in tandem is not 
unparalleled in IR research. However, considering that the opposite is more the 
norm, this study exposes IR and in effect “tests” the bearing of the Theory of 
Practice in three manners: multiple “thinking tools” (combined with an assiduous 
self-reflexive elaboration on my part as the researcher) in addition to a more 
balanced usage of the concepts. Furthermore, the “bottom-up” inquiry where field-
data is rationed (chiefly) primacy reflects a use of Bourdieu (and IR research in 
general) in a more social constructionist epistemological direction aligned with the 
‘cyclic’ research process associated with this study. This reflects a focus on what 
matters to the research subjects rather than my own pre-conceived categorisations of 
their ‘social reality’ (i.e. how ‘China’ and ‘American-ness’ are constructed). 
 
An additional significant realisation is argued to be achievable in the present study. 
The first facet relates to the relationality of Bourdieu’s conceptual “thinking tools”. 
This study does not pursue to “merely” employ Bourdieu’s “thinking tools” but a 
focus on including more of them in concert and a more balanced usage – but also to 
incorporate how they work in relation to each other and thus producing a fuller and 
                                                          
434 See Swartz, ibid. 47. 
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more rigorous analysis with the potential to unveil more nuanced understanding of 
the data. In fact, this endeavour realigns beyond the conventional demarcated area of 
IR research. Indeed, the relational method is central in Bourdieu’s sociology,435 and 
his concepts were not intended as stand-alone (for example, as a theory of doxa or 
theory of field).
436
 As Swartz points out, this issue and potential progression is an 
issue pertaining to sociology (and beyond) as well.
437
 Consequently, thus, my study 
has a potential to engage with a wider audience beyond the IR discipline in this 
particular facet of my research.  
 
In terms of the second facet, my study also advances the Bourdieusian inquiry in IR 
research farther (though not uniquely) in regard to self-reflexivity which is integrated 
in the overall analysis. I will conduct a monologue (or in fact an internal dialogue 
with myself) as an ongoing self-reflexive elaboration throughout the study in 
addition to employing Bourdieu’s pillar concepts. The concepts are themselves to be 
utilised self-reflexively by making use of new empirical research (in Washington, 
DC) which offers a generative usage of Bourdieu rather than mere exegesis. And 
finally, the rationality linkages between Bourdieu’s concepts are accommodated for 
through deploying the pillar “tools” (for example, habitus, field, capital) –when 
warranted  
 
This displays incorporating dynamics, contextuality, and an empirical case (essential 
in ethnography) which is innate in Bourdieu’s thinking. The approach is connecting 
                                                          
435 Swartz 2008, op.cit. 47. 
436 P. Bourdieu and L.J.D. Wacquant, An Invitation to reflexive sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1992), 96. 
437 In Swartz 2008 (op.cit. 45), the point concerning relationality relates to sociology and social theory in general 
and not only organisational analysis which the article specifically engages with. 
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micro and macro levels in the analysis.
438
 Bourdieu’s obsession with dialogue 
between theory and research occurs where new theoretical insights emerge out of 
empirical investigations.
439
 For example, this insights “talks to” the widely used 
rational theory in IR – and beyond – such as calculations of self-interests, rational-
choice theory in addition to fields as non-static entities that are not only constituted 
by formal and physically delimited space – a deterministic feature often a source of 
criticism against Bourdieu’s social theory.440 
 
3.2 Literature strand 2: Think tank literature and IR 
The second strand of literature relates to the specialised think tank literature. Aligned 
with the style of an exploratory review, I am discussing trends within this body of 
literature rather than specific findings in studies carried out concerning think 
tanks.
441
 This coheres as think tanks perform as the ‘unit of observation’ (hence, not 
the main ‘unit of analysis’ – the latter being individual China policy-research 
experts) and serves as an overarching framework (i.e. socio-political phenomenon). 
Again, the purpose of this section of the review is to identify how this study can 
contribute to this particular literature. This activity differs from the previous 
sectional review in two areas due to not being directly linked to the underlying spur 
of this study (i.e. to explore the relevance and applicability of Bourdieu): I am 
claiming original conceptual contribution/advancements rather than theoretical 
                                                          
438 See Swartz, ibid. 47 and 51. This connection, between micro and macro levels, I argue, coincides and thus 
constitutes what I have earlier described as the ‘sociological meso-level’ (Chapter Two). In fact, according to 
Bourdieu, a field is a meso-level itself (W.F. Hanks, “Pierre Bourdieu and the Practices of Language,” Annual 
Review of Anthropology 34(1) (2005): 67-83.) 
439 Swartz 2008, op.cit. 51. 
440 See Swartz 2008, ibid. 48, and P. Jackson, “Pierre Bourdieu, the ‘cultural turn’ and the practice of 
international history,” Review of International Studies 34(1) (2008): 155–181. 
441 I discussed the trends in the think tank literature in a conference paper at the PSA Graduate conference 
2010, which highlights main themes within the two ‘school of analyses’ regarding applied methodological and 
theoretical frameworks, geographical representations, research philosophical underpinnings as well as 
suggested future research directions (D.S.A. Guttormsen 2010a, op.cit.). 
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advancements to the aforementioned academic literature (in this case, the specialised 
think tank literature) and is subsequently allocated less space in this review.  
 
Reflecting on that the inquiry in this study is running in the nexus between the 
academe and the policy profession, I am emphasising that the vast amount of 
literature published by policy-researchers outside the academic realm have not been 
included. In practical terms, this means that only peer-reviewed material is included 
in compliance with academic standards.
442
 The former type of literature is on the 
contrary a source of data which will be analysed by employing an 
interpretive/ethnographic contents analysis. It is purposeful to identify these 
somewhat blurry lines in order to avoid confusion: many policy-researchers do have 
a PhD and are thus an academic albeit not necessary being affiliated to an academic 
institution or work within that profession. Some policy-researchers alternate 
frequently between the worlds of academia and policy or simultaneously hold offices 
in both – where a portion of them produce papers which later becomes academic 
publications.
443
  
 
Linking think tanks to an IR study accommodates for contributing to the latter 
discipline through focusing on non-governmental organisations at another level than 
                                                          
442 By no means does this reflect my stance in what I find “proper” or “correct” analysis. As the blurry lines 
themselves suggest, a pure distinction is not empirically sound, and it can be the case that an expert on a given 
topic works in a think tank rather than at a university (or both or alternating). However, as I am “talking to” 
academic literature which I am also obliged to contribute to, it would be an inconsistency to include non-
academic literature in this review. However, it should be acknowledged that what constitutes ‘academic literature’ 
is a blurry line itself. The peer-review process, which I uphold as the distinguishing marker between ‘academic’ 
and ‘non-academic’ is not an infallible approach. For example, what is, then, a comprehensive report produced 
by academics such as the Global Shift report at the German Marshall Fund’s Transatlantic Academy reviewed by 
an international advisory board (see http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/publications/global-shift-capstone-
report-released)? Academic for sure – but perhaps not an academic publication per se. 
443 This is frequently the case at the more academic inclined think tanks or research organisations such as the 
US Institute for Peace and the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars which executes major 
Visitorship/fellowship-programmes predominantly welcoming prominent and published academics. GMF too, but 
on a smaller and more eclectic scale, such as business people, journalists. 
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that of the state. In this regard, the focus on think tanks and affiliated policy-research 
experts abate the arguably lack of focus on non-state level organisations. Think tanks 
are also interesting to explore in their very own right – being overlooked institutions. 
They are a key player in U.S. domestic politics and foreign affairs. However, their 
influence are often too hastily dismissed within academic research – for example, 
when the author does not engage with such institutions on-the-ground and rather 
relies on “observable evidence” remotely located, and consequently not completely 
privy to grasp the roles of think tanks and their entanglement in U.S. socio-political 
discourses and political system.
444
 Two plausible explanations for this relate to the 
indistinct relationship with non-academic work concerning think tanks which 
sometimes does not make it onto the academics’ “radar”.445 Second, IR scholars 
outside the U.S. may be less prone to engage with think tanks because of being a 
particularly American socio-political phenomenon. 
 
 
                                                          
444 One example, with humbleness, is partly related to D. Stone, “Recycling Bins, Garbage Cans or Think Tanks? 
Three Myths Regarding Policy Analysis Institutes,” Public Administration 85(2) (2007): 260, 275-276. 
445 Excellent, thought-provoking pieces about think tanks might be missed out on, such as Peter Singer’s of the 
Brookings Institution ‘Factories to Call Our Own: How to understand Washington’s ideas industry’, published in 
the Washingtonian, a widely read American weekly magazines in August 2010 (see 
http://www.washingtonian.com/articles/people/16506.html). The same symptomatic hypothesis applies to the 
spaces of blogs (see for example ‘Freakonomics blog’ (http://www.freakonomics.com/2011/08/30/a-postcard-
from-brookings-wolfers-bids-d-c-a-fond-farewell/), ‘On think tanks’ (http://onthinktanks.org/) and ‘Goran’s 
musings’ (http://goranspolicy.com/)), prominent and impactful newspapers (for example the ‘Think Tanked’ 
column in Washington Post (http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/think-tanked), and in particular related to the 
main theme of ‘American-ness’ in the current study – the discourses concerning America which often are much 
more widely read amongst the general public and policy decision-makers than those produced within academia, 
for example James Fallon interviewed in the Atlantic (another national and renowned weekly magazine, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/01/how-america-can-rise-again/7839/) and the ‘Danger 
Room’ blog which is hustling and bustling with a young generation of newcomers on the DC think tank scene 
(http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/) (email, Mr Brian Till, New America Foundation, 3rd April 2010). As an 
anecdote, reflecting the above-mentioned ‘blurry lines’, Mr Steve Clemmons very understandably had to 
withdraw from our interview appointment, then a Director and policy-researcher at the New America Foundation, 
due to transiting to assume the post as editor at large with the aforementioned Atlantic. In addition, dealing with 
such material also provides think tanks (through policy-researchers) a voice, aligned with the “bottom-up” 
approach embedded in ethnography, rather than only being presented through the strictures of academic lenses 
embroiled in a researcher’s pre-categorisation and intellectual bias if only relying on an ontology with identical 
boundaries to those upheld in academic literature. 
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3.2.1 Rapidly evolving and diversifying literature 
Although think tanks as a socio-political phenomenon and professional research 
organisations have been around since the first half of the 19
th
 century and from the 
early 20
th
 century in the U.S.,
446
 little scholarly investigation existed prior to the 
1990s.
447
 Diverting from a benchmark book edited by Stone and Denham, academic 
inquiry branched into research encompassing policy research institutions beyond the 
Anglo-American sphere as well as to into other subject-fields (such as comparative 
politics and public policy,
448
 in addition to Security Studies and IR).
449
 This research 
was conducted by academics possessing other disciplinary backgrounds, herein 
sociologists, economists and anthropologists,
450
 and only recently with a focus 
beyond nation states (i.e. transnational think tanks and those located in other 
countries).
451
 
 
3.2.2 Typologies of think tank research 
This exploratory review follows a categorisation of think tank research suggested by 
Professor Diane Stone – an internationally leading scholar in the area. Stone lays out 
two ‘school of analyses’ argued to encapsulate the scope of inquiry within the 
specialised think tank literature. One of these research avenues focuses on think 
                                                          
446 For example, The Institute for Defence and Security Studies (1831, London), and Brookings (1916, 
Washington, DC) respectively. 
447 D. Stone, “Introduction: think tanks, policy advice and governance,” in Think tank traditions: Policy research 
and the politics of ideas (Manchester: University Press, 2004), 2. See also D. Stone, A. Denham & M. Garnett 
(eds.), Think tanks across nations (Manchester: University Press, 1998). 
448 See D. Stone, Banking on Knowledge: The Genesis of the Global Development Network (London: Routledge, 
2000b). 
449 See I. Parmar, “Mobilizing America for an Internationalist Foreign Policy: The Role of the Council on Foreign 
Relations,” Studies in American Political Development 13(2) (1999a): 337-373. and I.Parmar, “The Carnegie 
Corporation and the Mobilisation of Opinion during the United States’ Rise to Globalism, 1939-1945,” Minerva 37 
(1999b): 355-378. 
450 See D. Stone 2004, ibid. 
451 D. 2004, “Think tanks beyond nation-states” (2004): 34-50, D. Stone, “Think Tanks Across Nations: The New 
Networks of Knowledge,” NIRA Review, Winter (2000a): 34–9, and R.J. Struyk “Management of Transnational 
Think Tank Networks,” International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 15(4) (2002): 625-638. 
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tanks as organisations, whereas the second ‘school’ has chiefly been preoccupied 
with influence within policy-networks.
452
 Common to both ‘schools’, however, is the 
concentration on description rather than conceptualisation.
453
  
 
The first analytical school (i.e. organisational forms) features one of the main topics 
in think tank research – that of defining a think tank.454 Waever echoed the 
staggering increase in the numbers and spread of think tanks in 1989, and explored 
tension between models of understanding their nature, namely ‘universities without 
students’, ‘contract researcher’, and ‘advocacy think tanks’. Construing with 
referring to them as non-profit think tanks, he concludes with four lessons: no single 
model can explain their operations and financing; that managers in these think tanks 
must lead consistently in regard to financing; production, staffing and perceptions in 
order not to scare off relevant stakeholders; influence seems to be disproportioned to 
increase in number of think tanks; and that the role of think tanks might not be 
transferable to other countries which feature other political systems.
455
  
                                                          
452 D. Stone & A. Denham (eds.), Think tank traditions: Policy research and the politics of ideas (Manchester: 
University Press, 2004), 2. 
453 Prof D Stone, 6 April 2010, pers. comm. 
454 D. Stone, “Introduction: think tanks, policy advice and governance” (2004), 2-5. See also McGann & Weaver 
(eds.), Think Tanks and Civil Societies: Catalysts for Ideas and Action (London and New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 2000), 4. 
455 R.K. Weaver, “The changing World of Think Tanks,” PS Political Science and Politics September (1989): 563-
578. More than two decades later, these perspectives remain a strong foothold (Professor Donald E. Abelson, 11 
October 2011, seminar). I strongly concur with the latter point, which is evident when a researcher allows him or 
herself to be informed in a “bottom-up” fashion and by giving field-research primacy. In Norway, for instance – a 
political landscape which I am very familiar with, international leading “think tanks” such as the Peace Research 
Institute Oslo (PRIO) and the Norwegian Institute for Foreign Affairs (NUPI) with many-doubled higher 
publication rates than the nation’s leading University of Oslo, do not fit into neither of these typologies due to 
being extraordinarily focused on peer-reviewed academic research and publications. Furthermore, the meaning 
of the ‘independent-dependent’ dichotomy assumed in the U.S., herein that the farther away you are from the 
state the more independence enjoyed by a think tank (regardless of private interests being main donors), has a 
completely different connotation in Norway: physical and conceptual distance to the ‘state’ is not thought of as 
inappropriate closeness in Norway (or Scandinavia) – but funding from private sector indeed would be (PRIO 
Director Dr Kristian Berg Harpviken, 30 August 2011, pers. comm.; PRIO Special Advisor on External Relations 
Ms Ingeborg K. Haavardsson, August/September 2011, pers. comm.; Research Fellow Mr John Karlsrud, NUPI, 
August 2011, pers. comm.; see http://www.prio.no/ and http://english.nupi.no/). 
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McGann and Waever analyse further the scope and growth of research organisations 
(aka think tanks) in both the developing and developed world in regard to producing 
expert knowledge about the societies and policies implemented in them by 
governments.
456
 Smith focuses on U.S. think tanks and their impact on American 
policies through looking at think tank evolution and policy-researchers as elites.
457
 
Common to these studies were questions revolving around managing and funding of 
think tanks as well as their positions for exercising influence.
458
 
 
In the second ‘school of analysis’, according to Stone,459 the research efforts tend to 
centre on a main activity of think tanks, herein policy. This relates in particularly to 
abilities of influencing policy processes and the role of ideas and expertise during 
decision-making – seeking changes in politics and relationships with states by 
exercising, and subsequently, impact. Measuring influence is a core question. 
Influence is constrained and dependent, for example due to contextuality such as 
closeness to government and involvement  of the latter, which vary across country 
borders and consequently in policy-making processes. Stone highlights, therefore, 
methodological issues with measuring ‘influence’ as it can be contested through 
different interpretations and willingness to disclose information about what has 
happened.
460
 James for this reason rather focuses on policy influence and social 
relevance in terms of setting the agenda and influence the wider public with policy 
                                                          
456 McGann & Weaver (eds.) 2000, Think Tanks and Civil Societies: Catalysts for Ideas and Action, 1. 
457 J.A. Smith, The Idea Brokers: Think Tanks And The Rise Of The New Policy Elite (New York: Free Press, 
1991). 
458 D. Stone 2004, op.cit. 2. 
459 D. Stone, ibid. 2. 
460 D. Stone, ibid. 10-11, and D. Stone 1996a, op.cit. 105-106. I made a similar, epistemological and ontological 
driven argument referring to this as an inevitable effort of measuring the immeasurable in I. Iborra Medina & 
D.S.A. Guttormsen, “Who Thinks for Me? Think Tanks’ Visibility and Activity in Contemporary Britain” (paper 
presented at the PSA Graduate Conference, Oxford, 2010). 
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narratives.
461
  Context is played out in many ways, for example what is considered 
not independent in the U.S. (i.e. relying on government) might be considered 
independent in another country, such as in Norway where think tanks are very 
academically oriented.
462
 My study has the potential to collect new and non-
replicable data post-2010, hence more or less a decade after the aforementioned 
studies to inform these literatures were published. 
 
3.2.3 Theoretical orientations 
The abovementioned elite studies reflect an early research tradition where such elites 
were part of power approaches in studying think tanks with a focus on the macro-
level. However, as noted by Stone,
463
 some countries have closer relationship to 
particular think tanks thus making elite studies a study of the minority rather than the 
majority.
464
 In addition to elite studies, think tanks have also been investigated from 
other theoretical and analytical perspectives. Neo-Marxists consider think tanks as 
way of politically mobilising business for privileged capitalists as a controlling 
factor where class interests are upheld by state action.
465
 Himmelstein, however, 
takes a somewhat more neo-pluralist and structuralist stance, herein that diversity 
                                                          
461 S. James, “Influencing Government Policymaking,” in Banking on Knowledge: The Genesis of the Global 
Development Network, ed. D. Stone (ed.) (London: Routledge, 2000), 165-182. In a similar vein, I made the 
proposition that instead of influence and impact, researchers ought to approach this issue as a position to being 
able to exert influence, or not (hence leaving out the causation aspect) in ‘Who Thinks for Me? Think Tanks’ 
Visibility and Activity in Contemporary Britain’, ibid. 
462 I made this point in Iborra Medina and D.S.A. Guttormsen 2010, op.cit. 
463 D. Stone 2004, op.cit. 11. My study, however, is not an elite study as I am not applying elite theories albeit 
referring to them as policy-research experts because of their expert knowledge and potential access to policy-
networks where general members of the public would not naturally have access to (nor through their profession 
or knowledge). 
464 See D.T. Critchlow, The Brookings Institution, 1916-52: Expertise and the Public Interest in A Democratic 
Society (Dekalb: Northern Illinois Press, 1985) and T.R. Dye, “Oligarch tendencies in national policy making: the 
role of private planning organisations,” Journal of Politics 40 (1978): 309-31 - as examples. This resonates with 
the methodological criticism of McGann’s global rankings which are heavily based on self-referential data (i.e. 
think tanks ranking each other). 
465 D. Stone 2004, ibid. 12. See also J.S. Peschek, Policy Planning Organization: Elite Agendas and America’s 
Rightward Turn (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), J. Stefanic & R. Delgado, No Mercy: How 
Conservative Think Tanks and Foundations Changed America’s Social Agenda (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1996), and W.G. Domhoff, Who Rules America Now? A View for the ‘80s (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 
1983), 82. 
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amongst think tanks is rather a result of divided capital and that they tend to be 
ideological oriented and partisan.
466
  
 
Neo-Gramscians approach think tanks as actors in ‘knowledge networks’ where 
“professional associations, academic research groups and scientific communities are 
organized around a special subject matter or issue”. Inclusion is based on expert 
recognition as well as more subtle scholarly and scientific validated credibility”.467 
The Neo-Gramscians style illustrates that these networks are linking private 
knowledge of actors and institutions with material interests and structures of 
globalised capitalism where ‘organic intellectuals’ serve as translators of ideas of 
different organisations.
468
 Parmar extends this framework by including the 
transnational aspects of the hegemonic projects.
469
 Pluralist studies emphasise think 
tanks operating in a market place of ideas with competition between them in a space 
of many ideas in the open. The roles are portrayed as transparent and educating as a 
counterforce to polity and others with interests to set the policy-agenda such as the 
media and corporatists.
470
 The earlier discussed Büger and Villumsen article 
peripherally includes American think tanks as a player in their discussion in regard 
to democratic peace.
471
 
                                                          
466 J.L. Himmelstein, To the right: The Transformation of American Conservatism (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1990), 159. 
467 D. Stone, “Global Knowledge and Advocacy Networks,” Global Networks 2(1) (2002): 2. 
468 D. Stone 2004, op.cit. 12. See T.J. Sinclair, “Reinventing Authority: Embedded Knowledge Networks and the 
New Global Finance,” Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 18 (2000): 487-502, and I. Parmar, 
“Institutes of international affairs: their roles in foreign policy-making, opinion mobilization and unofficial 
diplomacy,” in Think tank traditions:  Policy research and the politics of ideas, eds. D. Stone & A. Denham 
(2004), 19-33. 
469 I. Parmar 2004, ibid. 19-33. 
470 D. Stone 2004, ibid. 12-13. See C.H. Weiss, “The Uneasy Partnership Endures: Social Science and 
Government,” in Social Scientists, Policy and the State, eds. S. Brooks & A-G. Gagnon (New York: Prager, 
1990), 97-112.  
471 C. Büger and T. Villumsen 2007, op.cit. 
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Stone, however, takes a stance with such a taken-for-granted “purist” role of think 
tanks by purporting three myths: that think tanks are bridges (in fact, divide between 
theory/”Ivory Tower” and practice/”real world” is an ontological fallacy as think 
tank themselves produce these boundaries); that think tanks serve the public interest 
(think tanks often create their own power/knowledge nexus where recognition from 
scholarly credentials impinge upon the role as “neutral” hence not being independent 
of the state or society and rather a one-way, “top-bottom” approach to the “public”); 
and that think tanks do think (the presumption of think tanks being an intellectual 
enterprise is challenged by high frequency of recycling ideas as well as expertise 
from other sectors who might lack qualifications to enter university appointments, 
constructing problems to fit solutions, as well as moving boundaries between science 
and politics through policy-entrepreneurship).
472
 
 
Several studies are undertaken under the umbrella of the network literature, 
emphasising the policy-networks and interaction between think tanks and other 
actors – defined as a “mode of governance that incorporates actors from both inside 
and outside government to facilitate decision-making and implementation”.473 This 
area encompasses various conceptual models, such as ‘policy communities’, 
‘epistemic communities’, ‘advocacy coalitions’, and ‘discourse coalitions’. These 
types of networks may accommodate elite views as networks might exclude the 
public and those with divergent values and interests, and also Marxists point of 
views possessing capital by the dominant players within the network.
474
 The 
advocacy coalition approach highlights the long-term nature of policy and the 
                                                          
472 D. Stone, “Recycling Bins, Garbage Cans or Think Tanks? Three Myths Regarding Policy Analysis Institutes,” 
Public Administration 85(2) (2007): 260, 275-276. 
473 D. Stone 2004, op.cit. 13. 
474 D. Stone, ibid. 13. 
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processes of altering those including ideational factors which are argued to have 
been neglected.  
 
The discourse coalition emphasises language and political symbolism influencing 
how problems are defined and understood as part of an ‘argumentative turn’ in 
policy research – often derived from epistemological and methodological shifts due 
to change in political regimes (government).
475
 Stone also refers to this strand of 
network literature as constructivist due to its emphasis on intersubjective knowledge 
as a driver and where ideas independently can have an impact on policy. Similarly, 
Haas argues for ‘consensual knowledge’ and the role of experts in times of policy 
uncertainties as part of his ‘epistemic communities’ approach.476  
 
3.2.3.1 Think tanks and Bourdieu 
To the best of my knowledge, the only identified study within the think tank 
literature which employs a Bourdieusian approach is that of the American scholar 
Thomas Medvetz. However, in the area of China-policy research and to understand 
‘American-ness’ amongst policy-researchers, the established study seems to be a 
first. Medvetz investigates think tanks as a sociologist within American politics, 
whereas I am rather researching think tanks as an ‘international problem’ and aligned 
with the contemporary and emergent area of Bourdieu-research within the IR 
discipline. Medvetz uses Bourdieu’s synthetic approach of the material and symbolic 
                                                          
475 F. Fischer, “Policy Discourse and the Politics of Washington Think Tanks,” in The Argumentative Turn in 
Policy Analysis and Planning, eds. F. Fischer & J. Forester (Duke University Press, 1993), 21-42. See D. Stone 
2004, op.cit. 13. 
476
 See D. Stone, ibid. 13, and P.M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination,” International Organization 46(1) (1992a): 1-35, P.M. Haas, “Banning chlorofluorocarbons: 
epistemic community efforts to protect stratospheric ozone,” International Organization 46(1) (1992b): 187-224, 
and P.M. Haas (ed.), Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination (World Peace Foundation and 
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1992c).  
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when developing the concept of ‘hybrid intellectuals’ in regard to theorising think 
tanks and public policy experts in the U.S.. He argues that it overcomes the separated 
constructivist (non-reflexive policy-research where which particular ‘social reality’ 
of someone does matter) and structuralist (instruments of economic and political 
power) accounts of understanding think tanks.
477
 
 
In his endeavour to locate typologies concerning think tanks, he applies Bourdieu’s 
concepts of ‘social space’ and ‘field of power’ in order to break with scholastic 
definitions and conceptualisation of think tanks, and rather understands think tanks 
as having different positions in the field due to various amounts of capital and 
exercising different relations with other players – as “constitutively hybrid 
organizations situated in an intermediate structural position”.478 My study provides 
an opportunity to comment on this from the perspective of the China policy-research 
environment.
479
 
 
3.2.4 Think tanks in U.S. foreign policy towards China and IR research 
The current study researches think tank policy-research experts in regard to what 
constitutes ‘America-ness’ in their narratives concerning ‘China’ as the mutually 
constitutive Other.  This issue is unfolding within the overarching framework of 
U.S.-Sino relations in addition to being positioned as an IR study. Although not a 
focus of the study’s overarching research question, I shall in this sub-section briefly 
point out the void of think tank research in the above areas. This further illustrates 
                                                          
477 T. Medvetz (under review in AJS), “Hybrid intellectuals: Toward a theory of think tanks and public policy 
experts in the United States,” (2007): 1-2, 35-36. 
478 T. Medvetz, “Think tanks as an emergent field,” The Social Science Research Council (2008), Available from: 
http://www.ssrc.org/workspace/images/crm/new_publication_3/%7Ba2a2ba10-b135-de11-afac-
001cc477ec70%7D.pdf. 
479 This will be addressed in the first analysis chapter in this thesis (Chapter Four). 
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the broad space in the literature which my study is “talking to”, and thus a potential 
of being relevant to. Indeed, there is a devoid of research focus on think tanks as 
organisations in studies concerning U.S. foreign policy towards China besides those 
working within them.  
 
Studies of perceptions of China amongst American political players are not plentiful. 
Such efforts have largely included partakers other than policy-researchers. Examples 
encompass perceptions between the countries within a bilateral trajectory (i.e. 
national perceptions, Chinese and American perceptions of each other, images and 
symbolic gestures),
480
 scholars and players in educational and scientific exchange 
schemes,
481
 in American print media,
482
 and members of the U.S. Congress.
483
 An 
exception relates to a book published by the Center for International and Strategic 
Studies (CSIS) comprised of essays concerning mutual perceptions between China 
and the U.S. The compilation of essays encourages to re-examining images used to 
perceive each other through exploring views of various professionals – such as 
global strategists, historians, journalists, military experts, business representatives, 
human rights activists, and government officials.
484
 
 
                                                          
480 D.M. Lampton, Same bed, different dreams: managing U.S.-China relations, 1989-2000 (University of 
California Press, 2001), 65, 162, 221, 239, 267, 358, 360. 
481 D.M. Lampton, J.A. Madancy & K.M. Williams, A relationship restored: trends in U.S.-China educational 
exchanges, 1978-1984, Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China (U.S.) 
(Washington, DC: National Academic Press, 1986). 
482 A. Liss, “Images of China in the American Print Media: a survey from 2000 to 2002,” Journal of Contemporary 
China 12(35) (2003): 299-318. 
483 S. Lubman, “The dragon as demon: images of China on Capitol Hill,” Journal of Contemporary China 13(4) 
(2004): 541-565. 
484 C. McGiffert (ed.), China in the American Political Imagination, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
Washington, DC (2003). This point was also emphasised by one of my excellent interviewees, Satu P. Limaye, 
Director of the East-West Center (in DC) – herein that international relations (also with capital letters) often could 
be better/more broadly be understood when incorporating other levels than that of the state. 
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Think tanks have been addressed in U.S. foreign policy research, but seldom in a 
specific relation to another country. These studies feature few or no links to policy 
issues regarding China.
485
 An interesting exception is Dickson’s mentioning of the 
“blue-team” which also included American think tank members and their forceful 
communicated threat-perceptions concerning China’s military modernisation.486 
Policy-research experts in think tanks themselves, of course, write about U.S.-Sino 
relations in terms of policy-issues. The sheer volume of this production, however, 
ponders on the relations with China and not the role of think tanks per se.  
 
Chinese IR think tanks, however, have been addressed as a separate phenomenon by 
China hand, Professor David Shambaugh, at the George Washington University and 
the Brookings Institution. He points out the vast perception gaps of ‘the world’ 
between Chinese think tanks and “the rest of the world”.487 Other studies elucidate 
think tanks as a key centre for expert knowledge in the Chinese government,
488
 an 
increasingly influential role in Chinese foreign policy,
489
 as well as their role in 
policy process of reforms
490
 – including their limitations.491 The lack of 
                                                          
485 D.E. Abelson, A capitol idea: think tanks and US foreign policy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2006), Donald E. Abelson, American Think Tanks and their role in US Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin’s, 
1996). 
486 B.J. Dickson, Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for Political Change 
(Cambridge: University Press, 2003), 11. 
487 D. Shambaugh, “China’s International Relations Think Tanks: Evolving Structure and Process,” China 
Quarterly 171 (2002): 575-596, and D. Stone, “The Foreign Policy Club,” in Capturing the Political Imagination: 
Think Tanks and the Policy Process, D. Stone (London: Frank Cass, 1996b), 184-202. 
488 B. Naughton, “China's Economic Think Tanks: Their Changing Role in the 1990s,” China Quarterly 171 
(2002): 625-635. 
489 B.S. Glaser & P.C. Saunders, “Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutes: Evolving Roles and 
Increasing Influence,” China Quarterly 171 (2002): 597-616. Bonnie Glaser, another of my excellent interviewees 
represents some of the few China policy-research experts in my study who has an academic publication record 
in prominent outlets. 
490 M.S. Tanner, “Changing Windows on a Changing China: The Evolving ‘Think Tank’ System and the Case of 
the Public Security Sector,” China Quarterly 171 (2002): 559-574, and S. Ming-Shen with D. Stone, “The 
Chinese tradition of policy research institutes,” in Think Tank Traditions: Policy research and the politics of ideas, 
eds. D. Stone & A. Denham (Manchester: University Press, 2004), 141-162. 
491 R. Higgott & D. Stone, “The limits of influence: foreign policy think tanks in Britain and the USA,” Review of 
International Studies 20 (1994): 15-34. 
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communication is evident in Wang’s call “to improve matters, Chinese and U.S. 
government agencies and their foreign policy think tanks should launch a sustained 
and thorough dialogue on the issue and explore ways to prevent separatist forces 
from making a rash move” as a means to maintaining stability with the U.S.492 
 
3.2.5 Synthesising: Literature area 2 – Think Tank literature and IR 
To reiterate the nature of an exploratory literature review: the focus is directed 
towards identifying trends in a delimited area of selected literatures and not 
reviewing the studies themselves. I would like to address three identified features of 
the specialised think tank literature derived from the above review and in relation to 
the IR discipline. Firstly, in terms of the two ‘school of analyses’ propounded by 
Stone which reflects the scope of think tank research, I argue there is a considerable 
lack of focus on the actual individuals conducting the thinking on conceptual topics 
(i.e. understanding of ‘China’ and in essence – ‘American-ness’). When a focus has 
been appointed to individuals, it has often involved political scientists examining the 
theoretical roles as elites
493
 within a U.S. domestic political context,
494
 or U.S. 
Foreign Policy in general.
495
  
 
I suggest that my study warrants and accommodates for an additional, third ‘school 
of analysis’ in the specific think tank literature. This ‘school’ instils a focus on the 
                                                          
492 J. Wang, “China’s Search for Stability with America,” Foreign Affairs 84(5) (2005): 39-48.  
493 See Thomas R. Dye, Who’s running America: The conservative years, 4th edn (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-
Hall, 1986) and Joseph G. Peschek, Policy-Planning Organizations: Elite agendas and America’ Rightward Turn 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987) – cited  by J.A. Smith, The Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and the 
Rise of the New Policy Elite (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 311. 
494 One example, is the benchmark study of US think tanks by J.A. Smith, The Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and 
the Rise of the New Policy Elite (New York: The Free Press, 1991).  
495 D.E. Abelson, A capitol idea: think tanks and US foreign policy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2006), Donald E. Abelson, American Think Tanks and their role in US Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin’s, 
1996). 
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thinking of the thinkers, so to speak – in the present study being the 
conceptualisation of U.S. think tank China policy-research experts’ thinking in 
regard to ‘American-ness’, ‘China’, as well as the Other and Otherness. Thus, I am 
making a second claim in terms of original contributions of this study, i.e. a 
conceptual contribution. I consider such undertaking conceptual rather than a 
theoretical one contemplating on Bourdieu being deployed as a set of conceptual 
“thinking tools” in terms of the processes of thinking of (social construction in 
particular) ideas (i.e. what constitutes ‘China’ and ‘American-ness’).  
 
This is accomplished through both collection of new empirical data (in fact multiple 
data source through, predominantly in-depth interviews, but also observation and 
triangulation) as well as novel theoretical synthesis between IR research and the 
specialised think tank literature. From the former’s point of view, the sociological 
meso-level which diffuses individual and organisational levels contributes with more 
research on the non-state level which dominates the IR discipline (and Political 
Science, more so). I argue there is a substantial relevance to link the specific think 
tank literature with the IR discipline: 
 
Foreign policy think tanks and institutes of international affairs are of interest to the 
wider debates in international relations for two reasons. On the one hand, they aspire 
to be participants – if mostly marginal ones – in the foreign policy making process. 
On the other hand, notwithstanding the tension between these two roles, some 
contribute directly to international relations as a field of study.
496
  
 
Second, as far as theoretical frameworks are concerned, Bourdieu has been 
diminutively employed as a thinker (i.e. conceptual/analytical framework) in the 
specialised think tank literature. A Bourdieusian-inspired study, therefore, signals a 
                                                          
496 R. Higgott & D. Stone, “The limits of influence: foreign policy think tanks in Britain and the USA,” Review of 
International Studies 20 (1994): 15-34. 
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novel way of studying policy-researchers and, secondary, the think tanks they are 
affiliated to. Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice beckons various lines of inquiries due to 
the operationalisation of his conceptual “thinking tools”. This has the profound 
potential to unveil additional layers of information and untangle complex and 
nuanced ‘universe of data’ collected in the field. Moreover, the focus on policy-
researchers might fruitfully increase interests of this evident part of the policy-world 
in IR as the research agenda pertains to the divide between the world of academia 
and practitioners.
497
  
 
Third, the focus on conceptualising policy-research experts’ perceptions of ‘China’, 
in which analysis of ‘American-ness’ is realised, provides an avenue for purporting a 
rare perspective concerning U.S. foreign policies towards China and U.S.-Sino 
relations in general – those of China policy-research experts. 
 
3.3 Conclusion  
This chapter has reviewed the research trends, in accordance to the style of an 
exploratory review,
498
 in chiefly two bodies of literatures: Bourdieu in IR research, 
and the specific think tank literature. The established study is positioned within, and 
thus “talks to”, the IR discipline. The exploratory review both indicates space in the 
literature for the present study, and effectively, justifies it. This review has 
established the relevance for a study deploying Bourdieu’s practice theory to analyse 
policy-researchers’ “China-narratives” and what constitutes ‘American-ness’ – 
which subsequently warrants a new, third, ‘school of analysis’ in the specialised 
think tank literature. Relevance is also identified for showing the importance of 
                                                          
497 D. Stone 1996a, op.cit. 207, 211, 212. 
498 See A.B. Thomas 2004, op.cit. 72-73. 
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culture and a social constructionist epistemology in IR research, in addition to being 
able to portray perspectives of policy-researchers on U.S. foreign policies towards 
China as well as more broadly within U.S.-Sino relations. I am also promulgating 
and seeking theoretical advancement through the use of Bourdieu – in particular with 
a focus on the relationality between his conceptual “thinking tools” and making use 
of them concurrently.  
 
The first chapter in this thesis outlines the investigatory frame of the present study 
by unpacking the overarching research question as well as delimiting the scope of 
the inquiry and the various elements of the research design. The second chapter aims 
to justify the relevance of the study in addition to identify the space in the literature 
concerning how my study can contribute with original knowledge (i.e. IR 
constructivist research programmes, specific think tank literature, as well as U.S. 
Politics and Foreign Policy (towards China)) and novelty (i.e. first ethnographic 
study of think tanks and first within a Bourdieusian conceptual framework – to the 
best of my knowledge). Chapter Three (‘theoretical framework’) elaborates on the 
theories and concepts applied in this study which was set-out in Chapter One. This 
Chapter establishes the theoretical approach to collect, analyse, and present data and 
findings (i.e. lays out the explanatory framework). In concert, these three chapters 
comprise the theoretical framework of the thesis. This foundation reflects how and 
why data has been analysed, scrutinised, problematised, criticised, and presented in 
the ensuing analysis chapters (Chapter Four – Six).  
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- “We think, therefore we are”  
Commentary on the prominent presence of think tanks in U.S. 
politics and foreign affairs – a paraphrasing of Descartes’ 
 ‘Cogito ergo sum’ (“I think, therefore I am”)499  
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM A ‘SOCIAL 
FIELD’: THE CHINA POLICY-RESEARCH EXPERT 
COMMUNITY IN U.S. THINK TANKS 
 
4.0 Chapter Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate a multitude of social phenomena which 
impinge on the manoeuvrability of “China-thinking” and associated work practices 
by China policy-research experts across U.S. think tanks anchored in Washington, 
DC.
500
 This is achieved by positioning the community of China-policy research 
experts as a Bourdieusian ‘social field’. The analysis is predominantly based on in-
depth interviews, but also draws upon collected written material, descriptive 
statistics, and participant observation (including of material culture/contextuality). 
Conceptually, this effort is chiefly utilising Bourdieu’s concepts of ‘field’ and 
                                                          
499 See René Descartes, Principles of Philosophy (Dordrecth: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1644 [1991]) where 
the subsequent Latin version of the phrase appeared. There are numerous confusions and disagreements over 
the credibility and plausibility over Descartes’ original statement - “Je pense donc je suis” (in French, in 
Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences, 1637) – 
which is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, it is an interesting observation to make as it could 
potentially serve as an innovative and different perspective on investigating think tanks – for example, the 
relational elements of ‘existing’ in terms of individual policy-researchers’ thinking on the one hand, and 
physicality of organisations on the other. This is touched upon below, and deserves further attention in future 
research endeavours. 
500 This first analysis chapter signals the commencement of Part B in the thesis, i.e. analysis/empirical chapters. 
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‘capital’. Furthermore, social theoretically, the engagement with Bourdieu is not 
merely an effort in applying his “thinking-tools” as a means to collect, analyse and 
present data, but also to conjoin with his sociology of sociology in a dialectic manner 
through informing the analysis in a “bottom-up” fashion. This has the potential to 
propose additions to Bourdieu’s Practice Theory delineated from empirical findings. 
This further begets to contribute to broadening Bourdieu’s theoretical application to 
the IR discipline as part of the Bourdieusian ‘sociological turn’ and its evolving 
research agenda.
501
 
 
This Chapter is divided as follows. First, the premise of the chapter, and its 
investigatory scope, are explicated. Second, the alignments with the overarching 
research framework of this study are illuminated. Third (the main section of this 
chapter), I shall paint the ‘social field’ of China policy-research experts through 
Bourdieusian lenses by applying, predominantly, his key concepts of ‘field’ and 
‘capital’. Additionally, the inquiry will also address the relationality between 
Bourdieu’s concepts,502 and subsequently introducing and illuminating unveiled 
aspects and/or additional concepts warranted by the field-research. I will be 
interfacing my field-data in particularly with the work of Tom Medvetz – who has 
advanced think tank research in a relational direction including deploying 
Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice. The fourth section discusses impacting facets, 
including social phenomena such as influence, the conundrum with defining think 
tanks, associated roles identified in relation to think tanks, and contesting the usage 
of ‘expert’ amongst policy-researchers. Furthermore, when warranted as part of the 
                                                          
501 See the Special Issue ‘Bourdieu and the International’ (volume 5, issue 3 (2011), pp. 219-347, of the 
International Political Sociology). 
502 This is lacking not only in IR but in the social sciences in general (see David L. Swartz, “Bringing Bourdieu’s 
master concepts into organizational analysis,” Theory and Society 37 (2008): 45-52). 
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self-reflexive deliberation, I will critically reflect on my own personal experiences in 
the field – as an ‘objectification’ of personal contemplations. Fifth, in the concluding 
section of this chapter, I will articulate the main arguments running through this 
Chapter – which is to be synthesised with the proposed areas of main contributions 
of the thesis in its entirety. A self-reflexive discourse shall display my subjective 
decisions in regard to choosing particular lines of inquiries and areas of literature to 
juxtapose field-data with. 
 
4.1 The premise of this chapter – concepts and terms 
This sub-section briefly reiterates the assumptions made, pertinent to the chosen 
lines of inquiry in this particular Chapter, on seven accounts: the plausibility of 
equating policy-researchers with expertise; the relationship between policy-research 
and China (the country); the existence of a community amongst China policy-
research experts; the approach of equating the community with a Bourdieusian 
‘field’; the boundaries of what constitutes a ‘think tank’; the appropriateness of 
including research subjects localised in New York; in addition to the links between 
China policy-researchers as a community with the construct of being a Bourdieusian 
field and the influence of being a sociological meso-field.  
 
First, although being contestable, I am not disputing the notion that China policy-
research experts can be labelled as experts/specialists on China and/or the realm of 
U.S.-Sino relations (if that is the way he/she presents themselves as) and if reflecting 
an aspect (i.e. claimed expertise/specialisation) of ‘social reality’ within the China 
policy-research community based on how they socially construct and strategise 
within the architecture of this ‘social field’.  
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Most policy-researchers list their areas of expertise/specialisation on their websites – 
and for the same reason, I am not differentiating the latter term from the former due 
to both formulations seek, and enjoy, the role of authority (to various degrees) in the 
public sphere. For example, John A. Bolton, Senior Fellow at the American 
Enterprise Institute (AEI), and former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations (UN) 
frequents in the role as expert-commentator on various Fox News Channel 
programmes. In fact, the notion of being an expert/specialist served as a main 
principle for deciding whom would be deemed part of my “sample” – which also 
would include those who had written extensively on China but without necessarily 
listing ‘China’ as an area of expertise/specialisation (but for example “East-Asia”). It 
is a term that policy-researchers are baffled with themselves. In effect, this reflects 
an important boundary-marker in their self-categorisation as ‘policy-researchers’. 
Hence, a discussion concerning expertise as an influential factor becomes interesting 
and warranted to scrutinise as a means to grasp the aforesaid ‘social field’, and 
consequently representing a finding in its own right (which will be discussed later in 
this Chapter).  
 
Second, expertise is not precluded to those investigating the People’s Republic of 
China only.
503
 With few exceptions, most analysts conduct policy-research in 
additional countries and/or themes
504
 other than China – and occasionally not having 
China as a main area of specialisation.
505
 Moreover, there are also policy-researchers 
                                                          
503 An example relates to Malou Innocent, Foreign Policy Analyst at the CATO Institute, who also researchers 
Afghanistan and Pakistan (see http://www.cato.org/people/malou-innocent). 
504 An example is Debra Liang-Fenton at the US Institute for Peace who researchers democracy and peace 
across various the African and Asian continents (see http://www.usip.org/experts/debra-liang-fenton). 
505 For example, Satu Limaye, Director of the East-West Institute in Washington, DC, who researchers also on 
the Asia-Pacific in general as well as Japan and India (see http://www.eastwestcenter.org/about-
ewc/directory/satu.limaye, n.d.). 
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with a particular expertise/specialisation relating to China.
506
 In the undertaken 
study, any policy-researcher who has claimed specialisation/expertise (thus, 
authority) on China and/or U.S.-Sino relations (or particular aspects of it) has been 
deemed eligible for this study. There are also nuances – expertise/specialisation on 
China and in regard to U.S.-Sino relations, are often used interchangeably by think 
tanks themselves as well as in public discourse – hence, not problematised. 
  
Furthermore, there is what I call “issue-experts”,507 i.e. those who study China (and 
might claim/portray some degree of authority in this regard among external 
audiences). This may be accomplished due to the nature of the issue rather than 
expertise/specialisation/interest/motivation concerning China and/or U.S.-Sino 
relations. Seth Cropsey, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, investigates China 
predominantly due to his expertise in international security and terrorism (naval and 
maritime issues specifically) where U.S.-China relations in the South-China Sea 
makes China, indeed, an unavoidable country to include in your research.
508
 
Similarly, Keith Crane, Director of Environment, Energy and Economic 
Development at the RAND Corporations, repeatedly avoided to answer questions 
(during our interview) concerning the political aspects of U.S. foreign policies 
towards China (and U.S.-Sino relations in general) as his specialisation related to 
                                                          
506 For example Louisa Greve, Vice President for Middle East/North Africa, East Asia and South/South East Asia, 
Multiregional programmes (see http://www.ned.org/louisa-greve), who specialises on democracy particularly in 
relation to China, and Alan D. Romberg, Distinguished Fellow (East-Asia), at the Henry L. Stimson Center, who 
focuses specifically on Cross-Strait relations in regard to China (and Asia in general) (see 
http://www.stimson.org/experts/alan-d-romberg/). 
507 Hence, assuming such authority might be intended or unintended – or a result of intentionality, and conscious 
and unconscious). 
508 See http://www.hudson.org/learn/index.cfm?fuseaction=staff_bio&eid=CropSeth. 
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military modernisation (which makes China of utmost importance) but not China per 
se.
509
  
 
Third, the existence of a community comprised by policy-research experts on China 
can be justified by empirical evidence. In an email from Jennifer L. Turner, Director 
of the China Environment Forum at the Wilson Center, indicates a closely knit 
congregation of China policy-research people within the DC think tank 
environment.
510
 Her colleague at the Wilson Center, Sue Levenstein, a Programme 
Assistant on the Asia Programme, expressed when probed about a community:  
 
Absolutely… you know, in my experience, just from interacting with people who 
work on a particular issue, is that regardless if it’s China or if it’s Pakistan, everyone 
knows each other. And you go to these think tank meetings and it’s all the same 
people, who show up, and knowing it is a small world – it is a small world – 
everybody knows each other by name.
511
 
 
As an extension of the evidence imparted above, when interacting with interviewees 
and other policy-researchers, nobody seemingly rejected the notion of a China 
community across the DC think tank environment. Arguably, it is a social 
construction, and practised space, which already exist.
512
 Observations in the field 
also support the notion of a China-community, for example in the recycling of 
speakers.
513
 This point is echoed by Bryce Wakefield, a Programme Associate (Asia) 
at the Wilson Centre:  
                                                          
509 See http://www.rand.org/about/people/c/crane_keith.html. 
510 Email correspondence 4th April 2011, Jennifer L. Turner, Wilson Center. 
511Levenstein, Sue. Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. (Wilson Center), May 24, 2011 (006-F). 
512 In interviews and invitation to partake in my study via email, I often referred to “China-thinking” and “China-
community”. As there are multiple ‘social realities’ (see Martin Hammersley and Paul Atkinson, Ethnography: 
Principles in Practice (London: Routledge, 2007), I make no assumption that the boundaries of these community 
are not varied – a point which ties into the notion of the field being a ‘cross-over field’ which performs a 
constitutive hybrid social space. 
513 This point should not be exaggerated; to some extent it is a natural phenomenon due to think tanks often find 
themselves only having one or a couple of people working on China (from a methodological point of view, thus, it 
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(…) those think tanks will often have the same people speaking (…) for an event at 
a certain think tank – they basically bring in their expert.514  
 
Importantly, the construction of ‘community’ should not be mistaken as an epistemic 
community as the descriptions and analysis of China, and in effect U.S-Sino 
relations, are dynamic and vast within the DC think tank environment. Thus, the 
Bourdieusian construct of a ‘social field’ differs from Haas’ notion of epistemic 
communities in several ways:
515
 China policy-research experts do collectively reflect 
a body of professionals pursuing influence through providing knowledge to policy-
makers. Furthermore, they are known to each other as some sort of network. 
However, by no means does this China-field feature policy-researchers who all 
possess the label as a ‘recognised expert’ or that universal mechanisms concerning 
how to validate ‘expertise’ is instituted. Furthermore, as a group, they do not share a 
set of normative and casual beliefs, intersubjective understandings or are creating 
one mutually acknowledged reality.  
 
Fourth, there are two entwined facets to this point, namely the relevance of 
approaching the China policy-research community as a field (Bourdieusian sense) on 
the one hand, and the germane linkage between applying the notion of ‘field’ in 
regard to the manoeuvrability of “China-thinking” on the other. The former facet 
relates to elucidating the opportunities, strengths, and limitations that China policy-
research experts face during work and production of their “China-thinking”. The 
Bourdieusian lens provides a vocabulary for analysing the China policy-research 
                                                                                                                                                                    
made more sense not to conduct a comparative study of China policy-researchers between think tanks). A more 
interesting minor point relates to ideological boundaries in this regard; during my time in the field and the myriad 
of events which ensued, would extremely rarely feature speakers from the other end of that spectrum.  
514Wakefield, Bryce. Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. May 19, 2011 (005-E). 
515 See Peter M. Haas 1992a, op.cit.: 3. 
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community coherently – and appropriately so – contemplating on the present 
relational aspects (as shown above).  
 
This extends to the second facet, herein that “China-thinking” does not evolve 
detached from cultural structures or organisational factors but rather dialectically in 
symbiosis with such surroundings – where thinking also relates to negotiated social 
realities.
516
 Again, the construct of being a ‘field’ – hence a meso-field – enhances 
the focus on the enmeshed macro-structures and micro-individuals and not 
investigating policy-researchers in isolation.  
 
Fifth, the organisations included in this study are assumed to be identified as ‘think 
tanks’. However, two of them do not label themselves as such in terms of their self-
image.
517
 For example, National Endowment for Democracy (NED) creates distance 
to the ‘think tank’ identity. Louise Greve (NED), states at the very outset in our 
interview: 
 
NED is not a think tank. It is primarily a grant-making institution. It is a private 
organisation, organised and incorporated in Washington as a what we call 501(c)3. 
The classic straight forward non-profit registration status under U.S law. And the 
intention was to serve, however, a public purpose, which is to provide non-
governmental support from the U.S. to counterparts abroad who are working for 
democracy in their own countries (…) private actor to private actor, but with public 
money, so it has a public purpose, it has a public character – at the same time NED 
staff are not governmental employees, we have our own Board of Directors who are 
private citizens (…) always bi-partisan (…). It is a mixed character in some ways.518 
 
                                                          
516 Two such ‘macrostructures’ have been established in this thesis (see Chapter Two); think tanks as a socio-
political phenomenon (focal point of this chapter) and U.S.-Sino relations. This does not, of course, imply an 
assumption that there exist no other relevant and impactful phenomena in this ‘field’. 
517 Two out of in 23 think tanks in my “sample”. 
518 Interview, Louise Greve, National Endowment for Democracy (NED) (002-B, recording: 00:11). 
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In the aforesaid email from Jennifer L. Turner at the Wilson Center, expresses “we 
actually don't call ourselves a think tank, but I can explain that later!”519 This point 
was echoed by her colleague, Bryce Wakefield:  
 
We are actually not supposed to call ourselves as a think tank, and rightfully so, we 
are a center for advanced research.
520
 
 
The justification for including NED and the Wilson Center are based on the 
following. Epistemologically, this study seeks to grasp the nuances of the multiple 
‘social realities’ which exists “out there” where organisations such as NED and the 
Wilson Center are indeed considered as think tanks. No other interviewees 
discounted them as such as they are both evident in the broader policy-networks in 
addition to the general think tank scene. Thus, the identity as ‘think tank’ is 
externalised by audiences beyond these actors’ self-image.521 This sentiment is 
accentuated by both NED and the Wilson Center appear, and prominently so, on the 
influential McGann ranking of influential think tanks.
522
 Furthermore, the 
organisations gladly accepted my invitations to partake in the study (which explicitly 
targeted, and requested, ‘think tanks’).523  
 
Sixth, this study has included both research subjects as well as think tanks located in 
New York.
524
 The rational relates to the following, in addition to appropriately being 
                                                          
519 Email from Turner, Wilson Center. 
520 Interview, Bryce Wakefield (005-E). 29.59 
521 See C. Lemert and A. Branaman (eds), The Goffman Reader (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1997), 2-3. 
522 This is a somewhat two-edge sword, also experienced by Norwegian think tanks which attempt to upheld the 
academic elevation and thus distance themselves from the “think tank” label (often allotted a binary meaning of 
ideologised/party-politics), which is relational – herein, ‘think tanks’ perceived as “non-academic”. However, they 
gladly announce their prominent positions on the McGann ranking. See PRIO and NUPI. 
523 See my invitation-email. 
524 I conducted three interviews in New York as part of my study (the fourth one was cancelled due to changes in 
Trevor Houser’s itinerary, Visiting Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and a Partner at 
the Rhodium Group).  
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part of a “convenience sampling”. For example, Dan H. Rosen who works, and was 
interviewed, at the Rhodium Group located on 10 East 40th Street address in New 
York, is a Visiting Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics 
(DC).
525
 This makes him an eligible interviewee and I would argue that his physical 
location would rescind the counter-argument. The same applies to Leland R. Miller 
who works in a New York based global strategy and management consultancy firm, 
but is conjunctionally affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council (in DC) 
as a Fellow in International Economics.
526
  
 
Additionally, the head-quarters of the Asia Society is located on a fashionable 725 
Park Avenue address (in New York), but has a very active branch-office in 
Washington, DC, where I attended several events on Chinese Outward Direct 
Investment in the United States, and socio-historic comparisons of India and 
China.
527
 Thus, in all instances, they are affiliated via their organisations to 
Washington, DC. And again, from a social constructionist perspective, their presence 
in DC also makes them part of the think tank environment and surrounding ‘social 
realities’ there, and I am not “authorised” to discount these nuances in a study 
aiming to be informed by the field-data (“bottom-up”). In fact, it provides a ‘social 
reality’ concerning the relationship between the DC and New York think tank 
environment.
528
 
 
 
                                                          
525 See Dan H. Rosen, http://www.iie.com/staff/author_bio.cfm?author_id=18. 
526 See Leland R. Miller http://www.avascentinternational.com/International/About/Leadership/Leland-R-
Miller.aspx. 
527 On 21 June and 27 June 2011, respectively. 
528 See sub-section on ‘impacting dimension’ later on in this chapter. 
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4.2 Aligning this chapter with the overarching research framework 
This sub-section will demonstrate the “methodological fit” between the present 
chapter and the overarching research framework of the study.
529
 The three 
empirical/analysis chapters in this thesis (i.e. Section B) interface with the four core 
aspects in Section A (i.e. social constructionism, Bourdieu, methodology, and 
significance) – in addition to overarching facets of contributions – as signposted 
below.  
 
For this particular chapter,
530
 illuminated empirical findings are connecting with all 
areas of proposed contribution of this thesis.
531
 This is achieved by applying 
Bourdieu’s conceptual “thinking tools” on new collected data in order to supplement 
original knowledge to the specific think tank literature (through a particular focus on 
the China policy-research expert community/’field’). This infuses with the 
corresponding main arguments purported in this thesis: the relevance of deploying 
Bourdieu’s conceptual “thinking tools”, which elucidates the potential for obtaining 
more in-depth, meaning and context-based understanding of factors impinging on the 
“China-thinking” in U.S. think tanks and work-practices, in addition to achieving 
deeper and contextualised understanding of the ‘field’ (for example the hurdle of 
defining think tanks) through a focus on relationality. Furthermore, the focus on the 
actual policy-researchers as individual thinkers unfolds the fruitful prospects of 
introducing a third ‘school of analysis’ in the specialised think tank literature – and 
                                                          
529 See Amy C. Edmondson and Stacey E. McManus, “Methodological fit in management field research,” 
Academy of Management Review 32(4) (2007): 1155-1179; Tatiana Zalan and Geoffrey Lewis, “Writing About 
Methods in Qualitative Research: Towards a More Transparent Approach,” in Handbook of Qualitative Research 
in International Business, eds Rebecca Marschan-Piekkari et al. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004): 507-528). 
530 The current Chapter Four. 
531 See point 5.0 (Chapter One); employment of Bourdieu’s conceptual “thinking tool” as part of adding to the 
Bourdieusian ‘sociological-turn’ of IR, new primary data-collecting (featuring novelty due to applying Bourdieu to 
policy-research experts themselves within U.S. think tanks), and consequently, the prospects of developing new 
propositions based on identified empirical data.  
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as important voices regarding U.S. foreign policy towards China – in addition to 
elevating individuals and think tank organisations as non-state players in 
International Relations (IR) research. It brings policy-researchers’ own thinking and 
conceptualisations to the forefront of the specialised think tank literature – and on 
the IR research agenda (exalting the individual level), and its sub-fields such as U.S. 
Politics, U.S. Foreign Policy, and U.S.-Sino relations.  
 
The specific arguments put forward in this particular chapter substantiate the above 
areas of contributions and arguments. Based on the new collected empirical data, the 
scope of such argument encompass the following:
532
 relationality of the ‘field’ and 
‘capital’ concepts and their explanatory power in terms of the manoeuvrability of 
“China-thinking” and work practices, moving beyond the issue of defining think 
tanks through making sense of the configuration of the China policy-research field 
and roles played within them, problematising the relationship between policy-
researchers as individuals and think tanks as organisations, opposing Medvetz’ 
findings regarding the highly contestable nature of ‘expertise’ and ‘academician’, the 
arguably need for a more nuanced concept of influence and impact where Bourdieu’s 
practice theory is particularly helpful in grasping ability for “positioning”, advancing 
Medvetz’ model of think tanks as a Bourdieusian ‘field’, and proposing further 
nuancing of Bourdieu’s concept warranted by the collected field-data. Moreover, it 
takes stance with mainstream constructivist research programmes in IR research 
which tends to assume ideas and constructions as precursors for materiality and 
structures as opposed to being a dialect where contextuality of context would rather 
determine the nature of this nexus and interplay. 
                                                          
532 Listed in random order. 
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Lastly, a sufficient degree of significance can also be derived from the prospects of 
relevance to research beyond the IR discipline (the disciplinary foothold of this 
study) through the sociological ‘turn’ of IR research. This relates particularly to 
Swartz encouragements for incorporating multiple conceptual “thinking tools” 
conjunctionally in addition to focusing on the relationality between them. 
Furthermore, new angels of operationalising the aforementioned “thinking tools” 
will also be presented when warranted by the analysis of obtained data.
533
 
 
4.3 The ‘social field’ of China policy-research experts in U.S. think tanks 
In this main sub-section of the current chapter, I am proposing how the ‘social field’ 
of China policy-research experts can be constructed. In addition, I address an array 
of factors which plausibly influence the ‘field’ – and in particularly the 
manoeuvrability of “China-thinking” and associated work-practices across the think 
tanks, anchored in Washington, DC. These lines of inquiry are warranted by the data 
collected in the field, which I juxtapose with selected bodies of established literature 
– and in particularly Medvetz’ work on the application of Bourdieu to inquiry about 
think tanks.
534
 In my opinion, Medvetz has advanced the social theoretical inquiry 
into key issues concerning think tanks, and his work is particularly pertinent to 
address due to having produced the only published work which incorporates 
Bourdieu regarding U.S. think tanks (to the best of my knowledge).  
 
In my analysis, I principally draw upon Bourdieu’s conceptual “thinking-tools” of 
‘field’ and ‘capital’. The engagement with Bourdieu is not only a cosmetic one (to 
                                                          
533 This relates to, for example, the relationality between actors in the field (i.e. individuals and organisations) and 
the interplay between different forms of capital and indeed the warranted necessity to problematise the concept 
of capital itself. 
534 See literature review (Chapter Three) for a presentation of Medvetz’ work in this regard.  
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show the relevance and a style of presentation) – but more importantly – to utilise his 
sociology of sociology to unveil additional layers of obtained field-data, and 
secondly, to accommodate for proposing modifications and/or additions to this 
conceptual/analytical framework itself – if warranted by the data, that is.535 This is a 
cornerstone in the ‘cyclic research’ process associated with a social constructionist 
epistemology coupled with an ethnographic research strategy.  
 
4.3.1 Architecture of the field
536
 
The positioning of this study as a sociological meso-level is apposite due to 
Bourdieu’s ‘field’ is innately a meso-field. A field, according to Wacquant, is a 
social arena containing struggles for particular stakes (and accessing them) where the 
boundary of the field is ascertained by the “stakes at stake” and agents’ positions 
based on the capital they possess.
537
 This approach has positive implications on the 
presentation of empirical evidence as well as the analysis of obtained data through 
achieving further sense-making of the ‘field’. Furthermore, this path accommodates 
for unveiling new directions for analysing policy-researchers and their affiliated 
think tanks through a coherent social theoretical vocabulary with a focus on 
relationality and enmeshed contextuality.  
 
                                                          
535 See points 2.1 (Chapter Two) for an in-depth explanation concerning deploying Bourdieu’s conceptual 
“thinking tools” as this study’s conceptual/analytical framework, as well as 3.1.7 on theoretical advancements 
(Chapter Three). 
536 Although a central operation when applying Bourdieu’s field, constructing a ‘social topology’ (mapping the 
‘field’ in terms of ‘objective structures’ of the positions which comprise the field and interrelationships competing 
for capital) (Jenkins 2002, Pierre Bourdieu, op.cit., p. 86), is arguably beyond the purview of this PhD. Such a 
task would be unmanageable within the parameters of any doctoral research project; for example, Bourdieu 
employed more than 50 “disciples” at the College of Europe (similarly to Prof Didier Bigo at King’s College) as a 
means to collect and run statistics of various fields. This omission (in my study) is deemed appropriate as I am 
only investigating a particular number of actors within the China policy-research community – as a ‘field’ – and 
neither the conceptualised field itself nor the homologised relations to other ‘fields’.  
537 Bourdieu and Wacquant 2003, op.cit. 37-41. 
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The relations between Bourdieu’s ‘field’ and individuals should not be understood as 
an orthodox where fields can be categorised as structure and individuals as agency. 
Rather, such field reflects a constantly transforming dialectical phenomenon of 
thinking relationally.
538
 In the same vein, the meso-level does not taxonomically 
distinguish between microindividual and macro-structural “levels”539. Here, 
Bourdieu states that in theoretical analysis, an observer’s relation to the social world 
(i.e. ‘China’ and ‘American-ness’) is also a product of the constructed rules and 
models (representations) accounting for the social relations making such observation 
possible.
540
 Furthermore, ‘social reality’ is constructed though negotiations where 
social structures are also created through agency.  
 
Consequently, to taxonomically distinguish, as social actors, the 
‘group’/‘organisation’ (think tanks) from the ‘individual’ (policy-researchers), is 
empirically unsound and illogical.
541
 The China policy-research ‘field’ 
predominantly comprises both individual policy-researchers in China-related areas 
as well as think tanks (aka institutions) as social agents, or occupants, in a network 
of objective relations.
542
 This involves, according to Jenkins, “to think in terms of a 
field involves recognising the centrality of social relations to social analysis”.543 
Policy-researchers and affiliated think tanks are entwined in structured social 
positions. Thus, this approach depicts the situation and relational position of 
                                                          
538 Professor Bigo lecture, Bourdieu in International Relations, University of Warwick, 21 February 2012. 
539 See Bruhn & Rebach 2007, op.cit. 115-145. 
540 Bourdieu, The Logical of Practice, op.cit. 29. 
541 This is an important point which should be further problematised when it comes to the notion of multi-level 
analysis in the quantitative research paradigm (analysis of human nature). For example in International Business 
research it is common-place to compare such levels, but arguably there are a lot of decisions and behaviour 
which are generated amongst individual on the ‘firm-level’ and it is not possible to distinguish the extent of 
context influence between these artificial “levels” of analysis.  
542 See Wacquant 1979, ‘Toward a Reflexive Sociology’, op.cit. 39. 
543 Jenkins 2002, op.cit. 84. 
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aforesaid social agents in this particular field, in addition to its internal power 
structures in which capital chiefly defines what positions are being held and actors’ 
“feel for the game” in this structured system. As a result, context, institutions, 
organisations are also incorporated into the analysis albeit the individual policy-
researchers are the focal point of this inquiry. It is within this symbiosis where the 
“China-thinking”, and thus Self/Other constellations, are dynamically evolving. 
  
This begs the question concerning the, supposedly, two ‘units of analysis’, i.e. 
individual policy-researchers on the one hand, and think tanks as organisations on 
the other. This area not particularly problematised in Bourdieu’s work. My empirical 
evidence exemplifies two central points in this regard: The presence of non-linear, 
multiple relationships between the individual policy-researchers and their affiliated 
think tanks (which employ them), in addition to conjoining facet of the enmeshed, 
inseparable nature of individuality and organisations. This assertion permeates the 
below analysis where the ‘individual’ and the ‘organisational’ cannot be 
taxonomically distinguished.
544
 This line of inquiry has also shown to be highly 
relevant when discussing other, aforementioned social phenomena, due to Bourdieu 
also argues that these objective relationships between the relative positions of 
different ‘occupants’ in the field, which are determining possessed capital – rather 
than the actors per se.
545
  
 
As far as the former is concerned, the relationships between individual policy-
researchers and think tank organisations are non-linear, non-fixed, and multiple: 50% 
                                                          
544 This has baffled social scientists from the onset of the disciplinary history, for example Weber and Durkheim. 
545 Pierre Bourdieu, The Rules of Art. Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field. (Stanford: University Press, 
1996a), 181-2 
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of my research subjects are also formally affiliated/employed members of other 
current organisations. This includes, for example within the think tank sphere; Ellen 
Frost (Peterson Institute for International Economics),
546
 Bonnie Glaser (Center for 
Strategic and International Studies),
547
 and Malou Innocent (CATO)
548
 – do all hold 
ongoing memberships with the Council of Foreign Affairs (CFA) and International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Furthermore, Pieter Bottelier of the School of 
Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at the John Hopkins University (JHU) is 
formally attached as a non-resident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace,
549
 a senior diplomat in the State Department is also working 
with the National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies 
(INSS), and Charles Horner (Hudson Institute) is serving on committees within the 
US Institute for Peace.
550
 
 
Evidently, linkages between individuals and organisations are also multi-directional 
– traceable as multiple affiliations beyond the think tanks sphere. This entails, for 
example, with the academe – Andre Laliberte (Wilson Center) lectures at the 
University of Ottawa,
551
 Adam Hersh (Center for American Progress) lectures at the 
University of Massachusetts,
552
 Jamie Metzl (Asia Society) is teaching human rights 
law at Georgetown University,
553
 Dan Rosen (Peterson) lectures at Columbia 
University's School of International and Public Affairs,
554
 and Stein D. Tønnesson 
                                                          
546 See http://www.iie.com/staff/author_bio.cfm?author_id=72. 
547 See http://csis.org/expert/bonnie-s-glaser. 
548 See http://www.cato.org/people/malou-innocent. 
549 See http://www.sais-jhu.edu/faculty/directory/bios/b/bottelier.htm and 
http://carnegieendowment.org/experts/?fa=expert_view&expert_id=466 
550 See http://www.hudson.org/learn/index.cfm?fuseaction=staff_bio&eid=CharHorner 
551 See http://www.wilsoncenter.org/staff/andre-laliberte 
552 See http://www.americanprogress.org/experts/HershAdam.html/ 
553 See http://asiasociety.org/jamie-metzl 
554 See Dan H. Rosen, http://www.iie.com/staff/author_bio.cfm?author_id=18. 
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(USIP) is employed at Uppsala Uni in Sweden.
555
 This also reflects the existence of 
asymmetric relationships within such linkages. Whereas Laliberte and Tønnesson are 
typical examples of foremost being academics working in universities and associate 
themselves with think tanks through prominent (employed) visitorships – the other 
examples reflect that the think tank functions as their primary organisation. 
Tønnesson also reflects an additional nuance because his principal organisation is in 
fact another (Norwegian) think tank; the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).
556
 
These multifaceted affiliations have an influence on the positioning (and capabilities) 
in the ‘field’ relating to the type, amount and consolidation of capital – which will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
 
Other spheres include the entanglement with the corporate world herein Leland 
Miller (America Foreign Affairs Council and a global strategy management 
consultancy firm),
557
 Nathaniel Ahrens (CSIS, who also manages various business 
ventures in China, and previously with the Carnegie),
558
 in addition to other non-
think tank organisations such as Luke Schoen (World Resources Institute and the 
China FAQs), and governmental bodies (American Enterprise Institute’s Dan 
Blumenthal who is also serving on the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, as well as the Project 2049 Institute).
559
 The case of Blumenthal also 
                                                          
555 See http://www.prio.no/CSCW/People/Person/?oid=20351 and http://www.usip.org/fellows/index.html and 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/about/staff/Stein_Tonnesson/ 
556 I spent two months as a Visiting Researcher at PRIO (Director’s Office), an internationally leading academic 
think tank, in 2011, Oslo, Norway. I am very grateful for the opportunity to learn about Norwegian think tanks and 
to interact with their extraordinary friendly and rigorous staff. Furthermore, it was an utmost joy and learning 
experience to interview their former Director, Stein D. Tønnesson in Washington, DC (then representing the 
USIP). 
557 See Leland R. Miller http://www.avascentinternational.com/International/About/Leadership/Leland-R-
Miller.aspx (no longer with the AFAC). 
558 See http://csis.org/expert/nathaniel-ahrens and 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/experts/index.cfm?fa=expert_view&expert_id=494 
559 See http://www.aei.org/scholar/dan-blumenthal/ and http://project2049.net/who_we_are.html#boardofadvisors 
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illustrates the existing multiplicity beyond two linkages (in addition to the main 
affiliated think tank).
560
   
 
On the flipside of the coin, the latter aspect relates to the enmeshed nature of 
individuality and think tanks as organisations – where both qualify to the role of 
Bourdieu’s social agents in the ‘field’. I propagate to problematise this relation 
which is assumed to have equating boundaries in Bourdieu’s theory of practice. 
Being positioned as a meso-level reminds us about their interrelationship where 
agents are socialised into the ‘field’. The boundary-construction of ‘social reality’, 
‘habitus’, and ‘capital’ of individuals do not equate with those of the organisational – 
nonetheless, these constituents of the ‘social field’ do not possess faculties to operate 
in isolation. Thinking in terms of ‘field’ – hence thinking relationally – prompts the 
social analysis to incorporate the properties of the meso-level. As it will be shown 
below, this distinction is crucial as ‘capital’ arguably operates across this divide – 
where capital ought to be understood as individual and organisational (as empirical 
evidence suggests above) – but they cannot be fully comprehended in isolation – 
only dialectically.  
 
The above explicated aspects of dynamic and enmeshed relationships between 
individual policy-researchers and their affiliated think tanks – what I refer to as a 
“crossover” feature of the ‘field’ – reminisce with Medvetz’ argument concerning a 
hybrid ‘social field’ of think tanks (se figure 1 below).561 I am in particularly 
interfacing my line of inquiry with Medvetz’ work, chiefly due to the following: his 
                                                          
560 I am not making a chart as the identification of multiple, non-linear and asymmetric linkages are not the 
principal ‘unit of analysis’ in this study, although important. 
561 See Medvetz 2008, op.cit.  
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work on think tanks, is one of the few scholars, to the best of my knowledge, who 
comprehensively incorporates and deploys Bourdieu’s sociology of sociology in the 
analysis of think tanks and policy-research experts.
562
  
 
Figure 1 – Medvetz’ think tank model in social space563 
 
I concur with Medvetz on three broad accounts in his effort to advance think tank 
research by deploying relational thinking via Bourdieu’s social theory;564 that think 
tanks are constitutively hybrid organisations,
565
 the plausibility for depicting the 
preceding points in a multi-dimensional thinking-model as a heuristic device in order 
to feature Bourdieu’s ‘fields of power’;566 that a social topology is relevant for 
                                                          
562 See Medvetz, ibid.; Thomas Medvetz, Think Tanks in America (Chicago: University Press, 2012a). 
563 © Tom Medvetz 2008, ibid. 6. 
564 The only published work that I have identified which is combining US think tanks and Bourdieu. 
565 See Medvetz 2008, op.cit. 5. 
566 See Medvetz 2008, ibid. 6. In the State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power, Bourdieu pinpoints three 
fields of powers as meta-fields (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996b). 
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overcoming the definitional hurdle (of think tanks) through thinking relationally
567
 – 
but that this exercise lies ahead us.
568
  
 
However, my field-research divulges opportunities to further advance Medvetz’ 
work, including taking stance with the narrow treatment of hybridity, a more  
empirically sound application of the term ‘social space’, lack of multidimensionality 
and hierarchy when constructing the field, and lack of empirical data – especially 
from the perspective of a specific policy-area and community. As a whole, here, my 
line of inquiry would provide the think tank literature with an enhanced empirical-
driven, in-depth elaboration, in addition to a widened deployment of Bourdieusian 
conceptual/analytical approach including a reflexive inquiry into these “thinking-
tools” themselves. 
 
Firstly, regarding think tanks as a ‘social field’, I have chosen to construct the China 
policy-research expert community as a separate ‘field’ in its own right rather than a 
mere ‘social space’. This contrasts Medvetz’ notion of an ‘emergent field’, which 
merely overlaps with Bourdieu’s ‘fields of power’.569 I argue this to be an 
inconsistency in Medvetz work – as the title of his article is about an ‘emergent 
field’. Medvetz refers to Bourdieu’s idea concerning ‘social space’ as:  
 
(…) the entire social structure can be represented as a multi-dimensional system of 
positions ordered by the volume and composition of authority (capital, in Bourdieu 
terminology) organising relations among individuals, groups, and classes.
570
  
 
                                                          
567 See Medvetz 2008, ibid. 3-4. I will discuss that in more detail later on within this sub-section. 
568 See Medvetz 2008, ibid. 
569 See Medvetz 2008, op.cit. 6. 
570 Medvetz 2008, ibid. 4. 
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In my reading of Bourdieu, ‘social space’ relates to the positions of individuals (due 
to ‘capital’) in the ‘field’ – but not a composition of a ‘field’ itself. Medvetz does not 
provide a reference here (but provides one for ‘fields of power’) and consequently 
reflects the relevance, and need for, a deeper elaboration of think tank organisations 
as a ‘field’. I do not dismiss the notion of ‘social space’ – but argues it rather 
constitutes only a component of an ‘emergent field’ – and rather ought to be coupled 
with strategising of policy-researchers (discussed in more details below). 
Symptomatically, Medvetz does not advance further into Bourdieu’s concepts on 
‘field’ and closely related social theoretical thinking in this regard. 
 
Secondly, extending on the preceding point above; what then, constitutes the ‘field’? 
In essence, my effort indirectly supports Medvetz’ approach to grasp think tanks as a 
social structured system. However, I am advancing this enterprise through data-
collection from a specific policy-area (i.e. China policy-research expert community) 
as opposed to conceptualising about a general think tank-field. This modifies his 
avenues of inquiry. Arguably, my chosen ‘field’ has its own acknowledged “stakes at 
stake” which the social actors struggle for: to be influential – or at least portray an 
influential position
571
 (in general, but particularly relating to U.S. foreign policy 
towards China). Policy-researchers are ascribed to this ‘field’ – an illusio – through 
“playing the game” and having a sense of “the rules of the games”. This coincides 
with the included ‘field of powers’ – ‘knowledge production’, ‘economic’ and 
‘political’. These meta-field possess the highest amount of influence over other fields 
due to being positioned at the apex of the hierarchy (of ‘fields’). The notions of 
‘fields’ being defined by “stakes at stake”, taken-for-granted structures, and that the 
                                                          
571 The issue of a portrayed “versus” ‘real’ (not in a materialised sense, though) influence will be discussed later 
in this chapter – especially in regard to ‘capital’. 
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nature of social positions depend on the unequal distribution of capital (or power) 
and thus ultimately access to profits from what is at stake,
572
 assists in grappling with 
the nature of this community and its praxis.  
 
I would contest the latent argument that a China policy-research field is similar to all 
other policy-fields. Sure, there are many commonalities – let us say, with the Japan 
policy-research environment across U.S. think tanks
573
 – in areas such as U.S.-Asia 
relations, maritime security in the South-China sea, North-Korea and power-balance. 
However, dissimilarities emerge when taking into account the relational nature 
which constitutes the type and nature of consolidation of ‘capital’ that matters. For 
example, in the China policy-research field, more types of capital and “stakes at 
stake” are in play because of its elevated importance in the current strategic 
environment. Essentially, China ascribes more substantially into all ‘fields of power’ 
simultaneously – as expressed by Nathaniel Ahrens (CSIS): “U.S.-Sino relations is 
now the most important bilateral relations in the world”.574  
 
This would be opposed to, let us say Iceland: To hold and/or exercise political and 
cultural capital in the U.S.-Iceland policy-research field would offer a diminutively 
“exchange-rate” to the economic field due to the scant position of Iceland in U.S. 
media, political debates and public discourses, as well as being placed low on the 
issue-agenda in Washington. Nevertheless, it does reflect how thinking relationally 
through fields facilitates for a coherent vocabulary, in addition to nuanced thinking, 
when taking into account that possessing ‘capital’ in the sub-field of the military-
                                                          
572 See Jenkins 2002, op.cit. 84-85; Wacquant, 1979, ‘Toward a Reflexive Sociology’, op.cit. 39. 
573 See interview with Japan specialist, Bryan Wakefield (005-E), Wilson Center. 
574 See interview with Nathaniel Ahrens. See also Satu Limaye, 14 May 2009, pers. comm. 
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domain might have a much higher “exchange-rate” to various ‘fields of power’ 
contemplating on the U.S. Naval Air Station Keflavik, which was harboured at the 
Keflavík International Airport until 2007. This case also reflects the importance of 
contextuality, for example, when the Americans ceased their activities on the island 
– it left the country defenceless and without its own military. Hence, the stakes for 
Americans were somewhat removed and those holding accumulated ‘capital’ in this 
domain might find them to have substantially relegated in value. 
 
Thirdly, social actors (aka the individual policy-researcher) do not move within a 
‘field’ in an isolated fashion. Rather, he or she traverses multiple fields 
simultaneously, and different individuals are doing so across a different set of 
‘fields’ depending on, principally, their area of policy-research. Furthermore, this 
occurs in different directions as already shown by empirical evidence concerning 
non-linear and multi-directional relationships between individual policy-researchers 
and the think tanks they are affiliated with. For example, this may entail a policy-
researcher such as Luke Schoen (Associate, Climate and Energy Program, World 
Resources Institute, WRI) who conducts policy-research in regard to China and 
environmental issues, thus subscribing to the China policy-research field, in addition 
to, for example, the U.S. think tank field in general, the global environmental 
movement, U.S. politics, the Congress, and the international development ‘field’.575 
 
However, the boundaries between the ‘field’ and the relations between them 
(homologies), in addition to what the “stakes” and recognised ‘capitals’ are in the 
specific ‘fields’ – cannot be grasped without incorporating context (for example, 
                                                          
575 See Luke Schoen http://www.wri.org/profile/luke-schoen and interview. 
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who holds the Presidency or the majority in Congress,
576
 and the numerous “social 
universes” which think tanks are oriented towards, that be funders577 and 
stakeholders/affiliations with universities,
578
 political parties/ideologies,
579
 
government,
580
 and advocacy groups
581
 – to mention some of the most salient 
one).
582
  
 
This point supports Medvetz’ promulgation of think tanks being hybrid 
organisations. Thus, in addition to hybridity, the ‘social space’ of think tanks is also 
constitutive of its relationship – homology – with other fields. As seen above, think 
tanks due to its different natures are integrally and constitutively part of multiple 
fields. For example, RAND Corporation is embedded in the defense sub-field, the 
governmental-field (because of being a semi-governmental think tank), the power-
                                                          
576 As an illustrative, anecdotal evidence; around 50 policy-researchers at the Center for American Progress 
entered the federal administration when President Barack Obama took office. He also received a 704-page book 
outlining a possible policy agenda. Furthermore, when President Reagan took office in 1981, he provided his 
cabinet members with a 1,100-page book produced by the Heritage Foundation (entitled Mandate for 
Leadership) The book contained 2,000 recommendations where, apparently, roughly 60 percent were 
implemented in accordance to conservative principles (see Peter W. Singer, “Factories to Call Our Own, 
Washington,” (2010, see http://www.washingtonian.com/articles/people/factories-to-call-our-own/). 
577 Different examples include Smithsonian and US Congress in regard to the Wilson Center and the US Institute 
for Peace for the latter, and predominantly private funders for the Heritage Foundation, and large endowments 
(i.e. Brookings Institution and Carnegie Endowment for Peace). For example, the American Enterprise Institute 
receives annually in average US$5.7 million from corporations, representing approximately 20% of total income 
during the 2003-2010 time period (see http://www.aei.org/files/2012/01/10/-ar2011new_15462528616.pdf; 
http://www.aei.org/files/1969/12/31/2010-Annual-Report.pdf; http://www.aei.org/files/2009/12/18/2009-Annual-
Report.pdf; http://www.aei.org/files/2002/12/07/20081205_2008AnnualReportweb.pdf; 
http://www.aei.org/files/2002/12/07/20081205_2008AnnualReportweb.pdf; 
http://www.aei.org/files/2002/12/07/20061220_2006ARweb.pdf; 
http://www.aei.org/files/2002/12/07/20051213_AnnualReport.pdf; 
http://www.aei.org/files/2002/12/07/20050119_annualReport04.pdf). In 1987, Kent Weaver reported that as much 
as 63% of AEI’s income was donated by the business community (1989, op.cit. 565). 
578 For example, the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at the John Hopkins University (JHU) (see 
http://www.sais-jhu.edu/), and the Hoover Institution affiliated with Stanford University (not part of my “sample”) 
(see http://www.hoover.org/about/mission-statement). 
579 An example is the Cato Institute plausible categorised as the libertarian think tank (see 
http://www.cato.org/about.php), and that the Center for American Progress was established primarily to 
counterweigh the rapidly growing conservative ideologised think tanks, such as the Heritage Foundation (see 
Singer 2011, Factories, op.cit.). 
580 Such as the RAND Corporation and the Center for Naval Analysis on China Studies (unfortunately, I was not 
able to secure any interviews with the CNA (see http://www.cna.org/centers/china/)).  
581 For example, the Institute for Policy Studies and Africa Action (see http://www.ips-dc.org/about/partners). 
582 See Medvetz 2008, op.cit. 4.  
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field of politics, the China research-field, the security-field and the general think tank 
field – and list goes on. This turns the focus towards relationships – homology – to 
other fields including the boundaries of the field. This cross-over field, Bourdieu’s 
‘social space’, reflects that its social structure is a multi-dimensional system of 
positions through influence based on ‘capital’ and not solely authority as a 
representation of ‘capital’, as purported by Medvetz. This subsequently organises the 
relationships between individual policy-researchers and think tank as organisations – 
as warranted by collected field-data.  
 
However, inversely to Medvetz notion of constraining hybridity to the think tank 
organisation only, due to the above, I argue that the ‘field’ itself is constitutively 
hybrid, and so are the individual policy-researchers working within them. The 
general think thank field, and interconnected policy-research field can intriguingly 
be thought of as a multi-directional, non-linear, and asymmetric composition. 
‘Capital’ has varying power which depends on the corresponding ‘fields’. This 
serves as a reminder about another short-coming of Medvetz’ work: The proclaimed 
multidimensional model as a heuristic device, which in fact is one-dimensional, I 
argue.
583
 Within the hierarchy of fields, underneath the ‘fields of power’ (meta-
fields), there are different sub-levels derived from the former – where the China 
policy-research field is one of them (alongside an array of other policy-domain 
fields). The individual sub-field will be “cross-over” with numerous other fields 
depending on the contextuality and nature of the praxis within that particular field.  
 
                                                          
583 See figure 1 (this chapter) or figure 1.1. (‘think tanks in social space’) (Medvetz 2008, op.cit. 6). 
176 
 
Again, the one-dimensionality of Medvetz’ model constrains the self-proclaimed 
heuristic device from illustrating the homology interplay with other ‘fields’ and thus 
removing attention from ‘capital’ and its transferability and convertibility.  It is not a 
hypothesis but serves as a heuristic tool where I have placed the China policy-
research field as overlapping/traversing (with diffusing boundaries) through the 
various meta-fields and several other sub-fields, in a hierarchy of fields aligned with 
Bourdieu work. This means that any field exhibits properties to cross-over with other 
fields in both horizontal and vertical directions. This homology is lacking (beyond 
the ‘field of powers’) in Medvetz’ current depiction and thus remove important 
questions prompted by the multiple fields, herein the relations beyond them 
(homology). The relationship between the fields – homology – illuminates the 
complexity of fields – and even more so the nature of the work-practices within the 
policy-research as a profession. There are further sub-disciplines, organised in 
accordance to, for example, academic disciplines (e.g. economists and security 
scholars, humanities and lack of area-studies scholars) and such as the influence of 
the evident political science degrees and Realpolitik thinking).  
 
That policy-researchers are influencing, and influenced by, various organisations 
should not come as a surprise. The particular benefit of thinking in ‘fields’, again, is 
the diverted focus on relationality on the one hand – and on the other – to incorporate 
contextuality, evaluating how the different “stakes at stakes”, ‘collective habitus’, 
and valued forms of ‘capital’ are consolidated in all the various ‘fields’, and 
ultimately how this might affect work-practices, manoeuvrability of “China-
thinking”, and abilities to influence U.S. foreign policies – essentially the “rules of 
the game”. This links to Bourdieu’s concepts of ‘interests’ and ‘strategising’ – and 
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reflects an incredible complex picture where a pure assessment of behaviour (in a 
behaviourist ontological sense) – would not provide in-depth understanding of this 
intricate interplay, decision-making, or how impactful dimensions might be played 
out. 
 
Different forms of Bourdieu’s ‘capital’ are in play. The amounts of power, or 
authority, are decided by the stake. The “stakes at stake” relate, predominantly, to 
exercising influence – or at least to portray to relevant audiences that they possess 
such ‘influence’/authority. Different think tanks possess different types of ‘capital’, 
amount, and consolidation of forms of ‘capital’. Thus, the nature of the consolidation 
of ‘capital’ should be highlighted beyond having what types of ‘capital’ (as a 
typology), and on transferability and convertibility. Consolidation, here, signals the 
combination of the different forms of ‘capital’ as well as the total amount and 
balance between them (not in a quantitative manner). Both “real” (not in a 
materialised sense) ‘capital’, and “imagined ‘capital’”, can be “cashed in” through 
equal transferability to the media power-field, as both may be recognised as equal 
specialists on a policy-topic and subsequently be invited as a commentary on a 
televised news programme. This same consolidation of ‘capital’, in another context 
(read: fields of power) may not have the same innate capability to be “cashed-in” 
unreservedly in other ‘fields’. For example, a funder with academic inclination who 
normally would donate to the Brookings Institution might more readily be prepared 
to expand or shift their funding to somebody having a prominent publication-record 
(including in peer-reviewed scholarly journals) such as Bonnie Glaser (CSIS) – as 
opposed to, for example the former eminent journalist Ed Paisly (Vice President for 
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Editorial, Center for American Progress), who focuses more on non-academic 
outputs in a journalistic writing style, such as opinion-editorials.
584
  
 
The concept of ‘context of contextuality’ becomes relevant to draw upon. 
Transferred to a study on think tanks, this concept in brief relates to that we need to 
incorporate understanding of the conceptual and physical location of a particular 
consolidated amount of ‘capital’.585 In regard to the multidimensional model, the 
relationships between hierarchical levels (vertically) must not be understood as 
fixed, herein that a particular combination and/or amounts of ‘capital’ would be 
attached to different meanings (or values) depending on what fields they are crossing 
over with at different levels. Thus, I argue, ‘capital’ ought to play a much more 
evident role when examining the ‘field’ – the former being the case with Medvetz’ 
work in this regard.  
 
The most powerful think tanks, those which are exercising symbolic power are 
related to those possessing all forms of capital and that can be actually “cashed in” 
(or transferred between fields, as Bourdieu put it): Brookings, AEI, CSIS, and 
                                                          
584 I would like to emphasise that this juxtaposition by no means indicates a statement regarding quality of work. 
Paisly is a former eminent journalist with substantial on-the-ground experience, and graciously provided an 
extremely interesting interview account. 
585 I developed this concept in my MPhil International Business thesis (Centre for International Business, 
University of Leeds (CIBULU)) in regard to intercultural encounters. IB as a discipline is strongly adhering to 
positivistic quantitative research hence essentialist, reductionist, and hypothetico-deductive, acontextual, 
ahistorical and non-meaning-based (S. Paul Bate, “Whatever Happened to Organizational Anthropology? A 
Review of the Field of Organizational Anthropology and Anthropological Studies”, Human Relations, 50(9) 
(1997): 1147-1175; Chapman 1997, op.cit. 3-29; Stephen Linstead, “The Social Anthropology of Management”, 
British Journal of Management, 8(1) (1991): 85-98) – I formulated this specifically in regard to the ‘Cultural 
Distance’ construct which innately assume a fixed measurable and physical distance between culture x and 
culture y, and thus assuming equal distance between xy=yx. However, if Scandinavian expatriates encountered 
Chinese managers at home or in China would obviously affect the nature of intercultural encounters due to 
contextual surroundings. 
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Carnegie.
586
 The symbolic power, here, relates to, again, the relational nature of 
thinking in ‘fields’; the consolidation ‘capital’ which lesser reputable or recognised 
think tanks possess – is partly determined by what Brookings, AEI, CSIS and the 
Carnegie do possess.
587
 This infiltrates work-practices. This authoritative position 
has been attained through building up various types of capital and historic 
conditionings. Those holding this capital, consequently, exercise symbolic 
power/violence: the ability to the “imposition of systems of symbolism and meaning 
(i.e. culture) upon groups of classes in such a way that they are experienced 
legitimate”.588 The faculty of this symbolic power accommodates to alter the 
behaviours of others (work-practices). For example, a sheer volume of voiced 
opinions, policy-influencing, seminars and produced policy-analysis at the Cato 
Institute, US Institute for Peace, the Center for American Progress, The Heritage 
Foundation, and the East-West Center (to name a few) can be associated with what 
they see fit in relation to what other think tanks are currently offering in the ‘market-
place of ideas’589 – such as libertarian ideas, agents for change on the ground in the 
development world, combating rise of conservatism, focus particularly on the 
Congress, and working more in-depth on Asian issues, respectively. 
 
The above substantiates my argument of both think tanks as organisations and 
individual within them are hybrid (not just the ‘field’, as suggested by Medvetz). 
                                                          
586 These “big four” were repeatedly listed by my interviews, and in general discourse, when wanting to express 
the epitome of think tanks.  
587 For example, the book by Professor Hu Angang published by the Brookings Institution Press (see 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/books/2011/chinain2020), addressing China’s future growth was nothing 
more than listing of any areas where an inclining cure could be identified. It carried prominence and received 
high interest, but probably mostly because of the prominent “Brookings” label (as was imparted to me by others 
(interviewees) in Off the Record). Here, the “academic” flare of Brookings was “borrowed” to also include their 
published material (their own publication press). 
588 Jenkins, Pierre Bourdieu, op.cit. 104. 
589 Abelson 2002, op.cit. 51. 
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Thinking in cross over fields also facilitates for thinking of different lines of 
narratives within and organisation as well as collectively a think tank are comprised 
with employees ascribing to various fields. This debate also extends into the 
narratives themselves. There is a tendency of taking a predominant eschewed 
approach towards the organisational “level” in both the specific think tank literature 
and the IR discipline as a whole.  
 
Ellen Frost (Peterson Institute) expresses: “… of course we are all trying to be 
objective, but there are many Chinas and many truths”.590 Moreover, as Walter 
Lohman, Director of Asian Studies at The Heritage Foundation pointed out, there are 
not always agreements between different departments within one think tank, for 
example where Asia scholars tend to have a more pragmatic view than defence 
analysts.
591
 To pinpoint one organisational think tank narratives is often not plausible 
– nor should it be an end goal. Sue Levenstein’s (Program Assistant, Wilson 
Center’s Asia Program) experiences also illustrate constrains but in relation to 
multiple narratives within one think tank:
592
 
 
For instance, you know the Asia program is close with Kissinger Institute on the 
U.S. and China here at the Wilson Center. We cover Taiwan, they China, and from 
time to time there is an issue of Cross-Strait relations, and then we ensure we are not 
openly saying something that’s completely anti-China because Kissinger foster 
positive relations with the Chinese government; we have to come up with 
conference topics not in conflict with their mission – as long as we cover, for 
example we do something on Taiwan Republic of China, as long as we don’t do 
things on what will happen after reunification [laughter], could you imagine, we 
could not. We do bear in mind the constraints and avoid this when we can, for 
example we cannot invite Dalai Lama as it would recognise Tibet’s sovereignty. 
 
                                                          
590 Interview, Frost (001-A), recording: 1.15. 
591 Interview with Walter Lohman, The Heritage Foundation. Symptomatically, Derek Scissors (Senior Research 
Fellow, Heritage’s Asian Studies Center) declined – politely and decisively – to be interviewed by me due to the 
aspect of “culture” in my study. 
592 Interview with Sue Levenstein, 26.00 
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The nomos, which construct the field, create organising laws that govern practices in 
the field and thus the manoeuvrability of policy-researchers.
593
 The nomos signal 
that there are particular macro-structures influencing the manoeuvrability of China-
policy research experts. This facet coincides with the established overarching 
framework of U.S.-Sino relations and think tanks as a socio-political phenomenon. 
The political field of power (meta-field) where the nature of U.S.–Sino relations 
chiefly are played out dictate the scope of manoeuvrability amongst policy-
researchers. For example, in order to gain political capital, to only carry out policy 
research in issue areas which attract diminutive interest from decision-makers, 
politicians, media and other interest groups, would neither produce much capital nor 
be associated with a particular good “exchange rate” (convertibility) into the 
economic form of ‘capital’.  
 
Think tanks have become a fixture in the American political landscape.
594
 Ellen 
Frost (Peterson) encapsulates this position in what can be taken as a collective 
habitus of the field – alluding to their interconnectedness:  
 
Washington is like a corporation, and think tanks like subsidiaries – following the 
head-quarter (aka government) as a tail of the beast.
595
  
 
Leland Miller follows up the animal metaphor – hinting of people driven by a 
particular modus operandi which they cannot escape from:
596
  
 
(…) if you are the academic type you stay in DC. People in New York are a bit 
different – those in DC are more political animals, wanting to serve, to influence 
                                                          
593 Bourdieu 2000, Pascalian meditations, op.cit. 96. This is not to say that there are no other influential 
overarching frameworks. 
594 Medvetz 2008, op. cit.; Medvetz 2012, op.cit. 
595 Interview, Ellen Frost, recording: 07.50 
596 Interview with Leland Miller (040-AAZ). 
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policy. New York is more Wall Street oriented – old view, but still true, New York 
makes money.  
 
Furthermore, Peter W. Singer, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy, at the Brookings 
Institution, also addresses the very position of think tanks in DC in his refreshingly 
interesting article ‘Washington’s Think Tanks: Factories to Call Our Own’. He 
argues that production of ideas is the industry of DC. Approaching metaphors as a 
language device, it is rewarding to take notice of the utterance of unintentional 
messages in relation to think tanks – herein re-production (thus lack of 
innovativeness and creativity) of ideas, a sentiment supported by a keen observer of 
the think tank environment – social anthropologist Hugh Gusterson at the George 
Mason University.
597
 
 
This relationship and position also reflect the doxa of the field in addition to the 
predisposition to act in symbiosis with the government. None whatsoever of my 
interviewees nor the around 50 others I approached for an interview and conversed 
with at various think tank events and political seminars questioned this assumed 
natural, fixed position of think tanks within the U.S. political system.
598
 This 
structure is a taken-for-granted, and resemblance Bourdieu’s ‘doxa’. When I posed 
the question concerning the role of think tanks to Samuel Sherradan, Program 
Director, Economic Growth Program at the New America Foundation, it instantly 
turned into an existential inquiry:
599
  
 
                                                          
597 See Interview. 
598 A humorous and pertinent critique against think tanks – but without validating the specific criticism against the 
one tank in question (The Heritage Foundation), was performed by talk-show host Bill Maher (see 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VcJohfS4vTQ). 
599 Interview with Sam Sherradan (003-C), New America Foundation, including the follow-up interview (003-C2). 
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Me: How do you perceive the potential of think tanks in DC to influence U.S. 
foreign policies towards China? 
Sam: (long pause) It is almost a broader question about how influential think tanks 
are, you know [laughter]. [Pause] I think … hmm … [long pause] it is a good 
question [tapping his fingers on the table], it’s like what I do with my life! [friendly 
and a bit nervous laughter]. 
Me: [laughter] sorry did not mean to ruin your… 
Sam: It is like my life-evaluation …. [laughter]. Ahm, you know, I think think tanks 
play an important role, kind of in between somewhat academic and journalism style, 
perhaps closer to the latter in the America. But possible to do two things relating to 
China.
600  
 
What I deduce from the above account is that what think tanks are well equipped to 
do and that can be considered a praxis in the ‘field, is to create “social space”. This 
practice elevates (marginalised) viewpoints, narratives, and possibly particular 
speakers which might be marginalised on the debate/topic-agenda in DC – and not 
normally part of Singer’s ‘factory’ or frequent re-circulation of speakers and seminar 
topics. Here, as opposed to Medvetz’ deployment of this Bourdieusian concept, I 
find it more relevant to employ this concept as a work-practice among policy-
researchers rather than signifying the ‘field’ itself as a whole. This effort also serves 
as a stark reminder of what might be placed on the top of the China policy-research 
agenda, especially in its communication with the wider public audiences, is highly 
dependent on context on the one hand, as well as politicisation on the other.  
 
The economic form of ‘capital’ itself is especially gained though funding, where 
relationality to context and other fields are impactful factors, as Sue Levenstein at 
the Wilson Center expressed:
601
 
 
I think certain issues are marginalised, considered not sexy, mainly because of the 
group-think in DC (…) we had an event on Burma, two little conferences – one on 
                                                          
600 Interview Sam Sheridan, op.cit. (recording: 19:20). 
601 Interview with Sue Levenstein (006-F), 29:38. 
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Burma’s economy and one about politics. Guess which one was best attended. 
Talking about the American audience, they think about human rights, politics, 
communism, and now economy, regarding China. Things like Chinese culture and 
history is so rich, for example the Tung dynasty – personally interested – but won’t 
be attended. It’s too academic, I just think. 
 
Thus, contextuality of donors strongly influences the contents of “China-narratives” 
as any think tank is reliant on attracting high numbers (audience).  
 
I upheld strategising as a praxis of policy-researchers. I coin the term “policy-
boundary entrepreneurs” creating additional ‘social space’ for their propagated 
“China-thinking” which again depends on their acquired ‘capital’ and its 
convertibility and transferability to other ‘fields’. The significance of this work-
practice, and especially the subtle references to this aspect, was somewhat surprising. 
Many of my interviewees requested this particular utterance to remain Off the 
Record. The ‘field’ is imperative here (internal structures of the ‘field’ and 
positioning), as it explains the links between action and habitus, which further 
highlights embodied and tacit approaches in the work-lives amongst policy-
researchers. This substantiates the importance of thinking relationally also in regard 
to the simultaneously employment of Bourdieu’s “thinking-tools”.602 
 
The notions of ‘capital’ become crucial in order to fully comprehend the strategising 
practice – as the manoeuvrability to exercise this is not equally accessible to all 
social agents (aka policy-researchers and think tanks). ‘Capital’, again, ought to be 
pushed much closer to the forefront of a Bourdieusian inquiry for a more 
appropriately focus on relationality. In essence, what the debate is informed by, and 
                                                          
602 See Swartz 2008, ‘Bringing Bourdieu’s master concepts into organizational analysis’, op.cit. 45-52. 
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the capabilities and motivation/disposition for strategising, cannot be separated from 
the acquired ‘capital’. As Gusterson expressed – somebody like Peter W. Singer can 
take such a critical view because he resides at the Brookings Institution – which 
proclaims, and exhibits, a more academic and non-politicised/ideologised distance. 
Hence, self-critical and retrospective efforts are expectedly more accepted, but occur 
infrequently at most other think tanks. Similarly, when glancing through hundreds of 
commentaries of policy-researchers, these discourses are impressively silent. Not a 
coincidence, then, that these practices were to be found at one of the other self-
proclaimed “academic” think tanks in DC. A think tank with more academic capital 
has more room for manoeuvre as it reflects the role and identity of the very same 
think tank. 
 
Strategising is also important due its wide-ranging implications beyond the mere in-
house think tank seminars. Most events are broadcasted live on the Internet and 
available as podcasts thereafter. Thus, the stage of think tank policy-deliberations 
and analysis is very accessible to people around the globe. However, many a viewer 
will probably, and understandably, possess very limited grasp of the “rules of the 
games” about the ‘field’ hence not be privy to understand these “rules” and their 
impact on the information they are exposed to. For example, in a Congressional 
hearing taking place during the summer (2011), two of my respondents at Carnegie 
and the Wilson Center reported about think tanks being invited to testify on a 
particular China-issue. They found, however, that only like-minded (who supported 
the wanted outcome) were invited by the applicable Committee – and indicated that 
their participation would have provided a more appropriate polyphony of different 
perspectives. 
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4.4 Other impacting factors 
In the discussions above, the focal point has been on policy-researchers as 
individuals (including their affiliated think tanks) and their agency – however, 
without removing relationality or to detach it from the enmeshed nature of the meso-
field (contextual, macro-structures). This sub-section discusses additional contextual 
factors as social phenomena, which evidently influence the ‘social field’ of China 
policy-researchers within U.S. think tanks.
603
  The effort encompasses ‘influence’, 
sex, roles, and expertise, as well as definitions pf think tanks and self-image. The 
interface with factors such as funding and the media are continued. These main 
themes are derived from, and thus warranted by, the obtained field-data. As the focal 
point of this study relates to the individual policy-researchers, the below 
deliberations are somewhat more brief. The engagement with Bourdieu’s concepts, 
however (and proposed arguments in this regard) is continued from the discussions 
in preceding sub-sections.  
 
4.4.1 Influence 
Influence, or to portray the position of possessing authority, has already been 
identified as the “stakes at stake” in the constructed China policy-research ‘field’. 
This determines what the social actors (aka policy-researchers as individuals and 
think tanks as organisations in an enmeshed symbiosis) struggle about. It further 
defines what forms of capital which matter in this particular field. To measure 
influence, or discussing the extent and approach of exercised influence (or impact), 
is not an objective of this study. However, due to its centrality in the narratives and 
constructed ‘social realities’ reported by the research subjects, it can purposefully be 
                                                          
603 Earlier discussed influential contextual, macro-structural factors in the previous sub-section revolved around 
funding and the media. 
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engaged with from the following perspective: to obtain a deeper nuanced 
understanding of the field itself, and to grasp ‘influence’ as a social phenomenon in 
relation to constrictions on “China-thinking” and work-practices by deploying 
Bourdieu’s concepts.  
 
This also illustrates the relevance of incorporating Bourdieu’s social theory as it 
unveils new lines of inquiry when allowing the investigation to be informed in a 
“bottom-up” fashion by obtained field-data. In addition, by presenting new collected 
data, this inquiry also contributes with original knowledge to the specific literature 
think tank literature, herein what Stone identified as the second ‘analytical school’. It 
is here, where obtained field-data, in contrast with established body of literature in 
this domain, takes stance with the current dominance of organisations in this 
literature. 
 
This sub-section, firstly, comments briefly on influence versus impact. Secondly, I 
discuss the need for a hierarchical understanding of ‘influence’, which in effect 
further advances my critique of Medvetz’ model. Thirdly, research subjects’ 
experiences and other observations will be presented. Fourth, I will highlight the 
intricate nature of influence. Fifth, I shall engage with the explanatory power of 
Bourdieu’s concept. The latter effort includes seeking opportunities for developing 
his concept of ‘capital’. 
 
4.4.1.1 Influence “versus” Impact 
I am making a purposeful distinction between the terms ‘influence’ and ‘impact’. 
The former relates to having their opinions being listened to by policy-makers and/or 
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at least informing part of the policy decision-making. Impact, however, would 
require a qualitative change in society and/or a distinct and sole influence on a 
specific policy-outcome. I have argued elsewhere, that both concepts are impossible 
to measure quantitatively in any meaningful manner.
604
 Thus, this epistemological 
stance is also a critique of the focus on ‘outcome’ and the premise of any model, 
such as Holsti’s model, depicting influence on the basis of linearity and causation.605  
 
I argue it is more plausible to talk about ‘positioning’ (to various degrees; strong to 
weak continuum) in terms of abilities to influence without having to determine a 
quantifiable value on the outcome of the influence-seeking process. This does not 
“solve” the issue of measuring influence, but as my stance is that this cannot be 
accomplished in any meaningful way, I subsequently do not evaluate the concept of 
‘positioning’ within the ontological premise of the former. In this context, think 
tanks and policy-researchers are indeed possessing such positions to influence, 
which depends on accumulated capital and structural position within the ‘field’. 
Thus, the inclusion of thinking in terms of a Bourdieusian ‘field’ shows the 
dialectical relevance of his “thinking tools” and they further assist in highlighting the 
applicability of the proposed ‘positioning’ concept.  
 
Furthermore, to think relationally – the foci of applying Bourdieu’s field to the 
China policy-research community – is also a reminder of that “positioning” in the 
field’s internal structural system which is based on possessed ‘capital’, is not a fixed, 
quantifiable amount. Inversely, it is dynamic and transformative due to it depends on 
                                                          
604 See Guttormsen, DSA 2010a, op.cit.; Medina and Guttormsen 2010, “Who Thinks for Me?”, op.cit. 
605 See Kalevi J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1983).  
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the positions (and positional changes) of the array of other think tanks and other 
social agents within the ‘field’. Furthermore, thinking relationally also shows the 
determining role of capital in “positioning” and the links to the ‘fields of power’. As 
the activity of ‘influencing’ strongly relates to influencing foreign policy, the power 
field of politics is particularly relevant. It also assists in explaining why think tanks 
with the most amount and variation of capital also enjoy the position of the most 
prominent ones, i.e. Brookings, CSIS, Carnegie and AEI.  
 
Moreover, the position of the Cato Institute is partly determined, and elevated, by the 
very nature of the faculties of relationality: by having fewer similar (libertarian) 
think tanks as competitors in the general think tank field, Cato enjoys an almost 
“free-standing”, outsider role – which is further enhanced due the ‘field’ features 
more vacant ideological space. This position is accentuated through a perceived 
conceptual distance to the “beltway”, articulated by Justin Logan, Director of 
Foreign Policy Studies at Cato – but subsequently laughed when I asked him who 
then is within the beltway.
606
 For this reason, Cato is often mentioned alongside the 
“big four” think tanks (above) albeit not having the same amount or range of capital. 
It also hints about the prevalent role of ideology in the general think tank field – as 
the above social categorisation is very much based on a spectrum of ideologies.
607
 
 
4.4.1.2 Advancing the ‘field’: an hierarchical approach regarding ‘influence’ 
In addition to thinking contextually, relationally as well as through “positioning”, I 
am also highlighting the need for a hierarchical perspective on ‘influence’. This 
corresponds with the notion of sub-fields (aka hierarchy) as a core element of the 
                                                          
606 Interview, Justin Logan (Cato Institute), Washington, DC, USA, 27 July, 2011 (044-EEV). 
607 The facet of ideology is addressed in the two remaining analysis chapters. 
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proposed hybrid field. This is empirically warranted by field-data and secondary 
research, and also takes into account Medvetz’ various ‘social universes’,608 in 
addition to the fact that the authority exhibited (based on consolidation of capital) 
depends on the audience in terms of what ‘capital’ is recognised by them. I will not 
dwell too long on this topic but this facet should be recognised contemplating on that 
the relationality with other ‘fields – homology – are not fixed either. Again, context 
is paramount – for example, the shift of balance in the U.S Congress or who holds 
the Presidency might very well change the distance between various sub-fields 
(different hierarchical levels). Opposed to popular belief, there is a shared agreement 
among DC China policy-researchers that this has not been the case with U.S. foreign 
policies towards China post-Bush Jr.
609
 
 
However, especially through Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who has more 
adamantly and publically championed China’s poor human rights record,610 has led 
to increased accumulation of political capital amongst human rights policy-analysts, 
organisations, and watchers. In terms of homology and relational distance, this sub-
field arguably has closed some of the “hierarchical gap” with the economic power-
field when economic interests have been placed at the forefront. This means that the 
constellations of sub-fields at the different levels within the hierarchy also do not 
have a fixed relationship (aka “distance”), and this can only be grasped through a 
                                                          
608 Medvetz 2008, op.cit. 
609 Hathaway, Robert. Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. (Wilson Center), June 14, 2011 (016-P). 
610 See article Jeffrey Goldberg, “Hillary Clinton: Chinese System Is Doomed, Leaders on a 'Fool's Errand”, The 
Atlantic (http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/05/hillary-clinton-chinese-system-is-doomed-
leaders-on-a-fools-errand/238591/, 2011). 
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contextualised inquiry where neither materiality nor construction can be allotted 
primacy.
611
  
 
In effect, my multidimensional model (based on Medvetz’, unintentionally, one-
dimensional heuristic device), can be further improved – by thinking of the hierarchy 
of fields where each level comprises several sub-fields. This takes form as a tapestry 
of cross-over sub-fields and these can move both horizontally and vertically in the 
space between the hierarchical levels. Different sub-levels of ‘fields’ may, thus, 
interface depending on historic conditions and contextuality. This is not a far-fetched 
thought, as hierarchy of fields is a very prominent idea in Bourdieu’s social theory. 
Thus, my contribution is more closely aligned to the advancement of thinking about 
fields specifically in regard to China policy-research and think tanks in general, in 
addition to further enhancing Medvetz’ model as a heuristic device.  
 
The multidimensionality of the hybridity of the field, think tanks, and individuals – 
as practices and movements across fields are neither not necessarily synchronised 
across individuals and the affiliated think tank, or unison across one think tank. This 
makes it impossible to count “China-narratives” and number of ‘fields’, in the same 
vein that determining the populace of think tanks have generated startlingly 
fluctuating sums.
612
  As anthropologist Edwin T. Ardener eminently showed in his 
ethnographic field-research in Africa relating to population and demographics; a 
                                                          
611 This relates to Bourdieu’s dialecticality, of this thesis and subsequently contrasts with mainstream 
constructivist views within IR where construction/ideas are assumed to be preceding before 
structures/materiality. 
612 See Medvetz 2008, op.cit. – numbers varies between approximately 100 in 1991 (Smith 1991, The Idea 
Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite, op.cit. p. 214), 1,200 in 1996 (Lynn Hellebust, ed., 
Think Tank Directory: A Guide to Nonprofit Public Policy Research Organizations. Topeka, KS: Government 
Research Service, 1996), 300 in 2004 (Andrew Rich, Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise 
(Cambridge: University Press, 2004), to “somewhere between 115 and 1400 think tanks in the United States” 
(McGann, “Academics to Ideologues,” op.cit. p. 738). 
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researcher can count human beings, but in terms of meaning, we cannot know what 
we really are counting if we are not aware of how the individuals socially categorise 
themselves.
613
 Thus, a line with ten China policy-researchers mathematically 
constitutes 10 people, however, in terms of what sub-fields they ascribe to the sum 
might be a completely different number. 
 
4.4.2 Experiencing and observing ‘influence’ by China policy-researchers 
The research subjects were asked about their abilities and prospects to influence in 
relation to U.S. foreign relations towards China and U.S.-Sino relations. From the 
perspective of Bourdieu’s capital, there are three elements which should be 
highlighted; the policy-researchers reactions to influence in addition to 
problematising the notion of ‘influence’ across policy-researchers as individuals and 
the think tanks which are housing them; the acquisition of capital/influence through 
an imagined form of capital; and the permeating individuality outlook of exercised 
influence (in contrast to the dominating organisational perspective in the specialised 
think tank literature). 
 
First, in terms of how policy-researchers themselves think about ‘influence’, in my 
interviews, all respondents acknowledged the infeasibility to gauge influence 
                                                          
613 Ardener raises subsequently the question of whose interest are we following when counting and naming a 
population. This relates to who possesses the power to prevail in the decision-making process in this regard. Are 
they names or numbers, if so who are naming them and for whom? It is therefore inescapable – to acknowledge 
that in more areas than expected, bodies of numerical data do not necessarily warrants a culture-free or neutral 
(demographic) science (see Edwin Ardener 1989a, “Language, Ethnicity and Population”, in Edwin Ardener: The 
Voice of Prophecy and Other Essays, ed. Malcolm K. Chapman (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1989a), 65-71). 
This is a lesson learnt from Africa, where post-colonial countries were delimited according to the victories of 
colonial powers – and not dynamic factor such as social phenomena previously mentioned. A revealing example 
relates to an African tribe, which considered an individual who had left the enclosure around the designated living 
area (for the tribe), as no longer a member of the tribal population (Ardener 1989a, ibid. 65-71; Edwin Ardener, 
E, “Social Anthropology and Population”, in Edwin Ardener: The Voice of Prophecy and Other Essays, ed. 
Malcolm K. Chapman (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1989b), 108-126; Diane Forsythe 1989, German Identity and 
the Problems of History, in History and Ethnicity, eds Elizabeth Tonkin et al. (London: Routledge, 1989), 137-
156). 
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quantitatively. This was encapsulated in the frequent utterances: “how can you really 
know?”614 As Wakefield expressed:  
 
Hard to know what impact we have, not criteria we pride us on. Reports written here 
have been influential.
615
  
 
Malou Innocent at the Cato Institute argues: 
 
I think think tanks are a bit unorthodox, and by unorthodox I mean, it is just a 
bizarre format. You aren’t tied directly to any administration; you aren’t tied directly 
to any governmental official. It’s the…what you can make palpable in the debate – 
so you push your ideas either through media, through talking to governmental 
officials, or meetings on Capitol Hill to spread your influence. You are not 
spreading anything tangible. It is very difficult to measure the impact a think tank is 
having on public policy unless they have talked to a specific policy-maker who has 
implemented this in a policy. I think it is very difficult to measure the impact of 
one’s influence on policy in the think tank world – that is extremely difficult. 
 
What they all do engage with (work-practices) to various degrees of scope and 
authority, however, is to exercise ‘influence’ – enabled by the “positioning”. They 
are preferred talking-heads and commentators on talk-shows and news programmes 
on television, and authors of opinion-editorials in leading newspapers and prominent 
weekly magazines. They publish work (mostly non-academic outlets) and host a 
myriad of seminars and consultations.
616
 When watching American television, the 
familiar picture from my home country of Norway with professors and other 
academic experts serving the role as media commentators and analysts – it was 
particularly noticeable how “think tankers” occupied this role in American media.  
 
                                                          
614 Field-notes 2011. 
615 Interview, Bryce Wakefield (005-E), Wilson Center. 
616 An example with the corporate sphere relates to donor privileges (as funders) through the Brookings 
Corporate Council (see 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/About/development/Brookings%20Donor%20PrivilegesCorporate.pdf). 
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The concept of “positioning” comes in handy, coupled with Bourdieu, as it explains 
this process. Brookings, which holds symbolic power, can be interviewed as a 
centre-left think tank due to this prominence even in conservative media outlets – a 
more articulated “leftist” labelled Institute for Policy Studies or Center for American 
Progress would not be as they lack general capital. The World Resources Institute 
holds substantial capital in the environment civil society field but may lack capital in 
general – political and economic in particularly – in commercial areas, or the field of 
security. The US Institute for Peace (USIP) holds more political capital and 
particularly manages well in the political power-field due to their funding being 
channelled through Congress. Different think tanks possess different types of capital 
– and a combination of them (aka consolidation), if any – where the transferability 
and convertibility across fields is varying. During my field-work, USIP was a prime 
example of this – when experiencing profound uncertainties due to the House of 
Representatives voted in February 2011 to remove all federal funding to the USIP 
(and thus its livelihood).
617
 However, the funding was reinstated in April 2011. 
 
The “positioning” to influence is a notion grounded in empirical data – as the sheer 
volume of respondents would recognise and be comfortable with talking about 
‘having input’, ‘being listened to’, ‘provide an informed view’ and the alike.618 
Donaldson also contemplates on this being a better way of gauging influence.
619
 
Positions are here crucial, because if being “unpositioned” – there is likely a void of 
audience being receptive at the receiving end when communicating policy-advice 
                                                          
617 See Al Kamen, “Just give peace a chance?”, Washington Post (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/02/24/AR2011022406522.html, 24 Feb 2011); interview with Stein D. Tønnesson (009-
I), USIP/PRIO/Uppsala. 
618 See field-notes. 
619 Abelson 2006, op.cit. 169. 
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and research – or holding a ‘weak position’ where your views might be marginalised, 
not respected or subject to bias. In the case of USIP, it shows that capital can 
diabolically be, almost, removed due to macro-structures and where agency of 
policy-researchers and affiliated think tanks stand more or less defenceless.  
 
The second point relates to the particular nuance of what I call ‘imagined capital’. 
This corresponds with the already established “stakes at stake” (portraying having 
authority through capital “we do not really have but can portray that we possess”). 
This nuance is also closely linked to my notion of approaching influence 
hierarchically. The notion of “imagined capital” is warranted by my interpretations 
of empirical data. It explains better the “rules of the game”. To exercise authority 
through “imagined capital” works out most effectively when encountering a 
generalist public when scrutiny can be expected to be less intense (as opposed to in 
case with a specialist audience). This is accommodated by the nature of American 
media where policy-researchers are called upon to address a “hot topic”/”breaking-
news” in that typical “30-second spot”.620  
 
As one policy-analyst explained to me; “if you research on Iraq and Afghanistan but 
asked to give a commentary on Yemen (and do not have knowledge about the 
country/topical issue) – do accept!” Likewise, to display such imaginary capital in 
other sub-fields can also lead to additional recognition. For example, with the earlier 
mentioned reference to the CATO Institute – they adamantly broadcast themselves 
                                                          
620 See interview with Malou Innocent, Cato Institute. Furthermore, during my 3-month fieldwork in DC, I eagerly 
followed news programmes on different television channels, Fox News in particularly as they are positioned 
farthest away from my viewpoints politically, hence more interesting to self-reflexively reflect upon my own views 
through the ontologies of Fox. Nevertheless, this participative observational element informed me about the 
frequent usage of this journalistic style (to some extent similar to in the UK and Australia) but quite different from 
the norms in Norway and Scandinavia in general.   
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as the ‘liberal alternative’ as far as think tank ideologies are concerned.621 Being the 
only one (or amongst the very few; perhaps alongside the less famous Hudson 
Institute), is gaining capital due to being relationally distinct from the “rest of the 
crowd”, so to speak. It is a ‘capital’, imagined, which is available for them to 
“borrow” in public discourse. 
 
This means that occasionally, one meta-field can play the role as a catalyst, where 
one ‘field’ is dependent on having been preceded by another meta-field. Hence, you 
cannot access the benefits without the interplay with the necessary, preceding ‘field’. 
Innocent (Cato) highlights this social phenomenon and contextuality – effectively an 
aspect of the established the “stakes at stake” of the ‘field’:622  
 
(…) what impact and effect think tank have, much easier to see effect in public 
debate and public discourse – and to the influence of their views (…) I can certainly 
speak for Cato, several years ago our position on foreign policy were considered 
outside the mainstream, especially because there was a lot of interventionist fever 
after 9/11 but also after the attacks on Afghanistan, the attacks on Iraq, and now on 
Pakistan. There was a war fever that gripped the nation and so we were considered 
outside the mainstream until, honestly, very recently, when I, I would say until 
08/09, when we really gained a lot more deal of traction within the political 
discourse. Now, simply because we have greater influence in the public domain on 
television and media, this does not always reflect on policy. Ahm, you know, we can 
have a great numbers of hits on New York Times or BBC, but if policy-makers are 
still wedded into the notion of intervention and nation-building – then it would be 
very difficult to measure the impact on change, so I think it is very difficult so I 
don’t think it translate smoothly popular discourse into public-policy – two different 
things sometimes. 
 
The importance of structures is evident – she continues:623  
 
                                                          
621 The Cato Institute also organises an annual Cato University in the summer months about liberty (see 
http://www.cato.org/cato-university/). 
622 See interview with Malou Innocent (043-DDW), Cato Institute. 01.06 
623 Innocent interview, ibid. 04.54. 
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Me: Is there a space for Cato – you mentioned earlier you were outside the 
mainstream? 
Innocent: (…) before my time 06, the public was more agreeing with us, we have 
the same positions, but THAT effects the policy-makers as we have the public on 
our side. Now we have the policy-makers, the intellectuals giving us more 
credibility and acceptance, very interesting, we have been able to push the public 
debate – and through the public debate we can influence more people within 
Washington, I think. They might not agree with us at the end of the day, but people 
start to understand that we are constrained military, budgetary-wise, AND when 
having the public on our side, we see more invitations to conferences, more 
placements in newspapers, op-eds, media appearance requests, more requests, so 
there are tangible ways we see an increased interests in our public contributions. 
 
The authority (‘capital’) for agency relating to influence of policy-researchers are 
constrained by the audience – it cannot be understood within the confinement of the 
one ‘field’ only. This is a reminder about the non-deterministic nature of fields and 
thus substantiates the proposition of hybridity in a multidimensional construct (i.e. 
my proposed advancements of Medvetz’ original model). Nevertheless, this is 
imperative although this influence has a low(er) transferability and convertibility as 
opposed to “genuine” capital. To continue the monetary metaphor – it is “borrowed 
capital” in the “eyes of the beholder” (aka the audience). The flipside of such 
imaginary capital is that abilities to “cash-in” into other forms of capital are close to 
zero. However, the exposure can translate into the all-essential increased funding 
from donors. Thus, “imagined capital” ironically is not without any worth (potential 
to be converted into economic capital). Position to influence can be improved 
without necessarily possessing the capital, but the capabilities to do so would 
increase in effectiveness when acknowledged by the relevant audience(s).
624
  
 
                                                          
624 Depicting this social phenomenon as an impactful factor in the ‘field’, I am solely illustrating its salience and 
not diving into a deeper discussion regarding ‘audiences’. A separate literature exists concerning the latter – but I 
am deeming it beyond the scope of this study. 
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Third, I argue that the specific think tank literature, which principally talks about the 
organisational level, fails to elevate the individual outlook in the ‘field’ in terms of 
influence.
625
 I am sympathetic of the voices who would say that this is common-
sense as only human-beings act – however, my point is that this consequently should 
be much better and comprehensively reflected in this particular literature and its 
research agenda. Thus, this point further substantiates my argument for the need for 
a ‘third school of analysis’ (the individual level and conceptualisation of why and 
how they think – rather than mere descriptive accounts). The point is strengthened as 
the epitome of gauging influence is the McGann global rankings of think tanks (and 
civil society organisations).
626
 The evident individual outlook on exercising 
influence accommodates for two departures from the specific think literature: the 
obtained empirical data justifies a much stronger focus on individuals, as well as the 
importance of comprehending think tanks as organisations and affiliated individuals 
as inseparable, and having dialectic relationships. This follows suits with the 
argument throughout this chapter.
627
  
 
I shall first focus on the first instance of the above-mentioned departures. The 
aforesaid example with Sam Sherradan at the New America Foundation serves as an 
example of how ‘social space’ is opened up – but by the strategising of individual 
policy-researchers. When the interviewees are queried about influence, references 
turn immediately to individuals, such as Nicholas R. Lardy at the Peterson Institute, 
as well as China hands Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David Shambaugh at the 
                                                          
625 See (Chapter Three – literature review) concerning the first ‘school of analysis’ within the specialised think 
tank literature. 
626 See McGann 2010, op.cit; McGann 2009, op.cit; Schifferes 2003, op.cit; Quality. Independence. Impact, 
2010. Available from: http://www.brookings.edu/about.aspx. 
627 I.e. as a sociological meso-level. 
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Brookings Institution. In my interview with the former at Brookings, on the question 
of influence, Lieberthal only had to gaze out his window on the 5
th
 floor, and point to 
the other adjacent think tanks (Peterson Institute for International Economics, John 
Hopkins SAIS) in order to illustrate what can almost be thought of as a “physical” 
manifestation of ‘power’ and “all the China-expertise you need in the country” 
(U.S.).
628
 My other interviewees – Andrew Scobell (Senior Political Scientist, 
RAND Corporation) and Bonnie Glaser (CSIS) both highlighted the shortened 
distance to “power” and influence by former staff who currently possess or 
previously held top positions in the State Department and the Department of 
Defence.  
 
The second aspect of the third point relates to that influence is dialectic, which can 
be explained by Bourdieu’s ‘capital’. Both individual policy-researchers and think 
tanks as organisations (depicted above) do possess ‘capital’. From the policy-
researchers’ point of view, the ‘capital’ which is giving them authority and improved 
capabilities  for “positioning” are not separate from the think tank (and its ‘capital’) 
they are affiliated to. CSIS is particularly known for close networks and links into 
government and federal departments, and thus exemplifies how the think tank on the 
organisational level is associated with political and cultural capital and subsequently 
closely interfacing with the political power-field. This is nurtured through 
individuals but the organisational reputation also attracts donors, or being used to 
attract them with such narrative. Thus, individual policy-researchers with perhaps 
less capital might benefit from the organisational accumulation of capital at the, 
                                                          
628 Lieberthal, Kenneth. Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. Tape recording. Brookings Institution, July 6, 2011 
(032-KL) – not recorded on request. 
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predominantly, organisational “level”.629 This notion relates to what many policy-
researchers find China to be in the international system; a “free-rider”. See figure 2 
for this dialectic set-up. 
 
Figure 2 –Enmeshed dialcticality of capital 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This dialectic form is different from the staged “imagined capital” as the former 
relates to elements of possessed capital – whereas the latter depicts what authority 
you stage through merely being perceived by a particular relevant audience to hold. 
In terms of the dialectical form of capital, the “divide” does not only occur between 
individual policy-researchers and affiliated think tanks (within the same field), but 
also with other types of organisations (for example, other strands of civil society 
organisations). This aspect further substantiates the notion of the above social actors 
in addition to the ‘field’ itself being hybridised cross-over ‘fields’ which are 
organised in social structures across a hierarchy.  
 
This relates also to what Bourdieu labels as the ‘transferability’ of ‘capital’ – or said 
more colloquially and in line with the monetary metaphorical take on the ‘capital’ 
                                                          
629 See interview with Bonnie Glaser (035-QR), CSIS, as well as Steven Balla (018-R) and Bruce Dickinson (030-
GH) at Georgetown University, in addition to Hugh Gusterson (037-UV), George Mason University. 
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concept; “borrowed” capital, herein the prominence from related to the same form of 
capital but from another field. For example, David Shambaugh (George Washington 
University and Brookings Institution) certainly bestows academic prominence to 
Brookings due to his academic affiliation and standing as well as his position as a 
China-hand and an area-study expert as far as China is concerned (and perhaps the 
only one in town operating within the intersectional area between the academe and 
think tanks).
630
 The same process occurs when individuals can increase 
organisational capital by making media appearances (not only for personal 
reasons).
631
 Furthermore, Leland Miller (American Foreign Policy Council) talks 
about borrowing the identity of the Council (i.e. portraying the image of a “thinker” 
and being plugged into the political world). He would utilise and emphasise his 
various titles in various context – an effort to capitalise the capital, as it were 
(appreciation of your capital – to continue the monetary metaphor).632 Influence 
ought to be understood as the ‘capital’ of the think tank and the individual, where the 
meso-level represents the intersection between them. This is a reminder that ‘capital’ 
is contextual and also relational to Bourdieu’s other concepts. 
 
4.4.2.1 “Revolving-door” and networks 
It becomes pertinent to include the two above interrelated aspects when discussing 
influence and its individual outlook. The argument concerning the prominence of the 
latter is further substantiated by the emphasis policy-researchers are placing on the 
                                                          
630 Interview with Ellen Frost (001-A), Peterson Institute. 
631 Abelson 2002, op.cit. 84. 
632 Interview with Leland Miller (American Foreign Policy Council), op.cit. 
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networks of individuals. Ellen Frost highlights the social phenomenon of the 
appropriately illustrious term “revolving door”:633 
 
(…) lots of people have worked in presidential campaigns, Jeff Bader is the top-man 
on China in the National Security Council, before on the Obama campaign, left a 
couple of years, went back to Brookings, and now advice on China and a “go-to-
man” whom the National Security Council calls when wanting to know what they 
should think about China. Same with Lieberthal at Brookings under President 
Clinton. 
 
Similarly, Douglas Paal (Vice President for Studies at Carnegie) reported about face-
to-face consultancy with President Obama on China (and a bit annoyingly indicating 
that he had hoped Obama would have also taken more notice of his advice on 
Afghanistan).
634
 Furthermore, Bonnie Glaser (CSIS) relayed that herself and four 
other China-scholars had a 2.5 hour meeting with Secretary Hilary Clinton on 
China.
635
 They do not hide the fact that such networks and work-practices do not 
necessarily translate into direct influence on a particular China-policy or the 
government’s “China-thinking” – but more a case of having their voices heard as 
part of the policy decision-making process. In concert, it arguably speaks volume for 
the relevance of my earlier proposed concept of “positioning”.  
 
Ellen Frost, who formerly held high-level government positions, also pinpoints the 
cultural aspects (role of ideas) in combination with the “revolving door” 
phenomenon through acquired political and social capitals – which nuances the 
forms of capital:  
 
                                                          
633 Interview with Ellen Frost, ibid. 
634 Interview Douglas Paal, Carnegie (022-V). 
635 Interview with Bonnie Glaser, CSIS, op.cit. 
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(…) gives you experience, you know, what is possible or not when having been in 
Congress and bureaucracy, people in government don’t have time to think, some 
research but not in-depth thinking (…) outside you have time to think, what should 
we think, active/passive?, what do we do, a little bit more time to think. Government 
is all about process, meeting after a meeting, always running for an office – does not 
stop, just worse and worse, already beginning next election season.  
 
This sentiment was supported by a senior diplomat in the State Department whom I 
interviewed Off the Record an early morning in Virgina at 8AM! In essence, this 
makes the “revolving door” phenomenon a particular powerful one between the 
government and think tanks. Expert on think tanks, Steve Balla, also highlights the 
importance of contextuality herein constraining factors:
636
  
 
(…) there are more leftist in academia hence revolving door takes more form from 
government and back to academia, less in conservative think tanks (…) thus, 
certainly the case that this happens between think tanks and government – a 
democrat government – but also the case with right-wing think tanks and NGOs that 
are supplying right wing government officials with policy-ideas  (…) what happens 
– think tanks and NGOs on the right are newer and less established, we are used to 
think about Brookings because republicans were only out of power since 1990s – 
then you saw the establishments of conservative think tanks (for example Newt 
Gingrich) – both sides but absolute better established on the left. More of it now. 
 
The above also illustrates the appreciation of different forms of capital, and 
consolidation of them, in different fields beyond the think-tank sphere (in this case 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the academe).  
 
John Feffer (Co-Director, Foreign Policy in Focus, Institute for Policy Studies), 
pinpoints the process of the “revolving door” in comparison with a key characteristic 
of the Chinese value-system (‘guanxi’):637  
 
                                                          
636 Interview with Steve Balla, George Washington University. 
637 Interview with John Feffer, Institute for Policy Studies, 11.11. 
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On specific issues think tanks can influence, like the currency issue; the new 
administration comes in, not necessary having the time or interest even to do home 
research, they can ask congressional research service to do it (…) think tanks can 
come in with papers, what we can really do is to have very focused impact on 
specialised technical issues, on the other hand, ex-staff of former government people 
(functions, contacts) thus translate experience plus contacts into impact. Might have 
nothing to do with value of what they saying, can be ludicrous, but what matters is 
personal connections, that means a great deal (…) discrepancy about guanxi as if 
operating to a feudal system not like Weber’s modern society, older patriotism 
system relies on connections (…) peel away rational bureaucratic façade – that is 
how DC operate as well, the revolving door is a major part of the guanxi system 
here. 
 
The above also substantiates my introduced notion of “imagined capital”. 
 
Networks (work-practices and receiving audiences) are global and expand across 
country-borders (into China in particularly). One central facet, here, relates to the 
increased transnational dimension of the contemporary think tank world. For 
example, both Brookings and Carnegie have branch-offices (with full-time employed 
policy-research staff) in Beijing affiliated to Tsinghua University, as well as the 
German Marshall Fund of The United States, World Resources Institute and the Asia 
Society (various locations). Moreover, policy-researchers themselves frequently 
travel to the region. However, in China their movements are often constrained by 
governmental officials and consequently only allowed to meet with selected people 
and government offices.
638
 As many do not possess conversational (or above) 
Chinese language skills – they are also prevented to follow local news and interact 
with people with not a direct stake in their work. As a Congressman imparted 
(referring to his official travels to China): “I felt like a donkey on a trade-show”.639 
Furthermore, many policy-researchers only experience what cultural research 
                                                          
638 Field-notes. 
639 Off the Record statement, hence interview not referenced. 
205 
 
scholars refer to as the ‘honeymoon-phase” as far as entering another country is 
concerned – dazzled by modern, skyscrapers where poor areas such as in the west of 
the country and topics beyond the prevalent economic, security/military and 
financial sphere are “out sight, out of mind”.  
 
This serves as a pertinent reminder of the hybridised cross-over fields, policy-
researchers, and think tank organisations which subscribe to ‘fields’ traversing 
country-borders (beyond the U.S.). There are equivalent players in China who also 
are embedded in the China policy-research field as social actors. This further 
complicates the work of policy-researchers in U.S. think tanks as macro-structures 
such as U.S.-Sino relations and the transnational dimension of think tanks have an 
impact on the “stakes at stake” and that factors playing out in another culture and 
country very much are beyond their control. Ultimately, this further constrains the 
manoeuvrability of “China-thinking” and work-practices.  
 
4.5 Expertise, roles, gender-balance, cold-war mentality, political science, 
language – an emerging, new generation of “think tankers”? 
The aspects of expertise (constable term) and think tank roles (“borrowing” capital 
from the academe) have earlier been addressed (this chapter). The interchangeable 
use of ‘U.S.-Sino relations’ on the one hand – and ‘China’ on the other, is 
disingenuous. Occasionally, it assumes an expertise on the U.S. (your own country) 
but subsequently, then, also China albeit the term ‘U.S.-Sino relations’ depicts what 
is between the countries. As Ross established, internal/domestic variables within 
China have been grossly marginalised on the research agenda relating to a country’s 
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policy-making,
640
 the bilateral relationship,
641 
in addition to international variables 
on a state’s external behaviour.642 Furthermore, I support Medvetz’ notion of roles of 
the ‘academician’ – where think tanks and policy-researchers borrow the prominence 
(e.g. job titles such as ‘fellow’ and ‘research professor’) but not the labour or work-
tasks requirements which come with it (e.g. benchmark for publications, or what 
constitutes ‘expertise’). Collectively, it reflects another practice of strategising, i.e. 
capitalising on already acquired capital. 
 
The aforementioned dominance in terms of the China policy-researchers’ 
background profiles, were often picked-up on by the younger interviewees. These 
facets are rarely discussed and problematised in the mainstream think tank 
literature.
643
 Without having run descriptive statistics on the entire field (but only 
amongst my research subjects), it is a noticeable tendency that the policy-researchers 
in their early twenties is a quite different breed compared to their senior colleagues: 
most have lived and studied in China, speaks at least conversational Mandarin, and 
portrays experiences relating to having encountered Chinese culture and individual 
Chinese people – or alternatively Chinese-Americans.644 Without being able to draw 
any conclusions in this regard, the nature of policy-research on China will be 
exciting to follow and to look for major qualitative shifts (for example the 
understanding of China’s internal/domestic issues and U.S. role in the world) 10-15 
                                                          
640 Robert S. Ross, “Engagement in US China policy”, in Engaging China: the management of an emerging 
power, eds Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, (London: Routledge, 1999), 176-206. 
641 Robert S. Ross 1999, ibid. 176-206. 
642 Li Mingjiang, “Domestic Sources of China’s Soft Power Approach”, China Security, 5 (2): 55-70. 
643 See for example textbooks from leading think tanks scholars such as Diane Stone (Think Tanks Traditions 
2004, and Think Tanks Across Nations, 1998), op.cit, as well as Donaldson (A Capitol Idea 2006 and Do Think 
Tanks Matter 2002), op.cit. 
644 For the former, this includes Sherradan (New America Foundation), Schoen (World Resources Institute), Dale 
Swartz (American Enterprise Institute) – and the latter Levenstein and Sandy Pho, Kissinger Institute on China 
and the United States (Wilson Center). 
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years in ahead. Samuel Sherradan (New America Foundation) constructed this 
contemporary generation-gap as an anti-thesis to ‘Cold-War mentality’.645  
 
Collating descriptive statistics on the background-profiles indicates a dominant 
educational background of political scientists (such as PhD in Political Science or 
similar) rather than IR and even less so area and cultural studies. Indeed, as 
prominent China-hand, Ken Lieberthal at the Brookings Institution, uttered – the 
policy-research world is a very complex one, and not something all can do as many 
political scientists are more used to working with simplified models and regression 
analysis.
646
 The latter point is also a comment on the strongly positivist driven 
quantitative “PolSci” environment in this ‘field’ (without assuming to be different to 
other policy-fields), where qualitative research is not widely used, understood, or 
respected. My study become known as “European”,647 and “things you do at 
Warwick” (where the interviewee listed the terms she found most “out there”, herein 
“feely, feely, post-structuralism, modernism”).648 Again, as with the gender 
discussion (below sub-section), it would not be possible to speculate if the “China-
thinking” would transpire differently in a field with predominantly sociologists and 
historians – but it is nonetheless a latent dimension which should be elucidated and 
assessed as potentially having a future impact (or an area to look for explanatory-
factors). 
 
                                                          
645 Interview with Samuel Sherradan (003-C), New America Foundation. 
646 Interview, Ken Lieberthal, op.cit. 
647 Interview (op.cit.) – said with a friendly and supporting smile by Bryce Wakefield (Wilson Center). 
648 Interview with Ellen Frost (001-A) (Peterson) – not uttered in any derogatory manner, which cannot be said 
about my interview with Lieberthal (Brookings) who responded as follows when I had explained my scope of 
research to him: “You are not testing any hypotheses? That study would not be accepted onto a doctoral 
program at any American university … – of significance …”.  
208 
 
4.5.1 Gender-balance 
A striking observation during my fieldwork relates to the void of women in the 
China policy-research world. My interviewees were predominantly Anglo-Phone, 
white, middle-aged men. In my “sample”, only seven out of 44 interviewees (15%) 
were females. My list of targeted interviewees across most think tanks in DC 
revealed a similar tendency. Bruce Dickson at George Washington University 
contemplates on this being a difference between men and women or a more closed 
path of advisors and mentors – a point which Leland Miller concurred with.649 
However, young (20s something) female interns are in abundance, at DC think tanks. 
The Foreign Policy magazine discussed the addressed issue in an article published 
during my fieldwork – “City of Men”:650 only one out of five policy-researchers in 
foreign policy were women, which makes the “China-field” even more negatively 
eschewed.  
 
This negative balance is further divided when taking into account that even a lower 
number of women are holding positions in the dominating policy-areas in 
Washington, DC, herein the “hard-power” domains which women respondents 
themselves (in Zenko’s article) defined as military and economic forces. I cannot 
conclude, of course, that the policy-research would have looked differently if 
females constituted 50% of the think tank positions as I have not compared with a 
compatible China field containing such high number of women. Moreover, such an 
argument would also be flawed even as anecdotal evidence due to female policy-
researchers (as with men) ascribe to more than on socio-biological taxonomic 
                                                          
649 See interviews with Bruce Dickinson, op.cit., and Leland Miller, op.cit. 
650 Micah Zenko, 14 July 2011 (see http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/07/14/city_of_men). 
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category (sex). Nevertheless, from a ‘capital’ perspective, I argue that the possession 
of ‘capital’ is extremely eschewed gender-wise. 
 
4.6 Defining ‘think tanks’ and self-categorisation – a question of identity 
The issue of defining what constitutes think tanks as organisations is very interesting 
in its own right as the first ‘analytical school’ in the specialised think tank literature 
has been obsessed with solving this conundrum: 
 
Discussion of think tanks (…) has a tendency to get bogged down in the vexed 
question of defining what we mean by ‘think tank’ – an exercise which often 
degenerates into futile semantics.
651
  
 
I am linking this debate to the appreciation and construction of Self of think tanks 
(identity). I find this relevant as meaning-production depends on Bourdieu’s 
concepts of ‘field’ and ‘capital’ and reflects strategising and work-practices among 
policy-researchers. Relationality and a ‘social topography’ of the ‘field’ can move 
the definition issue beyond essentialism – aligned with Medvetz’ attempt.652 I concur 
with Medvetz’ effort to move towards social topography as a highly relevant way to 
circumvent the aforesaid ‘murky’ definition issue, where the field beckons the focus 
towards relationality. He asserts:
 653
 
 
(…) concept’s “slippery”, mutable, fuzzy nature (…) we could do better to 
recognize that trying to establish on paper where the think tank ends and where the 
university research center, the advocacy group, the public relations firm, or the 
political party begins only ensnares us in an endless debate about which 
organisations are the “true think tanks” and which are not.  
 
                                                          
651 Simon James, “Review of Capturing the Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the Policy Process, by Diane 
Stone,” Public Administration, 76(2) (1998): 409-10. 
652 See Medvetz 2008, op.cit. 
653 Medvetz 2008, ibid. 
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However, I also agree with Medvetz that the humongous task to map the field is a 
journey which lies ahead of us.
654
 
 
I am also arguing for the relevance of incorporating conceptual boundaries and 
boundary-markers in regard to identity-construction in a Bourdieusian dialectical 
sense.
655
 The strategising, by drawing upon various forms and consolidations of 
‘capital’, was prevalent among policy-researchers in terms of positioning themselves 
within the ‘field’. Conceptual boundary-construction is particular pertinent here due 
to it being a dialectic concept where social construction of what constitutes “Us” and 
“Them” – Self and Other – is relational as with Bourdieu’s notion of ‘field’.  
 
The possessed ‘capital’ assigns policy-researchers and think tanks to a position 
within the internal structural systems of the ‘field’, and the strategising is carried out 
in order to alter this position for political reasons (not meant in a party-political 
sense). The relational aspect is empirically warranted – what one think tank does in 
terms of “China-thinking” and associated work-practices are relational and 
constitutively formed by what other think tanks do. For example, The Heritage 
Foundation is particularly targeting the Congress – hence, making ‘party-politics’ an 
evident boundary-marker as far as their identity-construction is concerned. 
Symptomatically – Heritage is no stranger to invite close allies on the Hill as key-
note speakers to, for example, their China-events.  
 
                                                          
654 Medvetz 2012, op.cit. 115. 
655 See Lamont and Molnar 2002, op.cit. 167-195; Barth 1971, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social 
Organization of Cultural Difference, op.cit.  
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When I attended Heritage’s ‘The China Challenge: Mixing Economics and Security’ 
seminar (29 June 2011) it prominently featured Senator John Cornyn (Republican, 
Texas) who, according to Heritage’s Dr Holmes (Vice President, Foreign and 
Defense Policy Studies), has become a strong advocate for Taiwan’s security 
concern and sales of fighter-jets to Taiwan.
656
 The honour bestowed to Senator 
Cornyn whose speech reminded me more about an undergraduate essay in terms of 
the contents, was, fair to say, equally an exercise in maintaining Heritage’s political 
connections, and thus political and social ‘capital’. When USIP moved away from K-
street, a hotspot in the think tank world, down to Constitution Avenue overlooking 
the Jefferson Memorial, this was very much in line with accentuating their identity as 
a government-funded policy institution due to closeness to iconic landmark in 
Washington, DC.
657
 In this case, ‘governmental’ performs as one of USIP’s 
boundary-markers. As alluded to earlier (in this chapter), the boundary-marker of 
‘academic’ is salient for Brookings and in particularly the Wilson Center – the latter 
which also would shy away from the marker of ‘policy-advice’, something which 
diverse think tanks such as Center for American Progress, Brookings, Hudson 
Institute would take for granted – even another semi-governmental think tank such as 
RAND Corporation.
658
 
 
Through the theoretical and dialectical lenses of Bourdieu’s sociology of sociology, 
the focus on identity-construction is directed towards how “think tankers” construct 
themselves differently by the use of boundary-markers rather than merely identify 
differences between them (which often boils down to observed behavioural patterns). 
                                                          
656 See http://www.heritage.org/events/2011/06/china-challenge. 
657 Interview with Stein D. Tønnesson, USIP/PRIO, op.cit. 
658 See field-notes. 
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Thus, these boundary-markers are assessed relationally (social and cultural 
boundaries) where the inquiry relates to how they have been drawn and what uphold 
them through the attributed meaning of the boundaries and what unfolds inside them 
and what is excluded.
659
 This social theoretical conclusion further advances 
Medvetz’ stance on the definition issue (to include relationality) by moving it 
beyond the sole problem of essentialism and towards dialectical and sociological 
relational conceptual boundary-construction.  
 
Interestingly, this identity-construction plays out in, exactly, a hybridised cross-over 
field. Each think tank has a different Self/Other constellation, i.e. what Others they 
are constructing their organisational Self within. This is a dialectical interplay in its 
own right; on the one hand their identity is constructed through conceptual 
boundary-construction and materiality (such as USIP; location), on the other hand 
the identity-formation can influence the distribution of capital and their position in 
the various fields themselves (strategising – as with the Cato Institute; inside our 
outside the “belt-way”). Essentially, it illustrates the illogicality of a dichotomised 
binary to define think tanks and where assuming a universal applicability due to 
different countries and cultures (even within one, single think tank) have different 
end points on the very same continuum. Take the example of Norwegian think tanks, 
where higher prominence is linked to “distance from corporations” (and closer to 
government is not problematic), whereas in the U.S., the binary between corporation 
and government relates to a good/clean and bad/dirty binary. 
 
 
                                                          
659 Lauring and Guttormsen 2010, op.cit; Lamont and Molnar 2002, op.cit. 167-195. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
In this first analysis chapter, I have positioned the China policy-research community 
as a Bourdieusian ‘social field’, which in its own right interfaces with this thesis’ 
main contributions. This includes advancing the investigatory scope of think tanks
660
 
which leads to making contributions to the specific think tank literature and U.S. 
Foreign Policy and politics more broadly, in addition to the Bourdieusian 
‘sociological-turn’,661 the importance of dialectical (and especially contextual macro-
structural) facets in the structure/agency debate, and the relevance of dialectical and 
relational thinking in this regard – in IR research. The social theoretical effort is 
integral to a Bourdieusian analysis – the theoretical framework of this study. 
Additionally, the Chapter achieves to contextualise and enhance the understanding of 
the conducted analysis in the subsequent analysis chapters. Overall, the constructed 
‘social field’ has the ability to explicate contextualised factors in more depth, and 
thus shows the need for an enhanced meaning-based inquiry (macro-structures) 
conjointly with examining individuality and agency. In concert, this serves as a 
means to making sense of the research problem at hand relationally, which 
substantially influence the manoeuvrability of “China-thinking” and work-practices 
among China policy-researchers in Washington, DC, anchored think tanks.  
 
In terms of topics, this chapter has predominantly engaged with constructing the 
architecture of the ‘social field’, as well as influential contextual, macro-structural 
factors (media, funding, politics) and microindividual agency (expertise, roles played 
out, gender and background profiles of policy-researchers, identity-construction, 
                                                          
660 Medvetz  2012, op.cit, which is based on Medvetz “Think Tanks as an Emergent Field.” (2008), op.cit.; in 
addition to Medvetz 2012, “Murky Power: ‘Think Tanks’ as Boundary Organizations.”, op.cit. 113-33. 
661 See Adler-Nissen, ed. 2013, op.cit. 
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influence) aligned with the sociological meso-level. Methodologically, this chapter 
draws principally on my conducted interview-questions relating to the above in 
addition to participant observation, informal conversation, collection of written 
material, descriptive statistics, cross-tabulation, and field-notes. The deployment of a 
Bourdieusian framework has accommodated for a way to present and analyse 
collected field-data, but I have also been able to open up new lines of inquiries 
pertinent to the study of think tanks as well as allowing the field-data to scrutinise 
Bourdieu’s conceptual “thinking-tools”. My research has particularly interfaced with 
the work of Tom Medvetz – whose empirical study on American think tanks is one 
of the few which have employed Bourdieu’s social theory in this realm.662  
 
In this chapter, I am presenting various findings which correspond with the main 
arguments and proposed areas of contributions in this thesis. The application of 
Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice has shown a high degree of relevance on three 
accounts. First, it accommodates for a coherent vocabulary in order to present and 
analyse data. Second, this conceptual frame has unveiled new avenues for 
investigation (questions which may not have been asked if the line of inquiry would 
have been subject to an alternative theoretical framework regime) – such as the 
relationship between individuals and groups as social actors in the ‘field’. Third, the 
juxtaposition with new, collected field-data has allowed scrutinising Bourdieu’s 
concept themselves – pointing out the need to differentiate between individuality and 
organisations as social actors in the field, and the existence of a staged “imagined 
capital”.  
 
                                                          
662 Medvetz 2012, op.cit. 
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The above prompts to relay the findings linked to conceptual contributions. The 
study warrants further advancements of Medvetz’ heuristic device through 
establishing the ‘field’ as non-linear, non-fixed, asymmetric, and multi-directional – 
in addition to featuring a constitutively hybrid/cross-over nature as with individual 
policy-researchers and think tank organisations within such ‘fields’. More recently, 
Medvetz developed his thinking in a similar direction – however without including 
central elements of hierarchy or expanding the notion of constitutively hybridity 
beyond organisations as “boundary-organisations”:663 
 
(…) it is possible to use a field theory approach to conceptualize think tanks in three 
different ways: first, as inhabitants of a larger field; second, as organizations that 
span multiple fields; and third, as organizations that collectively make up their own 
field or ‘proto-field’. 
 
Moreover, I have identified the importance of hierarchy of fields as well as the 
dynamic horizontal and vertical movement between them (homology). Here, a ‘field 
of power’ sometimes functions as a moderator for an effect within another ‘field of 
power’ within which the relationality between the different forms of ‘capital’ (aka 
consolidation) influence the position in any given ‘field’. Consequently, this 
supports the proposed conceptual contribution of enhancing the body of research 
regarding the Bourdieusian ‘sociological turn’ in IR research. Additionally, this set-
up substantiates the argument for introducing a third ‘school of analysis’ in the 
specialised think tank literature as well as elevating individuals and think tank 
organisations as non-state players in IR research. 
 
                                                          
663 Medvetz 2012, op.cit. 125. 
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Empirically, this study supports Medvetz notion of “borrowing” prominence from 
the academe as far as what roles think tankers play in their ‘field’ and further 
modified/contested the usage of the term ‘expertise’ as lacking a benchmark. 
Additional findings encompass the strategising practices of creating additional 
“social space”, “imagined capital”, “capital borrowing”, as well as capitalising on 
‘capital’. I have also identified a significant gender-imbalance. 
 
In terms of influence, policy-researchers can be argued to engage substantially with 
“positioning” (for influencing) as a practice – which also vaults the issue of defining 
think tanks as organisations. I have further shown the relevance for adding 
conceptual boundary-markers relating to identifying think tanks as organisations 
which essentially ties in with my support to Medvetz’ encouragements to surpass the 
essentialist definition issue by thinking relationally through a social field with a 
focus on how these organisation have materialised. Moreover, as far as identity is 
concerned, identity-construction is also utilised to improve their structural position 
within the ‘field’ as well as the notion of “positioning” as a means to overcome the 
issue of gauging exercised influence. 
 
The above also underscores an epistemological and methodological contribution – 
contemplating on Bourdieu’s theory deployed as a method – through Bourdieu’s 
own operationalisation of this social theory, i.e. the embedded conceptual “thinking 
tools”. The unveiling of new research avenues is facilitated by a social 
constructionist embedded ethnographic research strategy (and the ‘cyclic’ research 
process in particular) which emphasises the primacy of field-data and gives agency 
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and primacy to research subjects as well as their ‘native categories’ and 
constructions of ‘social realities’.  
 
As secondary contributions, the findings and conceptual framing in chapter, also 
benefit the U.S.-Sino and U.S. Foreign Policy towards China literatures (herein, 
what do individual policy-researchers think and conceptualise about China – and 
what the constraints are), in addition to U.S. Politics through analysing a fixture, i.e. 
think tanks, in the American political system. In terms of the constructivist research-
programme within IR – Bourdieu’s dialectical approach and the intersection between 
ideas/construction and materiality/physicality also takes stance with the mainstream 
constructivist idea that ideas precede macro-structures in the structure/agency debate.  
 
This is different to Bourdieu’s view on dialecticality; the interplay between structure 
and agency never ends or perform detached from each other but always 
transforming. However, even in recent research revolving around culture from a 
constructivist perspective (for example, in Strategies for Research in Constructivist 
International Relations, by Klotz and Lynch 2007),
664
 cultural research 
notwithstanding seems trapped in a relatively structuralist line, as was the case with 
Social and Cultural Anthropology – but three decades ago.665 Their statement 
concerning identity guiding behaviour reflects both a separable factor, a fixed entity, 
and a material persona which indeed resonates with a more positivist inclined social 
psychological behaviourist tradition.
666
  
 
                                                          
664 See Klotz and Lynch 2007, op.cit. 
665 Chapman 1997, op.cit. 3-29. 
666 Klotz and Lynch, ibid. 
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On a broader note, applicable to the social sciences in general, the application of 
Bourdieu contributes towards the structure/agency debate which primacy has heavily 
been dominated by the latter
667
 – and thus, consequently, neglected contextuality and 
cultural structures – a key facet of one of the most challenging issues across the 
social sciences.
668
 Furthermore, the increased focus on relationality between 
Bourdieu’s concepts also contributes towards the social sciences more broadly, 
which has tended to detach them and/or not having been deployed in conjunction.
669
 
 
Lastly, this first analysis Chapter contributes with knowledge about U.S. think tanks 
as well as serving an important purpose of providing context to the two remaining 
analysis chapters. In the two latter chapters, a contextualised inquiry into the policy-
researchers’ narratives on China (in addition to ‘American-ness’) – and the role of 
culture in this regard – will be conducted through Bourdieu’s social theoretical 
lenses. In the final Chapter, I shall synthesise and summarise findings and suggested 
contributions that have emerged in this chapter with those of the subsequent 
chapters. Overall, it has been shown and argued in the present Chapter, that the 
“China-narratives” (encompassing conceptualisation of policy-researchers’ thinking 
and associated work-practices in this regard) are intricate to the dynamics of the 
interplay within a sociological meso-level (macro-structure and microindividual, 
agency and structure). Consequently, the theoretical focus is redirected towards the 
Self/Other constellations (identity/culture) as far as constructing ‘China’ and 
‘American-ness’ are concerned, and where Bourdieu’s practice theory will recur 
through deploying, predominantly, his embedded “thinking-tools” of doxa, interests, 
                                                          
667 King 2000 op.cit. 417-433. 
668 Jackson 2008, op.cit. 155–181. 
669 Swartz 2008, op.cit. 45-52. 
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strategising, and habitus. The focus on relationality and simultaneous employment of 
Bourdieu’s concept is indeed very much placed at the forefront throughout this thesis 
due to the ability to interface the remaining chapters with the current chapters which 
strongly focuses on ‘field’ and ‘capital’.670 As earlier mentioned, the links between 
action and habitus can only be explicated through taking into account the positioning 
within the ‘field’ and its internal structures. 
                                                          
670 Swartz 2008, ibid. 45-52. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE ‘EXCEPTIONAL’ VOID OF ‘INTERNATIONALITY’: 
NARRATIVES ON CHINA WITHIN U.S.-SINO RELATIONS 
 
5.0 Chapter Introduction 
This second analysis chapter investigates the role of culture embedded in identified 
China-narratives amongst policy-researchers in U.S. think tanks. This is achieved by 
the following approach. First, a multitude of narratives relating to U.S. relations with 
China will be presented as several cohesive clusters (of narratives). This 
consolidation will serve as the discursive frame for the ensuing analysis. In concert, 
this foundation effectively portrays the variation and ‘social realities’ existing “out-
there” as far as China-narratives are concerned. Second, I will synthesise the above 
sense-making with established and pertinent bodies of literature in order to build 
theories bottom-up concerning what constitutes such China-narratives. Third, by 
synthesising the previous two assignments, I shall propound an overarching 
argument (as reflected in the chosen title of this chapter) surrounding the discursive 
frame. This proposition is employed as an explanatory source which signifies 
cultural influence in the way policy-researchers socially and dialectically construct 
their narratives on ‘China’ (with the context of the relationship between the two 
countries).
671
  
 
                                                          
671 This structure (analysis) is replicated in the final analysis Chapter Six, albeit examining auxiliary clusters of 
China-narratives. Thus, the “set-up” of the present Chapter also applies to Chapter Six and will therefore not be 
repeated. 
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The analysis draws heavily upon my conducted interviews and to some extent 
written material published by the policy-researchers themselves – in addition to 
context and observations made. Social theoretically, the analysis interfaces with the 
Bourdieu’s dialectic Self/Other constellation and conceptual “thinking tools” – in 
particularly ‘habitus’, ‘strategising’ and ‘interest’ – which are all part of his Theory 
of Practice more specifically.
672
  
 
The preceding Chapter Four (which established the China policy-research 
community as a Bourdieusian ‘social field’) serves as a “bridging-chapter” between 
the theoretical framework and the three analysis chapters.
673
 Thus, the conducted 
analysis should be read through a particular set of epistemological lenses, herein that 
imparted China-narratives have materialised as integral to the established 
sociological meso-level. Thus, the diffused nature of individual policy-researchers’ 
agency are dialectic and enmeshed with macrostructures,
674
 and where ‘social 
reality’ amongst them are negotiated contingent on the given context.675   
 
These interlinks are aligned with the Bourdieusian theoretical framework of this 
thesis: the more evident engagement with the particular conceptual “thinking tools” 
of ‘habitus’, ‘doxa’, ‘strategising’, and ‘interests’ – are not being discussed in 
isolation with the recognised performativity of ‘capital’ and ‘field’.676 For instance, 
the “China” (amongst several “Chinas”) which appear more prevalent on the horizon 
                                                          
672 This constitutes the conceptual/theoretical framework of the thesis. 
673 Part A: Chapters One – Three & Part B: Chapters Four-Six, respectively.  
674 Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, op.cit.; Richard 2002, Pierre Bourdieu, op.cit.      
675 John G. Bruhn and Howard M. Rebach, “Problem Solving at the Mesolevel,” in Sociological Practice: 
Intervention and Social Change, 2nd ed, John G. Bruhn and Howard M. Rebach (New York: Springer, 2007), 
115-145. 
676 This was the case, predominantly in Chapter Four. 
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of a policy-researcher trained as an economist as opposed to, let us say, an 
international development scholar, can plausibly be linked to their educational 
background. Such influence often branches out to their engagement with specific 
work-tasks in a given policy-area.
677
 
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, I will establish the premise of the 
investigatory scope of this particular chapter. Second, I shall outline the 
“methodological fit” with the main elements of the study’s research design.678 Third, 
a self-reflexive account is proffered. Fourth, the various clusters of China-narratives 
will be presented and elaborated on. Fifth, the empirical material and identified 
findings will be juxtaposed with pre-established bodies of literature. Sixth, I will 
articulate the overarching argument pertaining to the synthesis of the discursive 
frame and research findings.  
 
5.1 The premise of this chapter and linkages to overarching research 
framework 
In this sub-section, I shall briefly lay out the assumptions made in the investigatory 
scope pertaining to this chapter.
679
 This includes the rationale for the above-
mentioned three-step analytical approach, i.e. the delimitation of a ‘cluster’; the 
scope concerning what constitutes a ‘China-narrative’; what topics this Chapter does 
not engage with, to reiterate the Bourdieusian dialectical and relational orientation 
                                                          
677 Some policy-researchers, though, work in a policy-area other than what their educational background would 
normally dictate. 
678 See Edmondson, Amy C and Stacy E Mcmanus. "Methodological fit in management field research."Academy 
of management review 32, no. 4 (2007): 1246—1264; Zalan, T and Lewis, G 2004, “Writing About Methods in 
Qualitative Research: Towards a More Transparent Approach”, in Handbook of Qualitative Research in 
International Business, ed. Rebecca Marschan-Piekkari and Catherine A. Welch (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, )  
507-528. 
679 This also applies to the subsequent analysis Chapter Six. 
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concerning the dialectic Self/Other orientation; and finally, what can be understood 
as the role of culture in this investigation.  
 
First, the three-step process as the chosen way to make sense of data as well as to 
produce and to present findings/arguments reflects a firm foothold in the 
ethnographic research strategy: granting primacy to the voices of those being studied 
(i.e. China policy-research experts), aligned with the ‘cyclic’ research process. The 
formulation of an overarching argument, appropriately and beneficially contributes 
to sense-making of nuances and complexity through synthesising narratives, 
findings, and theory/literature across such empirical multiplicity.  
 
Second, cognate narratives are assumed to belong to each other (groupings), 
resulting in thematic clusters, which is in accordance with the 
interpretive/ethnographic contents analysis approach.
680
 I acknowledge that data and 
arguments might have been organised and delimited differently by other researchers 
due to subjectivity. Thus, in order to display the validity and reliability of the 
rational in this regard, a self-reflexive deliberation (aligned with Bourdieu’s 
sociology of sociology) is carried out.   
 
Third, what constitutes a “China-narrative” can be delimited based on two factors: in 
relation to the U.S.-Sino contextuality, and the influence of subjectivity. For the 
former factor, alongside with acknowledging multiplicity (herein, multiple 
“Chinas”), I am not assuming that there is a particular ‘China’ within the context of 
the relationship between the U.S. and China. This links to the second factor – the 
                                                          
680 Such approach makes use of counting interpretations rather than the frequency of appearances, for example, 
of a word. 
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inevitable influence of subjectivity on my own part as the researcher. In this chapter, 
I am drawing the line as following: what belongs inside the boundary of the inquiry 
in the present chapter encompasses the nature of the bilateral relationship at the 
macro-level in addition to the mutual impact on each other within this purview. It 
needs to be recognised that any clustering of narratives is influenced by some pre-
conceived notions of what constitutes similarity in what is deemed as cognate 
narratives.  
 
For example, on a self-reflexive note, I might perceive narratives relating to the 
‘(nation) state’ and those addressing ‘health’ as connected due to the strongly 
intervening state in a Norwegian context – and the focus on upholding the welfare 
state. Whereas, in the U.S., ‘health-narratives’ might be more pertinently associated 
with core values such as ‘individuality’, ‘freedom’, and the mantra of “getting the 
state out of our lives”. The influence of subjectivity extends to the delimitation of the 
narratives themselves. I am, however, treating this as a minor concern due to the 
argument that this study does not rest on a narrative analysis per se – but rather an 
exercise in making sense of the complexities relating to imparted meaning-
constructions within narratives which are given significance regardless of contents. 
This enterprise serves as the basis of developing arguments of the cultural 
embeddedness in constructing the variety of “China-narratives” which flourish “out-
there”.681 
                                                          
681 I am using the term ‘cultural embeddedness’ in its simplest form – hence not associated with the concept 
embeddedness proposed by sociologist Mark Granovetter (individuals and firms enmeshed in social networks in 
various degrees across social and economic ties) (see Mark Granovetter, “Economic action and social structure: 
the problem of embeddedness.”American Journal of Sociology 91 (1985): 481-510), or Karl Polany’s notion of 
social relationship submerging a man’s economy (The Great Transformation, Boston: Beacon Press, 1944). 
Rather, “China-narratives” are produced in a non-universal, cultural contextuality (‘American-ness’) which is 
infused with the social process underpinning the constructed reality (in regard to what constitutes ‘American-
ness’ and ‘China’, which are particular relevant to the present study). 
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Fourth, the focus of this chapter is to examine the role of culture in the identified 
“China-narratives” amongst the interviewed China policy-research analysts. 
Consequently, the scope of inquiry does not encompass an analysis of the U.S.-Sino 
bilateral relationship per se or U.S. foreign policy towards China (or the cultural 
foundation), nor does it specifically address general American narratives on ‘China’ 
or China in general as an area study. 
 
Fifth, the analysis of “China-narratives” is conducted in harmony with Bourdieu’s 
dialectical outlook concerning the Self/Other. For this reason, the analysis chapters 
do not divide the examination into narratives on ‘China’ and those involving 
‘American-ness’ – but more appropriately marry them. Thus, ‘American-ness’ is 
infused into the aforesaid articulation of the overarching argument reflecting the 
analysis of the discursive frame.  
 
Sixth, I am purposefully and consciously operating with the phrase “role of culture”. 
This signals that on ontological grounds, I would not necessarily assume an ever-
present cultural component and thus in practice dismiss social theoretical strands 
proclaiming that culture can be analytically detached (such as structuralist and 
behaviourist orientations). 
 
5.2 Aligning this chapter with the proposed contributions 
The preceding sub-section has ensured “methodological fit” within the current 
Chapter with the methodological and research philosophical frameworks of the thesis 
as a whole, which coincides with elaborating the premise of this particular Chapter. 
This display also applies to the subsequent analysis chapter. It remains, though, to 
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link the endeavour of this chapter with main arguments and proposed contributions 
of the thesis as a whole – briefly highlighted below.  
 
As far as the main arguments are concerned, this Chapter connects to the overarching 
research questions on two accounts. First, the chosen approach to developing an 
overarching argument is derived from the discursive frame. This thesis applies 
Chapter Four as a “bridge-chapter” – where the China policy-research community 
was established as a ‘social field’ – which is pertinent due to the relationality and 
dialectical interplay between Bourdieu’s conceptual “thinking-tools”. Second, the 
enhanced explanatory power of identified “China-narratives” in the present Chapter 
is strongly related to the specific think tank contextuality which subsequently 
impacts on the manoeuvrability of “China-thinking” in addition to how work-tasks 
are carried out.  
 
Furthermore, the main arguments offered in this Chapter coincide with previously 
outlined arguments relating to the various areas of literature which this thesis 
engages with. First, as far as Bourdieu in IR research is concerned, this Chapter 
showcases the relevance, necessity, as well as advantage of thinking relationally and 
to operate with the full range of Bourdieu’s conceptual “thinking-tools” embedded in 
this Theory of Practice – which is lacking in IR research.682  
 
Second, in terms of the second strand of literature (think tanks), investigating policy-
researchers is a fruitful avenue to investigate as a means to contribute towards areas 
featuring vacancy of polyphony of voices. I argue that such focus strengthens the 
                                                          
682 See Emirbayer 1997, op.cit. Swartz 2008, op.cit. 
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need for, as well as relevance, for establishing a ‘third school of analyses’ as far as 
the specialised think tank literature is concerned.   
 
As far as proposed contributions are concerned, this study, I argue, has the potential 
to contribute to original knowledge via the following three avenues:
683
 expanding the 
literature in the realm of the Bourdieusian sociological ‘turn’ in IR research (novel 
theoretical synthesis); presenting new collected primary data specifically relating to 
the perceptions of ‘American-ness’ and ‘China’ within the context of the U.S.-Sino 
relationship; and presenting additional propositions for future “testing” (which might 
not have been unveiled unless utilising a Bourdieusian theoretical frame). 
 
In terms of significance, novelty and originality, I argue that this particular Chapter 
responds to all six areas which have been proposed to make the study worthwhile: an 
in-depth field-study into the specific China-policy analysis community in U.S. think 
tanks, and as a Bourdieusian ‘social field’); Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice 
contributes to the Bourdieusian sociological inquiry in IR research as an 
epistemological vehicle for grappling with how and why the policy-experts perceive 
‘American-ness’ and ‘China’ (and in essence exploring the relevance and degree of 
applicability of a Bourdieusian analytical framework; making the policy-researchers 
the focal point of the study creates the foundation of the proposed ‘third school of 
analyses’ in the specific think tank literature; elevating the individual (aka policy-
researcher hence non-state) level in IR research (where the state-system traditionally 
dominates the ontological research approaches as well as the unit and level of 
analyses), but also to address the intentionality IR discipline’s to marginalise the role 
                                                          
683 I am here making use of Professor Matthew Watson’s (University of Warwick) list of ten ways to make a 
contribution. 
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of culture
684
; elucidating how and why policy-researchers’ socially construct 
‘American-ness’ through ‘China’ as the Other,685 and how such boundary 
construction materialise
686
 contemplating on identities evolving out of that 
process
687
; by deploying Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice and the social constructionist 
epistemological underpinning, the study is ensured “methodological fit” with the 
overall research design – hence positioning the study well for enabling new collected 
data to inform me concerning the usage of the various “thinking tools” in the specific 
contexts of Self and Other in addition to also allow me to scrutinise those concepts 
themselves through engaging with the relationality between them.   
 
5.3 Self-reflexive deliberations devised as a method and a helpful 
“thinking-tool” for both policy-researchers and the researcher 
I have in previous chapters elucidated Bourdieu’s emphasis on reflexivity and his 
particular promulgation for ‘epistemic reflexivity’688 – where the “objectification of 
objectification” is deemed by Bourdieu as a crucial aspect of research.689 Reflexivity 
is arguably an area in contemporary social theory where Bourdieu stands out.
690
 
                                                          
684 Jeffrey T. Checkel,”The constructivist turn in international relations theory,”, World Politics  50 (1998): 324-
348; Jeffrey T. Checkel, ”International norms and domestic politics: bridging the rationalist constructivist divide,” 
European Journal of International Relations 3 (1997): 473-495; Peter J. Katzenstein, The culture of national 
security: norms and identity in world politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996a); Peter J. Katzenstein, 
ed. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1996b); Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic 
Structures, and International Institutions (Cambridge: University Press, 1995). 
685 Such position is aligned with Bourdieu’s emphasis on dialecticality as far as the Self/Other constellation is 
concerned. 
686 Frederik Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference (Bergen: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1971). 
687 Such position is aligned with Bourdieu’s emphasis on dialecticality as far as the Self/Other constellation is 
concerned. 
688 See Leander 2008, Thinking Tools, op.cit. 
689 Jenkins, Pierre Bourdieu, 61. 
690 Bourdieu and Wacquant, Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, 36. Bourdieu, however, was not the “inventor of the 
wheel”. For example, Wacquant argues it is an intellectual practice which is an integral component of and a 
necessary condition of critical social theory, which distinguishes him from other social theorists. 
229 
 
Hence, my efforts in this regard are very much aligned in the spirit of Bourdieu’s 
work, as expressed by Wacquant:  
  
If there is a single feature that makes Bourdieu stand out in the landscape of 
contemporary social theory, it is his signature obsession with reflexivity.
691
 
 
In this sub-section, I shall continue the ongoing self-reflexive deliberation in relation 
to the particular principal conceptual/thematic components of the present chapter. In 
this instance, this encompasses a dialectical outlook on ‘American-ness’ and ‘China’ 
as a Self/Other constellation. Following suit, to appreciate how – and why – 
‘American-ness’ and ‘China’ as social phenomena are taking form through American 
cultural lens(es), I argue for the need for researchers to undertake the integral 
processes of ‘de-contextualisation’ and ‘re-conceptualisation’. These processes, I 
argue, are necessary for achieving ‘epistemic reflexivity’ and to establish my 
‘theoretical posture’ to the particular social world which I am scrutinising (i.e. 
community of policy-researchers’ narratives on ‘China’ and ‘American-ness’).692  
 
Inevitably, engagement with reflexivity is particularly pertinent in a study on policy-
research experts which indeed are in the “business” of knowledge-production. Thus, 
my own self-reflexive exploration in this sub-section also serves as reminder of an 
emerging finding of this chapter, herein the lack of reflexive discourse in U.S. think 
tanks (practical contribution). It reminisces also how Bourdieu’s advanced thinking 
can enhance my own analysis of policy-researchers (theoretical contribution – 
through devising reflexivity as a “thinking tool”, and how to operationalise it). 
                                                          
691  Loïc J.D. Wacquant, “Toward a social praxeology: The structure and logic of Bourdieu’s sociology,” in An 
invitation to reflexive sociology, ed. Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J.D. Wacquant (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992). 
692 Jenkins, Pierre Bourdieu, op.cit. 47. See Karl Maton, ”Pierre Bourdieu and the Epistemic Conditions of Social 
Scientific Knowledge”, Space and Culture 6, no.1 (2003): 52-65) for an example of adopting reflexivity as an 
integrated element into research practice. 
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Furthermore, it serves as a reminder for emphasising the strong position of 
Bourdieu’s practice theory contemplating on how Bourdieu’s relationism assists in 
grasping the fundament of ‘epistemic reflexivity’ and how reflexive engagement 
might be played out, i.e. to think relationally.
693
   
 
The process of ‘de-contextualisation’ encompasses my movements in a strict 
geographical sense (swapping my office desk in Coventry with a rented student room 
at the George Washington University (GWU) Foggy-Bottom campus. This 
inevitably results in changing material and physical surroundings – hence a dynamic 
‘Unit of Observation’.694 Indeed, I found myself being dwarfed by historicity and 
focal manifestations of American political culture and ideology:
695
 for me, in 
Coventry, the “American-stuff” would come from British “Americanist” scholars 
and being fed American popular culture through media. Having transported myself 
to down-town Washington, DC, I was much more contiguous to the personification 
of the underlying embedded values: when stepping out of my GWU Hall on Virginia 
Avenue, I could gaze the Washington Memorial in the horizon. Furthermore, I was 
in fact exiting the very notorious building which formerly housed the Howard 
Johnson Hotel. Room 723 (on my floor!) was used as the FBI “look-out” room 
during the break-in into the Democratic National Committee head-quarters in 1971 
(“Watergate-scandal” of 1972).  
 
                                                          
693 Bourdieu and Wacquant, Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, op.cit. 96. See Swartz, op.cit. 
694 See Ghauri and Grønhaug, Research Methods, 2005, op.cit. 71. In the context of a qualitative study, the 
‘UoO’ simply relates to the context/level within which the ‘Unit of Analysis’ (aka policy-research experts) are 
studied and drawn conclusions from. 
695 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Erosion of American National Interests,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 5 (1997): 29; H. 
Kohn, “Review: The American Idea”, The Review of Politics 17, no. 3 (1955): 411; Lipset 1996, op.cit. 18. 
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Furthermore, this unaccustomed context of the location of my own body taps into a 
central area of Bourdieu’s sociology, which also illustrates the importance of 
‘habitus’ as a “thinking-tool” – as well as for self-reflexivity:696 the dispositions and 
generative classificatory schemes are embodied in real human beings. i.e. ‘hexis’697 – 
the essence of the ‘habitus’. Thus, the habitus can only exist in our bodies (our heads 
in particularly): ‘habitus’ exists as part of our practices generated from interaction 
with others and our surroundings – an integral part of our manifested behaviours, and 
the generative schemes of the habitus (‘practical taxonomies’ – for example 
male/female) are rooted in the body.
698
 This highlights the imperative of contexts of 
research and situation of the researcher. 
 
However, more important is the second aforesaid process concerning the ‘re-
conceptualisation’ of my thinking, thoughts, behaviour, upbringing, accumulated 
life-experiences, and identity – which reflects Lizardo’s re-conceptualised and post-
culturalist take on Bourdieu’s understanding of ‘culture’: my mental structures as 
well as social structures as a system of action and perception are acquired in a tacit 
state through tacit mechanisms – where I as an actor/researcher executes practices in 
accordance to the tenants of such a system.
699
 It is an illogical and unachievable 
process of detaching my own habitus and body from my innate culture and 
personality.
700
  
                                                          
696 See Bourdieu and Wacquant, Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, 1992, op.cit. 263; see Jenkins 2002, Pierre 
Bourdieu, op.cit. 37, 75 on culture being rooted in the necessary physical embodiment(s) of its producers (men 
and women).  
697 Bourdieu 1990b, Logic of Practice, op.cit. 66-79; see Jenkins 2002, ibid. 75, for “how we conduct ourselves” 
(hexis). 
698 Jenkins 2004, ibid. 74-75.  
699 Lizardo, O 2011, op.cit.; Loïc Wacquant, Body and Soul: Ethnographic Notebooks of An Apprentice-Boxer 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
700 According to Geertz, Man should be understood as a “summative upshot” of diffusing values, behaviour, 
biological, psychological processes, and social existence (Geertz 1973, op.cit.). 
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It becomes relevant to inquiry about my own ‘Norwegian-ness’ in relation to 
grasping how policy-research experts in U.S. think tanks perceive ‘China’ as the 
cultural Other and the contingent social construction of the American Self, i.e. 
‘American-ness’. According to Bourdieu, the sociology of sociology is both the 
fundament for his epistemological sociology and subsequently the prerequisite for 
rigorous sociological practice, which scrutinised the “uncontrolled relation to the 
object which results in the projection of this relation onto the object”.701 It serves as a 
reminder of the realisation that to objectivise the objectivising is necessary in order 
to avoid claiming scientific discourse about an object (e.g. policy-researchers), and 
on the flip-side of the coin, to neglect illuminating my own (as the researcher) 
relation to this same object. This does not end by pointing out my socio-biological 
traits and backgrounder – but also my position in the academic field as a cultural 
producer, and more so my intellectual posture within which my theoreticist or 
intellectualist biases evolve as a product of:  
 
(…) forgetting to inscribe into the theory we build of the social world the fact that it 
is the product of a theoretical gaze, a ‘contemplative eye’.702  
 
In sum, I need to ‘objectifying’ my scholarly gaze on the social phenomena I deploy 
to scrutinise the research subjects with, and thus acknowledging my innate biases 
when doing so – such as the scholar investigating the why and how, which is 
bequeathed little space in the policy-world where outputs, answers, and action points 
prevail.  
 
                                                          
701 Bourdieu and Wacquant, Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, op.cit. 68. 
702 Bourdieu & Wacquant, op.cit. 68-69. 
233 
 
The main point in this sub-section on reflexivity is not to elaborate my own ideas 
concerning the U.S. and China, but rather to showcase the processes of 
acknowledging that there are inherent intellectual biases when attempting to 
‘objectify the objectification’ when claiming scientific knowledge about the social 
world.
703
 Although not being a main enterprise of this thesis, my engagement with 
reflexivity has three additional advantageous usages – in addition to accommodating 
for enhanced transparency, trustworthiness and credibility of my work through self-
reflexive deliberations.
704
 First, as far as the latter point is concerned, it constitutes a 
methodological contribution (the importance of self-reflexive deliberation and 
inquisition).  
 
Second, extending conceptually on the previous point, Bourdieu’s undertaking on 
reflexivity can be expanded upon. Maton supplicates the establishing of ‘epistemic 
capital’ as an additional relationship to scrutinise: between the researched (objective) 
and the knowledge-claim (by the researcher). This identification (of relationships) 
has the potential of “realizing the potential of Bourdieu’s enterprise” and to remedy 
shortcomings in Bourdieu’s conceded relationship through highlighting “a missing 
epistemic relation for research to become reflexive” (beyond merely exploring 
relations between the researcher and the researched).
705
 Returning to the previous 
point, a self-reflexive deliberation also increases my own self-awareness as a 
                                                          
703 Maton, “Reflexivity, Relationism and Research”, op.cit. 52. 
704 I mentioned earlier about Geertz who is heavily drawn upon when it comes to cultural analysis in IR and 
Political Science and somewhat the social/cultural anthropology’s face outwards in this regard (see Lisa 
Wedeen, ”Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science,” The American Political Science Review 
96(4) (2002): 713-728). This interface also marks a cross-roads where the aforesaid disciplines advantageously 
could make good use of Bourdieu’s ‘epistemic reflexivity’ due to the epistemological – but tacit – assumption in 
Geertz naïve realism’s (originating with Malinowski) engagement with the subjective role of the researcher: the 
belief in the ability of the researcher to impart one truth which can be told in one way, and the researcher serving 
to be a mere conduit of uncontaminated and non-biased data, non-theoretical, non-reflexive, and detached from 
the text and research process (Brewer 2000, op.cit. 37-55; see Marsh, David and Gerry Stoker, Theory and 
Methods in Political Science, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 
705 Maton 2004, “Reflexivity, Relationism and Research”, op.cit. 53. 
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researcher, but also enhances internal validity of knowledge-claim that I purport 
throughout this thesis (aka ‘objective reflexivity’). The extended value relates to 
divulging the “collective scientific unconscious embedded in intellectual practices by 
the field’s objectifying relations” – hence, not only my own biases.706 Maton 
illuminates the importance of supplementing the scrutiny of relationships between 
the object of the study and any knowledge-claims in order to achieve a collective, 
procedural and epistemological reflexivity as opposed to individualist, narcissistic 
forms of reflexivity.
707
 This can be attained through pinpointing three integral but 
analytically distinct relations underlying Bourdieu’s objectifying relation of 
knowledge:  
 
(…) the social relations between the subject or author and the knowledge claim, the 
epistemic relation between the knowledge claim and its object, and the objectifying 
relation between subject and object.
708
 
 
A third usage resemblances a claim that I proposed in Chapter Four: that Bourdieu’s 
Theory of Practice is “good to think with”,709 and also contributes towards unveiling 
data, findings and/or new lines of inquiries which may not be imminently observable 
to me as the researcher.
710
 On the one hand, the previous point illustrates the 
potential for further nuancing and expanding Bourdieu’s work in this regard (i.e. 
reflexivity – moving onwards with Maton). What does this mean in practice in terms 
                                                          
706 Maton, ibid. 58. 
707 According to Maton (ibid. 63), whereas traditional philosophical approaches of grasping knowledge have 
tended to focus on the epistemic linkage between knowledge (e.g. about ‘China’) and its object (see Karl Maton, 
“Languages of legitimation: The structuring significance of intellectual fields of strategic knowledge claims,” 
British Journal of Sociology of Education 21, no. 2 (2000): 147-167), Bourdieu incorporated the significance for 
knowledge claims through the neglected objectifying relation between subject and object aka knower and known 
where the objectifying relation itself become the object for analysis (serving as the epistemological foundation for 
social scientific knowledge) (Maton, ibid. 57).  
708 Maton 2004, op.cit. 57. 
709 See Jenkins 2000, op.cit. 176. 
710 For example, in the previous analysis-chapter (Chapter Four), data was used to highlight the relationship 
between the hierarchical layers of fields and the two-faceted aspects of ‘capital’, on the one hand, in addition to 
the relationship between individuals and groups as social actors in the ‘field’ as a second example. 
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of my research praxis? I am achieving ‘epistemic reflexivity’711 by turning the 
Thinker (Bourdieu) against myself.
712
 This subjecting of my practices as a researcher 
entails to scrutinise them with the same critical eye as I do with the researched
713
 
beyond merely “interpretation of interpretation”,714 or solely dealing with the 
relationship between the researcher and subject of the research.
715
  
 
Thus, in terms of operationalisation, I would need to engage with “objectifying 
objectification” – referred to as ‘participant objectification’716 – collectively 
assessing three main sources of knowledge biases when making social scientific 
claims, herein my social background as the researcher, my position in the intellectual 
field, and the “intellectualist bias” itself, i.e. the lenses I gaze at the social through.717 
Evaluating myself, these three sources could correspond to being a Norwegian 
national with a strong sense of social-democratic values,
718
 coming from a 
qualitative research stance focusing on process and thinking rather than output, 
universality and generalisability, in addition to theoretically coming from a more 
French-style post-structuralist orientation conducting research on a topic which 
heavily draws upon “quants” and political scientists, and in a country at the top of 
                                                          
711 Leander, Thinking Tools, op.cit. ‘Epistemic reflexivity’ is considered as Bourdieu’s “signature obsession” with 
the unleashed faculty of epistemological potential of reflexivity (Maton ibid. 53), and underpins the fundament of 
his enterprise of conducting relational sociology (see Bourdieu and Wacquant, Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, 
op.cit.). 
712 See Anthony King, ”Thinking with Bourdieu against Bourdieu: A 'Practical' Critique of the Habitus”, 
Sociological Theory 18, no. 3 (2000): 417-433. 
713 Jenkins, Pierre Bourdieu, ibid.  61. 
714 M. Alvesson and K. Sköldberg, Reflexive Methodology, op.cit.  
715 M. Easterby-Smith, R. Thorpe and P. Jackson, Management Research, 3rd ed. (London: Sage, 2008). 
716 Loic D.J. Wacquant, “Towards a reflexive sociology: a workshop with Pierre Bourdieu,” Sociological Review, 7 
(1989): 33. 
717 See Pierre Bourdieu, The logic of practice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990b); and Bourdieu, Pascalian 
mediations, op.cit. 
718 The political landscape in Norway covers the entire political continuum of political parties in national 
politics/Parliament from left to right (albeit generally eschewed to the left in comparison to the U.S.). However, as 
discovered in my international business research on expatriates (MPhil, Leeds) – there is a broadly shared sense 
of regardless of political colour, “we are all basically social democrats” (Field-notes 2008-2009). 
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the hierarchy concerning symbolic power within an international system with a 
stronger sense of power-balance in a unipolar architecture of world politics.  
 
Furthermore, the ‘China’ that I encounter in my intercultural encounters with 
individuals, travels, my mind-set, thinking as well as academic literature and politics, 
is not the same ‘China’, due to vastly different intra-relationality and context in the 
case of the U.S. and Americans. That my own country and China are distant as 
opposed to two intertwined powers such as China and the U.S. warrants a completely 
different intricate relationship. When Norway can opt out from engaging with China, 
with small consequences, the U.S. does not nearly have the same space of 
manoeuvrability due to their relationship with China exercises much stronger 
influence on domestic politics and international interests. This dawned upon me 
during my field-work, and resulted in a somewhat more respect and appreciation of 
the U.S.’ space (or lack thereof) for manoeuvring in world politics.719 This re-
conceptualisation is thus possible to engage with, but can never be complete.  
 
On the other hand, operating with Bourdieu’s reflexivity also begs the question – or 
places the spot-light on policy-analysts and experts themselves – how reflexive are 
policy-experts? There is hardly any discourse on this – let alone the widened and 
more sophisticated level as we are beckoned to immerse ourselves with from a 
Bourdieusian standpoint. This warrants a theoretical/empirical finding. A linked 
theoretical/empirical finding relates particularly to the intersecting points of 
narrative-clusters (subsequent sub-section) where narratives are understood based on 
intellectual positioning and not a fixed notion of Self. This is partly why Bourdieu’s 
                                                          
719 This is regardless of what my own opinions and sentiments are about the actual actions and underlying 
values – but rather an appreciation of the nature of the architecture and power in the international system. Thus, 
my statements do not relate exclusively to this context, but in general, (that be assessing political strategising, a 
business negotiation, or coverage of international news – just to mention but a few). 
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relationism is imperative – and this foundation further supports the relevance of a 
Bourdieusian ‘sociological turn’ in IR – by having approached the social 
backgrounds, positions in the intellectual field, and “intellectualist biases” (the lenses 
of policy-researchers which they gaze through when making social scientific 
knowledge claims about the researched/social world).
720
 
 
In essence, this self-reflexive exercise pinpoints the pertinence of making ‘habitus’ 
the natural “level” of inquiry in this regard, rather than “American-ness” and 
“Norwegian-ness” as Selves. Bourdieu himself was less interested in the ‘Self, in fact 
opposed it, and instead relocated such faculties to a theory of ‘habitus’ as a model, 
albeit contradictory, of Self.
721
 This directs the focus towards a decentralised Self as 
opposite to conscious action and will-power.
722
 In sum, this further strengthens the 
applicability of Bourdieu’s conceptual “thinking tools”. His ‘epistemic reflexivity’ 
cannot be fully grasped without addressing ‘habitus’ – and aligned with relationality 
– the position and struggles in the multiple fields of which policy-researchers 
subscribe to, is pinpointed further. It is important to grasp this interface, because in a 
Bourdieusian sense, the habitus in human beings makes me as the researcher 
“trapped (…) within the limits of his brain (…) within the limits of the system of 
categories he owes to his upbringing and training”.723  
 
                                                          
720 See Bourdieu 1990b, The logic of practice, op.cit.; and Bourdieu, Pascalian mediations, op.cit. 
721 Skeggs 2004, op.cit. 83. Symptomatically, there is no entry of this term in his book on reflexive sociology 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, op.cit.). 
722 Sökefeld 1999, op.cit. 417; Erikson 1980, op.cit. 109. Erikson combined the two above depicted approaches. 
723 Bourdieu & Wacquant, Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, ibid. 126. Here, Bourdieu draws upon Marx, but on 
the flipside of the coin, where he departed with Herbert Simon’s “bounded rationality” (see H. A. Simon, 
“Rationality in psychology and economics”, Journal of Business 59 (1986): 209–224; James G. March, “Bounded 
Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice,” The Bell Journal of Economics 9(2) (1978): 587-608) due 
to rationality is also bounded as a result of being socially construed and socially structured – not only a question 
of available information being curtailed and that the human mind cannot process all information about everything. 
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Additionally, it also moves away from understanding “identity” as a product of 
sameness (sameness of Selves in Psychology) and is remaining fairly fixed after 
childhood. The above also creates some distance to Social Anthropology where 
identity was chiefly relating to ethnical identity and treated Self separately from 
“identity” where selfsameness also included sameness with Others (diffused with 
Self).
724
 “The term ‘identity’ expresses such mutual relation in that it connotes both a 
persistent sameness within oneself (sameness) and a person sharing some kind of 
essential characteristic with others”.725 This also evinces the importance of 
understanding ‘intellectual bias’ as an impactful source needing to be unbundled 
when laying out the theoretical inquiry (depending on theoretical, intellectual, and 
disciplinary subscriptions). 
 
5.4 “China-narratives” clusters – Analysing empirical data as the 
discursive frame 
In the two previous sub-sections, I have justified the relevance of this chapter in 
alignment with the overarching conceptual/theoretical framework of this study.
726
 In 
addition, I have outlined the findings and contributions of the present chapter as part 
of a self-reflexive deliberation.
727
  
 
In this Chapter, from this point forward, I shall engage with empirical data which 
have been collected and analysed in accordance to the methodological and 
conceptual/theoretical outlook of this thesis respectively, as follows: first, I shall 
organise the multitude of “China-narratives” imparted by the China policy-research 
                                                          
724 Sökefeld 1999, 417. 
725 Erikson 1980, op.cit.109. Erikson combined the two above depicted approaches. 
726 This effort contributes to ensuring “methodological fit” with the overarching research endeavour (see 
Edmondson & McManus 2007, op.cit.). 
727 To reiterate, this set-up and the actual contents also apply to the subsequent Chapter Six. 
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experts into thematic clusters. The clusters are consolidated based on clustering 
cognate narratives (with similitudes of attributed meaning-construction) on multiple 
‘Chinas’ within the overarching contextuality of the U.S.-China relationship. 
‘Relationship’ relates to their interaction in general, hence not only delimited to their 
bilateral relationship. Second, the empirical data – which serves as interesting 
findings in its own right due to the novelty of studying policy-research experts at the 
individual level in IR – will be juxtaposed with various areas within four, broadly 
speaking, relevant bodies of literature, namely the nature of U.S.-Sino relations, 
power-transition/realist theory in IR, the specific think tank literature, and social 
theory.
728
  
 
Third, I shall throughout this Chapter, highlight when further methodological efforts 
can assist in unveiling additional aspects of the thematic clusters of narratives.
729
 
Fourth, I will develop this Chapter’s argument concerning what constitutes 
‘American-ness’ – through policy-researchers’ “China-narratives”. Furthermore, this 
sub-section in particular, interfaces with Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice as a dialectic 
and diffused explanatory and investigatory frame
730
 – especially ‘habitus’ and 
‘doxa’, and adjuvant, ‘interests’ and ‘strategising’. The discussion also interfaces 
with the “bridge” chapter (Chapter Four) which brings Bourdieu’s relationalism to 
                                                          
728 These findings have been established in addition to those identified in the preceding section; the role of self-
reflexive engagement (or lack thereof) amongst think-tank policy-research experts, and the support of Bourdieu’s 
dialectic relationality between the conceptual “thinking tools”. 
729 For example, data and method triangulation. 
730 My term, here, reflects the dialectic nature of deploying Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice as the 
theoretical/conceptual framework: that the embedded conceptual “thinking tools” provides a conceptual 
vocabulary on the one hand, (but also!) a way of inquiry/entrance into the ‘total universe of data’ (see Miles and 
Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis, op.cit.) on the other hand. The interplay between collected data and the 
ongoing analysis (theory as method, which was Bourdieu’s intention anyhow, see Bourdieu and Wacquant 
Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, op.cit. 224-235) has the potential of unveiling pathways otherwise hidden due to 
the particular properties of the operationalisation of Bourdieu’s practice theory. This argument is identical to the 
one I made in Chapter 4 where I argued for the potential to further expand/improve Bourdieu’s concepts based 
on relevance governed by the empirical data (for instance, the two facets of ‘capital’ and the “homology distance” 
between the layers of field in Bourdieu’s hierarchy of fields. Lastly, this is not to say that other theoretical 
framework could not locate the same or other or “better” investigatory avenues to explore. 
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the forefront.
731
 Fifth, the Chapter conclusion will highlight research findings and 
proposed contributions. The above-depicted approach also reflects my subjectivity as 
a researcher and thus the need to engage with an ongoing self-reflexive deliberation.  
 
In terms of consolidating the thematic clusters, collectively, the established clusters 
of narratives become tantamount to the discursive frame, which in effect serves as 
the empirical foundation of this particular Chapter as representations of the policy-
researchers’ construction of ‘social realities’ concerning ‘China’ in the context of 
U.S.-Sino relations. It makes sense, now, to continue with imparting the empirical 
data – aligned with the ‘cyclic’ research process and social constructionist 
epistemological underpinning of this study where new, collected field-data is placed 
at the focal point in the inquiry. I make use of particular strands of the collected data 
from the ‘total universe of data’, including data concerning U.S.-Sino relations. 
 
5.4.1 ‘Non-foreign policy’ narratives – Cluster 1 
This cluster relates to narratives which are engaging with China but outside the 
conventional confined two-country relationship/bilateral-trajectory ontology in 
foreign-policy and IR realms. Louise Greve’s (National Endowment of Democracy, 
NED) utterances encapsulate this particular type of narratives: 
 
NED is not concerned with U.S-Sino relations, all we care about is – China – it’s 
like a think tank but we could be anywhere. When we think about China in analysis, 
                                                          
731 See Bourdieu and Wacquant, Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, op.cit. 15/179/224-235, regarding Bourdieu’s 
emphasis on primacy of relations (dialecticality) and not opposing binary inquires (“endoxic propositions” 
constituted by social and political positions (see Pierre Bourdieu, Lecon sur la lecon (Paris Editions de la Minuit, 
1982); Norbert Elias, What is Sociology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978): 113) as opposed to 
dualistic notions such as ontological primacy to structure, system, the collective (as part of methodological 
monism) as taxonomic, binaries to agent, actor, or the individual respectively. We need to think relationally, 
which also was reiterated by orthodox Bourdieu scholar, Professor Didier Bigo (King’s College London), in a 
seminar in PaIS (hence also supporting the relevance, and the importance of, the “bridge” Chapter Four, which 
established the China policy-research expert community as a Bourdieusian ‘social field’. Bourdieu effectively 
resolves, in part, theoretical duality and dichotomised binaries, postulating that: “the relation between the social 
agent and the world is not that between a subject (or a consciousness) and an object, but a relation of 
“ontological complicity – or mutual possession” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, op.cit. 20). 
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we don’t have to think about America’s approach to China, we only think about 
what happens in China, what we can do as a private actor. Our only mission is 
democracy. (002-B)
732
 
 
She continues:  
 
I am giving you the analysis (…) but if you want my analysis of U.S. foreign policy 
towards China, I can give you that in another interview…? (002-B).733 
 
It is not an anti-foreign policy narrative, but rather reflects that the field of think 
tanks does not solely harbour foreign policy – or even political – policy institutions. I 
coin the term ‘mission think tank’ (democracy, in this instance). Interestingly, Greve 
draws an equating boundary between being ‘non-foreign policy’ oriented with the 
notion of escaping the label of ‘non-American’. This position is strongly related to 
NED’s “non-think tank” identity – albeit NED arguably can be classified as one 
from Bourdieu’s perspective of ‘internalising the external’ and ‘externalising the 
internal’ concerning identity-construction.734 Effectively, I dispute such disconnected 
boundaries. There are particularly two lessons to take from this. First, gazing from 
the outside/in – the bias relating to a fixed “American-ness” of U.S. think tanks 
should be questioned – there is a vast variation inside the U.S. think tank world. 
Second, on the flip side of the coin – as illustrated in the previous section – the 
silence of the extent of “American-ness” embeddedness amongst U.S. think tank 
policy-researchers illuminate the lack of self-reflexive inquisition on their own part. 
 
                                                          
732 Interview Louisa Greve (NED) (002-B), 6 May 2011 (recording: 09.23). 
733 Unfortunately, due to time constrains/changes in my diary (fieldwork in the U.S.), I was not able to act on her 
very kind offer to conduct a follow-up research interview. I did, however, had the pleasure of meeting her again, 
coincidently, during a seminar at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), featuring a high-profile 
speaker, Prof Thomas J. Christensen (Princeton) – formerly serving on the National Committee on U.S.-China 
Relations. 
734 In Chapter Four, it is established that NED is perceived as a think tank by the wider policy-community. 
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From a NED perspective, the oppositional notion to the “typical” American think 
tank constitutes the boundary-marker of ‘non-foreign policy based’ and ‘non-
advocacy’ – and in effect, ‘non-ideologised’. In the context of discussing narratives, 
it begs the question why NED is a relevant organisation to engage with 
contemplating on the diverging focus of narratives on China. It pinpoints that China 
is dealt with in American political and think tank discourses, but additionally in a 
non-foreign policy context. NED remains, nevertheless, political being influenced, 
and influencing, and indeed not operating in isolation, by the U.S. approach to China 
in the realm of democracy.  
 
This particular type of engagement with China and the U.S. reflects this cluster’s 
void of suggested boundary-markers of their narratives – or narratives at all – 
because they do not exist. 
 
Extending on the same issue explicated above, my interview with Xiaomei TAN 
from the World Resources Institute (WRI) was prematurely ended. Their “China-
narratives” can also be labelled as ‘non-foreign policy’ due to engaging with China 
on a ‘mission’ herein environment. However, there is an important nuance when 
comparing with NED; the WRI does not share the boundary-marker of ‘non-
advocacy’ due to investing time in influencing the environment-agenda in American 
domestic politics (and beyond).  
 
The two above experiences with NED and the WRI reflect particularly three facets 
relating to sense-making of data and analysis. First, on a self-reflexive note, prior to 
entering the field with the aim to secure and conduct interviews, I had been oblivious 
to Bourdieu’s ‘objectification of objectification’: to inquisitively questioning the way 
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I make social scientific claims (social background, position in the intellectual field, 
and “intellectualist bias” – i.e. the lenses I gaze at the social through.735 It became 
clear to me, post-field work – that I had a preconceived understanding of all think 
tanks working with foreign-policy and international relations.  
 
However, as pinpointed above with NED and WRI, many a think tank does not work 
within this ambit.
736
 It also reflects the importance of scrutinising the meaning-
construction of the term ‘non-advocacy’ used above. Again, in Political Science, IR 
and the specific think tank literatures, ‘advocacy’ connotes to operate within local, 
national and/or international political agendas. However, with NED and WRI as an 
example, those think tanks are on a mission relating to creating change regarding a 
particular socio-political or environmental concern. Indeed, this elaboration shows 
how I, as the researcher, was gazing at my research subjects with an intellectual bias 
from having been educated, and conducted research, within the realm of IR. Such 
approach has a different focus than if having been a product of, for example, general 
cultural studies or area-studies in the humanities.
737
 It is an important reminder as 
self-reflexive deliberation unveils new nuances in the data – but also highlights 
implications on research design.
738
 
 
                                                          
735 Jenkins 2002, op.cit. 61; Maton 2004, op.cit. 52; Wacquant, “Towards a reflexive sociology: a workshop with 
Pierre Bourdieu,” 33. See Bourdieu 1990b, The logic of practice, op.cit., and Bourdieu, Pascalian mediations, 
op.cit. 
736 I coined the term ‘mission-based think tank’, in the preceding sub-section. 
737 To add on to the complexities, as highlighted in Chapter Four, I conducted another interview at the WRI – 
however a policy-researcher with an IR educational background and research interests. This illustrates the 
nuances within one given think tank (also within the same office) where the background of the particular staff 
member has implications on grasping the think tank’s identity, dynamics as well as external outreach work. 
738 For example, if I had not contested the tacit assumption in my ontological understanding, I might have 
devised a less empirically sound research design for future research endeavours, for example pursued only think 
tanks working in the foreign policy realm. 
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The boundary-marker of ‘non-advocacy’ also resonates in “China-narratives” from 
The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Wilson Center) and the US 
Institute for Peace (USIP). It further reflects the importance of meaning-construction 
– the ‘non-advocacy’ marker has evolved from different interests and strategies. The 
Wilson Center links this to the self-proclaimed label of academic research and partly 
due to receiving about one-third of their funding from Smithsonian and Congress 
sources. The “anti-thesis” between ‘academia’ on the hand and ‘advocacy’ and 
‘lobbying’ on the other signals a binary between “good” and “bad” respectively.739 
Bryce Wakefield (Wilson Center) also defines this as the Wilson Center’s 
organisational policy – and not to provide policy advice due to being funded by 
Congress (005-E).
740
  
 
USIP does not find the latter boundary-marker (‘non-advocacy’) a problem as it is 
outside their remit as being fully funded by the Congress. Both the Wilson Center 
and USIP share the boundary-marker of ‘foreign policy’ – as they work with 
political agendas and analysis of foreign-policy as opposed to NED. An additional 
aspect of boundary-markers relates to the strength or salience, herein not all markers 
of a conceptual boundary can be assumed to be of equal definitional strength (of 
explaining what is socially and culturally construed as inside/outside the conceptual 
boundary).
741
 Furthermore, the Wilson Center in terms of a Bourdieusian outlook on 
identity is less strongly externalising the internal creed, in comparison to what the 
external policy-environment does as far as internalising Wilson Center’s Self. 
                                                          
739 See LaLiberte, Andre. Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. (Wilson Center), May 12, 2011 (004-D). 
740 Wakefield, Bryce. Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. May 19, 2011. (005-E) (recording: 32.20). 
741 See Fredrick Barth, “Introduction,” in Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture 
Difference, ed. Fredrick Barth (London: Allen and Unwin, 1969b). Extending on Barth’s work, cultural processes 
precede social ones, and that think tank identities cannot be taken as a given – but occurs through the 
negotiating of identity (social processes) in juxtaposition with the larger society/context (which shows the 
relevance of the sociological meso-level). 
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Thus, in sum, it is not the “difference” between the organisations that explains such 
importance nuances, but to also to comprehend the meaning of boundary-markers as 
well as the relationality and strengths between them. In fact, the “non-China 
narrative” which has been portrayed, problematised and elucidated in this sub-
section, constitutes a narrative on the very forms of “China-narratives” per se. 
 
5.4.2 ‘Multiplicity, multi-layered narratives’ – Cluster 2 
This grouping reflects the variation between and within narratives that transpire 
inside and amongst think tank organisations and individual policy-research experts – 
in addition to their own views of other existing narratives. Methodologically, I do 
not treat these two slightly different perspectives differently. The rationale relates to 
that a policy-researcher’s assessment of different narratives is indeed integral to their 
own narrative. Furthermore, this distinction is not insignificant – cross-tabulating of 
imparted narratives (data) and the degree of expertise/scope of experience illustrates 
a strong relationship between lower expertise/less experience, with higher degree of 
“narratives about narratives”. 
 
Frost (Peterson) formulates this form of cluster-narratives as different types of 
narratives in American discourses:  
 
I think there is a tendency for the United States in general to look at China in certain 
common ways, impressed by China’s economic performance, but a little bit wary of 
China’s rapid military capability. We need that in one layer below that so to speak, 
each individual policy researcher care about one issue more than other (…) mixture 
of views depending on the particular think tank in questions (…) different views, we 
try to be objective, but there are many Chinas and many truths [my italicisation] 
(001-A).
742
  
  
                                                          
742 Frost, interview (Peterson), May 3, 2011. (recording: 00:13 & 1:01 min). 
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Dan Blumenthal (American Enterprise Institute) surveys the myriad of narratives 
concerning positioning China within the context of her relationship with the U.S.:  
 
Well, I think that it is always a mix of strategic competition, rivalry, and cooperation 
and engagement. But I think competition and rivalry aspects have grown (…) most 
security issues, larger conflicts of interests; North Korea’s future, Taiwan’s future, 
and types of operations and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. There is 
no resolution, disagreement over Iran. I think probably broader disagreements are 
around conflicts of interests of the way China will behave unilaterally at times and 
on the world stage. On the cooperative side, we are deeply intertwined, lots to talk 
about regarding financial relations, or global balancing. (008-H).
743
 
 
Adam Hersh (Center for American Progress) follows suit:  
 
The relationship is somewhat schizophrenic. We have many different goals on 
national security, military, on global institutions, on economic issues, environmental 
human rights issues, there are lots of balls in the air being juggled, often with 
conflicting goals and strategies, often without clear, at least from the outside, a clear 
strategic approach concerning how to achieve these goals.
744
 
 
Banning Garrett (Atlantic Council) warns against what narratives to take notice of: 
 
If you talk to senior people in the admin – on both sides – they believe in the need 
for cooperation, they believe that our common interests are greater than the 
differences (…) if talking to Obama he would nod his head, he would not say that 
“you don’t know shit”. I have talked to very senior people who work on China stuff, 
we are on the same page on this. But that’s not what you hear, so be careful of the 
narrative – who is making the narrative, lots of people are making a lot of noise; the 
media, pundits, the think tanks (…) those who focus on U.S.-Sino relations, they 
have a view, I don’t think they get it right, they don’t get it the way it is seen on 
either sides (…) but nobody really sets out a long terms strategic picture. (025-Y).745 
 
The boundary-markers of such narrative form include ‘multi-layered’ (multiplicity of 
narratives between different policy-areas, as well as between policy-areas and 
underlying interests), ‘cooperation-competitive relationship’, ‘short-term focus’, 
‘interests’, and ‘issue-topic’.  
 
                                                          
743 Blumenthal, Dan. Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. AIE, May, 25, 2011. (008-H) (recording: 0:58 min). 
744 Hersh, Adam. Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. (CAP) (010-J), May 26, 2011. (recording: 1 min). 
745 Banning, Garrett. Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. Atlantic Council, June 28, 2011. (025-Y) (recording: 
57:56). 
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5.4.3 ‘GDP/economy hype’ narratives – Cluster 3 
Frost (Peterson) highlights the “Gross Domestic Product (GDP)/economy-fetish”746 
in Washington (001-A). Underlying this critique is another narrative about the 
“China-narratives”, which can be formulated ontologically and epistemologically. 
For the former, as the purpose of GDP is to capture a state economy’s market value 
of goods and services with one figure, the arguable over-emphasis on such a 
measurement divert the ontological focus away from internal, domestic variables 
including human/national/societal well-being within China. Epistemologically, based 
on the above ontological-lens from which so-called objective analysis and 
subsequently derived policy recommendations are derived from, there is a risk of a 
too narrow focus when producing knowledge and claim about whatever ‘reality’ 
which is being scrutinised.
747
 Sherraden’s (New America Foundation) utterance 
below reflects the relevance of non-bilateral factors – and serves as an example of 
how most narratives are also being multi-layered: 
 
(…) so if it is on substance or on politics? I think it is both. I do not think that the 
American public is wrong necessarily on this issue. I think that the media obviously 
exploits some of the… and exaggerates, kind of, the U.S.-China bilateral 
relationship as the cause of all the economic decline in the United States over the 
past decade [laughter]. But there is some truth to what they are feeling in their lives 
– and the impact on local economies, and that’s not all due to China. But there are 
some things that the U.S. that can do that I think is reflected in the U.S.-China 
relationship. So, dealing with the value of the dollar and taking that head on – that is 
not a U.S.-China relationship issue, but it is definitely related (…) I think the way to 
manage it is to be, kind of, forthright about issues that will be confronting these two 
countries. And right now – I think there is a little bit of, kind of, hoping that the 
                                                          
746 As expressed by French President Nicolas Sarkozy (see Judith D. Schwartz, ”Is GDP An Obsolete Measure 
of Progress?”, Times CNN, 30 Jan. Available:  
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1957746,00.html (2010)). 
747 This is not to criticise GDP as a specialised tool per se, as it was not designed to accommodate for the 
lacking properties which I have just described. The criticism is on the overly focus and usage of the GDP in 
debates that involve important aspects far beyond the parameter of the GDP figure. As will be discussed later, 
the “China-threat” notion might for many feel more imminent when exposed to GDP figures showing comparable 
economies (the U.S. and China) as opposed to if having utilised the more appropriate Purchasing-Power-Parity 
(PPP) which reflects differences in income at the individual level.  
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recovery will take hold well enough in both countries – and not dealing with these 
issues. But there are issues that are coming. (003-C).
748
  
 
Sherradan also points out that regardless of how important human rights are, that 
China’s compliance with fair labour policies will always lose out for the average 
American who focuses on own livelihood and to place food on the table (003-C).
749
 
The above illustrate several multiple layers in narratives – for example: between 
different policy-interests, between normativity and assessment of ‘reality’, and 
between the ‘analytical scope’ and influencing contextuality. 
 
An absolute decline of the U.S. economy is outright dismissed across the 
respondents. However, there is a supporting consensus of a relative decline: “there is 
a relative decline, but not military – we have more of that than everybody else put 
together” (Frost 001-A).750 GDP is implicitly equated to power. Levy (AEI) finds 
that narratives on economics take a big role (007-G).
751
 Economics is also evident in 
Sherraden’s (New America Foundation) assessments where he points out that there 
are “tensions” when it comes to changes in America’s stance on trade towards China, 
but also the principal role it plays in the U.S.-Sino relationship dictated by what 
matters to Americans:
752
 
 
My general impression is that the United States and China were kind of caught in 
this, kind of, unsustainable economic… you know, I would say economic 
integration. And that, as China develops more, the problems with that integration is 
becoming more and more obvious. So there is going to be a lot more to work 
through in the next decade than it has been in the past decade. The honeymoon is 
                                                          
748 Sherraden, interview (New America Foundation), May 11, 2011. (003-C) (recording: 16:05 min). 
749 And understandably so. See also interview with Malou Innocent (043-DDW). 
750 Frost, interview, recording: 11 min. 
751 Levy, interview (AEI), May 25, 2011 (recording: 13 min). 
752 Put forward as a humble criticism, the intertwined and dominant nature of economic aspects relating to U.S. 
foreign policy in general, and towards China in particular, degree programmes not adopting this is in my opinion 
disadvantaging their students (for example. MA in US Foreign Policy (2013), see 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/studymasters/usfp/ – as opposed to U.S. Foreign Policy (n.d.)., see: 
http://elliott.gwu.edu/academics/grad/ia/policy.cfm).  
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over, so to speak. You know, as China becomes… there is a lot of kind of 
contradictory, I would say, patterns of growth in China right now. Things that had 
been propelling them forward, are going to be perhaps… in order to get to next stage 
of growth, those same things might be pulling them back from taking the next leap – 
and the U.S. is definitely caught in the middle of that. So, one example is; China 
moving up in the value chain, in production, increasingly coming up in competition 
with U.S. companies and U.S. export. It used to be China exporting socks and 
watches. But if they are exporting high value added, wind turbans, machinery, you 
seeing that now in commercial chambers in Asia – Shanghai, I think, and Hong 
Kong in a letter last year, expressing quite a bit of discontent about U.S. companies’ 
access to the Chinese market. But a lot about it is China trying to move up in the 
value chain – that is going to be one sort of tension. The other sort of obvious 
tension is the post-bubble economy – is just a much more difficult stream or river to 
navigate. In a situation where you have, in my opinion, Chinese growth will 
definitely going to slow in the next decade when making transition to consumption, 
which I think will happen – it has to happen. But it is not going to be the 10% 
growth that we see today (…) Troubled waters [laughter] are ahead essentially, 
definitely get through it because so there is so much invested interests on both sides, 
and a lot of people have documented that. And it is a huge outflow of Chinese 
capital right now into the U.S. One is, kind of, managing this increased competition 
in production. Another one is going to be how do we deal with cross-border 
investments? I think the U.S. and China need to sit down. One of the things I think 
they should put on the agenda is – what are the guidelines for neutral investment, 
and lay them on the table so that we know what is possible – and what’s not. 
Because at the moment we kind of have this… we have a situation where neither 
sides really feel what the rules are, the rules are probably unfair on both sides, and 
there’s more capital coming from China than it ever has been, probably north of 
$100 billion, it is a huge amount. (003-C).
753
 
 
Additionally, the above quote also reflects the relevance for taking into account the 
background and work-area of the policy-researcher (in this instance, economists).
754
 
Their ‘policy’ or ‘professional habitus’ very much places them in the economic 
Bourdieusian ‘field of power’, which arguably results in predominantly focusing on 
economic facets. There is nothing wrong with that, but in terms of aforesaid 
epistemological and ontological lenses, it is important for outsiders to be aware of 
                                                          
753 Sherraden Samuel (New America Foundation). Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. May 11, 2011 (003-C) 
(recording: 00:27 & 03:59 min).  
754 At a first glance, this might be uninterestingly obvious. However, as discussed in Chapter Four (China policy-
research community as a Bourdieusian ‘field’), it is imperative to consider as far as knowledge-production is 
concerned: why and how people think in the ways they do, and what possible implications this might have on 
their focus in policy-analysis and recommendations.  
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such underlying dynamics as far as knowledge-production is concerned, hence why 
some narratives and policy-areas tend to trump others. Thus, the preceding Chapter 
highlights – and serves as a vehicle – for problematising the portrayed ‘reality’ 
through policy-researchers utterances, writings, and agendas. The specialist focus is 
also evident with Levy (AEI):  
 
Oh, that is a big question (…) Ah, I think there are some important tensions between 
the two countries right now, and some forces that are working to perhaps heighten 
them rather than diminishes them (…) Sure, I am an economists so my principal 
focus is on economic matters. There are some economic imbalances (…) I think 
both countries have big economic imbalances that they worry about, but done little 
to address those imbalances. Each holds the other to somewhat blame for some of 
the problems going on in the world. But yet China at least has not been seen to use 
multilateral fora like the G20 to address some of those questions, which could be 
mutually beneficial (007-G).
755
 
 
Another facet of this narrative-cluster relates to the politicisation of economic issues 
between the U.S. and China. This can be linked to Bourdieu’s less known “thinking-
tools” of ‘interests’ and subsequently ‘strategising’, which are socially construed 
with the given ‘field’.756 This is particularly relevant contemplating on last U.S. 2010 
mid-term election where the Chinese reportedly became subject to what national 
media referred to as “China-bashing”.757 U.S. domestic economy was facing 
scrutinising and unprecedented challenges – and politicians would often find 
themselves disempowered, marginalised, and “un-American” if opponents would 
manage to label them as soft on “the juggernaut” China (panda bear)758 and “sending 
                                                          
755 Levy, interview (AEI), May 25, 2011 (recording: 1 min). 
756 Bourdieu, 1990a, 88, op.cit.; Williams 2007, Culture and Security, op.cit. 
757 Also mentioned in several of the interviews with the policy-researchers. See Wei, R “U.S. politicians to 
compete to bash China for gains in midterm elections,” Xinhuanet English News. Available: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2010-10/14/c_13557438.htm (2010). Citizens Against 
Government Waste (2010) used in their advertisement the “horror scenario” of China owning U.S. (and all 
Americans working for China) if not ending perceived government waste which is bankrupting America – in their 
eyes (see http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=JlkLhVo3PbY). 
758 Garrett (Atlantic Council) points out that you easily get labelled as ‘panda-hugger’ (025-Y (recording: 19:56 
min). 
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(manufacturing) jobs to China”, which would resonate very negatively with the 
populace deprived from income and jobs.
759
 In fact, as none of the interviewees 
contested – very few jobs were actually lost to China and secondly, many of these 
jobs would have disappeared regardless due to the decline in the global economy.
760
 
 
As formulated by Levy (AEI): 
 
I think the U.S. has political forces at work which offers great rewards to anyone 
who demonise China. China has political forces at work which offers rewards to 
take nationalistic stances, and show themselves not to give in under pressure from 
the U.S. Both countries have big economic imbalances they worry about – but both 
have done little to address them. (007-G).
761
 
 
Levy also agrees with the hyphened China-threat relating to economic matters:
762
  
 
I think there are those who believe that China is responsible for many job losses, 
look at the Alliance for American Manufacturing for example – “that’s where the 
jobs went, they went to China”. I think that is a misguided analysis, I think it tends 
to pretend it is only two countries in the world – U.S. and China. Every now and 
then, you often get media to play into that (…) A story I was pleased to see, I think 
it was in Washington Post, these bilateral measurements have not been very 
effective, when you block furniture from China you don’t get Carolina furniture 
production, but you end up with furniture production from Vietnam! (…) there is a 
multi-country world. (007-G).
763
 
 
Hersh (CAP) points out the combined media and political hype: 
 
For about the past, I guess, it is about 15 years or so, since the post-Tiananmen when 
China started coming back in 1983 moving even more rapidly on economic reforms, 
there has been a, let’s call it a… I guess naïve free trade slash corporatist view of 
how to best engage China for U.S. national benefit and also for the goal of 
facilitating changes within China. This was the, you know, trade with them, 
encouraging trade and investment and this would help China grow (…) the view of 
how to engage China, the naïve trade view is starting to crumble, as business in 
                                                          
759 See J. FlorCruz ”China's rising status makes it potential friend or foe,” CNN Beijing. Available:  
http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/11/11/florcruz.china.g20.us.europe/index.html (2011). 
760 According to the EastWest Center, the percentage of jobs created within the U.S. due to export to Asia, has 
risen with more than 30% since 2002 (see Asia Matters for America http://asiamattersforamerica.org/Jobs-from-
exports-2012). 
761 Levy, interview, recording: 1.30 min. 
762 See also Hersh, interview (010-J). 
763 Levy, interview (recording: 09.18 min). 
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particular is realising that the relationship is, the structure this way is not working 
for them anymore, that China is playing a different game than they realised or that 
the game China was playing was once beneficial to them, but now is at odd because 
they have developed enough to compete, not happy with the arrangements (…) the 
perspective on U.S.’ China policy is crumbling somewhat. (010-J).764 
 
This narrative clusters reflects perceptions of ‘China’ with boundary-markers 
including ‘economics’, ‘politicised’, ‘managing new environment’, ‘competition’, 
‘bilateral’ – and for China specifically – ‘scape-goat’ and ‘free-rider’.765 The 
overlapping nature of the cluster is evident in Levy’s utterances on China-threat, and 
the separate cluster on that very topic (below). I argue that this Othering reflects, and 
re-reproduces, ‘American-ness’ in terms of upholding the Self and own identity766 of 
an ‘exceptionally different’ country in addition to a source of deflecting domestic 
problems.
767
 This is made possibly due to the dire economic situation and thus shows 
the relevance of thinking about the economy as a Bourdieusian overarching ‘field of 
power’.768  
 
5.4.4 ‘Accommodating narratives’ – Cluster 4 
This form of narratives moves beyond power-balance, and scrutinises the necessity 
of giving China “space” in the international system for her uprising and growth.769 
                                                          
764 Hersh, interview, (CAP) (010-J), May 26, 2011 (recording: 3.02 min & 04:15). 
765 Importantly, though, I am here alluding to China becoming the ‘scapegoat’ in terms of U.S. economic and 
political deficiencies (for example job-losses and the humongous trade deficit with China – regardless of who is 
to blame) – herein China being a target for passing on the blame and hence deflecting own short-comings (within 
the U.S.). I am not proposing that China is a “scapegoat” in general – coinciding with Malou Innocent’s (043-
DDW) utterance (Cato Institute) (interview 26 July 2011) who expressed that China is not an innocent player 
which the term “scapegoat” implies.  
766 See Jenkins, Social Identity, op.cit. 
767 See Barry Buzan, ”American exceptionalism, unipolarity and September 11: understanding the behaviour of 
the sole superpower,” Guoji Guancha (International Review) 38 (2005); Joseph Lepgold and Timothy McKeown, 
”Is American Foreign Policy Exceptional? An Empirical Analysis,” Political Science Quarterly 110(3) (1995): 369-
384; Lipset, American Exceptionalism, op.cit. 
768 See Jenkins, Pierre Bourdieu, op.cit. 84-85; Wacquant, ”Toward a Reflexive Sociology”, op.cit. 39. 
769 See Frost, interview, recording: 11 min. 
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Frost (Peterson) paints the U.S.-Sino relationship as a continuum between win-lose 
(for China concerning the latter) or win-win (both countries).
770
  
 
Sherradan (New America Foundation) also points out accommodation as a key 
element in the understanding between the countries:  
 
No, I think they do understand each other. I do not think that there is, really…. You 
get these kinds of comments even out of the communist party members, the senior 
leadership, that reflected that they were trying to communicate even publically, that 
they are dealing with a very difficult political situation at home. And I think that 
reflects, and I think that those are being translated into, definitely being discussed at 
meetings at the STD. I think there is a very good understanding of each other 
basically. I don’t have any, I guess, I have no reason to think there isn’t. It is very 
clear what the Chinese interests are and what the trying to do, and I think the U.S. 
has understood that China’s economy is developing and a lot of people have not 
been integrated. Perhaps to a fault, but the United States has been very 
accommodative for China’s rise, and I think that reflects our understanding of what 
that country is going through, and the need to develop – I would say, the need to get 
rich before old. The U.S. understands that. (003-C).
771
  
 
He continues with exhibiting acknowledgement of a changing environment due to 
China’s growth – and links this to, again, the influencing and impinging economic 
hardship and political contextuality: 
 
Again, the U.S. is not… it is a symbiotic relationship, it is not like policy makers are 
trying to avoid it all, right, it’s not that I am blaming that China has done something 
wrong, taking advantage of a market that exist, a market place where people are 
willing go into debt beyond their incomes, willing to borrow more than they earn in 
a year on goods made in China! So, it is not a China problem, it is a symbiotic 
relationship (003-C).
772
  
 
Hersh (CAP) finds sympathy amongst the American people and understanding for 
China wanting to pursue economic progress (010-J):  
 
                                                          
770 Frost, interview, recording: 26.27 min. 
771 Sherraden (003-C), interview, recording: 5.38 min. 
772 Ibid. recording 09:19. 
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(…) even the old industrial manufacturing unions who at first would say let’s shut 
out China or let’s have large protective trade barriers against them – are now starting 
to recognise that this is not a viable position or policy option. One, because they are 
up against too much resistance from the free trade corporate lobby and not going to 
achieve the goals that they want which is to have a level playing field of workers to 
compete, even if Chinese wages came up 30%, still fractions of U.S. wages, not 
business it can repeat, and see they can build cross border solidary working with 
Chinese workers, helping them to have democratic participation within a not very 
democratic labour relation system in China. (010-J).
773
 
 
Metzl (Asia Society)
774
 is focusing on the accommodation efforts which also come 
with specific demands towards Beijing’s behaviour – within a relationship he 
characterises as “increasingly interdependent”:  
 
How I see it China is rising very rapidly. They have enormous domestic needs and 
they are willing to be a free-rider on the international system, and in my view take 
advantage of the international system until, their countries tell them to support or 
make them support. We see this across the board, whether it is on currency policies 
or indigenous innovation, or intellectual property protection, or investment in Africa 
which has many positive aspects as well, China is taking advantage of the 
international system. And if everybody did what China does, the entire international 
system would collapse overnight, so I think as China rises, China must assume far 
great responsibility in international affairs, or risk destroying the very systems that 
has facilitated its rise. (039-YZ).
775
   
 
The degree of accommodation, though, is not always assumed to be limitless. When 
Glaser (Center for Strategic and International Studies) is asked about her perceptions 
concerning the premise of China’s peaceful rise, she replies: “OK to give China 
space but only in areas where we don’t have clashing interests” (035-QR).776  
 
I suggest the following boundary-markers: ‘free-rider’, ‘managing China’s rise’, 
‘accommodating China’s rise’, and ‘stakeholder view’. The notion of little variance 
                                                          
773 Hersh, interview recording: 11:24 min. 
774 In New York, where Asia Society’s head-quarter is located, but deemed relevant for my study because it has 
a branch in Washington, DC, where I also attended a seminar. The interview itself was conducted in New York. 
775 Metzl, Jamie. Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. (Asia Society, New York), July, 2011 (039-YZ) (recording: 
6 min). 
776 Glaser, Bonnie. Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. (CSIS), July 8, 2011(035-QR) (recording: 06:19). 
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across the political spectrum in American think tanks remains credible (after cross-
tabulation), as well as the more sober attitudes amongst policy-researchers compared 
to the media and certain streams of politicians.  
 
5.4.5 ‘The dualism non-China threat & non-zero sum game’ narrative – Cluster 
5 
This cluster of narratives reflects the interrelatedness of the two above social 
phenomena – and eventually the dismissal of the latter.777  
  
Frost points out: 
 
It is not a zero-sum mentality due to the countries influence each other (…) the basic 
question is what trajectory they will follow, with India we now see as a messy 
democracy becoming a bit richer. With China in 20 years – we don’t know (…) this 
is fairly mainstream in the respected think tanks, mine opinions are fairly consistent. 
(001-A).
778
  
 
IR theories are shown little interest, and Frost (Peterson) subsequently makes a 
notice of mainstream policy-research experts and China-hands, David Shambaugh
779
 
and Kenneth Lieberthal – labelled as area specialists and not academics with theories 
“probably like yours” (and she is right!),780 all that “functional theories” etc. (001-
A).
781
 Frost cannot see any China-threat, but rather a positive development about 
cultural learning (001-A).
782
 Intercultural exchanges at the individual levels (for 
example, Chinese immigrants, students, food, more sophisticated and outward-
                                                          
777 In the previous sub-section, I established the wide-spread understanding of the “China-threat” being 
exaggerated and intensified by politicisation, ideologisation and election tactics politics. 
778 Frost, interview, ibid., (recording: 18:45 min). 
779 Prof David Shambaugh very kindly offered to be interviewed, but this did not materialise due to incompatible 
diaries. 
780 It relates to what Bryce Wakefield (Wilson) refers to as “European”, which I have later jokingly, but probably 
succinctly, expressed is the worst word you can use in this context in the U.S. – second only to “French”! 
781 Frost, interview, op.cit. (recording: 19:44). 
782 Frost recording, ibid. 28 min. 
256 
 
looking younger diplomats working at the Chinese Embassy) are highlighted by 
many as a source of better understanding between the two countries.
783
 
 
Sherradan (New America Foundation) also does not identify any threat from China 
and rather emphasises learning: 
 
No, not at all, too much to lose at both sides. Maybe that is one of those reasons if 
you have not spent time in China, you don’t, you have not talked to people there, not 
kind of figured out what their interests are or what their leadership want even. 
Maybe easier to get a sense that of major conflicts or crisis coming. But I don’t think 
there is, the party I mean, Jiabo has clearly demonstrated that elements in the party 
is interested in democratic reforms, how that happens is unclear whether CCP 
divides or splits and becomes two parties. It could happen in the next 30 years in 
trying to become a democratic nation. So, in the meantime commercial interests are 
too strong, the Chinese have benefited too much, and the U.S. obviously has 
enormous commercial interests in China and for a stable China. Too much demand 
in Chinese economy and too much risk over Taiwan, or South China Sea. I do not 
see any areas that would be inflammatory, or benefit for the U.S. to go to war over 
Taiwan (…) will pass with generation of leaders which had a commitment to 
Taiwan, but it is a hard bargaining chip.” (003-C2).784 
 
Laliberte (Wilson Center) echoes the dismay with the power-transition analytical 
frame, which innately dictates a threating China by default (004-D):  
 
Well, no no. I don’t buy it, I don’t buy it. The idea that China’s rise is going of 
course to be peaceful because they are peace loving country, that’s nonsense. There 
is no country which is inherently peaceful or inherently warlike. All countries think 
about their national interests, their government gets carried away with what that 
means. China is no saint as nowhere else, when they see that their national interests 
include Taiwan and the Taiwanese – Taiwan is a tiny part of East-Asia – prefer not 
to be part of PRC, and if they decided to say it loudly, well the Chinese will become 
warlike like any country and they are clear about that, there is no doubt about it, if 
there is referendum on Taiwan independence, China will intervene as any other 
country. (004-D).
785
  
 
                                                          
783 See interviews: Limaye (EastWest Center), Levenstein (Wilson), Frost (Peterson), Pho (Wilson), Sherraden 
(New America Foundation), Anonymous (World Resources Institute), Swartz (AEI), Ahrens (independent). 
784 Sherradan, interview, ibid., (recording: 8:17 min). 
785 LaLiberte, Andre. Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. (Wilson Center), May 12, 2011 (004-D) (recording: 
46:03 min). 
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His colleague, Wakefield (Wilson Center) points out the American perceptions of 
successful nations – the latter often being considered as a threat to the U.S. (but 
unwarrantedly). He draws lines to Japan in the 1980s (005-E).
786
 Another Wilson 
Center colleague, Sue Levenstein, concurs and also emphasises learning. This 
perspective also coincides with notions of upholding an American Self through 
radicalisation of China as an Other through Othering:  
 
I think that they have an alarmist theory, only because for the U.S. to tell themselves 
they should start getting their act together, more competent, and competitive on the 
world market. I mean the U.S. standard of excellence are really, you know, 
plunging, in a way that, if you look at for education instance, it is dropping, you 
know, not only is it dropping I seem to think that back in the 80s maybe because I 
was just a little kid back then, I just felt like you know we were striving the standard 
of excellence, I feel that does not exist today (…) a perception that I felt we were 
like, I hate to say, that it was the Reagan area, it was I think associated with the Cold 
War that we won, and therefore we were the only mighty superpower, and I think 
this made us feel like we were the role model of the world and were sort of setting 
the standard. I think that is no longer the case for the U.S., China has come, we have 
to like pass the torch on to someone else (…) I tend to agree with the 
constructivists… (006-F).787 
 
Swartz (AEI) points out the bipolar (threat/no threat) approach in understanding 
China, finding the China-treat school to be overblown due to China being welded 
more together with the U.S. through enticing China to become a more responsible 
stakeholder – a belief founded in the primacy of American power (017-Q). 788  
Blumenthal reacted with negative body language to the China-threat thesis:  
 
I think that is nonsense, I am not an academic and I think that these … lots of these 
academic theories make no sense, nothing is predetermined (…) certain ideas and 
terms came from academia into the policy sphere like strategic reassurance. Often 
                                                          
786 Wakefield, Bryce. Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. (Wilson Center), May 19, 2011 (005-E) (recording: 
22:30 min). 
787 Levenstein, Sue. Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. (Wilson Center), May 24, 2011 (006-F) (recording: 
45:56 min & 51:36 min). 
788 Swartz, Dale. Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. (AEI), June 15, 2011 (017-Q) (recording: 5 min). 
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realism, but nothing is predefined – the UK and the U.S. are prime examples, there 
were so many factors why the U.S. was rising. (008-H).
789
  
 
Hersh (CAP) plays down the China-threat picture – pointing at the politicisation of 
the issue in political campaigns like in the 2010-mid-term election, which was 
playing on the fear of China, and calls for placing individuals at the core and how it 
should be managed (010-J).790 Limaye (EastWest Center) agrees: 
 
You know, there are extreme views, that China will be the most powerful, and the 
U.S. will fade into the background. I simply don’t buy it, I simply don’t analytically 
believe the trend of power-transition. Do I believe that China will become stronger, 
yes considerably stronger, will develop into leadership, material power into soft 
power and ideational power and ability to set rules of game? I don’t think so for a 
very very long time. So, there is a power transition occurring. I think the nature of 
that power-transition is highly conditional, highly uncertain, highly contested within 
China, (…) I personally don’t anticipate a war, I simply refuse to except that – that 
war is inevitable out of power transition.
791
 
 
Peter Masters (Wilson) believes that peaceful rise is possible and does not see any 
practical reasons why China would pose a threat for going to war on any scale (011-
K).
792
 An anonymous policy-researcher at the World Resources Institute finds 
resemblance in terms of the fear-mongering relating to China where Japan was 
positioned in the American imagination one-two decades ago; concerning the 
economic sphere – for buy-ups and increasing Foreign Direct Investments, and thus 
the China-threat being exaggerated both economically and even less so when it 
comes to challenging U.S. culture and global leadership (028-CD).
793
 Keith Crane 
(RAND) finds the power-transition outlook a: 
 
                                                          
789 Blumenthal, interview, op.cit. (recording: 09:48 min and 11:05). 
790 Hersh, interview, op.cit. (recording: 7:50). 
791 Limaye, interview, op.cit. (recording: 08:13).  
792 Marsters, Peter. Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. (Wilson Center), May 24, 2011 (011-K) (recording: 
07:00). 
793 Anonymous policy-researcher. Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. (WRI), June 29. 2011 (recording: 13:16). 
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(…) kind of dumb way to look at it and the world, it is not like power goes around. 
We have a very dynamic society and in China, so it generates lots of ideas and 
culture and people and they are going to contribute to the world globally just like 
other countries do. But to argue that because someone from China has made an 
intervention or read a book – making the U.S. diminish is bizarre (…) we are a large 
country, we have a large military which is quite effective. (029-EF).
794
 
 
As a minority, Seth Cropsey (Hudson Institute) paints a somewhat darker/sceptical, 
non-deterministic picture: 
 
Well, at this point I am not a diplomat, so I don’t have to speak in diplomat language 
(long pause). I think there is an extended period extremely important for both 
countries (…) the U.S. and China goes back a long time, and is likely to continue for 
years into the future. And I would not rule out any outcomes, everything is possible 
from sort of (pause), controllable economic and strategic competition – to maybe 
something is better than that, less tense – to war itself. I don’t predict any of them 
that’s, not my job, my job is to see it as far as U.S.-China relationships to understand 
what it is and what possibilities are for future and what possibility are the most 
likely. (012-K).
795
 
 
Robert Hathaway (Wilson) assesses the situation: 
  
As an American analyst, when I look 20-30 years out, I conclude that all the 
possible country based-threat to the U.S., like traditional national security threat, 
China poses greater threat than any other nation-state. Having been said, I think we 
are in a world where nation-states are not necessarily even the only principal threat. 
So, I for instance think that environmental degradation is a greater threat to 
American security than China is, but only the level of the nation-state. However, I 
am also impressed by China’s growing strength but by also by its vulnerability (…) 
but a fragile China which is facing huge challenges domestically, and I think it is at 
least possible that an unstable, big weak fragile China is more of a threat to 
important U.S. interests than a strong assertive China, threat can come from a weak 
China as well (…) does not mean I am predicting an adversarial relationship (…) 
both would suffer greatly if they allowed their relationship to get out of control, 
power constituencies in both countries keeps the on differences and continues to 
build a decent relationship, I use the word workman like, decent or working 
relationship, not good, cordial, or partnership. (016-P).
796
 
                                                          
794 Crane, Keith. Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. (RAND) (029-EF), (recording: 14:35 and 20:32). 
795 Cropsey, Seth. Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. (Hudson Institute), May 24, 2011 (012-L) (recording: 
01:28). 
796 Hathaway, Robert. Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. (Wilson Center), June 14, 2011 (016-P) (recording: 
16:00 min). 
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Hathaway redirects the focus slightly towards non-bilateral explanatory sources: 
I don’t totally rule it out, history is replete with examples of calculations or 
ignorance that has resulted in war. But I think the pressures for solving differences 
short of armed conflicts are far greater than forces that would propel them into war, 
Taiwan always a joker, whether or not U.S. and China goes to war over Taiwan will 
be determined not only in the U.S. and China, but also in Taipei. Neither the U.S. 
and China have control over Taiwanese actions, always a possible a third actor 
would be a sophisticated hacker based in Malaysia or Russia that convince the U.S. 
or China that either was engaged in full scale cyber war fare, I don’t lose sleep, but a 
theoretical possibility where a third force could push the other into armed conflicts, 
but I don’t expect serious armed conflicts. (016-P).797 
 
Garrett (Atlantic Council) follows suit with Hathaway’s non-bilateral and historical 
focus in relation to U.S.-Sino relations, and continues the attack on academics!:  
 
( …) China and the U.S. are both not only extraordinary interdependent with their 
two economies but both interdependent with the global economy, they are the key 
players. This is a different world than the past competitive strategic world, which is 
not always appreciated by all the realists around town. They always want to compare 
with WWI: “see greater percentage of GDP and global trade at the time”. Maybe, 
but that does not tell you much, we have had WWI and that did not work out very 
well. Secondly, we have nuclear weapon today and very difficult to envisage any 
conflicts with China regardless of how trivial that does not risk escalate with nuclear 
weapon (…) no good outcome with nuclear war, word differ from 1914, nuclear 
weapon did not exist, and I think global interdependence is far greater and more 
depth (…) in terms of risks, I find we are stuck on the interdependence side, whether 
we like it or not. And I think realist fails to look at bigger picture; they focus on the 
old paradigm, rising power and conflicts with an established hegemon. There is an 
element of that no doubt about it– an element of this sure, but so what, is this an 
endgame? But where does that leave us, better to get the war over with now and just 
start reconstruction, what is the point here?! I don’t thing sober leaders in both 
country think about the world like that probably.” (025-Y).798 
 
Dan Rosen (Peterson) shares the sentiment of a decline, but also points out the 
China-threat exaggeration. He refers to the questionable assumptions concerning 
claims of expecting political leverage when it comes to Chinese outward foreign 
direct investments (ODI) into the U.S. (041-BBY).
799
 
 
                                                          
797 Hathaway, interview, op.cit. (recording: 20:00 min).  
798 Garrett, interview, op.cit. (recording: 05:45 & 12.31 min). 
799 Rosen, Dan. Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. IIIE, New York, July 20, 2011 (041-BBY). 
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Boundary-markers for this group of narratives entail ‘no-threat’, ‘post-Cold War’, 
‘no-zero sum game’, ‘anti-IR realists’, ‘non-state level’, ‘risk’, ‘stakeholder-view’, 
‘competition’, ‘non-bilateral’, and ‘interdependence’.  
 
5.4.6 ‘Non-containment’ narrative – Cluster 6 
Frost (Peterson) dismisses the widespread allegations in China of the U.S. exercising 
a containment strategy through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (001-A):
800
 “they 
are trying to project a Cold War mentality on us, we don’t have it, THEY have it” 
(001-A).
801
 Garrett (Atlantic Council) simply uttered that Chinese perceptions of an 
American grand strategy of containment were “simply nonsense” pointing to history 
– where would China be today if the U.S. had not opened up to them?!” (025-Y).802  
 
Such stances, though, are touching upon the significant issue of misunderstandings 
in the relationship, as well as the potential issue of operating with different 
understandings of the key concepts in question. For example, the renowned analyst 
Bonnie Glaser, Senior Fellow in China Studies at the Center for International and 
Strategic Studies (CSIS), discounts the argument that the U.S. is exercising a 
containment-strategy towards China. Her stance is based on her interpretation of 
what constitutes ‘containment’ – and what would not.803 This also illustrates the 
importance of relationality (i.e. relational to what she perceives to be the currently 
executed in terms of U.S. foreign policy towards China).  
 
                                                          
800 Frost, interview, recording 12.30. The TPP is a proposed free-trade zone for countries with a Pacific coast 
(which excludes China) – with alleged claims to address the issue of China being a perceived ‘free-rider in the 
international (economic) system.  
801 Ibid. recording: 40 min. A colleague of mine, Mr Michiel Foulon (Warwick), who is conducting doctoral 
research into U.S.-Sino economic relations, also found in his research interviews that policy-researchers outright 
rejected any credibility to the concept and existence of containment (for instance, Shambaugh). 
802 Garrett, interview, recording 9 min & 15 min. 
803 Interview Bonnie Glaser (CSIS), 8 July 2011 (035-QR). 
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For example, Frost (Peterson) reflected on an encounter with a Chinese counterpart 
who had quoted President Obama by actually having used a statement by a Peterson 
Institute staff-member. The latter had used the term ‘balancing’ in a policy-paper, 
which Frost’ counterpart interpreted as President Obama exercising containment. 
This example reflects both the failure to understand the division between 
government and civil society,
804
 but also (possibly) language translation issues (001-
A).
805
 Alan D. Romberg (Henry L. Stimson Center) follows suit: “I think there is a 
common belief, at the top of government, and senior policy bureaucracies, that we 
NEED to work better (…) The U.S. contained Soviet, but China did not spread, not 
like the Cold War: if we are containing China, than we do it in a strange way!” (026-
Z).
806
 
 
Iskander Rehman (German-Marshall Fund) also diverts from U.S. non-containment 
strategies illustrating that the post-Cold War word is too complex and multifaceted 
for an either/or bipolar thinking – but rather calls for hedging in areas of uncertainty 
(026-W).
807 Nat Ahrens also prescribes the requirement for avoiding to fall into the 
pitfall of containment by establishing mutual interests/threats between the two 
countries (020-T).808 Douglas H. Paal (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) 
compliments the current Obama administration for “basically, you have to 
understand that you need to have a combination of hedging and engagement” (022-
V).
809
 
 
                                                          
804 Frost, interview, recording 60 min). 
805 Understanding in the bilateral relationship will be a core element in the final analysis chapter. 
806 Romberg, Alan D. Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. (Henry L. Stimson Center) (026-Z), June 28, 2011 
(recording: 26 min). 
807 Rehman, Iskander. Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. (GMF), June, 23 2011 (023-W). 
808 Ahrens, Nat. Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. June 17, 2011 (020-T) (recording: 05:24). 
809 Paal, Douglas H.  Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. (Carnegie), June 22, 2011 (022-V) (recording: 11:40). 
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The boundary-markers of this narrative-cluster encompass ‘non-containment’, ‘non-
threat’ (shared with previous cluster), ‘non-linear’, ‘stakeholder-view’, ‘burden-
sharing expectations’, ‘interdependency’, and ‘cooperation’. Overall, there is a 
shared understanding of the U.S. being accommodating towards China, with 
expectation for China to become an increasingly invested player in the system.
810
  
 
5.4.7 ‘Washington consensus’ narratives811 (and its shortfall) – Cluster 7 
The utterance of China-hand Kenneth Lieberthal (Brookings) captures the essence of 
the narratives in this cluster concerning U.S. relationship with China; “good and 
deeply interdependent (032-KL).
812
 The other consolidated cluster-narratives reflect 
different viewpoints on the relationship at the macro level, whereas the “Washington 
consensus” cluster also showcases the dynamics within such consensus. This 
harmonises with Charles Horner (Hudson),
813
 who explicates the necessity of 
engagement, but also pinpoints that it is difficult to paint one view on China in the 
U.S.
814
  
 
This cluster is divided into two sub-groups: (strategic) competition, and continuation 
– with the commonality of being a steady relationship moving forward where 
China’s development and U.S. relations/challenges with the country, are understood 
within the parameter of her inexorable rise. Although this cluster cannot offer hugely 
                                                          
810 Paisly, Ed. Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. (Center for American Progress), July 7, 2011 (034-OP) 
(recording: 31 min). 
811 The title should not be equated to the term coined in 1989 (developed to deal with the constraints relating to 
the traditional classical liberal policy package in U.S. economic policies for creating growth in developing 
countries, specifically Latin America (see John Williamson, “A Short History of the Washington Consensus,” 
Institute for International Economics Paper, Barcelona, September 24–25 (2004); Deepak Lal,”Is the Washington 
Consensus Dead?”, Cato Journal 32(3) (2012): 493-512. 
812 Lieberthal, Kenneth. Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. Tape recording. Brookings Institution, July 6, 2011 
(032-KL) – not recorded on request. 
813 Horner, Charles. Interview by David S. A. Guttormsen. Tape recording. Hudson, June 16 (019-S) – not 
recorded on request. 
814 Horner, interview, ibid. 
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controversial opinions imparted by the policy-researchers – for the same reason – it 
is nevertheless an important aspect of the overall and holistic “China-narrative” 
corpus. Such rationale relates to the American populace being frequently presented 
with exaggerated China-stories by the media – but often unwarrantedly 
intensified:
815
 “media tends to focus on negatives” (006-F).816 
 
In terms of ‘(strategic) competition’, traditional IR realists have operated with ‘the 
state’ and ‘anarchy’ as ontological tools, with the expectation of containing China 
due to posing a security threat to the U.S. deadlocked in inherent competition.
817
 
Levenstein’s utterance (Wilson Center) that the U.S. and China are constantly 
competing – and doing so about everything – is also a reminder about the limited 
explanatory source that an IR paradigm can offer to the policy-world. Furthermore, 
“we also owe much foreign debit already. I don’t think the U.S. has a choice to treat 
China other than the emerging rival superpower, and to give it a lot of, you know, 
the status it deserves” (006-F).818  
 
As Limaye (East-West Center) eloquently promulgated “international relations 
between countries can at times be better grasped when the spot-light is placed on 
interactions between the countries’ non-state players, for example business-groups, 
universities, and research institutes”,819 and propagates to move beyond the 
government-to-government as the ontological focal point” (015-O2a/b).820 
                                                          
815 I am here, of course, not intending to act as a sole judge of which realm tends to impart a more “accurate” 
narrative on China within the U.S.-Sino relationship context. 
816 Levenstein, interview, ibid. (recording: 40 min). See also interviews with Sherraden, Paisley, Innocent, Frost, 
Barrett, Levenstein, Pho, Lohman, Blumenthal, and Hersh. 
817 See Stephen G. Brooks, “Dueling Realisms (Realism in International Relations),” International Organization 
51, no. 3 (1997); Kenneth, Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979). 
818 Interview Sue Levenstein (Wilson Center), 24 May 2011 (006-F). 
819 David S. A. Guttormsen & Carina van de Wetering, “Non-State Actors in World Politics and International 
Relations research – an Introduction,” Political Perspectives 7(1) (2013): 2. 
820 Interview Limaye (EastWest Center), 10 June (015-O2a/b) (recording: 10:15). 
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Tu (Carnegie) highlights that ”China has certainly provided an example for a 
competing model for developing countries, and has certainly in this process 
undermined the attractiveness of the U.S. model” (033-MN).821 This reflects the 
competition also at the strategic level. As a metaphor, the two countries are 
interlocked as an older (aka the U.S.) and younger (aka China) brother – who needs 
to constantly renegotiate their relationship as they move between age-groups and 
life-phases, which transpires in unknown terrain (aka the China’s unprecedented 
rise) – contemplating on one of the five key relationships in Confucianism.  
 
Bonnie Glaser (CSIS) echoes such a sentiment and warns about prospective strategic 
clashes: 
  
I think that the U.S. and China have a set of interests that we share, and we have 
another set that potentially clash, and there is a potential relationship to drift towards 
greater strategic competition, especially in the Asia Pacific region. And I think that 
leaders in both countries recognise this and there are efforts to divert that outcome. 
But there are areas where we do share common interests and seeking together. And 
there are areas with common interests but where our approaches are different. (035-
QR).
822
  
 
The above reflects that the end-points on the various continuums vary. 
 
As far as the ‘continuation (of interdependency)’ sub-group, Garrett (Atlantic 
Council) warns that the end point might be a zero-sum game if cooperation cannot be 
achieved at the strategic level (025-Y).
823
 Romberg (Stimson Center) draws attention 
towards continuation in U.S. foreign relations towards China since Nixon (026-Z).
824
 
Sherraden (New America Foundation) utters that: “there is no epic debate, but issue 
driven; I don’t see a big ideological divide, compared to foreign policies in the 
                                                          
821 Interview Kevin Tu (Carnegie), 6 July 2011 (033-MN) (recording: 42 min). 
822 Interview Glaser (recording: 00:55).  
823 Interview Lohman, and Garrett (recordings: 2 min & 57:03 min respectively). 
824 Interview Romberg (recording: 16 min). 
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Middle-East which is more controversial. There are disagreements with handling the 
relationship and the economy and what policies are working, but not as polarised“ 
(003-C).
825
  
 
Levy (AEI) points out that there has been remarkable amount of continuity between 
the Bush and Obama administrations as opposed to popular belief and/or 
expectations: 
 
I think they tried to distinguish themselves a little bit early on, and did not work very 
well – to deemphasising human rights, which got a backlash. I think a lot of this 
policy, because we are a democracy with different branches of government, this 
policy get shaped by political forces in the U.S. For example, if you say we are not 
going to care that much about human rights it seemed Clinton tried to say in the 
beginning, you will have backlash from important groups who would be quite 
unhappy with that statement (007-G).
826
  
 
He continues by explicating the constraints on continuation dialectic to the domestic 
political situation:  
 
But in the same way, you also when got a shift in the political scene, there are 
differences in behaviour. For example we have seen in the last 5-6 months in the last 
congress with a democrat majority there was much more openness to do anti-China 
currency legislation. With the new leadership, especially the new Mean committee it 
did not want to push legislation like that. What that meant, Obama was free to 
pursue a more sensible line of diplomacy which I think the Bush administration very 
much would like to pursue, by which I mean a line of diplomacy important to the 
business community, i.e. commercial diplomacy, where you have a reasonable 
chance of success as opposed to slamming your shoe in the table and say you must 
care about the currency issue, it did not work very well. The trick was, they had to 
do this, both Bush and Obama – the only way to hold off people in Congress who 
otherwise would do something even more damaging. What did you see, in January, 
Presidents Hu and Obama could focus on things like indigenous policy in China, 
and you saw that actually, at least in terms of verbal commitments, much more 
successful than we saw under currency issues. Sure, you could say that was a 
dramatic change of Obama administration has made, yes, but Bush would have done 
                                                          
825 Interview Sherradan, recording: 24 min. 
826 Interview Lohman (Heritage), recording: 32 min. 
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so too if they felt they had the political situation under control and could do it. (007-
G).
827
  
 
Hersh (CAP) agrees with the continuity thesis, but points out that Bush walked away 
from openness processes such as the strategic economic dialogue and the Joint 
Committee on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) (010-J).828 Lohman (Heritage) concurs 
also with the continuation nature of the relationship – which he perceives as 
‘artificial’ (due to American policy makers confusing dialogue with being a 
relationship) – but not only construed on similarities and agreements (021-U):829  
 
(…) it is important to note, first of all that is OK, it is OK to have a relationship 
defined by more differences than agreement. You just have to be honest about it, 
means that the relationship is bumpy and that is OK. It is how you got to work 
thought it, we cannot agree on everything, we are not going to agree on everything. 
We cannot, like Taiwan we are not going to agree, you know like Tibet, we already 
accept in the U.S. Tibet as part of China, but that is as far as we get; we are not 
going to agree that Dalai Lama is an evil Buddhist and all of that sort of stuff – 
South China Sea; we are not going to accept that claims in the South China Sea, we 
are not going to accept its assurance American naval forces, just like that. Also 
worth noting that there is a continuity in U.S.’ China policy that is still operable for 
40 years basically a continuous evolution and definitely held between the Bush 
administration and the Obama administration (…) it does not need to be that better, 
under the circumstances it is as good as it can be. (021-U).
830
  
 
Levy continues by identifying that China cannot be seen to give in on – and why 
would they.
831
 Hathaway (Wilson Center) contextualises the notion of continuity – it 
is not a rocky train-ride that necessarily can ensue without implication or indefinitely 
(016-P): 
 
Well, I start out by saying that for the next 50 years or so it will be the single most 
important bilateral relationship in the world. So I start out from the presupposition 
                                                          
827 Interview Lohman (Heritage), recording: 32 min. 
828 Interview Hersh, recording: 34:25 min. Brooking’s Kenneth Lieberthal championed, albeit unsuccessfully, for 
two meetings per year. 
829 Interview with Walter Lohman (Heritage), 21 June 2011 (021-U) (recording: 2:31). 
830 Interview Lohman, recording: 05:08.  
831 Interview Levy. 
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that this assumption is very important. Not an easy relationship, we will continue to 
disagree with the Chinese on fundamental questions; basic values divide, the two 
countries, and to a lesser extent the two peoples, the challenges on both sides I think 
is, finding a way despite our many differences, finding a way to get this relationship 
to work, to keep disagreements and differences from spilling into contaminating the 
entire relationship, challenge for statesmen on both side is to compartmentalise 
differences, so that in other areas we can forge working relationships. Won’t be 
close as long as I am alive, not close, not partnership, won’t be an alliance, but 
neither is it destined to be hostile. At this point, differences and disagreements get 
more attention than the places where our interests convergence. But I think on the 
many issues of global communities have to deal with in the coming century: if the 
U.S. and China cannot find a way to work together, then the entire world will 
suffer.
832
 
 
Limaye (EastWest Center) expresses that the relationship has been difficult but now 
experiencing “calmer waters”.833 Garrett (Atlantic Council) follows the maritime 
analogy, and reiterates his stances from his own policy-articles (025-Y):  
 
(…) government to government – I think there is actually a great deal of cooperation 
on a lot of issues; environment energy issues, huge amount of ties, probably nobody 
knows in the U.S. government who knows in one place all the different ties that are 
going on. I know there have been efforts to find the number of agreements with 
China, but you get different numbers where no one could actually figure it out, 
tremendous amount of cooperation, even on things like terrorism and proliferation 
but quiet and not publicised, economic environment, energy those kinds of issues. 
What gets all the attention is differences; Clinton and Gates being nervous of 
China’s activities in the South China Sea and if any differences over human rights, 
China’s intentions of dissidents – the usual set of bilateral issues that normal 
becomes public issues. There are a lot of differences on a lot of questions, certainly 
on indigenous innovation, economic realm, business realm, RMB issue albeit fading 
because appreciating it was not as important to our economic future as portrayed of 
those people making a deal of it. What I am saying there is a narrative of an 
intensive relationship on rising power, established hegemon, inevitable conflict, you 
hear this over and over again, a recognised industry of strategists on China threat, 
military build-up, cyber war all these other things but not necessarily giving you 
whole picture of what this relationship is. (025-Y).
834
  
 
Cropsey (Hudson) highlights that what comes across as what Croft refers to as the 
meta-narrative, of strategic competition,
835
 is inversely held by a few (012-L):  
                                                          
832 Interview Hathaway, op.cit. (recording: 5 min). 
833 Interview Limaye, op.cit. 
834 Interview Garrett (Atlantic Council), op.cit. (recording: 01:05). 
835 See Croft 2006, Culture, Crisis and America’s War on Terror, op.cit. 73. 
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(…) ultimately what matters, is maintaining stability in the economic relations. I 
think the Chinese see all of that, and I think they see something else too – strategic 
competition. That is not seen here. Talk to a Congressman, you find only a handful 
of them thinking about strategic elements of the relationship between the two 
countries, the rest of them don’t think about China. Or if they do, they’d come up 
with the economic notion. And, I don’t, it would be very hard press to find an 
American policy maker at senior level or an elected official who has given a lot of 
thought to economic relations that we count on for borrowing and buying cheap 
goods, could collapse because China could collapse. Again nothing I predict, not 
even sure I think it will happen, but an opportunity, but not part of our policy 
makers’ calculations what will happen, what it would do with the region, the U.S. 
economically, to the world economically, not part of the way we think.
836
 
 
In other words, as exemplified above, there is a “narrative about the meta-narrative”, 
which is that the manifestation of the “grand-thinking” into common-sense has not 
been collectively adopted – but rather an internalisation by the majority of a 
narrative of the few. Building on Croft’s conceptualisation juxtapositioned with the 
empirical discovery above – I coin the term of ‘deflective meta-narrative’.837 As 
policy-researchers across the ideological spectrum expressed in preceding 
paragraphs, the mechanisms (i.e. deflection) relate to sensationalist media and 
intensified political campaigns.
838
 As Keith Crane (RAND) soberly puts it: “US-Sino 
relations are overblown with critical junctions. It is just a bit fractured” (029-EF).839  
 
The above has a resemblance with Bourdieu’s symbolic power840 – therein a 
disproportional amount of symbolic power is held by what several interviewees refer 
                                                          
836 Interview Cropsey, recording: 11:10 min. 
837 The notion of “internalisation by the majority of a narrative of the few” (i.e. ‘deflective meta-narrative’) can be 
exemplified by the performativity of the type of a meta-narrative as described by Croft.  However, in terms of the 
‘deflective meta-narrative’, its subscription, however, is weak. Thus, in simple terms, something (‘descriptive’) 
has led to a particular narrative being perceived unwarrantedly as a mainstream narrative that the majority would 
have adopted. 
838 See interviews with Levy (AEI), Garrett (Atlantic Council), and Hersh (CAP). 
839 Interview Keith Crane (RAND), 29 June 2011 (029-F) (recording: 20:32). 
840 See Sallaz, JJ & Zavisca, J 2007, op.cit.; Pierre Bourdieu, In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive 
Sociology (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990a), 111. 
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to as the hawkish strategic realists around town.
841
 Methodologically speaking, 
cross-tabulation shows that the different analyses and predictions are varying 
diminutively when it comes to previous government experience or not. I argue that 
pertinent boundary-markers for this cluster are: ‘holistic competition’ (as opposed to 
strategic competition), ‘stable’, ‘free-rider’, ‘non-state level’ (IR), and 
‘continuation’. 
 
5.4.8 The triangular ‘decline-rise consensus’ – Cluster 8 
This collection of narratives interfaces with the debate concerning the notion of a 
declining America.
842
 Swartz (AEI) paints the strong belief in the primacy of 
American power as a conservative ontological (fixed) notion and acknowledged 
China’s rise, but “I don’t necessarily take it to the next step being paranoid 
concerning what is China going to do” as his response to an overblown China-threat 
school (017-Q). 843 Pieter Bottelier (Carnegie)
844
, states that the U.S.-model is 
experiencing a “kick in the side”: 
 
(…) there is no question, in every way you look at it, U.S. power is in relative 
decline, no question, and China’s power is in relative ascendency. We don’t have to 
wait for China to become the largest economy for that reality to sink in. In many 
ways, China is already the largest player in the global economy. Not because it is the 
largest economy – it is not – but because it is the most rapidly growing large 
economy, and therefore on the margins in terms of incremental purchases by China 
in the commodity markets, it completely outclass the U.S. China is by far the biggest 
player in the commodity market, even though the U.S. has a larger economy but not 
growing much. If you get an economy of 5 trillion, China is almost 6, growing at 
7,8-9% you see on the margin, it is a much greater factor for change (…) The U.S. is 
                                                          
841 For example, Garrett, op.cit.; Levenstein, op.cit. 
842 And interfaces with earlier clusters of narratives; Washington consensus and non-zero sum. 
843 Interview Swartz, op.cit. (recording: 5 min). 
844 He works full-time at John Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), which is 
also recognised as a think tank in addition to being part of a leading University with an international reputation of 
excellence. 
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not declining, not in absolute sense, might happen at some stage, but relatively, 
unquestionably the case. (038-WX).
845
 
 
Ed Paisly (Center for American Progress), a former finance journalist, has a different 
and intriguing reading of ‘decline’ – to appreciate both the American and the 
Chinese decline, as the bigger threat to the former in relation to China (034-OP):
846
 
 
(…) talking about my concept of managing China’s decline over the next 30 years is 
predicated on: one, the U.S. is not in decline, U.S. is innovative, powerful, we 
always have problems, but our system and economy is huge; we have 50 different 
regional economies, we are so above everybody else in the matter which we evolve. 
The idea that China is a threat to us?! Over the long term, nonsense, that is an 
important, that is something I have realised when coming back to Asia. I covered 
finance here before I left for Asia, only briefly, when coming back I discovered this 
place is power. Two, China, the reason I say we have to manage their decline, is 
because sure China has demographic problems, economic growth, environmental, 
health problems and they are all huge, they don’t really have a system to manage 
those problems. America can do worse, or can cause more problems if pushing them 
on all these stuff when they cannot solve it. Politically you do it in the U.S., to make 
noise, so it does not look like you have given up on American workers or the plants. 
That’s what I mean by managing expectations, here pushing China to what they 
have to do and helping them. You don’t want China to have a hard landing; you 
want China to have a soft, gradual landing where all things get resolved to the extent 
they can have democratic changes, that is what ultimately will happen. And I mean 
it. (034-OP).
847
 
 
Lohman (Heritage) does not dismiss that there might be some substance in the 
“China-threat” notion relating to uncertainties in what American policy-makers 
really know about what China’s rise really entails, and that misunderstandings of 
U.S. decline (which he contest) and miscalculations result in a real potential for 
conflicts (but not inevitably) (021-U).848 
 
                                                          
845 Interview Pieter Bottelier (JHU and Carnegie), 13 July 2011 (038-WX) (recording: 26 min and 33.40). 
846 Interview Ed Paisly (CAP), 7 July 2011 (recording: 37 min).  
847 Interview Paisly, ibid. (recording: 42:49). 
848 Interview Lohman, op.cit. (recording: 28:30 & 33:00 min). 
272 
 
Further denunciation of a declining America can be found with Rehman (GMF) who 
points out the keenness in the Asian region for keeping U.S. military presence and 
commitment. He identifies the rationale to relate to increasing concerns with a rising 
China and the prospect of a power-vacuum if the U.S. was to withdraw or continue 
to decline. Rehman does not trace any Cold-War style containment (yet) but does not 
dismiss the notion of a regional containment / a balancing U.S., which may lead to a 
more traditional 19
th
 century state-to-state relations (023-W).849 Romberg (Stimson 
Center) finds, however, that the U.S. is not being in decline despite facing many 
problems. He does not see the transition of China overtaking the U.S. on the world-
stage, and signals clearly that keeping American forces in the South-China Sea 
(which China otherwise endeavours to push them out from) – and possible partly a 
hedging strategy – indeed serves China’s own interests in terms of avoiding 
undesirable consequences if the U.S. pulled out (for example, what would ensue with 
Taiwan, or instability on the Korean peninsula). He draws attention towards the need 
for cooperation (026-Z).
850
 
 
Across the interviews, there is no belief in an absolute decline of America – for 
example Crane (RAND), Romberg (Stimson Center), and Rehman (GMF) who point 
out the U.S.’ comeback after recession and an effective military851  – but a relative 
decline of various degrees, is in general agreed on across the policy-researchers. Not 
surprisingly, there is no denial of Chinese growth and a rising China. The 
conceptualisation of what the latter notion entails, however, is associated with 
different predictions, and tends to be discussed in a short-term perspective and not in 
                                                          
849 Interview Iskander Rehman (GMF) (023-W) (recording: 18:24). 
850 Interview Romberg, op.cit. (recording: 16 min). 
851 Interview with Keith Crane (RAND) 029-EF (recording: 14:35); Interview Romberg, ibid., (recording: 28 min); 
Interview Rehman (023-W) (recording) 29 min). 
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much depth. In concert, there is an overall concern with managing the relationship 
regardless. Furthermore, collectively, the policy-researchers seem to paint a strategic 
landscape in Asia/South-China Sea of a free-riding, sought-after stakeholder China 
who perceives the U.S. to employ a “containment-grand strategy”, which Beijing 
also appreciates for serving their own national interests in the region. This potential 
advantage for China resemblance what I pinpointed earlier in this chapter: the hard-
line on China might be an expression of the politicisation and strategising in US 
domestic politics, just as it gives political capital in China to show capabilities and 
attitudes to not give in under American pressure.
852
  
 
Boundary-markers for this cluster are comprised of: ‘China rise’, ‘U.S. relative 
decline’, ‘free-rider’ (China), ‘short-term’, ‘managing uncertainties’, 
‘interdependency’ – and secondary ‘managing China’s decline’.853 
 
5.4.9 ‘Post-bilateral (ontological/epistemological) narratives’ – Cluster 9 
The final cluster deals with narratives which move beyond the bilateral trajectory of 
U.S. relationship with China. Post-bilateral, in this context, is not an ontological 
statement of the demise and repudiation of bilateralism in the international system – 
but rather that explanatory sources and impact on a relationship between two 
countries cannot be understood within the bilateral trajectory only. This finding is 
relational to the sensemaking of the preceding cluster-narratives, herein the detection 
of a predominant notion of constraining the ontological lenses during analysis to 
bilateralism. 
 
                                                          
852 Similar thoughts were relayed in the interview with Levy, op.cit. (recording: 02:31 min). 
853 See discussion-section (this Chapter) in regard to different strengths/salience of boundary-markers. 
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Paal (Carnegie) elucidates, as a rare type of narrative in my ‘total universe of data’, 
that the status-quo status between the U.S. and China will depend on “interaction 
with other states” which excludes the conventional realist view on classical power-
transition theory (022-V).
854
 Tønnesson (USIP) represents a view taking into account 
Chinese domestic variables, personalities, and problem-agenda. He also points out 
the unused opportunities for China to talk frankly with President Obama, as he is 
approachable and willing to listen (009-I).
855
 Feffer (IPS) moves beyond the bilateral 
trajectory to look within the U.S. in relation the notion of China-threat, which is also 
one of the few accounts of scrutinising and critical self-reflections:  
 
Well, my own perspective is that the U.S. challenges U.S. core values more 
frequently than what China challenge U.S. core values [long laughter]. We 
undermine our own state of values when we, you know, occupy other countries and 
we support autocrats in the Middle-East. And then we complain when about China 
does the same thing, we say “they don’t respect democracy by standing with 
Mugabe in Zimbabwe”. Well that is true. I mean it is absolutely true. But what about 
us?! We stand with autocrats. But China makes no bones about it, at least China is 
not hypocritical. China never not says that standing with democrats [laughter]. So, I 
don’t really see a future where China challenges our core values. What I see that the 
U.S. actually, unless changes foreign policy significantly, the U.S. will more and 
more challenges own values overseas because of an inability to (long pause) prepare 
for what will be a profound  transformation of the international scene; structurally, 
economically, and because we’re kind of behind, we’re not in front of change, not 
along but behind this change,  we will be forced into positions that we will support 
things for pragmatic reasons, but they will be anti-ethical to our stated values, and 
that’s going to be too bad. (013-M).856  
 
Feffer continues on specific military threats from China – also beyond a bilateral-
only perspective:  
 
I don’t see them challenging the U.S. military. The major challenge for China rather 
is what a multipolar system means for China. Generally speaking, China has 
preferred bilateral relations. If you look at the South China Sea, it does not want to 
do things in a regional framework, realised it has a better chance to secure own 
                                                          
854 Interview Douglas Paal (Carnegie), (022-V) (recording: 09:59). 
855 Interview Stein Tønnesson (USIP/PRIO), 25 May 2011 (009-I) (recording: 01.17.0). 
856 Interview Feffer (IPS), op.cit. (recording: 47:24). 
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national interests within bilateral relations. How China will deal with that 
internationally is another question – it won’t be able to do, it can’t apply that model 
from the South China Sea globally, it simply can’t guarantee the stability on a global 
level, that it needs for its own economic growth, simply through bilateral relations. 
So China have to, I think they are already rethinking about this, China has to change 
how it looks at regional institutions and international institutions – and that will be 
the fundamental change for China. Not so much for the United States, in some ways 
the U.S. has been a blessing for China, to the extent it has provided a degree of 
stability for China and (…) an advantage to China, to the extent that the U.S. dealt 
with Afghanistan, meddling in Pakistan, meddling in south China, meddling it the 
Middle-East (…) when the U.S. is no longer able to do that, not economically able 
to do that. China needs to ask a major question if absence of the U.S. what can 
China do for stability, required a re-think of relationship with institutions. (013-
M).
857
 
 
Tu (Carnegie) talked earlier about the declining credibility of the U.S. model, and the 
above, also indicates that there are actually two models being revised – including 
that of China regional versus national level of engagement.
858
 Garrett (Atlantic 
Council) flips the debate about decline and threat on its head
859
  towards U.S. 
managing its own decline. He points out that although China’s rise poses problems 
for the U.S., the need for cooperation (making use of the conflict situation in 2008 as 
an example) and interdependence (global recession where both countries suffer) 
prevail. “…if we fail, that the biggest threat to China, the biggest challenge is if we 
fail”, and further points out that realists in town do not always appreciate that it is a 
different type of environment than bipolarity with Soviet Union during the Cold War 
(025-Y).860 
 
Garrett redirects focus to global trends beyond the bilateral trajectory: 
                                         
(…) change happens. What China experts don’t know diddle about and strategist 
pay no attention to is technology? Technology totally transforms the world. Just 
look what has happened the last 20 year, and the pace it has accelerated. You want 
                                                          
857 Interview Feffer (IPS) ibid. (recording: 51:05). 
858 Interview Tu (Carnegie), op.cit. 
859 Similar to Paisley’s (Center for American Progress) highlighting of the necessity of managing China’s decline 
(see cluster 8; ‘Triangular decline-rise consensus’ narrative). 
860 Interview, Garrett, op.cit. (recordings: 05:23 and 04:00).  
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to predict what 20 years from now will look like and what that means for economy 
and geopolitics and all of that? That’s a pretty tough ting. Like 3-D printing, how 
many in foreign policy have a clue about that, it can transform the world 
dramatically, it can undermine supply chains, it can undermine China as an export 
platform. You can print out an iPhone in DC instead of making 10 million in China 
and shipped here. Had a workshop on this but foreign policy people had never heard 
of it, it can be to the material word what the PC has been for the information word 
(…) China experts don’t look at that or strategists don’t bring this into their calculus, 
we need much broader foreign policy. Look at internet in 1995, unimaginable that 
we would all operate on platforms. But, it has only been 15 years (…) what matters 
is not to predict, but have foresight about the world and how U.S.-Sino relationships 
will have to deal with inevitable changes” (025-Y).861 
 
Garrett also illuminates that real threats (as opposed to conventional bilateral issues) 
relates to climate change, which tends to be overlooked by strategists in discourses 
on conventional U.S.-Sino relationship (025-Y).
862
 His vigorous critique also 
extends to IR realists as explanatory framework – as an ontological and paradigmatic 
“tunnel-vision” (025-Y).863 
 
Suggested boundary-markers for this cluster of narratives are ‘non-military China-
threat’, ‘free-rider’, ‘interdependent’, ‘cooperation’, ‘long-term’, and ‘non-bilateral’. 
The post-bilateral lenses are also inherently a critique of assumptions of the primacy 
of strategic competition, state-to-state relations, in addition to the limits of 
knowledge-production and worldviews which are materialising within the 
parameters of bilateralism and paradigmatic ‘school of thoughts’. 
 
5.5 Discussion of key findings, overarching argument, and proposed 
contributions 
In the previous section, I presented selected empirical data (narratives) as thematic 
clusters relating to perceptions of ‘China’ within the context of U.S.-Sino relations, 
                                                          
861 Garrett, ibid. (recording: 01:03:34).  
862 Garrett, op.cit (recording: 55 min). 
863 Garrett, op.cit. (recording: 33.33 min). 
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which serves as the discursive frame of the chapter. In the present section, the 
analysis of the empirical foundation seeks to achieve the following tasks: to identify 
and summarise key findings through juxtaposing this aforesaid discursive frame with 
subjectively selected literatures. Additionally, I will develop an overarching main 
argument (i.e. void of ‘internationality’): encompassing the investigatory scope of 
this chapter in its entirety, making sense of linkages to the Bourdieusian theoretical 
framework of this thesis. Finally, proposed contributions, originality, and novelty, 
will be outlined. 
 
5.5.1 Discussion of key findings 
I will be identifying ten key findings pertinent to the current chapter (derived from 
the analysis). The findings have been established on the basis of juxtapositioning 
data with various bodies of subjectively selected literatures. As far as key findings 
are concerned, I shall commence with the two identified in the section regarding self-
reflexivity. First, in relation to self-reflexivity, one finding shows the importance of 
carrying out a self-reflexive deliberation in order to enhance transparency, internal 
validity, and reliability of the research process as well as credibility and 
trustworthiness of the research product.
864
 In practical terms, it becomes a 
triangulation method,
865
 which accommodates for scrutinising the analysis and 
arguments made on my part as part of a subjective and interpretivist research 
undertaking. Second, I identified a somewhat lack of self-reflexive thinking amongst 
the policy-researchers in their imparted narratives: to question their own assumptions 
                                                          
864 See Rudolf R. Sinkovics, Elfriede Penz & Pervez N. Ghauri, "Enhancing the Trustworthiness of Qualitative 
Research in International Business," Management International Review 48:6 (2008): 689-714. 
865 See Brewer 2000, op.cit.; Julie Wolfram Cox, “Triangulation,” in The Sage dictionary of qualitative 
management research, eds. Richard Thorpe & Robin Holt (London: Sage Publications, 2008), 222-224; Robert 
K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (London: Sage, 2003). 
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was, generally speaking, not evidently part of their narratives.
866
 In effect, it shows 
the high relevance of engaging with a Bourdieusian outlook on reflexivity in this 
regard, as a possible vehicle for exploring new avenues of intellectual inquiry into 
tacit boundaries of knowledge-production and the American Self as identity-
construction.
867
 
 
The ensuing key findings relate to narratives as a method.
868
 In my study, 
nonetheless, I have utilised the imparted narratives as the empirical foundation, 
herein as ‘cultural sites’ for sensemaking of ‘social reality’ as well as ‘discursive 
speech acts’.869 Thus, third, based on my interpretive/ethnographic contents analysis 
of the narratives,
870
 it was also revealed the necessity, and relevance, to engage with 
narratives as conceptual boundary-production in two layers. This structure of 
narrative (as interviewing and method) is hardly addressed in the methodology 
literature – which focuses more on the processes of understanding, conceptualising, 
structuring, and analysing narratives (as well as conducting them).
871
 When 
approaching narratives as/with conceptual boundaries (of the aforementioned 
‘cultural site’) presents an opportunity, additionally, to also direct focus towards the 
                                                          
866 I cannot with certainty, of course, claim if this is always the case (for example, outside the interview-situation). 
However, I detected the same trend at think tank seminars and publications produced by policy-researchers. 
867 See particularly the finding relating to the void of ‘internationality’ (subsequent sub-section). See Elliot G. 
Mishler, Storylines: Craftartists’ narratives of identity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004). 
868 See Barbara Czarniawska, Narratives in Social Science Research (London: SAGE Publications, 2004); 
Catherine K. Riessman, Narrative Methods for the Human Sciences (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications 2007). 
869 Molly Patterson & Kristen R. Monroe, "Narrative in Political Science," Annual Review of Political Science 1(1) 
(1998): 315-331. 
870 See Aaron C. Ahuvia, "Traditional, Interpretive, and Reception based Content Analyses: Improving the Ability 
of Content Analysis to Address Issues of Pragmatic and Theoretical Concern," Social Indicators Research 54:2 
(2001): 139-172. 
871 See Czarniawska 2004, op.cit., for an example. 
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boundary-markers rather than only the actual contents and/or the mere difference 
between the narrative accounts.
872
  
 
In the context of the policy-researchers, it became evident that the uttered contents 
can be placed in one layer as far as the “grammatical structure” of narratives is 
concerned, but that it exists as an intersectional layer of motivation inherent in the 
narrative. One the one hand, there is the actual content, and on the other – the form 
of narrative due to the nature of the boundary-markers. More specifically to this 
research study, the identified thematic clusters (one and two) of ‘non-foreign policy’, 
and ‘multi-layered’ do not only relate to the contents of the imparted narratives – but 
also to specific forms of narratives, as dictated by the nature of boundary-markers.  
 
The form, I am arguing, relates to Bourdieu’s conceptual “thinking tools” of 
‘interests’ and ‘strategising’,873 where the form of narratives is intricately linked to 
their sense of Self and constructed identity as an organisation and as experts.
874
 This 
illustrates the importance of also grasping the ‘social field’ they are strategising 
from/within. This elucidates the importance of the dialectic engagement with the 
‘social field’ (established in the preceding Chapter 4), as well as the relevance for 
employing a sociological meso-level inquiry
875
 and the relationality between 
Bourdieu’s conceptual “thinking tools”.876  
 
                                                          
872 See Lamont & Molnar 2002, op.cit. 167-195. I am also borrowing from (culture) Barth, Ethnic Groups and 
Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1971); Lauring & 
Guttormsen 2012, op.cit. 
873 See Williams 2007, op.cit. 
874 See Mishler 2004, op.cit.; Martine C. Gertsen & Anne-Marie Søderberg, “Expatriate stories about cultural 
encounters – A narrative approach to cultural learning processes in multinational companies,” Scandinavian 
Journal of Management 26:3 (2010): 248–257. 
875 See John G. Bruhn & Howard M. Rebach 2007, op.cit. 115-145. 
876 David L. Swartz 2008, op.cit. 45-52. 
280 
 
For example, NED, WRI, USIP, and the Wilson Center all share the boundary-
marker of having China as a theme and the ‘non-ideologised’ marker. Furthermore, 
NED and WRI also share the boundary-markers of ‘non-foreign policy’ but being 
active in advocacy work. USIP shares the latter with the other above-mentioned 
think tanks but not the former, whereas Wilson does foreign policy (academic 
analysis) but not advocacy. These boundary-markers reflect the identity of the think 
tanks, and are derived from interests and strategies in this regard. This, again, 
highlights the importance of relationality (being ‘non-ideologised’ depends on other 
think tanks being ideologised – for example, The Heritage Foundation or Cato 
Institute), in addition to grasping meaning-construction due to ‘advocacy’ and 
‘ideologised’ takes on different meanings (such as creating change on the ground in 
other countries (USIP) versus the Wilson Center which is not exercising advocacy 
because they are involved in foreign academic policy analysis (self-perception). The 
latter also showcases how a continuum between ‘non-advocacy’ to ‘advocacy’ is not 
empirically credible, as well as the role of underlying interests and strategies are 
either self-constructed (Wilson – not being a think tank due to the label of 
‘academic’) or dictated to them (for example, USIP due to being funded and 
mandated by the U.S. Congress). The ‘non-ideologised’ marker can also, of course, 
be debated: for example, some might argue that efforts in democratising other 
geographical areas abroad reflect an American “ideologically biased” fundament 
within the NED or USIP (which, if the case, not necessarily is less valuable for the 
recipient!).
877
  
 
                                                          
877 I have in the preceding chapter noted that the prevailing boundary-marker for Norwegian think tanks is 
‘academic research’ – which is also strongly echoed in other Nordic countries (I am less familiar with Iceland, I 
should mention). It would be pertinent to conduct further research into identity-construction of think tanks based 
on deploying boundary-construction as a theoretical framework, especially in a cross-national comparison. 
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Another facet relating to narratives as a method constitutes the fourth key finding. 
The discursive frame illuminates that narratives of particular policy-researchers can 
be placed in various thematic clusters. This reflects the empirical, ontological, and 
epistemological appropriateness to assume that narratives are ‘multi-layered’ due to 
intersectionality between the thematic clusters (connected thematically and/or by 
sharing boundary-markers). The usage of the latter shows how boundary-markers, I 
argue, can serve as a particular helpful operationalised tool beyond as a mere 
heuristic device, in order to discuss and illustrate relationships between different 
boundaries.
878
 
 
The fifth key finding relates to my coined term; the ‘post-Cold War generation’ of 
policy-researchers.
879
 It denotes the division often highlighted by the younger 
interviewees themselves relating to, in their eyes, two interrelated aspects: being 
younger (the approximate 20-32 years age bracket) than the more established 
generation of scholars whose formative years in terms of academic education and 
professional development did not transpire until after the demise of the Cold-War 
strategic environment. In addition, the majority of the younger generation has 
studied and lived in China, speaks Mandarin – and collectively articulates a 
“generation-gap” with the older generation (45 years and above age bracket). This 
division is further substantiated when cross-tabulating the relevant policy-
researchers’ background information with relayed narratives.880 I argue this division 
                                                          
878 Again, I am borrowing here from Lamont and Molnar 2002, op. cit.; Barth 1971, op.cit.; and Lauring and 
Guttormsen 2010, op.cit. 
879 This is applicable to the context of U.S. think tanks and American politics. 
880 I am not presenting this in a deterministic sense, but as anecdotal evidence at the least. There are noticeable 
exceptions such as area specialists and speakers of Mandarin – for example, David Shambaugh, those with 
extensive travel experience Garrett Banning (Atlantic Council), and conversational skills (Dan Blumenthal, AEI). 
On a self-reflexive, and personal, note, the concern with language and cultural proximity became much clearer to 
me during my stay in DC, which included experiencing 22 July 2011 – when 77 people were killed in the 2011 
terrorist bombing in Oslo down-town and subsequent shooting rampage on Utøya island. As a Norwegian, 
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is significant and I envisage major implications on the policy-analysis – and thus 
policy-advice – in future.881 This key-finding further supports my announcement of a 
third ‘school of analyses in the specialised think tank literature (elevating and 
focusing on the thinking and conceptualising of policy-researchers). 
 
With the next set of key findings, I am focusing on the IR and Political Science 
disciplines. Sixth, albeit the narratives are dynamic, multifaceted, multi-layered, and 
featuring somewhat different outlooks on the status-quo as far as U.S.-Sino 
relationship is concerned, overall the imparted narratives reflects a fairly unison and 
non-contradictory view on the relationship dynamics between the two countries. 
Such perspective remains intact although after turbulent periods with high-level 
clashes in 2001 and 2010 on a number of national security issues. However, these 
events are taken as smaller cycles within the overall notion of ‘stability’ and 
‘continuity’.882 This supports the argued similar approach to China traversing the 
three recent presidencies from the mid-1990s – the internationalist Bill Clinton 
(strategic engagement)
883
 with a precursor back to President Nixon’s “engagement 
policies”,884 the isolationist George W. Bush, and the incumbent Barack Obama – 
who proclaimed a stronger focus on international cooperation and addressed China 
                                                                                                                                                                    
gripped to my laptop desperately hounding for updates in national and international media – it was perturbing to 
experience that only after approx. 2-3 min, international media was clearly surpassed in the analysis and 
comprehending of the situation and/or context, compared to Norwegian media. I believe that Fox News reported 
about an “Islamic terrorist” long after it had been established that was not the case. This is also a start and 
important reminder to myself relating to “what do I really understand” when watching international media 
coverage of, for example, a conflict in a country that I do not know well and/or do not speak their language. 
881 Romberg (Stimson) is impressed with the young generation of policy-researchers, op.cit. (recording: 47 min). 
882 See interviews. 
883 Jing-Dong Yuan, “Friend or Foe? The Bush administration and U.S. China Policy in Transition,” East Asian 
Review 15:3 (2003): 39-64; see J.T. Mathews and D.H. Paal, “U.S.-China Relationship After Bush,” Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace (available: http://carnegieendowment.org/2008/11/10/u.s.-china-relationship-
after-bush/3jqi). 
884 Alastair I. Johnston & Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: the management of an emerging power 
(London: Routledge, 1999). 
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as “not a friend, but a strategic ally”.885 Paradoxically, President Bush Jr. and 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice were recognised with “getting China right” and 
their engagement-policies accordingly
886
 – what Roy described as a “late 
honeymoon”.887 
 
Many an eminent scholar has analysed and depicted the U.S.-Sino relationship by 
devising a metaphor
888
 as well as typologised the relationship with introducing a new 
term or phrase.
889
 My epistemological commitment lies with showcasing the 
empirical foundation of policy-researchers’ utterances rather than becoming “yet 
another U.S.-Sino scholar” – a label which recently has been negatively associated 
with “something everybody does”.890 The finding, however, relates more to the 
support of both political and academic analysis – which is easily dwarfed by the 
more negative impressions on ‘China’ and her relationship with the U.S., for 
example in the 2010 U.S. mid-election time and in the media.
891
 
 
My initial aim was to propose my own metaphor. However, the focus on elucidating 
the think tank narrative in their own right leads me to focus on imparting such ‘social 
                                                          
885 Bloomberg Television Hong Kong, 2008. 
886 For example, interview Hathaway, op.cit. 
887 Dennis Roy, “A Late Honeymoon for Bush and China: Enjoy It while It Lasts,” Asian Affairs 30:2 (2003): 79. 
888 Roy’s ‘honeymoon’ has been mentioned – others include Lampton’s “in same bed, different dreams” (David 
Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing United States–China Relations 1989-2000 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press). See Oliver Turner for review of images (Oliver Turner, “Sino-US relations then 
and now: Discourse, images, policy,” Political Perspectives 5:3 (2011): 27-45. 
889 Kissinger’s “Positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship” (Henry A. Kissinger, "The 
Future of U.S.-Chinese Relations Conflict Is a Choice, Not a Necessity," Foreign Affairs March/April (2012b); 
Sutter’s (2010) “Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present” (Robert Sutter, U.S.-Chinese relations: Perilous Pas, 
Pragmatic Present (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012); Shambaugh’s “rocky Foreign Policy” 
(David Shambaugh, "The Rocky Road Ahead in U.S.-China Relations," October 23, 2012. 
http://www.chinausfocus.com/. According to Ross 2008, ibid, however, U.S.’ approach to China is expressed in 
the dichotomy of ‘containment’ versus ‘engagement’. The former reflects preventing China’s growth to 
materialise into assuming power, whereas the latter relates to the U.S. making strategic adjustments in order to 
achieve a peaceful solution over conflicting interest, and to maintain a mutually beneficial East Asian order. 
890 Email correspondence 23 Sep 2011, Prof Shaun Breslin, University of Warwick. 
891 I shall discuss this more in detail in the following sub-section, where the overall thesis of ‘lacking 
internationality’ is developed. 
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reality’ and to avoid subjugating to the above tradition due to the essentialist and 
hypo-deductive nature of metaphors when utilised to reflect dynamic complexities. 
To understand the myriad of think tank perspectives are crucial, due to relations 
between the two countries are arguably the most significant bilateral relationship in 
the international system in the 21
st
 century, and exercises tremendous impact on 
world politics.
892
 Thus, in order to grasp future developments of the international 
system and how to achieve a peaceful coexistence between the current and the rising 
global power, it becomes paramount to obtain a rich, deep, and contextualised 
understanding of the nature of this transformation and fluid relationship.  
 
If I had to coin a metaphor, it would be a relationship of an ‘arranged marriage’893 – 
currently in couple counselling – or the earlier mentioned ‘older and younger 
brother’.894 I would rather list characteristics; continuation, interdependent, stable, 
lacking understanding (“growing pains”!), rising China/free-rider, managing 
uncertainty, and overall, identity-formation. This string of descriptors harmonises 
with Ross’ assessment:895  
 
U.S.’ relationship with China as a complex, interdependent, tapestry of short-and 
long-term interests and numerous trade-offs where Washington’s response depends 
on the perceived impact from China on U.S.’ immediate and long-term interests. 
 
The discursive frame devised in this Chapter also elucidates the issue with the 
tradition of operating with continuums as far as describing the nature of bilateral 
relationships. For example, Zhu noted that after the end of the Cold War, the U.S.-
                                                          
892 Alastair I. Johnston & Robert R. Ross 2007, op.cit.; Zhu 2006, op.cit. 
893 I am including ‘forced’ in order to acknowledge that many arranged marriages are indeed voluntary. 
894 I am not making any gender associations by using this metaphor. 
895 Robert R. Ross 2008, ‘Engagement in US China policy’, op.cit. 177. 
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Sino relationship has featured both ‘contention’ and ‘cooperation’.896 Walter 
Lohman (Heritage) expressed that he did not see the potential for retention although 
he saw looming dark skies ahead – simply because the “opposite” is not necessarily a 
valid option due to the arguably interdependence.
897
 I agree with such a notion, and I 
further argue that the “continuum-hype” reflects an empirically unsound and (too) 
structuralist thinking when it comes to dichotomised binaries and typologisation of a 
taxonomical nature. It is human nature to think in this way – oppositional binaries 
such as ‘good’ and ‘bad’. In U.S. strategic discourse (for example the 2006 National 
Security Strategy), the alleged mixture of containment and balancing and those being 
deployed differently in different policy-areas, there is a need for operating with 
multiple non-dichotomised binaries and continuums. It should also be highlighted 
that the interviewed policy-researchers, including those in conservative think tanks, 
are overall exhibiting a much more sober representation of aforesaid relationship, in 
comparison with the “hawkish” camps in Washington’s strategic discourses. 
 
Seventh, the notion of America being in decline is rejected outright. However, that 
American hegemony might not sustain its status as superpower for centuries to come 
and/or that there is a relative decline (as opposed to absolute, but then a natural 
consequence of the “natural demise” of a superpower) is widely shared.898 
Simultaneously, there is neither a prevailing disbelief that China is able to nor 
desires to compete for world hegemony and superpower status. Secretary Clinton’s 
notion of a ‘critical juncture’ in the relationship is not given much attention by the 
policy-researchers – rather some amusement because there is always a juncture and 
                                                          
896 A continuum purported by Zhu (2006:90), ibid. 
897 Interview with Lohman, op.cit. 
898 See “Debate: Is the United States of America in Decline?," Institute for Americas Studies, 
http://www.sas.ac.uk/videos-and-podcasts/politics-development-human-rights/debate-united-states-america-
decline. 
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it is “politics talk” due to “starting the relationship” every time when somebody 
entering office.
899
 I expected a much more aggressive line from the defence, military, 
and international security scholars, and from the conservative think tanks – however, 
after cross-tabulating data with the profiles of my respondents, this preconception is 
not credible. 
 
Eight, a blow to the IR realist camp relates to the elevated power-balance and power-
transition theories. There are few vastly contradictory narratives, such as China 
being a major threat
900
 and there will be a war – or not – or that the U.S.-Sino 
relationship is perfect or devastating. This reflects that across ideological/value 
bases, think tanks, professional affiliations, political convictions, gender, education 
and other socio-biological and background profiles – the viewpoints on China within 
the bilateral trajectory of U.S.-Sino relations are stable. Albeit being at times hyped 
of serious concerns with ramifications beyond the bilateral relationship more so than 
any other in the world (for any nation) – Samuel Sherraden (New America 
Foundation) points out that the relationship is not as polarised as in other domestic 
political issues such as universal health care, increasing levels of tax, or international 
conflicts such as the Israeli-Palestinian issue.
901
 The think tank narratives vary the 
                                                          
899 Interview with Paragh Khanna (New America Foundation), June 29, 2011 (027-AB). 
900 This is also frequently conceptualised as “China-threat”. The ‘China-threat’ is indeed a phenomenon where 
perception and identities are in the crossfire linked to China’s growing economic and military powers. Segal’s 
(1999) argument that the ‘China threat’ is exaggerated is a good example of how threat is equated with a static 
view on the distribution of military capabilities (Gerald Segal, "Does China Matter?," Foreign Affairs 78:5 (1999): 
24-36).  Furthermore, the ‘China-threat’ in the U.S. has been lurking from the end of the Cold-War, often as a 
“substitute” for not having the former Soviet Union as the “polarized enemy” (Zhu 2008, op.cit.). Only when the 
complexity of the U.S.-Sino relationship is understood, it can be effectively managed. Contemporary versions 
relate particularly to jobs manufacturing losses (last mid-term election) (interviews with Sherradan, op.cit.; Levy, 
op.cit.) and exaggerations (own admission) of China-threat itself (see Thomas Friedman on Fox News admits the 
overhyping of China, http://www.mrctv.org/public/checker.aspx?v=hdSUSU6U6U (n.d.). – recording: from 00:50 
min). 
901 Interview with Sherraden, op.cit. 
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most due to the focus of the individual expert – which is an important aspect, 
contemplating on the inevitable important issue of how influence is exercised.  
 
The U.S. has four principal contending policies for addressing the rise of China 
where the two extremes range from thwarting China’s pursuit of full power status 
and to bandwagon with China’s inevitable hegemony in East-Asia.902 The research 
agenda is deeply embedded with the realist school of thought, for example, ontology 
of realism such as anarchy, power balance, power, and the state as the main key 
player in the international system. Consistent with such notions, Zhu presents a new 
model of understanding power transition from the U.S. to China and securing a 
peaceful coexistence, and to better explain and predict such shift between global 
powers at regional and global levels.
903
 The development of power transition theories 
originated with Organski and Kugler, but the new model, however, is a multilevel 
analysis incorporating individual, societal, international and domestic levels.
904
 
Johnston and Ross conclude that states’ reaction to a rising power and the extent of 
how a rising power seeks engagement are the two dimensions which explain the 
choice of state strategies.
905
 But the mechanisms related to this decision-making and 
actual policy-making and implementation, as well as the “why’s”, appear to be little 
explored. 
 
With all the talk about the “U.S. model” and the “China model” an underlying 
criticism of mainstream realist power-theory, I would argue, relates also to the 
following: there is no model which can encapsulate or prescribe state’s behavior – 
                                                          
902 Ross, R.S. 1999, ‘Engagement in US China policy’, in A. Johnston & R.S. (eds), Engaging China: the 
management of an emerging power, Routledge, London, 181. 
903 Zhu, ibid. 167. 
904 A. F. K. Organski & Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University Press, 1980). 
905 Johnston and Ross 2008, op.cit. 273. 
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due to the dynamics of the U.S.-Sino relations in this given contexts, is 
unprecedented. Marginalised “ontological-tools” in realist thinking, such as learning, 
identity-formation, and intersubjectivity, are type of sources where richer 
explanations can be discovered.  
 
Furthermore, the analysis of Johnston and Ross,
906
 can also be linked to the disbelief 
in a declining America and China’s search for her international identity(ies), just as 
much they agree on the rising China. The IR realist camp has in decades 
promulgated the inevitable outcome of war.
907
 The empirical data presented here 
does not only discount such beliefs in it entirely – as with armchair academics as a 
whole – also when including the hot-spot Taiwan Strait issue, it also challenges the 
very premise of power shifts. The notion of an inevitable war of a demising and 
elevating power is aggressively discounted by the policy-researchers.
908
 In other 
words, the “China-threat” thesis is given little, if no credibility.  
 
5.5.2 Introducing the overarching ‘internationality’ thesis: Bourdieu and 
exceptionalism 
The ninth key finding relates to formulating an empirical sound overarching 
thesis/main argument pertinent to the objectives of this chapter. The foundation of 
such venture combines the discursive frame and the established key findings. 
Additionally, I shall revisit the conceptual/theoretical framework of Bourdieu and 
connect the overarching thesis of lacking ‘internationality’ with a specific part of the 
core idea of American exceptionalism. 
                                                          
906 Johnston and Ross 2008, ibid. 273. 
907 Ramon Pacheco-Pardo, "Review article - Beyond Power Transition: Sino-American Relations in the 21st 
Century," op.cit. 5. 
908 A healthy dosage of ‘anti-theoreticians’ was evident across several interviews. See also interviews with 
Blumenthal (AEI) op.cit., and Frost (Peterson), op.cit. 
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If arguing for a lack of ‘internationality’ – it becomes necessary to establish what 
constitutes the latter term. I approach ‘internationality’, heuristically, as the mode of 
thinking where additional actors (for example other countries, Non-Governmental 
Organisations/Intergovernmental Organisations, other groups, influential 
individuals/social phenomena/trends) are brought into the investigatory scope – in 
this instance, China and the U.S. 
  
I am arguing that the lack of ‘internationality’ emerges from two accounts. First, 
there is a demonstrated strong propensity, as an ontological “awareness-span”, to 
depict and analyse and assess implications concerning U.S.’ relationship with China 
through the bilateral trajectory almost isolated from other international players (to a 
high extent other countries, and indeed the case when it comes to IGOs).
909
 Second, 
there is also a tendency to keep the division between the national and international 
sphere, and not to diffuse non-state level aspects (such as internal variables within 
China or the U.S.) into the analysis beyond the description. For example, several 
policy-researchers acknowledge internal issues within China (often part of the 
normative argument of how China needs to change). However, when it comes to the 
analysis, many prescribe what China needs to do as if she as a state (and Communist 
Party) exercises full degree of free manoeuvrability.
910
 
 
For example, Frost (Peterson) cannot remember a time “… when we were not the 
world leader.
911
 She continues: “we have more military than the rest of the world, 
                                                          
909 See interviews with Innocent and Logan (Cato), op.cit., and Paal (Carnegie) op.cit. 
910 This is aligned with Bourdieu’s dialectical and relational thinking – that states do not have fixed and innate 
state identities (see Campbell 1998, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity 
(revised edition), Manchester University Press, 10), nor pre-given national interests. 
911 Interview Frost recording: 49 min. 
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look beyond GDP”.912 On a similar note, Scobell (RAND Corporation) uttered “we 
go everywhere!”913 Tønnesson expresses that in other countries, there are more 
mentioning of interacting with other states amongst foreign policy researchers, and 
that for the U.S. there is only one country that counts (China) and somewhat Israel 
(which is trapped in a bilateral trajectory).
914
 Furthermore, Feffer (IPS) says that his 
country “does not know how it is to be overtaken by another country”.915  
 
On a self-reflexive note regarding my researcher ‘habitus’, I am most likely 
predisposed to identify the above facet due to coming from a small and a “mere” 
regional middle-power country (Norway)
916
 where international relations and 
activities in the international sphere not only are predominantly taking place, and 
highly influenced by, collaboration with other states and indeed IGOs.
917
 This does 
not mean that my perceptions are superior or qualitatively better/distinguished, but 
nevertheless showcases how a self-reflexive deliberation can open up interesting 
avenues of inquiry. 
 
From the perspective of the American Self and identities, the “from a country-
border, to another country-border” analogy is resembling the precultural given in 
western cultures due to the belief that Self is placed within the body:
918
 that Man’s 
perception of ‘space’ is dynamic, something we often fail to comprehend due to the 
conviction that for “every effect there is a signal and identifiable cause and that it 
                                                          
912 Interview Frost. 
913 Interview Andrew Scobell (014-N) (RAND), 10 June 2011, (recording 9 min). 
914 Interview Tønnesson, recording: 1hr 10 min & 01:17:00. 
915 Interview Feffer, recording: 47.14 min. 
916 See John Langmore & Jan Egeland, "Learning from Norway: Independent Middle-power Foreign Policy," 
Griffith REVIEW 32 (2011): 97-110. 
917 See Leira et al. 2007 about Norwegian influence through international aid (Leira et al., Norske selvbilder og 
norsk utenrikspolitikk (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2007), 
http://www.nupi.no/content/download/1331/37033/. 
918 Nancy Scheper-Hughes & Margaret M. Lock, "The Mindful Body: A Prolegomenon to Future Work in Medical 
Anthropology," Medical Anthropology Quarterly 1:1 (1987): 6-41.  
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begins and ends with the skin”.919 In Bourdieu’s terms, the internal has not been 
externalised, and the external has not been internalised (identity).
920
 
 
The notion that ‘international relations’ with China stops at the country-border 
echoes Ross’ statement that the debate concerning the U.S.-China relationship is 
lacking a debate addressing in more depth how internal variables may influence 
foreign policy behaviour.
921
 The ineffectuality of incorporating domestic 
contextualities, politics and societal developments – and diffusing with the 
international sphere – somewhat contaminates the efforts of a more empirically 
sound “reading” of international politics, foreign policy, as well as state relations per 
se.
922
  
 
On the one hand, the U.S. faces sensitivity of constrained manoeuvrability. On the 
other, the U.S. is also exposed to a concurrent, albeit contradictory, 
acknowledgement of China’s internal problems in utterances offered across the 
policy-researchers’ analysis. Conjunctionally, however, the interview accounts also 
reflect assumptions about a State and Party which are exercising almost full agency. 
This two-folded facet can be coupled further to dialectic Self/Other constellations: a 
fixed, less dynamic Self, and a detached two-sided China as the Other. For example, 
                                                          
919 Edward T. Hall, The Hidden Dimension: Man's Use of Space in Public and Private (Garden City: Doubleday & 
Company, 1966), 109. Hall invented proxemics distances, and I am borrowing this notion to comprehend 
ontological space between countries. Also, between an individual and proximity to his or her own country and the 
Other country – across individual and national levels. 
920 Bourdieu, P 1990b, Logic of Practice, op.cit.; Bourdieu, P 1984, Distinction, op.cit.; Bourdieu, 1977, Outline of 
a Theory of Practice, op.cit. See Didier Bigo & Mikael R. Madsen, "Introduction to Symposium ‘‘A Different 
Reading of the International’’: Pierre Bourdieu and International Studies," International Political Sociology 5:3 
(2011): 219; Anna Leander, "The Promises, Problems, and Potentials of a Bourdieu-Inspired Staging of 
International Relations," International Political Sociology 5:3 (2011): 294-295; Rebecca Adler-Nissen, "On a Field 
Trip with Bourdieu," International Political Sociology 5:3 (2011): 327-330. – for a Bourdieusian reading of the 
‘international’ and transnational field overcoming international and domestic field. 
921 Ross, R.S. 2008, ‘Engagement in US China policy’, op.cit. 176-206. 
922 Simplistically described in most IR textbooks, for example John Baylis, Steve Smith & Patricia Owens, eds., 
The Globalization of World politics: An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford: University Press, 2008). 
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very few policy-researchers deliberate on how the American economy would look 
like in, for example, 2020 or 2050 – but readily prepared to comment on China’s 
trajectory (as if she is the mistress of her own destiny). This ought to serve as a call 
for (and encouragement) diffusing boundary-markers of domestic aspects of the 
Other into that twin-Other which encapsulates the external behaviour of China. 
Limaye (EastWest Center) does indeed that by highlighting domestic impulses also 
within a ‘non-fixed’ U.S.923 It follows, I would argue, this predisposition for being 
‘fixed’, also places an unhelpful short-term focus-span on U.S.’ relationship with 
China – which relates to Barrett’s (Atlantic Council) key criticism in his analysis, 
when pointing out the need for incorporating global trends. 
 
This “twin-Other”, I argue warrants the tenth key findings of the present Chapter. It 
departs from Campbell’s poststructuralist reading of a non-dynamic and 
ontologically fixed, dichotomised Other,
924
 which diverts from Hansen’s 
advancements who recognises there can be multiple Others (and different degrees 
and forms of Others).
925
 Thus, the established finding in my study supports Hansen’s 
departure from Campbell. Concurrently, though, the finding also further nuances 
Hansen’s work on the temporal (making Self advanced and the Other backward), 
spatial (removing the Other from its territory), and ethical (assuming the role as 
responsible) dimensions of constituting the Other. My coined term of the “twin-
Other” is not fully covered by Hansen’s aforesaid typologies nor Campbell’s 
poststructural readings of the Self/Other constellation.  
                                                          
923 Interview Limaye, op.cit. (recording: 04:30). 
924 See Campbell, 1998, op.cit. 
925 See Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (London: Routledge, 2006): 
42, 46-51. 
293 
 
My term relates to one/single Other – the same country and the same level (state). 
Furthermore, the “twin-Other” notion takes its names from being one such Other 
(aka China) but where perceptions of behaviour is detached from that Other’s (aka 
China’s) motivation, intentionality, and intentions (hence, a failure to diffuse the 
domestic and international political sphere). In Bourdieusian terms, this particular 
thinking amongst interviewees reflects that social fields composed across such 
national/international division do not perform as heuristic devises in grasping the 
Other.  
 
In practice, the detachment of the behavioural Other (what China does without 
consulting the scope of her manoeuvrability – for example, constraining internal 
variables and domestic politics) from a more holistic Other (which incorporates 
motivation, internationality, and intensions), is a process of not just advancing the 
Other – but also a justification of the Self. This resemblance Erikson’s finding 
relating to boundary-markers evolving in earlier imagination of new nations.
926
 
(Tønnesson (USIP and PRIO) uttered that “China is too busy with domestic issues 
(..) but you can talk to China”.927 For example, when stating that China can/should 
do such and such (without acknowledging the constraints) on the one hand, but 
simultaneously giving the American Self the benefit of the doubt (which has been 
denied for the Other country), a relational and dialectical “good guy” image can be 
built – but without creating this distinction with another Other country (aka 
China).
928
 
                                                          
926 Thomas H. Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism (London: Pluto, 1993). 
927 Interview Tønnesson, op.cit., (recording: 01.14.00). 
928 I would like to stress that such thinking did not apply to all interviewed policy-researchers, but as a group 
(non-representational) warranted developing such newish concepts – based on the thinking avenues unveiled 
during my analysis. 
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It is this social phenomenon which leads me to interface the above line of inquiry 
with the core American idea of ‘exceptionalism’ – both in terms of the lack of 
‘internationality’, but also the arguably tendency to elevate and justify Self through 
denying an attached/merged behavioural and holistic Other (China). McCrisken 
explains exceptionalism the “belief that the United States is an extraordinary nation 
with a special role to play in human history; a nation that is not only unique but also 
superior”.929  I am interpreting this as a two-edged concept, i.e. ‘unique’ but also 
‘superior’ which are not interchangeable terms. Innocent (Cato Institute) illustrated 
the quantitative and qualitative side of ‘exceptionalism’ as two properties – the 
notion of America being unique/exceptionally different (for example, comprable size 
of GDP and the size of military) – or unique/exceptionally different and qualitatively 
better.
930
 This Chapter engages with the former.
931
  
 
The linkage between the idea of exceptionalism and the overarching thesis of lacking 
‘internationality’, is my argument for that these two social phenomena 
accommodates, enables, and makes it possible for the way ‘American-ness’ is 
understood through China as the Other; they are dialectical and relational because 
they are mutually contingent upon each other and the effect/outcome would not have 
evolved without their diffusive, interlocking engagement. And it is the 
performativity of the above-mentioned “twin-Other”932 which makes this possible to 
uphold the “purity” of the Self, through the mechanisms of applying 
narratives/perceptions of one Other as mirroring the self-image of Self. Such 
                                                          
929 Trevor McCrisken, “Exceptionalism,” in Encyclopaedia of American Foreign Policy, eds. Alexander DeConde, 
Richar D. Burns & Frederik Logevall (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2002). 63-80. 
930 See Buzan 2005, op.cit.; Lepgold & McKeown 1995, op.cit. 369-84; Lipset 1996, op.cit; McCrisken 2002, 
op.cit. 
931 Whereas the subsequent, third analysis chapter makes use of the second property of the concept. 
932 See the two preceding paragraphs. 
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reflection of Self is achieved due to the idea of ‘exceptionalism’ performing as a 
mediating conduit. As purported in the ontology of Blumenthal: “U.S. does not 
change, the world will be the same”.933 Bourdieu’s dialectical approach, here, assists 
in unveiling the existence of a “fixation” of Self – as it could be detached from any 
form of Other and Othering. 
 
The proposition is further demonstrated by the sociological meso-level set-up of this 
study, where agency (microindividual) and structure (macrostructural) always 
operate dialectically in an inseparable fashion.
934
 This outlook is aligned with 
Bourdieu’s ‘constructivist structuralism’, or ‘structuralist constructivism’. 
Furthermore, policy-researchers/human beings are influenced by interaction and 
negotiation concerning ‘social reality’ amongst the individuals, but depending on a 
situational context/structure.
935
 
 
To summarise, and in effect conclude, I argue that reading ‘China’ through a 
bilateral trajectory, reflects ‘American-ness’ itself. Concurrently, the trajectory also 
contributes to uphold the American (“good”) Self as fixed or static by reflecting 
itself only partially through selected aspects of the Other (see ‘twin-Other). From a 
Bourdieusian perspective, the above reflects an American Self as a cultural identity 
which materialises through the production and reproduction of dispositions from a 
‘national habitus’.936 There is currency of such manifestation (identity-construction). 
Barth demonstrated how the Self/Other constellation can be examined by focusing 
                                                          
933 Interview Blumenthal, recording: 27.30. 
934 Bourdieu, P 1977, Outline of a Theory of Practice, op.cit.; Richard Jenkins, op.cit. 
935 John G. Bruhn and Howard M. Rebach, op.cit. 115-145. 
936 See Bourdieu, P 1990a, In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology, Polity Press, Cambridge; 
Bourdieu, P 1990b, The Logic of Practice, trans R. Nice, Stanford University Press, Stanford. 
296 
 
on boundary-markers of collective identity,
937
 and Friedman pointed out the impact 
of socialisation processes in early years as foundation of Otherness, becoming egos 
through the internalising of the objectification of ourselves by significant Others.
938
 
Collectively, the two latter points are aligned with the ethnographic path as far as 
Self/Other constellation in IR is concerned.
939
 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the policy-research experts’ narratives on ‘China’ from the 
viewpoints of being Americans and their country’s relations with the former. The 
empirical data served as a discursive frame from which ten key findings have been 
identified through being juxtaposed with subjectively selected bodies of literature, 
such as Bourdieu’s take on self-reflexivity, narratives as methodology, U.S.-Sino 
relations, the specified think tank literature, IR’s constructivist research programme 
and realist standpoints, U.S. Politics, social theory relating to the Self/Other 
constellations – in addition to the overarching thesis concerning lack of 
‘internationality’ where the core American political idea of ‘exceptionalism’ is 
argued to play a role in the understanding of policy-researchers’ constructions of Self 
through ‘China’ as the Other. Thus, the key findings have been established aligned 
with the ‘cyclic’ research process (and the ethnographic methodological framework) 
in addition to the social constructionist research philosophical underpinning of this 
study.  
 
                                                          
937 Barth, F 1971, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, op.cit. 
938 Jonathan Friedman, “Further Notes on the Advents of Phallus in Blunder-land,” in Constructing Knowledge. 
Authority and Critique in Social Sciences, eds. L. Nencel & P. Pes (London: Sage, 1991), 95-113. 
939 Iver B. Neumann, "Self and Other in International Relations," European Journal of International Relations 2 
(1996): 139. 
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In concert, the key findings also serve as contributions to the conjoined areas of 
literatures in accordance to the purpose of this study: potentially support (importance 
of self-reflexive deliberations), confirm (stable, continuous, interdependent U.S.-
Sino relationship – and the emergent importance of learning and understanding 
beyond the bilateral, ontological lenses), modify (Self/Other constellations, rejection 
of IR realist power-transition theory and about an America in decline), and build new 
theories (younger generation of policy-researchers, ‘internationality’ coupled with 
‘exceptionalism’, introducing the “twin-Other” concept, as well as  the ‘deflective 
meta-narrative’ and ‘mission think tank’ terms) through verification and validating 
of findings.
940
 
 
Again, it should be stressed that the findings and proposed contributions relate to 
generated empirical foundation of the particular Unit of Analysis, i.e. policy-research 
experts in U.S. think tanks, hence not my own assessment on these phenomena. 
 
This Chapter further showcases the main arguments of this thesis in its entirety – the 
relevance of ethnographic research where primacy is given to field-research and 
research subjects, in addition to relationality between Bourdieu’s embedded 
conceptual “thinking-tools”. For example, if having asked questions specifically 
about the countries bilateral relations, the research subjects would most likely not 
feel prompted to discuss more broadly. Subsequently, findings relating to an 
America in decline and their opposite take on IR realist power-theories might not 
have been unveiled in interviews. Furthermore, the understanding of the policy-
                                                          
940 John D. Brewer, Ethnography (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000), 107; Giampietro Gobo, Doing 
Ethnography (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2008), 227; Hammersley & Atkinson 2007, op.cit. 21, 159; Mehmetoglu, M 
2004, Kvalitativ metode for merkantile fag, Fagbokforlaget, 38, 119, 126; Alan B. Thomas, Research Skills for 
Management Studies (London: Routledge, 2004), 26. See Roger M. Keesing & Andrew J. Strathern, Cultural 
anthropology: A contemporary perspective (London: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1998); J. van Maanen, 
ed., Qualitative Methodology (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983). 
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researchers’ analyses is, in my opinion, strongly related to understanding the 
parameters they are working within, herein China-policy research community as a 
Bourdieusian ‘social field’ (and as part of a hierarchy of fields). As Frost (Peterson) 
uttered about non-value-free complexities:  
 
Views differ both in terms of ideology and which think tank. Most think tanks are 
independent and individually funded which does not reflect government philosophy 
or a political party. That’s very different from China. Specialisation, too, is a factor, 
like ideology.
941
 
 
And as uttered by Masters (Wilson Center): “depends on where you stand and field 
of study” (011-K).942 In other words, we have multiple ‘habituses’ – and I have 
argued that the ‘national habitus’ is highly socially conditioned of the social field of 
the China policy-research community and the broader political field.
943
  
 
This Chapter also provides originality and novelty through being the first (to the best 
of my knowledge) interview-based study of inside a think tank community, and of a 
larger scale, in addition to providing self-reflexive deliberation and offering a 
Bourdieusian reading in this regard. 
 
In the third and final analysis chapter, what will ensue are further narratives as the 
discursive frame (and empirical foundation) concerning the policy-researchers 
analysis on ‘China’. The particular focus covers perceptions on her motivations, 
intentions, and behaviour – also beyond the bilateral trajectory – portrayed through 
“American-lenses”, by drawing on Bourdieu’s concept of ‘doxa’ and the aforesaid 
‘qualitative’ facet of ‘exceptionalism’. 
                                                          
941 Interview Frost. 
942 Interview Peter Marsters (Wilson Center), 25 May 2011 (011-K) (recording: 32 min). 
943 See Pierre Bourdieu (1990a), op.cit. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE ‘EXCEPTIONAL’ AMERICAN 
‘ONTOLOGICAL LENS’: IMAGINING THE 
‘DEFLECTIVE OTHER’ AS SELF-REFLECTING 
‘AMERICAN-NESS’  
 
6.0 Chapter Introduction 
This third, and final, analysis chapter follows suit from the preceding Chapter Five; 
to investigate the role of culture, examining how policy-research experts socially 
construct ‘American-ness’ through ‘China’ as the Other. The present Chapter 
redirects the focus on ‘China’ and ‘American-ness’ beyond the investigatory scope 
of U.S.-Sino bilateral relations. The latter constellation was the enterprise of the 
foregoing chapter and also served as the overall label of the thematic cluster-
narratives. In the current Chapter, however, the particular focus surrounds 
comprehending another facet of the empirical data relating to ‘American-ness’; to 
engage with policy-researchers’ narratives concerning China’s motivations, 
intentions, and behaviour coupled with the international politics and foreign policy 
realms. Empirically, this demarcation has been informed by a “bottom-up” research 
process, as well as rolling-over relevant findings from the preceding analysis 
chapters founded on the basis of the ‘total universe of data’.944  Established findings 
and proposed contributions will be derived from such empirical foundation as the 
                                                          
944 Miles and Huberman 1994, op.cit. 
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discursive frame – based on juxtapositioning data with relevant, and subjectively 
selected, bodies of literature.  
 
This ‘cyclic’ research process is aligned with the ethnographic methodological 
approach and social constructionist epistemological underpinning devised for this 
study. Integral to the analysis, I shall also propose an overarching argument/thesis 
pertinent to this particular Chapter (regarding “China-narratives” and the role of 
culture) – specifically the core American idea of ‘exceptionalism’ and what I argue 
to reflect a qualitative aspect of this social phenomenon.
945
 Social theoretically, I 
shall particularly draw upon Bourdieu’s concept of ‘doxa’,946 which ought to be 
problematised relationally with other conceptual “thinking tools” integral to 
Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice.947 
 
The deliberation relating to setting-up the previous Chapter Five in terms of 
structure, premise, linkages to overarching research framework, theorising about 
self-reflexive deliberation, as well as claims for “methodological fit” across the 
                                                          
945 In the preceding chapter, I developed an overall argument/thesis relating to ‘exceptionalism’ developed from 
the empirical data – but focusing particularly on what I argued to constitute a quantitative aspect of the concept 
(see ‘American Exceptionalism’ for a conservative think tank and sober approach to exploring the theory of 
‘exceptionalism’. Available: http://www.aei.org/module/1/american-exceptionalism). The author promulgates the 
centrality of aforesaid theory: “Understanding the meaning of American exceptionalism is indispensable for 
anyone who wants to understand what it has meant to be an American”. I engage with ‘American exceptionalism’ 
(see Lipset 1998, “American exceptionalism reaffirmed,” op.cit. 25) in terms of the idea of own position in the 
world, and not the original question relating to why the U.S was the only industrialised nation without the 
presence of “leftist” influence in the 19th century (see Karen Tumulty 2013, “American exceptionalism, 
explained”, The Washington Post (2013. Available: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
fix/wp/2013/09/12/american-exceptionalism-explained/; Trevor B. McCrisken, American exceptionalism and the 
legacy of Vietnam: US foreign policy since 1974 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
946 See Vincent Pouliot & Frédéric Mérand, “Bourdieu’s concept: Political sociology in international relations” in 
Bourdieu in International Relations: Rethinking key concepts in IR, ed. Rebecca Adler-Nissen (Oxon: Routledge, 
2013), 27; Didier Bigo, “Security: Analysing transnational professionals of (in)security in Europe” in Bourdieu in 
International Relations: Rethinking key concepts in IR, ed. Rebecca Adler-Nissen (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), 125; 
Jackson 2008, op.cit; Leander 2010, op.cit.; Leander 2009, op.cit. 4; Jenkins 2002, op.cit. 70. 
947 This theory serves as the theoretical framework of this study. See Rebecca Adler-Nissen (ed.) 2013, ibid.; 
Emirbayer 1997, op.cit.; Swartz 2008 op.cit.; Bourdieu 1977, Outline of a Theory of Practice, op.cit.; Leander 
2010, ibid.; Leander 2009, ibid.; Leander 2008, “Thinking Tools”, op.cit.  
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thesis, also applies to the present Chapter.
948
 For this reason, the length of the 
Chapter is shorter. Points of departures in the current chapter encompass making use 
of other strands of the ‘total universe of data’,949 organising new narrative clusters as 
the discursive frame, as well as establishing additional key findings and proposing 
additional areas of contribution.  
 
This Chapter interfaces with substantive aspects of the previous “twin-chapter” on 
four accounts. First, to present “China-narratives” beyond the bilateral trajectory 
when it comes to the U.S.-Sino relationship is not only warranted by the collected 
data – but also through the cumulating analysis. Second, I will in the analysis 
harness some of the key findings established in Chapter Five – including the 
interrelated new coined terms of ‘twin-Other’ and the ‘deflective meta-narrative’. In 
terms of the latter, this is further expanded as ‘deflective Other’, ‘deflective 
Othering’ and ‘deflective Otherness’. Third, whereas Chapter Five proposed the 
influence of a quantitative aspect of ‘exceptionalism’, this Chapter will formulate a 
corresponding overarching argument/thesis, but as a qualitative aspect of this core 
American concept.
950
 Furthermore, fourth, the current Chapter is also informed by 
the particular key finding (Chapter Five) concerning bilateralism as the ontological 
vehicle in the production of (some) narratives. There, I argued that such occurrence 
performs as a representation of ‘American-ness’ itself.  
 
Consequently, I further argue that the employment of the four above-mentioned 
aspects in delineating, analysing, and imparting new narrative-clusters indeed 
                                                          
948 See Edmondson & McManus 2007, op.cit; Zalan & Lewis 2004, op.cit. 507-528. 
949 Miles and Huberman 1994, op.cit. 
950 ‘Qualitative’, here, indicates a non-numerical aspect (thus, nothing to do with the ‘quality’ of neither 
exceptionalism nor my own argument). 
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corroborates the applicability and robustness of those findings (Chapter Five). The 
title of the current chapter reflects such application of the introduced concepts: the 
concept of an American ‘exceptionalism’ influences how ‘China’ is being “read” by 
the policy-research experts, and that the social construction of ‘American-ness’ is 
upheld based on strategising involving the notions of an ‘twin-Other’951 and an 
‘deflective meta-narrative’952 in terms of Othering ‘China’. 
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, I will briefly highlight proposed 
areas of contributions. Second, I will briefly highlight influential self-reflexive 
aspects. Collectively, these two sections build upon linkages to the overarching 
research framework already explicated in Chapter Five, and thus not repeated in the 
present Chapter. Third, empirical data will be analysed as the discursive frame 
through establishing thematic cluster-narratives. Fourth, I shall discuss key findings 
– which are identified based on juxtapositioning data (aforesaid cluster-narratives) 
with subjectively selected bodies of literature. This effort includes the fifth section, 
herein developing the overarching argument/thesis of this particular chapter. Sixth, 
in my concluding marks, I will summarise the key elements of the Chapter and link 
its undertakings with the Conclusion chapter. 
 
 
 
                                                          
951 This coined term relates to that Othering and multiple Others can be traced within one country where different 
representations of that country are granted different values of Otherness, which differ from Hansen (2006, op.cit. 
42, 46-51) and an ontologically fixed Other (Campbell 1998, op.cit) – as opposed to my argument that such 
processes can also involve between different countries.  
952 I relate this notion to the phenomenon where a ‘meta-narrative’ (in a Croftesian sense (see Croft 2006, op.cit. 
73)) becomes assumed (through Bourdieusian ‘symbolic power’) to be a mainstream/dominant narrative, but 
conversely, in fact only held be a minority. 
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6.1 Aligning this chapter with the proposed contributions 
The linkages to the overarching framework of the study in its entirety (i.e. premise, 
main arguments and contributions, as well as the significance, novelty, and 
originality), have been explicated in Chapter Five. In this particular sub-section, I 
will briefly highlight additional areas of contributions specific to the inquiry in the 
present Chapter: collecting new primary data (policy-researchers’ perceptions of 
‘American-ness’ and ‘China’ – but focusing on narratives beyond the U.S.-Sino 
relationship); developing new propositions based on findings of purported narratives; 
and policy-researchers’ contrasting views concerning ‘national interests’, 
learning/understanding, meaning-construction of what ‘power’ China is pursuing, as 
well as aspects relating to comprehend ‘American-ness’ by making use of other 
strands of the collected data.  
 
6.2 Self-reflexive deliberation devised as a method for the researcher 
The previous Chapter Five provided an in-depth elaboration on reflexivity as a 
theory, and the operationalisation of the concept aligned with Bourdieu’s ‘epistemic 
reflexivity’.953 Specific for the present Chapter, I shall briefly expound on additional 
self-reflexive aspects which have transpired through “objectifying objectification” 
(i.e. ‘participant objectification’)954 – which entails to collectively evaluating three 
facets of principal knowledge biases when purporting claims of a social scientific 
nature: the social background of the researcher, position in the intellectual field 
where I as the researcher operate within, and “intellectualist bias” itself.955   
                                                          
953 See Leander 2008, “Thinking Tools”, op.cit. 
954 Wacquant 1989, “Towards a reflexive sociology: a workshop with Pierre Bourdieu”, op.cit. 
955 See Bourdieu 1990b, The logic of practice, op.cit.; and Bourdieu 2000, Pascalian mediations, op.cit. 
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I find it highly pertinent and important to interface my ‘researcher habitus’ with the 
role of cultural values in regard to a country’s dealings with other countries. This is 
not presented in a deterministic manner as I am discounting the notion of “national 
culture” on the basis of existing sub-cultures and ‘ecological fallacy’.956 Without 
denying such existence in Norwegian foreign affairs,
957
 I ought to bring attention to 
the following mechanisms considering the possibility for me influencing the data-
analysis: coming from Norway – a country which in my subjective (and thus biased) 
assessment does not have the motivation or desired mission to project its 
“Norwegian-ness” (herein, political values or world-views) onto the wider 
international system in the same grandeur style and extent as can be argued is the 
case with the U.S. Hence, it might very well be the case that I more easily become 
observant on such endeavours when executed by other countries – because it is 
different from the political culture surrounding the nurturing and developing of my 
aforesaid ‘researcher habitus’.  
 
A bipolar foreign policy-tradition (that of the U.S.) has been described by former 
Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger: 
                                                          
956 See Gerald H. Kramer, “The Ecological Fallacy Revisited: Aggregate- versus Individual-level Findings on 
Economics and Elections, and Sociotropic Voting”, The American Political Science Review, 77(1) (1983): 92-111; 
Glen Firebaugh, “A Rule for Inferring Individual-Level Relationships from Aggregate Data”, American Sociological 
Review, 43(4) (1978): 557-572; Edgar H. Schein, Organizational culture and leadership (San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass, 1992); Björn  Bjerke, Business Leadership and Culture (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999); Landis and 
Wasilevski 1999, op.cit.; Brendan McSweeney, “Hofstede’s model of national cultural differences and their 
consequences: A triumph of faith – a failure of analysis”, Human Relations, 55(1) (2002a): 89-118; and Brendan 
McSweeney, “The essentials of scholarship: A reply to Geert Hofstede”, Human Relations, 55(1) (2002b): 1363-
1372; Henriett Primecz (eds) et al., Cross-Cultural Management in Practice: Culture and Negotiated Meanings 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011). 
957 I have earlier (Chapter Five) alluded to Norway’s international aid activity as a form of “Norwegian 
exceptionalism” and/or grand-strategy (see Halvard Leira et al. 2007, op.cit. about Norwegian influence through 
international aid. Available: http://www.nupi.no/content/download/1331/37033/). Recently, the Norwegian Doctors 
without Borders criticised international aid distribution based on follow governmental political interest rather than 
humanitarian needs (see Frank Haugsbø and Eirik Linaker Berglund, “Leger uten grenser: Norsk bistand styres 
av politiske interesser - ikke behov’, Verdens Gang (2013. Available: 
http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/artikkel.php?artid=10141166). 
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The singularities that America has ascribed to itself throughout its history have 
produced two contradictory attitudes toward foreign policy. The first is that America 
serves its values best by perfecting democracy at home, thereby acting as a beacon 
for the rest of mankind; the second, that America’s values impose on its obligations 
to crusade for them around the world. Torn between nostalgia for a pristine past and 
yearning for a perfect future, American thought has oscillated between isolation and 
commitment.
958
  
 
Indeed, spreading democracy around the world also became a main pillar during 
President George W. Bush’ administration.959 I find my ‘scholarly gaze’ to positively 
influence the analysis.
960
 As indicated in both the title and the articulation of the 
overarching argument/thesis relating to this Chapter, the prevalence of what I argue 
to be a particular American ‘ontological lens’ (integral to as well as structured, and 
structuring, ‘American-ness’ as a representation of American values) would have 
been less perceptible to me if not coming from a country such as Norway. Turning 
the tables, the potential area of criticism following the above should be 
acknowledged; if I levy more importance (hence assigning more validity to the 
findings) regarding this particular aspect. Based on the collected data, which itself 
offers avenues for exploring various “American” ways in as much as thinking and 
foreign policy behaviour towards China, in my opinion justifies to proceed with my 
inquiry albeit entrenched with aforesaid ‘theoretical gaze’.961 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
958 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994). 18. 
959 Michael Mandelbaum, “Democracy without America: The Spontaneous Spread of Freedom”, Foreign Affairs, 
86(5) (2007): 119. 
960 Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, op.cit. 68-69. 
961 See Bourdieu 1990b, The logic of practice, op.cit.; and Bourdieu 2000, Pascalian mediations, op.cit. 
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6.3 “China-narratives” clusters – Analysing empirical data as the 
discursive frame 
The previous sub-sections have briefly established the positioning of the present 
Chapter within the investigatory scope of the study as a whole,
962
 in addition to 
engaging with self-reflexivity deliberations. What follows is to impart, analyse, and 
discuss empirical data as “China-narratives” organised into thematic clusters – which 
in concert serves as this Chapter’s discursive frame. 
 
The demarcation of narratives is also informed by, and thus extends, the analysis, 
key findings, and contributions postulated in the foregoing Chapter – in particular 
the enterprise of presenting “China-narratives” beyond the bilateral trajectory.963 
Such an approach is aligned with the “bottom-up” approach associated with a social 
constructionist embedded ethnographic study. The interlinked nature of these two 
“twin-chapters”964 is not dichotomous, and thus does not signal that bilateral aspects 
can be completely removed from analysing “China-narratives” outside the bilateral 
realm. 
 
6.3.1 ‘Asymmetric understanding’ narrative – Cluster 1 
This cluster highlights lack of mutual understanding between the two countries, as 
perceived by the policy-researchers,
965
 as an issue – and thus the need for learning.  
                                                          
962 This effort contributes to ensure “methodological fit” with the overarching research endeavour (see 
Edmondson and McManus 2007, op.cit.). 
963 See introduction (this chapter): the two other points of interface between Chapters Five and Six are as 
follows: the influence of a quantitative aspect of ‘exceptionalism’ formulated as an overarching argument/thesis, 
herein the ‘qualitative aspect’ of this core American idea, and the inter-related new coined terms of the ‘twin-
Other’ and a ‘deflective meta-narrative’. 
964 I.e. the present (Chapter Six) and previous (Chapter Five) chapters. 
965 I established in the foregoing chapter – as methodological justification – that narratives about other people’s 
narratives plausibly counts as a narrative of the policy-researcher. This decision is justifiable on the grounds of 
perceptions and meaning-attribution relating to other narratives cannot be detached from the subjectivity and 
perceptions diffusing own narratives. This is aligned with the non-objectivist and social constructionist 
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Douglas Paal (Carnegie) underscores the impact of culture in regard to 
misunderstandings between Beijing and Washington, by highlighting the nucleus of 
Kissinger’s book On China,966 due to:  
 
We talk past each other so often, because we are underestimating the power of the 
depth of Chinese culture and how they look down at us. And to get effective policies 
we need to understand the other party’s need. If we ignore their needs, we cause 
problems. (022-V).
967
  
 
Banning Garrett (Atlantic Council) illustrates how context dictates a higher degree of 
‘understanding’ – not necessarily based on actual comprehension, but how it may 
rather subjugate any lack of understanding because of the dire economic climate 
overshadowing other areas of conflicts. Common comprehension has been bridged 
over the threat (down-scaling of their economies) (025-Y).
968
 This reflects the 
primacy of a Bourdieusian economic ‘field of power’ and consequently being more 
influential than other fields lower down in the hierarchy.  
 
Peter Marsters (Wilson Centre) expresses that the general American public perceives 
China as a monolith due to limited cross-cultural contact and having very different 
cultures. Furthermore, he finds that language barriers result in somewhat more 
suspicious attitudes against China where the general public has not quite caught up 
with the relatively new relationship – albeit the countries’ business and finance 
                                                                                                                                                                    
philosophical underpinning of the study; there is no observable, detached, objective world “out there” that exist 
independently of the human mind and cognitive processes (Crotty 2003, op.cit.).  
966 Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin Books, 2012a). The reception has varied from the modest 
celebratory (for example; Michiko Kakutani, “An Insider Views China, Past and Future” (2011. Available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/10/books/on-china-by-henry-kissinger-review.html?pagewanted=all) to firm 
disappointment with the underlying motives and failure to address key foreign policy issues (for example; Jasper 
Becker, “On China by Henry Kissinger – review” (2011). Available: 
http://www.theguardian.com/books/2011/may/21/on-china-henry-kissinger-review). 
967 Paal (Carnegie), recording 29.56 (022-V). 
968 Interview Garrett (Atlantic Council), recording: 01.05. 
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spheres are more interconnected (011-K).
969
 His colleague, Sue Levenstein (Wilson 
Centre), finds that the average Chinese is much more informed then their American 
counter-parts (006-F):970 
 
(…) appalling to me, how little average Americans know about world affairs, we are 
the one superpower. I feel so many people in this country who just prefer to 
condense everything into black and white, as opposed to the grey areas – and to me 
that is very frustrating. Especially when looking at China, what is frustrating, my 
opinion, lots of think tanks like to talk about China in terms of military expansion – 
they would focus more on security because it is the sexy issue, like movie studios 
selling movies of low quality, same concept! (006-F).
971
 
 
Dan Blumenthal (AEI) utters that he finds the American system to appreciate the 
Chinese one “ (...) a little bit better, not particular about strategic tradition and how 
that affects their behaviour, but enough about what they seem wanting to do in the 
military sphere in Taiwan” (008-H).972 He continues by pointing out how values 
support policy, for example in regard to why NATO operates in Libya (and thus the 
U.S. and ‘west’ in general), and how misunderstandings can erupt concerning the 
rationale why countries may operate on principles and not only interests (008-H).
973
 
Regardless of the accuracy of such perceptions, the statements above also depict the 
importance of meaning-construction in terms of those assumptions we make about 
other countries’ behaviour and intentions. On the other hand, it is problematic to 
distinguish ‘principles’ from ‘interests’ as binary/dichotomised phenomena i.e. that 
‘interests ’are innately given as a fixed, non-contestable or construable entity, and 
thus evolved in isolation from principles or values, but entwined with power at the 
                                                          
969 Marsters (Wilson Centre), recording: 03.49. He also points out that it is, naturally, difficult to pinpoint one 
American public (011-K). 
970 Levenstein (Wilson Centre), recording: 14.09 (006-F). 
971 Levenstein, recording: 17.13. 
972 Blumenthal (AEI), recording: 2.54 (008-H). 
973 Blumenthal, recording: 04.10. 
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core of American foreign policy analysis, as formulated by Morgenthau’s realist 
camp.
974
 
 
Blumenthal continues his analysis, showcasing the impact of culture:  
 
I think their system is prone to being a closed system, there is a deep paranoia about 
U.S. intention, referential conclusions about why U.S. does particular things. They 
think every action is an attack on China? (008-H).
975
 
 
Bonnie Glaser (CSIS) also finds suspiciousness towards the U.S. from China (035-
QR).
976
 Interestingly, Blumenthal’s account begs the question if a more negative 
picture is painted by ‘China’ as the Other (where ‘paranoia’ reflects Otherness as one 
of the boundary-markers) – thus, a ‘deflective Other’ (based on ‘deflective 
narratives’) as the negative Othering allows for maintaining a positive self-reflecting 
(American) Self. 
 
Robert Hathaway (Wilson Center) also signals an imbalance in understanding – but 
rather gives the benefit to the Chinese side:  
 
(...) understanding is incomplete; at the one side of the coin China has a much more 
sophisticated understanding and operations at their Embassy here in DC. And I 
assume that the calibre of diplomats they send to DC are vastly superior for just a 
decade ago, presumably smarter, more informed, more sophisticated diplomats, who 
are conveying back to the political leadership in Beijing. They are more political 
nuanced of the Washington decision making process, the interplay between politics 
and interests, role of public opinion. There are reasons to think that understanding is 
better. Having said that, there is a vast gulf on both sides (016-P).
977
 
 
                                                          
974 Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951); Morgenthau 1948, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and 
Peace, op.cit. See Hans J. Morgenthau, “Another ‘Great Debate’: The National Interest of the United States,’’ 
American Political Science Review, 46(4) (1952): 961–962. 
975 Blumenthal (AEI), recording: 03:20 (008-H).  
976 Interview Bonnie Glaser (CSIS), 8 July 2011. Recording: 0.55 (035-QR). 
977 Robert Hathaway (Wilson Center), recording: 10:23 (016-P). 
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On the non-state level, however, Levy (AEI) maintains that there is less 
understanding in Beijing when it comes to other forces which drives the U.S. (for 
example in 2003, during periods of bilateral tensions between the two countries) – 
where China became fixated in understanding U.S. perceptions of China, but relying 
on predominant societal forces at that point of time such as manufacturing job losses 
and trade imbalances (007-G).
978
 Levy’s (AEI) statement reflects, I argue, a Chinese 
‘deflective narrative’, i.e. if wanting to find traces of U.S. hostility towards China, 
Beijing could easily find that in American discourse such as the above societal forces 
(allowing Beijing polity to upheld a meta-narrative serving their own interests – if 
they wanted to).  
 
The imbalance of mutual understanding is increasing due to (dynamics of) media 
coverage. Effectively, this signals the relevance of heuristically placing the media 
field in Bourdieu’s hierarchy at the top along with other larger ‘fields of powers’. 
Levenstein (Wilson Center) states:  
 
It is appalling what the average Joe on the street knows about China (...) how 
bureaucracy works, not largely understood; foreign countries. We are moving in 
news cycles, not very analytical [laughter]. It leads to surface level analysis – or not 
even analysis (006-F).
979
  
 
Banning Garrett (Atlantic Council) also points out the impending intentions being 
placed on the behaviour of Washington and Beijing. But foremost he takes a radical 
stance with assumed applied universal understanding by those who are placing 
intentions on others but without necessarily grasping what they are – for example a 
                                                          
978 Levy, recording 04.30 (007-G). 
979 Interview Levenstein, recording: 16.30 & 12.30 (006-F). 
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paper authored by Robert Kagan and Blumenthal (AEI).
980
 Garrett formulates in his 
policy-paper:
981
 
 
(...) problem is universal, where people are imputing intentions to others when they 
don’t know what they are (… ) they just stated as fact what China’s strategic 
intentions were – and they listed in their article to do this and that – my response 
was ‘how do they know that?’ There is no humility, at least say ‘based on China’s 
actions made me to include their intentions were x or y’, or ‘based on what the 
Chinese told me’, or a conclusion based on what they have seen (...) Gee, I have 
talked about North-Korea with the Chinese for twenty-years and it does not ring 
through with what I have heard, or surmise. I am not sure if I know what their 
intentions are, so if you are making false statements of what their intentions are; you 
better know what you are talking about or have evidence (…) but don’t pretend you 
actually know if you don’t know. You might be wrong. (025-Y).982 
 
Garrett (Atlantic Council) continues with illustrating misunderstandings also across 
the aisle: 
 
I have spent plenty of times with the Chinese and they misinterpret American 
actions and apply and attribute intentions we did not have, on very critical issues 
where I knew what U.S. was thinking – or not thinking – ‘oh grand strategic plans’. 
That is nonsense! (…) I have pounded on the Chinese on the other side to be careful 
with drawing conclusions based on series of facts or actions. There are problems on 
both sides; conspiratorial in their views, they [China] draw up a great theory why we 
are doing something, it is a fantasy – so we need to be careful so we don’t do same 
things. (029-Y).
983
  
 
Interestingly, that Self and the Other are treated differently also surfaces in the 
interview with Garrett (Atlantic Council). For example, where he above warns the 
Chinese not to make interpretations based on a series of actions – that is the same as 
action he stated earlier in the interview to be a normal thing and what all policy-
researchers try to do (U.S. think tanks). His argument, however, is nevertheless 
consistent: not to move from observations to assume intentions.  
                                                          
980 See Daniel Blumenthal and Robert Kagan, “How Obama Should Approach North Korea”, The Washington 
Post (2009). Available: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/05/25/AR2009052501391.html). 
981 In his essay, Garrett writes in the The New Atlanticist: “there is an all-too-common practice in Washington 
punditry of attributing strategic intentions to other countries without any apparent evidence” (Available: 
http://192.254.129.212/new_atlanticist/how-do-they-know). 
982 Banning Garrett (Atlantic Council), recording: 13 min (025-Y). 
983 Barrett, recording: 9.00 and 01.21.00. Barrett made this statement relating to some of the thinking in Beijing 
and not as a general statement. 
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On the prompt if the above reflects lack of self-reflections, Garrett (Atlantic Council) 
finds such evaluation plausible relating to both sides. During a speech (June 8) at the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), he pleaded to look at broader contexts 
and outside the bilateral box: 
 
(…) our experts they know a lot about the U.S., but less about China and the 
strategic environment, mirrored on the other side which focuses on bilateral aspects 
(Taiwan IPR, Tibet, the usual) and now military competition. That is the lens of the 
world but not useful in 5, or 10-30 years from now (…) experts do only thing they 
know about, actual relations take place in global strategic environment; rising 
energy and food prices, not a bilateral issue but more important than most bilateral 
issues, especially beyond 10 years (029-Y).
984
 
 
From the above, which reflects the argument in the preceding chapter regarding the 
bilateral ontological lens as ‘American-ness’, I induce that learning beyond the 
bilateral horizon is a key issue. Garrett (Atlantic Council) carries on by illuminating 
the above as a disciplinary/paradigmatic issue:  
 
(…) hear a lot about China threat, rising China – mostly from strategists? Great 
strategists don’t know diddle about China but have little paradigms from where they 
learn from Mearsheimer and others realists and just impose that on China without 
talking to the Chinese, not understanding anything on China nuances or debates or 
interest groups within China (029-Y).
985
 
 
 
Walther Lohman (Heritage) assesses the level of mutual understanding as “artificial” 
although he finds dialogue useful as opposed to the myriad of 84 working level talks 
affiliated with the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (SED),
986
 and finds the 
operationalisation a waste of time and resources. He argues that areas of shared 
understanding tend to be where the countries have shared interest (economics more 
                                                          
984 Barrett, recording: 34.55. 
985 Barrett, recording: 47.05. 
986 The Fifth Round of the SED was held in Washington, DC, whilst conducting my field-work (see 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/07/211861.htm). Kenneth Lieberthal (Brookings) was a proponent for 
conducting two meetings a year for working-groups in order to facilitate discussion on the upcoming meeting (but 
was not entertained) (032-KL, recording: 01.52). 
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so than political and security ones), which he warns against to be taken as having a 
relationship (policy-makers).
987
 Again, here, to think in Bourdieusian hierarchy of 
fields is helpful; it is evident that the economic field is elevated from other large 
‘fields of power’ at the top of the hierarchy and thus more impactful (downwards) in 
other fields. It also reflects the importance of context – for example U.S.-UK 
relations would have a more balanced homology between fields vertically and 
horizontally in the hierarchy – due to a closer bilateral relationship and more cultural 
proximity.  
 
Lohman (Heritage) also illuminates China’s politicisation of the imbalance as far as 
mutual understanding is concerned as: “ (…) opposite end of the spectrum, they 
think we don’t understand their development, but they are underdeveloped when we 
ask them [to contribute]” (021-U).988 He also links misunderstandings – especially 
from the Chinese side, to creating real conflicts – in interplay with key American 
ideas: 
 
(…) potential for real conflicts, mostly based on Chinese misunderstandings and 
miscalculations of the U.S. And misunderstanding of a U.S. decline (…) not in 
absolute decline, unfortunately except for policy here, ultimately U.S. makes the 
right policy choices, not a mystique force out there when powers decline. U.S 
remains expanding its population, rich in natural resources, stable political systems 
despite debts, not inevitable decline, don’t think the Chinese know that sometimes. 
(021-U).
989
 
 
However, imbalances in understanding is not necessarily fixed, but also a product of 
the dynamics of the Bourdieusian ‘social field’ (i.e. China policy research 
                                                          
987 Walter Lohman (Heritage Foundation), recording: 2 min (021-U). 
988 Lohman, recording 08:00 (021-U). 
989 Lohman, 33 min). 
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community) – for example in regard to age and the generation gap.990 Swartz (AEI) 
postulates:  
 
(…) on the whole, not nearly as much understanding as it should be but will change 
over time; student exchanges, studying in each other countries – almost no other 
generation above me who have had the experience like I had; study and go to China. 
If they did, it is often a very niche field like intelligence. True on Chinese side as 
well (017-Q).
991
 
 
Boundary-markers for this particular cluster are ‘meaning-attribution’, 
‘imbalanced/asymmetric understanding’, and ‘generation-dependent’. 
 
6.3.2 ‘Meaning of China’s rising power’ narratives – Cluster 2 
The type of power which China aspires to develop into and/or exhibit – presently and 
more so in the future – reflects the crux of this narrative-cluster. This discovery is 
warranted by the dynamics of empirical data and the iterative, hermeneutical analysis 
process. On the other hand, the impact of China’s rise (and, thus, potentially the 
perceived severity relating to such phenomenon being augmented) also intensifies 
the apprehension of her rise due to the existing imbalanced/asymmetric 
understanding of ‘China’ in general as elaborated in the preceding cluster-
narrative.
992
 As exemplified by Garrett (Atlantic Council): 
 
(…) right now, there are huge suspicions. An irony because China has become more 
and more pluralistic, and more and more lacking in real vision – and does not have a 
real long- term strategy of any kind other than the most general thing; they want to 
be a strong prosperous, secure nation. OK, who does not – I have never heard about 
any country wanting to be weak, poor, and insecure (…) but in terms of long-term, 
coherent strategy aligned with dominate the world, get rid of the United States and 
push us out from Asia – may be aspirations for some people, sure – but a strategic 
                                                          
990 Established in Chapter 5 (for example interviews with Samuel Sherraden (New America Foundation) (003-C & 
003-C2). 
991 Interview Dale Swartz (AEI), recording 11.45 (017-Q). 
992 This was identified in the previous cluster-narrative. 
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motivational factor behind all their policy, how they can weaken the U.S. and 
strengthen China, dominate the region, I don’t think so. If you talk with the Chinese 
they would laugh about it; ‘we don’t think long term, it is the Americans that think 
long-term!’ So, we need to be careful to think about them as juggernaut. (025-Y).993 
 
The above signals the intriguing point that if China does not have a ‘grand strategy’ 
or ‘long-term vision’ as far as the international system is concerned, how privy or 
capable, then, are bystanders and stakeholders outside the China polity and national 
boundaries to construe these focal representations of national identity on behalf 
another country?
994
 Ahrens links China’s power projection with the importance of 
understanding domestic variables and thus agrees to China’s uncertainty of its own 
future: that they do not themselves have a clear vision concerning what direction 
they want to pursue as a country, which is part of a robust discussion in China 
otherwise occupied with domestic issues (020-T).
995
 
 
Feffer (IPS) points out that “China says we are growing, we are cool with it” and 
indicates that the landing of her steep upward power projection as an end-goal is not 
necessarily prioritised by Beijing in terms of what to communicate to the external 
world as a status-quo – and facing important junctions without knowing how to 
address them (013-M).
996
 National-interest, however, is evident in China’s approach 
and positioning in the international system, as promulgated by Sherraden (New 
America Foundation). He assesses China wanting to evolve into an economic power 
but not a military one, which he argues takes place through leveraging capital of 
                                                          
993 Interview Garrett, recording: 01.12.42 (025-Y). 
994 This practice does not relate to the U.S., only, but most likely any country. Moreover, it is beyond the purview 
of this study to assess the existence of a Chinese grand-strategy and so forth. 
995 Interview Nat Ahrens, recording: 20.57 (020-T). 
996 Feffer, recording: 47:15) (013-M). Following Ganning Barrett’s (Atlantic Council) advice, I should also refrain 
from attributing meaning to something. 
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political and financial investments (003-C2).
997
 Ellen Frost (Peterson Institute) 
brings forward which trajectory China will be following as the core question: “look 
at India, we know they will remain democratic, but with China we don’t know” 
(001-A).
998
 Philip Levy (AEI) concurs: “I think China faces some really difficult 
choices. Don’t see as clear path, I think you got an intelligent industrious nation that 
has tremendous potential but huge contradictions” (007-G).999  
 
Stein Tønnesson (USIP) highlights how Beijing is wary about not exhibiting 
aggressive values, for example changing own slogan from ‘peaceful rise’ to 
‘peaceful development’ – where the former resemblances dominations over other 
countries similar to Japan’s rise.1000 Blumenthal (AEI) also rest assured on China’s 
peaceful intention: “there is structural similarity in terms of what China wants to do 
in the international system (...) regional architecture that China cannot change (...) I 
think Chinese elites want to rise peacefully, they don’t want war, but that don’t mean 
it is consummated with the western interest. Number one goal is economic 
development, power politics, territory, questions about dignity, restoration, sense of 
hierarchy, and international politics about goals, justice, restored” (008-H).1001 Hersh 
(CAP) highlights China’s rise as a pursuit for purchasing soft power through Foreign 
Direct Investments (FDI) in developing countries (African and Latin-American 
regions) – and to be speaking on the behalf of the developing world:1002 “I do not 
                                                          
997 Interview, Sherraden, (recording 13.01) (003-C2). 
998 Ellen Frost (Peterson), recording 13:40 (001-A). 
999 Philip Levy (AEI), recording 18:44 (007-G). 
1000 See also Stein Tønnesson, recording 1.22.00 (009-I). 
1001 Dan Blumenthal (AEI), recording: 08.10 (008-H). 
1002 Interview Adam Hersh (CAP), recording: 20.32 (010-J). It is also common to talk about China’s power 
trajectory as wanting to act as the Leader of the Third World (see The New York Times (2005). Available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/08/world/asia/08iht-beijing.html?_r=0). 
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know if Chinese leadership know what type of role they want to take on” (010-J).1003 
Swartz (AEI) expresses that “China is moving higher up in the region” (017-Q).1004 
However, Hersh also points out the limitations: 
 
I think they [China] are very clumsy about how to accumulate and use the soft 
power – partly because the country has been isolated for so long and partly because 
of cultural barriers that are difficult to transcend, and partly because, like you know, 
the U.S. has a very inward looking culture; ‘China’ is the middle-kingdom and the 
world revolves around it’. And the U.S. is the middle-kingdom of the west and all 
revolve around them (010-J).
1005
 
 
Jamie Metzl (Asia Society), who doubts that China can exercise international 
leadership,
1006
 reflects on China’s alleged ‘free-rider’ behaviour in the international 
system:   
 
With China, there is an increasingly interdependency between the U.S. and China 
and there is a growing mistrust between the two countries. From the Chinese 
perspectives, the U.S. is in some ways trying to keep them down. Which I think, I 
don’t believe, I think that the U.S. has done more than any other countries to help 
China rise. There are many other people in the U.S. who believe that China is rising 
as a power irresponsibly and not making the kind of commitments to maintain the 
international system that has facilitated China’s rise (039-YZ).1007 
 
Similarly, Levy (AEI) expresses concerns with China not taking enough 
responsibility as her position and size in the international system would dictate:  
 
(…) one of the things that has been so much frustrating for the U.S. with China; 
China is not trying to shape the U.S. manoeuvrability. In some ways China is still 
trying to pretend it is a small player in international system; it puts forward 
principles of non-interference – for its own reasons does not want to be criticised for 
what is done internally (…) the U.S. would be glad to have China shaping things. 
More commonly, the Chinese approach seems to be ‘that is not our business’, but 
                                                          
1003 Hersh, 42.48 (010-J). 
1004 Interview Dale Swartz (AEI), recording 08.30 (017-Q). 
1005 Hersh, interview, recording: 22.19. 
1006 See Jamie, F. Metzl, “Can China be an international leader?’, The Guardian (2010). Available: 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/apr/09/china-economic-international-leader). 
1007 Interview Metzl, recording 4.53 (039-YZ). 
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sometimes that U.S. would have liked that. Other times when it comes to Iran, or 
nuclear proliferation or other things the U.S. says ‘this IS your business’, you are 
going to help with this, you are a big country (…) U.S. frustration has been that 
China is not proposing alternate solutions (007-G).
1008
 
 
Boundary-markers can be argued to encompass ‘free-rider’, ‘non-global power’, 
‘multiple identities’, ‘meaning of rise and power’, and ‘economic power’.  
 
6.3.3 ‘Multi-level learning’ narratives – Cluster Three 
The established asymmetric understanding and imbalanced understanding between 
the two countries, which plausibly increases in line with China’s continuing rise in 
the international system, warrants further focus on learning.  
 
Similarly, relating to Bourdieu’s ‘social field’, Ellen Frost (Peterson) alludes to the 
nature of thinking within the conceptual space and physical locality presented within 
and around the DC think tank environment:
1009
  
 
For example, there are many Chinas, and what is said generally, is that what 
centrally government decide as of policy matters is not necessary carried out locally, 
that is one dimension that is missing in most think tanks; provinces and localities in 
China and how different they are (…) you tend not to get that here because this is 
the head-quarter of the national government, so that is what we tend to look at. We 
know there are layers and layers of powers which are not always in harmony with 
each other – there tend not to be paid attention to local levels. And because this 
community is interested in security, foreign policy and economic issues, there is less 
focus on cultural issues, people to people issues and that kind of things. We had one 
talking about soft power and Confucianism and so forth, but she was from 
Singapore – not from here. (001-A).1010 
 
Banning Garrett (Atlantic Council) concurs that culture and history have significant 
influence on the misunderstanding between the two countries because “we are from 
                                                          
1008 Interview Levy (AEI), recording: 29.45 (007-G). 
1009 Interview Frost (Peterson), recording: 14.25 (001-A). 
1010 Frost, 06.56 (001-A). 
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different places”. He points out binaries such as being developed or developing, but 
also internal dynamics relating to China having experienced the Cultural Revolution, 
being poor, and enduring social instability. Garrett does not, however, place culture 
as the primary factor; “ (…) not one cultural lens, we have real issues to deal with 
(…) keeping the economy growing and security issues (…) so I think it is a little 
more pragmatic and more common for all leaders and meet the same problem as we 
do on the ground” (025-Y).1011 I would argue that Garrett’s utterances also 
effectively strengthens the proposal stipulating that such cultural influence is an 
enduring trait of the American Self as himself is arguing for the commonality across 
bilateral contexts:  
 
Not the greatest understanding between Americans and Indians, or Americans and 
Brazilians either – a whole lot of suspicion everywhere we go in the world, about 
U.S. intentions and imperialism, so the Chinese are not unique. Our failure to 
understand other cultures is legendary, that is a huge problem. (025-Y).
1012
 
 
Levenstein (Wilson Center) highlights that learning materialises beyond the 
ontological lens of IR’s state-to-state paradigm and at different levels, for example 
the very high rate of Chinese and international students pursuing higher education in 
the America, and marriages (006-F).
1013
 As a result, Levenstein find tensions 
between the two countries to be exaggerated which supports my proposed concept of 
the ‘deflective-narrative’. Furthermore, this resemblance Satu Limaye’s (EastWest 
Center) promulgation that individual and group levels must be taken into account 
(for example business-groups), as discussed in the foregoing chapter.
1014
 
Appreciating that understanding varies depending on levels is also reflected in 
                                                          
1011 Interview Garrett, recording: 01.15.18 (025-Y). 
1012 Garrett, 01.15.51. 
1013 Interview Sue Levenstein (Wilson Center), recording 40 min (006-F). 
1014 See David S. A. Guttormsen and Carina van de Wetering 2013, op.cit. 2. 
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Levy’s (AEI) argument warning Washington and Beijing to treat each other as 
monoliths:  
 
(…) if you look at the more astute China hands in the State Department like David 
Levander – they understand China quite well, but that is not the whole U.S. political 
body, lots of misunderstandings (007-G).
1015
 
 
Douglas Paal (Carnegie) also elucidates the need for scrutinising different levels of 
understanding – which supports the importance of media as an impactful ‘field of 
power’ at the top in Bourdieu’s hierarchy of fields:  
 
No, the American press has been relatively inflammatory over the last couple of 
years. Quality of journalism has declined, and people are only good as the 
journalism – but Congress is not going to do independent research, so lots of 
problems in understanding. I think that the top few people in the White House and 
top people Beijing have very good understanding, take points, understand 
conversations – but most people don’t (...) general public is confused, conflicted, 
almost every headlines in the paper is about China either takes the jobs or taking 
over the country. (022-V).
1016
 
 
Peter Marsters (Wilson Center) points out the Othering which occurs at the 
individual level:  
 
Suspicious on the ground, it is kind of a new bilateral relation. The culture is very 
different, language different – not much cross-cultural context [inaudible]. China 
seems like a monolith, and I think you know financially and business wise the 
countries are much more intertwined. General understanding in the public has not 
caught up with the level of interaction.
1017
 
 
Boundary-markers would entail ‘non-state level’, ‘multi-level learning’, ‘impeding 
cultural influence’, and ‘individuals lacking knowledge’. 
 
                                                          
1015 Interview Levy, recording 1.30 (007-G). 
1016 Interview Douglas Paal, recording: 16.58 (022-V). 
1017 Interview Peter Masters (Wilson Center), recording 04.00 (011-K). 
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6.3.4 ‘The American Self as national habitus’ narratives – Cluster 4 
This cluster centres on different admissions into making sense of ‘American-ness’ as 
particular ways of thinking – traceable at the national level – through shared 
meaning-construction and thus framed as a ‘national habitus’. With this term, I am 
not implying that such processes transpire only at the non-state level (as purported 
by Norbert Elias’ non-state led representations)1018 but a ‘structuring structure’ 
serving as a system of deeply held beliefs socialised as internalised dispositions 
which dictates what constitutes “common-sense” practices.1019 
 
Seth Cropsey (Hudson Institute) articulates that “American academic ideology is 
about collaboration and good faith demonstrating being joint together with other 
nations, somehow a substitute for real identifiable national interest” (012-L).1020 
Furthermore, Cropsey argues for particular ‘American-lens’ that again positions the 
economy as a Bourdieusian ‘field of power’: 
 
We are more likely to watch China through an economic filter, to say they own so 
much of our debt, we rely so much on importing their goods, such that we are able 
to finance our borrowing. And at the same time, the Chinese own increasing stake in 
the economic future of the U.S. is increasing, and Americans are depending on low 
cost goods. (012-L).
1021
  
 
Swartz (AEI) illustrates the importance of power as being relational to China’ rise:  
 
For me, interesting watching from the AEI, I believe pretty strongly of the 
importance of primacy American power. When we do good, I don’t necessarily take 
it to the next step being paranoid about what is China going to do. (017-Q).
1022
 
 
                                                          
1018 See Deborah Reed-Danahay, Locating Bourdieu (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 104; 
Giselinde Kuipers, “The rise and decline of national habitus: Dutch cycling culture and the shaping of national 
similarity,” European Journal of Social Theory, 16(1) (2013): 17-35. 
1019 Bourdieu 1984, op.cit. 
1020 Interview Seth Crospey (Hudson Institute), recording: 22 min (012-L). 
1021 Cropsey, recording: 10 min. 
1022 Interview Swartz (AEI), recording: (017-Q). 
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Levy (AEI) relates the term (‘ideology’) to the ‘American Conscious’.1023 I argue 
this justifies the operationalisation of ‘habitus’ as an American Self – as Richard 
Hofstadter promulgated: “It has been our fate as a nation, not to have ideologies but 
to be one”. 1024 In my opinion, it is nevertheless an ideology. But rather than 
subscribing to any other nation’s ideology, it is an exercise in offering a uniquely 
different (a system of lasting transposable dispositions)
1025
 practicing of a belief-
system.
1026
 This particular take on the American Self diffuses with the concept of 
American exceptionalism – signalling the American difference1027 necessitated for 
demarcating the Self from the Other in terms of identity-formation
1028
 – which can 
be argued to be aligned with Huntington’s view on American universal principles: 
liberty, equality, democracy, constitutionalism, liberalism, limited government.
1029
 In 
concert, this realisation connects the present line of inquiry with the very starting 
point of this study; un-packing ‘American-ness’. 
 
The term ‘ideology’ is generally frowned upon in American political discourse1030 – 
as expressed by Ellen Frost (Peterson): “when you say ideology, yes, not quite sure 
how to answer then, we think about that as something communists have, we have 
values” (001-A).1031 The term ‘ideology’ is frequently used however in discourses 
relating to China. Frost continues by relating ‘American-ness’ (aka individualism) 
                                                          
1023 Interview Levy (AEI), recording: 29 min (007-G). 
1024 Kohn 1955, op.cit. 411; Lipset 1996, op.cit. 18.  
1025 Bourdieu 1977, Outline of a Theory of Practice, op.cit. 82-83. 
1026 As established in Chapter Two (theoretical framework), habitus becomes culture, herein consisting of durable 
transposable dispositions or organising actions (see Bourdieu, P 1977, ibid.). 
1027 Lipset 1996, ibid. 19; Alexis de Tocqueville, op.cit. 36. 
1028 See Eriksen 1992, Ethnicity and Nationalism, op.cit. 
1029 Huntington 1997, The Erosion of American National Interests, op.cit. 29. 
1030 For example, see Frost (Peterson) (001-A) interview. There are exceptions, but then often relating to 
something inherently positive (in an American context) – such as John Locke’s foundation principles for 
liberalism (see Dominic Tierney, “Why Are Americans So Ideologically United?,” The Atlantic (2011). Available: 
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/08/why-are-americans-so-ideologically-united/243951/). 
1031 Interview Frost (Peterson), recording 06.33 (001-A).These two-fold narratives are also discussed in her 
Kissinger paper.  
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and being outspoken/candid as a focal American value/thinking – in opposition to 
China (001-A).
1032
 This stance exemplifies the coined “twin-Other” concept; an 
‘enemy Othering’ of China creates and justifies a stronger self-congratulatory 
attitudes to what is perceived to be embodied within the ‘American Self’. 
Furthermore, this type of Othering also showcases my proposed nuancing of 
Hansen’s work – due to the good (‘values’)/bad (‘ideology’) binary as far as 
Othering is concerned, is transpiring across different countries – in this case ‘India 
good’, ‘China bad’.  
 
Bryan Wakefield (Wilson Center) points out an American cultural lens regarding 
China’s rise: 
 
Certainly the case with the U.S. is that Americans tend to see other countries that 
look like successful as a threat, same with the Japanese in the 1980s. Perhaps not 
people at the official executive level (…) still people see China in that way, but 
Chinese behaviour last year did not dispel that notion. (005-E).
1033
  
 
Pieter Bottelier (JHU and Carnegie) follows suit by pointing out the embedded 
mistrust against Japan in American culture – as was the case with the Soviet Union 
during the Cold-War era. He describes why suspiciousness against China evolves is 
plausibly due to the closed nature of China as opposed to India where society is 
much more open, transparent, and accountable (what matters to the U.S.) which 
manifests itself with a better negotiation climate at the individual level: “Very hard 
for Americans to look at China as a normal country – China is dubious (,,,)” (038-
WX).
1034
 
 
A policy-researcher at the WRI supports the above: 
                                                          
1032 Frost, recording 26.00 (001-A). 
1033 Bryan Wakefield (Wilson Center), recording 22.02 & 18.47 (005-E). 
1034 Interview Pieter Bottelier (JHU and Carnegie) (038-WX).  
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Personally I feel like many people in this country try to pain China into a Soviet 
Union during the Cold War – looking for an Other to fill the adversary role. Too bad 
for cooperation. More and more but in the private sector not the case; business is 
business and corporations have to work together across boundaries. The general 
public outburst mentality we saw last election cyclic, scare tactics from both sides 
that if China rules the world they would outpace our jobs outpace our military, job 
losses going to China – “my opponent is sending jobs to China” (…) China is now 
positioned where Japan was 1-2 decades ago. (028-CD).
1035
 
 
Dan Blumenthal (AEI) expresses:  
 
(…) why do we know more about India, because they are open! I mean China is 
closed in many ways, hard to control perceptions, quite natural. Columnists who go 
to China don’t go to Sanshui, they go to the Dallas equivalent and say they are like 
us. (008-H).
1036
  
 
On a similar note, Levenstein (Wilson Center) addresses the American self-image – 
which is intensified due to asymmetric understanding between the two peoples:
1037
  
 
(…) in terms of self-image, I think that, dominance of global seas has always been 
closely tied with U.S. military excellence. I think that part of this country’s [USA] 
self-image comes from how we have the most power military in the world, and that 
we use it to do good things all over the world. That is how we get the image to paint 
ourselves as a benevolent superpower. And I think that China has the next powerful 
military (…) the U.S. military is viewed upon as an overpowering giant and 
knowing so little about the Chinese military sort of motivates the U.S. to look within 
and try to refine the military (…) there is a military industrial complex here in the 
U.S. and it’s one of powerful industry in this country. To keep that working we need 
to maintain their standards of excellence that the U.S. military has and I think they 
are threatened by the rise and size of the Chinese military because first of all they 
know so little about the Chinese military – I think every year the Department of 
Defense report about the Chinese military. I think that, they have to take a more 
exaggerated, alarmist tone, that is one way to scare the military into improving and 
innovating themselves, stay in top form – serves the purpose (006-F).1038 
 
                                                          
1035 Interview, WRI, recording: 08.43 (028-CD). 
1036 Interview Blumenthal (AEI), recording: 25.27 (008-H). 
1037 As established in an earlier narrative-cluster (this chapter). 
1038 Interview Levenstein (Wilson Center), recording: 52.27 (006-F). 
325 
 
Peter Marsters (Wilson Center) affirms the prevalence of religion in U.S. politics, 
pointing out that morality is
1039
 often attached to U.S.’ actions in larger conflicts 
allowing righteousness to serve as guiding principles – as an inherent aspect of 
American culture (011-K).
1040
  
 
The boundary-markers for this cluster include ‘meaning-construction’, ‘multilevel 
and multi-faceted influence of culture’, ‘enemy-Othering’, ‘practice of ideology’, 
and ‘fear’. 
 
6.4 Discussion of key findings, overarching argument/thesis, and 
proposed contributions 
In the previous sub-section, selected empirical data (aka policy-researchers’ 
narratives) were presented in four narrative-clusters. The present sub-section will 
highlight key findings (interfacing with self-reflexivity, the role of culture, as well as 
IR’s realist ‘school of thought’ and the constructivist research programme), articulate 
the overarching argument (i.e. a particular political lens linked with Bourdieu’s doxa 
and a qualitative outlook on exceptionalism) – in addition to establish proposed 
contributions. Key findings, new coined terms, and proposed contributions from the 
other analysis chapters will be drawn upon.
1041
 In the analysis section below, I will 
                                                          
1039 For substantiated support for this notion, see Lee Marsden, “Faith-based Diplomacy: Conservative 
Evangelicals and the United States Military,” Politics and Religion (2013): 1-24; Lee Marsden, “Bush, Obama and 
a faith-based US foreign policy,” International Affairs, 88(5) (2012): 953–974;; Lee Marsden, “Religion, Identity 
and American Power in the age of Obama,” International Politics, 48 (2011): 326-343.  
1040 Interview Peter Marsters (Wilson Center), recording: 12.31 (011-K). 
1041 These type of key findings have a two-fold purpose; a finding in its own right in the present Chapter, but also 
the added value to support (or otherwise) findings in previous chapters. Hence, in effect, this increases the 
plausibility and internal validity of corresponding findings purported in other chapters.  
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also make use of empirical data from interviews with relevant academic experts as a 
means to strengthen the credibility of the analysis.
1042
 
  
6.4.1 Discussion of key findings 
I shall be highlighting five key findings, which have been derived, based on the 
inductive, iterative, hermeneutical analysis process where selected bodies of 
literature have been subjectively chosen to be juxtaposed with the empirical data. 
 
The first key finding builds on the identical discovery in the previous chapter – the 
importance of self-reflexive deliberation as part of the investigation but lacking in 
such engagement amongst the majority of the interviewed policy researchers. In 
effect, this finding also expands Bourdieu’s ‘epistemic reflexivity’ towards a 
stronger epistemological foundation. Such an approach is aligned with Maton’s 
argument that the objectifying should also scrutinise the relationship between the 
objectified and the social scientific claim that I would present as the researcher.
1043
 
This illustrates how my intellectual biases not only influence how I gaze at my 
interviewees, but also the knowledge-production, and thus making the self-reflexive 
deliberation efforts as an epistemological driver.  
 
For example my ‘researcher habitus’ as ‘Norwegian-ness’ is not only about 
appreciating that my ontological lens might make me disposed to detect particular 
things in the imparted narratives, but also why I think policy-researchers think and 
act as they do. This constitutes Maton’s ‘epistemic capital’,1044 which moves beyond 
                                                          
1042 I would like to thank my friend and colleague, Carina van de Wetering (University of Bristol, United 
Kingdom/Leiden University, the Netherlands), whom I interviewed these experts with, for the transcribed quotes. 
The quotes are used with her permission. 
1043 See Maton 2004, op.cit. 53, 57. 
1044 Reflecting the additional relationship to scrutinise, herein between the researched (objective) and the 
knowledge-claim (by the researcher) (see Maton 2004, op.cit. 53.) 
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the product of “objectifying objectification”, i.e. own social background, position in 
the intellectual field, and intellectual bias.
1045
 I agree with Maton that aforesaid 
capital assists in further enhancing the epistemological potential of Bourdieu’s 
‘epistemic reflexivity’.1046 The relevance and application of this finding applies 
beyond the think tank environment – including any activities related to making social 
scientific claims. This outlook is pertinent to highlight if aiming to understand 
international relations also at the individual level where analysis of decision-makers 
should be taken into account due to the ‘objectification’ transpiring in their work 
integral to a multitude of different Bourdieusian ‘social fields’. 
 
The following findings relate to the dynamics and the substantive spread of analysed 
narratives. The second key finding centres specifically on issues tied in with lack of 
understanding and learning between the U.S. and China. The policy-researchers 
identify a big gap in mutual understanding and thus a need for enhanced learning 
between the countries and peoples, especially when moving away from top-experts 
in government.
1047
 Chapter Four (‘social field’) evinces its relevance – as 
understanding the sociological meso-level set-up of the field signals an important 
reminder about the contextual influence. This relates particularly to the more 
influential ‘field of powers’ (i.e. economy and media meta-fields) as a means to 
appreciate how agency (microindividual) and structure (macrostructural) are 
interfacing with the observable practice; for example superficial media coverage in 
relation to insufficient public awareness and enlightenment.
1048
 In essence, this line 
                                                          
1045 See Bourdieu 1990b, The logic of practice, op.cit; and Bourdieu 2000, Pascalian mediations, op.cit. 
1046 See Maton, ibid. 53. 
1047 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Stability and Instability in Sino–US Relations: A Response to Yan Xuetong’s 
Superficial Friendship Theory”, Chinese Journal of International Politics, 4(1) (2011): 28. 
1048 I stress, this is not my opinion or drawing upon stereotyping or generalisations – but merely imparting (my 
perceptions of) viewpoints of policy-researchers themselves. 
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of inquiry further substantiates my argument in the foregoing chapter; that the 
limitations from relying on the bilateral trajectory,
1049
 and the importance of 
meaning-construction.
 
 
Steven Balla (George Washington University) supports this notion by pointing out 
how the Chinese psyche further increases misunderstandings due to deep 
misconceptions about the ‘West’ is “out to get them” – a persuasive attitude in 
Chinese society and government whose ordeal to recover after 100 years of 
humiliation remain not well understood in the ‘West’. Balla points out the major 
disabling factor for achieving good understanding is the failure of the ‘West’ to read 
and understand Mandarin (018-R).1050 The elevation of non-state levels further 
support findings in the previous chapter, as IR is predominantly ontologically 
focused on the state-to-state level.
1051
  
 
The above facet of learning across levels interfaces with the proposed third key 
finding, i.e. national interest and multiplicity of identity. The narrative accounts 
signal the impressions of China’s national interest (raison d’État) to currently being 
forming, and subsequently highly intersubjective in nature – and thus not innately 
given or fixed. This was evident in answers which related to what type of power 
China wants to pursue and their search for identity and role to embody in the 
international system. Aspects such as identity-formation (and to some extent internal 
domestic variables) are hardly mentioned in regard to sensemaking of China’s 
                                                          
1049 These type of key findings have a two-fold purpose; a finding in its own right in the present chapter, but also 
having the added value through its property of supporting (or otherwise) findings in previous chapters in this 
thesis – hence, in effect, increases the plausibility and internal validity of corresponding findings purported in 
other chapters.  
1050 Interview Steven Balla, Associate Professor of Political Science, Public Policy and Public Administration, and 
International Affairs (Elliott School of International Affairs, GWU), recording: 17.57 (018-R). 
1051 See Waltz 1979, Theory of International Politics, op.cit. 
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behaviour and intentions. This contradicts two established theoretical bodies of 
literature in IR research. 
  
One the one hand, realists’ notions of a primary and inherent national interest cannot 
be assumed to be fully valid in light of the above.
1052
 For example, if ‘national 
interest’ is taken to be a representation of exercised power (such as ‘influence’ or 
‘control’)1053 – if the latter is not known, the very remit of the realist’s inherent 
‘national interest’ is weakened as an explanatory frame.1054 Furthermore, the realist 
notion of approaching power chiefly as material resources is evidently less plausible 
– contemplating on the above narrative accounts. In fact, the narrative accounts grant 
more capital to other forms of conceptualisation of ‘power’.1055 If Morgenthau’s 
notion of power-struggle is assumed as the ontological lens,
1056
 then it can be argued 
that China’s rise and trajectory (partly) transpires beyond the realist paradigmatic 
lens and thus not engaged with; as I have previously argued, as explanatory-frames, 
paradigms in IR ought not to be considered as one binary but multiple binaries 
depending on the different policy-areas – and that, for example, realist and 
constructivist paradigms should be thought of as diffusing with varying strengths 
depending on context/policy-areas.
1057
 The realist-thinking is noticeable in many of 
the policy-researchers’ narratives on the “China-thinking” in general as well as 
within American society. Barrett (Atlantic Council) is particularly highlighting 
                                                          
1052 I acknowledge that classical realists do not discard moral judgement, however, my argument here relates 
more to the innate nature of ‘interests’ per se for a nation. 
1053 See Robert A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power”, Behavioral Science, 2 (1957): 201‐15.  
1054 Interviewee Douglas Paal (Carnegie) recently discusses the issue: ‘Contradictions in China’s Foreign Policy’, 
13 Dec, 2013 (Available: http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/12/13/contradictions-in-china-s-foreign-
policy/gw4w). 
1055 See Stefano Guzzini, “The Use and Misuse of Power Analysis in International Theory”, in Ronen Palan 
(ed.), Global Political Economy: Contemporary Theories (London: Routledge, 2000), 53‐66. 
1056 Morgenthau [1948] 1960, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, op.cit. 
1057 David Guttormsen & Ben Jacoby, “Bridging a ‘Gap’?: Academia and the Realist – Constructivism Debate”, 
op.cit. 
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Mearsheimer (029-Y)
1058
 –  where thinking would lean towards a zero-sum game 
where power would be distributed amongst Great Powers, hence China’s rise 
becoming deadlock into the mirror-question “what, then, about American power”.1059 
Such an unhealthy approach is evident in much of American political and media 
discourse – as Levy (AEI) showcased;1060 job gains for China is not necessarily at 
the direct expense of American job-losses. 
 
On the other hand, the constructivist research programme in IR has assumed primacy 
to construction/ideas, thus inherently always proceeding structures/materiality.
1061
 
Likewise, traditionally, the intentionality of constructivists (such as Adler and 
Wendt) has been to prioritise ontology over epistemology. However, the nature of 
the empirical data and the social constructionist outlook of the ethnographic research 
process, demonstrates how the above research philosophical conceptions, rather, are 
“two sides of the same coin”.1062 The conceptualising and thinking carried out by the 
policy-researchers represent where worldviews and the knowledge-production is 
dialectically materialising, and subsequently, unfolding. This method of 
understanding ‘reality’ of international relations would ultimately depend on the 
                                                          
1058 Barrett, recording: 47.05. See Waltz's Theory of International Politics (1979), op.cit., and  
Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York City: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001). 
1059 In fact, the above reflects recently proposed fruitful avenues for future research (see David A. Baldwin, 
“Power and International Relations,” in Handbook of International Relations, eds. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas 
Risse, and Beth A. Simmons. 2nd Ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2013): 273-297), such as forms 
of power, exercising power through institutions, how domestic politics influence ‘national power’, and distribution 
of Dahl’s relational power. 
1060 Previous Chapter (see Interview Levy, recording: 09.18 min (007-G)). 
1061 See S.J. Barkin, “Realist Constructivism and Realist-Constructivisms,” International Studies Review (2004): 
348-352; J.T. Checkel, “The constructivist turn in international relations theory,” World Politics 50 (1998): 324-
348; R.N. Lebow, “Constructive Realism,” International Studies Review (2004): 346-348; J.B. Mattern, “Power in 
Realist-Constructivist Research,” International Studies Review (2004): 343-346; J. Sterling-Folker, “Realist-
Constructivism and Morality,” International Studies Review (2004): 341-343; P. Jackson Thaddeus (ed.), 
“Bridging the Gap: Towards a Realist-Constructivist Dialogue,” International Studies Review 6 (2004): 337-352; 
P. Jackson Thaddeus & D.H. Nexon, “Constructivist Realism or Realist-Constructivism?,” International Studies 
Review (2004): 337-341; M. Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality 
(Cambridge: University Press, 2002) – for review texts of constructivist research in IR, as well as Guzzini and 
Leander (eds.), Constructivism and international relations: Alexander Wendt and his critics (Oxford: Routledge, 
2006) for an evaluation of Wendt and social theory in IR. 
1062 See Pouliot & Mérand, “Bourdieu’s concept: Political sociology in international relations,” op.cit. 30. 
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surrounding political/policy-issues as well as contexts in a dialectical and relational 
manner.
1063
 For example, materiality might at times prevail over ideas/immateriality; 
there are many ways to perceive the world, but not one where China has procured its 
first aircraft carrier, and another psychically distinct world, where they have not.
1064
 
Pacheco-Pardo argues that the U.S.-Sino relationship is one of, predominantly, 
cooperation; ‘materialistic terms seem incomplete’ and that ideas matter (for 
example, self-image being a driver for ‘interests’).1065 Ikenberry further establishes 
that China remains a status-quo power not showing attempts of challenging the U.S. 
or the order in the international system.
1066
 Indeed, the “real world” is being played 
out in the nexus of physicality and ideas.
1067
 
 
The fourth key finding relate to the empirically soundness and relevance for placing 
meaning-construction at the forefront of this inquiry – integral to social 
constructionism as the driver of knowledge-production – in order to obtained deeper 
and more contextualised understanding. Placing Waltz’ neorealist structural theory 
and the accompanying level-of-analysis debate to the side momentarily,
1068
 I would 
argue that the narratives presented in this Chapter also shows the pertinence of the 
claims of some IR constructivists; that state-behaviour is determined by identity (as 
earlier stated, contextualisation is needed for allowing a peaceful co-existence 
                                                          
1063 See Jutta Weldes, “Constructing national interests,” European Journal of International Relations, 2(3) (1996): 
275-318, for a critique of the realist notion of national interests. 
1064 See Kathrin Hille Aug 10 2011, ‘China’s first aircraft carrier takes to sea’, Financial Times. Available: 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6b20cdce-c300-11e0-8cc7-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1cHvGGqPy. Co-existence 
between materiality and construction ought to be unproblematic research philosophically, as the co-existence of 
realist ontology and constructionist epistemology is not a contradiction. There was a physical world (dinosaurs) 
before humans, but not a social world (see Crotty 2003, op.cit). 
1065 See Ramon Pacheco-Pardo, “Review article – Beyond Power Transition: Sino-American Relations in the 
21st Century,” op.cit. p. 154-160. See Rudra Sil & Peter J. Katzenstein, Beyond Paradigms: Analytical 
Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics (Basingstoke: Routledge, 2010), 3, 93. 
1066 G. John Ikenberry, “The Liberal International Order and its Discontents,” Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies 38(3) (2010). 
1067 See Guttormsen & Jacoby (2011), op.cit. This intersectional point represents one of the social sciences’ 
achilles heels. 
1068 See Waltz 1979, Theory of International Politics, op.cit. 
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between realist and constructivist paradigmatic dialogues – depending on the event 
and context),
1069
 and thus that behaviourism (from Social Psychology) and 
Behaviouralism (from Political Science) offer limited explanatory frames. Such a 
stance is especially evident when such identities have not been fully formed (in this 
case, China as the rising power).  
 
However, I would argue that further expansion on the above constructivist thinking 
within IR is both warranted and needed. On the one hand, critiquing what I find to be 
a streak of structuralism in Klotz’ and Lynch’ perspective on IR constructivism:1070 
identity should not be considered as an isolated entity guiding behaviour – but rather 
performs in symbiosis (observable behaviour is part of identity too). From Cultural 
Anthropology, we should be reminded by Geertz’ stance on the inseparable nature of 
Man, which I interface with the discussion of state-behaviour: “Man should be 
understood as a “summative upshot” of diffusing values, behaviour, biological, 
psychological processes, and social existence”.1071 The deterministic nature above 
(lack of macrostructural facets which is supposed to be present in the sociological 
meso-level set-up) could draw upon the discussion why Bourdieu’s ‘social fields’ are 
not fixed’.1072 Furthermore, to operate with static signs for observable and 
measureable behaviour (of the State) I argue becomes overly focused on differences 
                                                          
1069 See Guttormsen & Jacoby 2011, op.cit; S.J. Barkin, “Realist Constructivism and Realist-Constructivisms,” 
International Studies Review (2004): 348-352; J.T. Checkel, “The constructivist turn in international relations 
theory,” World Politics 50 (1998): 324-348; R.N. Lebow, “Constructive Realism,” International Studies Review 
(2004): 346-348; J.B. Mattern, “Power in Realist-Constructivist Research,” International Studies Review (2004): 
343-346; J. Sterling-Folker, “Realist-Constructivism and Morality,” International Studies Review (2004): 341-343; 
P. Jackson Thaddeus (ed.), “Bridging the Gap: Towards a Realist-Constructivist Dialogue,” International Studies 
Review 6 (2004): 337-352; P. Jackson Thaddeus & D.H. Nexon, “Constructivist Realism or Realist-
Constructivism?,” International Studies Review (2004): 337-341. 
1070 Klotz & Lynch 2007, op.cit. 
1071 Geertz 1973, The Interpretation of Cultures, op.cit. 
1072 It should here be recognised that Bourdieu’s concept of ‘social field’ has been criticised for being 
deterministic in nature as well. 
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– what Barth referred to as “cultural stuff”1073 – rather than viewing boundaries as 
“continuous inclusion and exclusion through socialisation and categorisation of 
differences”.1074 Thus, the inquiry should focus on how relations between the 
different countries are performing and the Whys and Hows relating to boundary-
markers during constructions of identities (“we” and “them”).1075 The core of the 
above critique has an applied relevance, contemplating on Garrett’s (Atlantic 
Council) critique against attributing intentions without evidence.
1076
 
 
How “enemy-Othering” is exaggerated plausibly as a result of asymmetric and 
imbalanced understanding, is expressed by Deepa Ollapally (George Washington 
University): 
 
(...) India has it good, because no one sees it as a threat in the West. But it is rising 
just like China, so what is the difference. Here I bring back identity. India is seen as 
a democratic, open society. China is seen as an authoritarian government with a 
government that has got its iron-grip. The idea of the democratic-peace theory is not 
entirely true but it helps India as it is rising (031-IJ).
1077
  
 
As Garrett boldly expressed: “easier to hate them [China]”, and also points out the 
dangers of self-prophecies: “treat it as enemy, and you create one. There are some 
benefits, if selling bombs you need a threat. This dynamics pushes the arms race. 
Hence, there are political forces on both sides” (025-Y).1078 This also provides the 
                                                          
1073 Barth 1971, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, op.cit. See David S. A. Guttormsen “Looking Forward by 
Looking Back: a Self/Other Perspective on Intercultural Expatriate Research,” in Routledge Companion to Cross-
Cultural Management, eds. Nigel Holden et al. (Routledge: London, 2015). 
1074 See Lauring & Guttormsen 2010, op.cit. 
1075 See Bourdieu 2004, Distinction, op.cit; and Eugeen E. Roosens, Creating ethnicity, (London: Sage, 1989). 
1076 Garrett writes in the The New Atlanticist: “There is an all-too-common practice in Washington punditry of 
attributing strategic intentions to other countries without any apparent evidence” (Available: 
http://192.254.129.212/new_atlanticist/how-do-they-know). 
1077 Interview with Deepa Ollapally, Research Professor of International Affairs (Elliott School of International 
Affairs, GWU), recording: 47.56 (031-IJ). 
1078 Interview Banning (Atlantic Council), recording: 57.55 (025-Y). 
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opportunity for introducing a new, third concept:
1079
 reversed ‘deflective-Othering’. 
This coined term extends ‘deflective Othering’ (the underlying process of a 
‘deflecting meta-narrative’), in the sense of a meta-narrative is not only internalised 
by the majority (but applying to only a few) – but also transpires as a result of the 
(un)conscious purpose of upholding a desirable (American) Self which develops into 
some sort of ‘universal truth’ by the sheer volume of the populace. Particular non-
desirable behaviours, consequently, are detached from the projected (and desirable) 
American Self. In concert, the above substantiates my argument, warranted by my 
empirical data, in regard to the work on Othering by Hansen and Campbell.
1080
 
 
6.4.2 Introducing the overarching ‘political ontological lens’ argument/thesis (as 
‘deflective Other’): Bourdieu and exceptionalism 
The overarching thesis identified for the present Chapter constitutes the fifth key 
finding. This overall argument/thesis is founded on established key findings and the 
discursive frame delineated from (my subjective interpretation of) the empirical data 
included in the investigatory scope of this particular Chapter. My sense-making is 
aided by the theoretical framework of the study (Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice), and 
I shall interlink the above with a particular facet of the ‘American exceptionalism’ 
theory. Furthermore, the overarching thesis encompasses the focal theoretical ideas 
integral to the theoretical framework (alongside Bourdieu) and findings in the 
preceding analysis chapters. 
 
I am arguing that the primacy of political values, and thus prevalent in the “political 
lexis” and relayed narratives, in the “China-narratives”, plausibly constitute the 
                                                          
1079 The first two were introduced in the foregoing Chapter Five; “twin-Other” and “deflective-narrative” (and 
deflective Other – derived from the latter). 
1080 See Hansen 2006, op.cit. 42, 46-51; and Campbell 1998, op.cit. 
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‘ontological lens’ within which ‘China’ is being “read” and from where ‘American-
ness’ as Self is constructed through. This is evident, both in the policy-researchers’ 
own conceptualisations as well as when narrating and assessing beyond own 
personal opinions. This argument further underscores that this ‘political lens’ serves 
as the reference points in terms of the Otherness of China (boundary-markers 
through the process of Othering) are saliently political characteristics. As Nat Ahrens 
promulgates about what constitutes ‘America’: 
 
(…) projection of values, beliefs that our value system is the only value system in 
the world, and should be pushed on other countries, there is some arrogance 
perceived about that. The other is intervention for commercial reasons. (020-T).
1081
 
 
Feffer (IPS) finds the following particularly ‘American’ – which he relates to 
political values: 
 
(…) well, we tend to think of all other countries as democracies in the making, you 
know, that is very American of us. And so, a country like China – China is now but 
fundamentally a democracy in making. All countries are democracies in making. In 
other words we have a theologically understanding where democracy is the endpoint 
in political evolution. Therefore questions where countries might backslide a little 
bit, but ultimately heading in that direction. We cannot allow for the possibility that 
the country is not heading in the direction of democracy, nor have a very different 
understanding of political order (…) and then the questions become which policies, 
either accelerate the country towards the goal we are thinking they are heading 
towards, or prevent/allow them to not head towards that goal. I think that is very 
American – the notion of progress. We are a progressive Institute (…) not peculiar 
to the Obama Administration, or conservatives, or China haters or nothing like that. 
I think they are, a certain set of assumptions we have as Americans when we look at 
other countries. (013-M).
1082
 
 
Frost (Peterson) further illuminates that some perceive China as non-transparent 
which becomes constructed as a binary to the American value-system – and also 
reflecting broader shared opinions amongst the policy-researchers themselves (in 
their narratives): 
                                                          
1081 Interview Nat Ahrens, 17 June 2011 (020-T) (recording: 23.25). 
1082 Interview Feffer (IPS), recording: 01.01.46 (013-M). 
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(…) white papers every two year analysed in depth here enormously, not transparent 
by our measure – not systems, capabilities and intentions, secrecy, inner circle, and 
notion of accountability to the public lacks. We are simple people because we are 
open (…) what we say in private we say in public. We are one extreme on the 
transparency spectrum, a core value in the U.S., but traditionally not normal to be 
open in China. (001-A).
1083
 
 
China, as is the case with all other countries, does not have a political facet only. By 
deploying the ‘ontological political lens’ onto China, it somewhat denies agency to 
the holistic dynamism of that country, for example social aspects and to some extent 
internal variables within China’s domestic political sphere. Paal (Carnegie) identified 
the “lifted out of poverty story” as a forgotten narrative in relation to China, and that 
China’s rise pertinently was the same old story as with Japan in the 1980s (022-
V).
1084
 In my opinion, substantiating my argument, it is rather astonishing that 
gargantuan aspects such as nearly 130 million are considered as poor,
1085
 and 800 
million remain living in rural area (“out of sight, out of mind” – including a 
staggering 500 million who lives for less than $2/£1.40 day according to the World 
Bank).
1086
 I am not arguing that the above ‘deflective’ processes and Othering is 
unexpected or abnormal – reconnecting with self-reflexivity (of policy-researchers 
interviewed) and Bourdieu’s ‘social field’ – the ‘ontological political lens’ is a 
natural mechanism. 
  
The above is the backdrop of my argument for deploying the concepts of a 
‘deflective Other’. The Other (aka China) is being upheld in order to strengthen the 
(American) Self, herein political facets due to the binary relations with an “enemy-
                                                          
1083 Frost (Peterson), recording: 20 min. 
1084 Interview Douglas Paal, recording: 16.58 & 30.36 (022-V). 
1085 See ‘China's poor: World-class poverty’, The Economist 2013. Available: 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2013/02/chinas-poor. 
1086 Mukul Devichand 2010, ‘Millions 'left behind' in rural China’, BBC Radio 4. Available: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/8668086.stm. 
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Other”: for example, China being ‘red’ and ‘communist’ – whereas the U.S. is the 
beacon of ‘democracy’, ‘capitalism’, and ‘free market enterprise’. More focus on, let 
us say, social inadequacies in China would open up for more scrutiny on the same 
aspects in U.S. society. This might conflict and subsequently weaken the sensation 
of the desired American Self, and thus potentially devaluate core aspects of that Self, 
for example American leadership of the ‘free world’. Ollapally suggests: 
 
I think the U.S., in the past, has needed an enemy threat. That was the way in which 
the military state was able to get resources, an activist policy. During the Cold war, 
there was an activist policy. In order to get people along with it, you needed an 
enemy. So you inflate the threat and that is what you did. So conflating threats 
where there were no real core interests. How do you manage to do that: send troops 
and money! Beyond your means militarily, when you cannot show a clear threat to 
you. U.S. was good at that because of the anti-communist drive. (031-IJ).
1087
 
 
Dickson (GWU) also supports the notion of relics from the Cold War as a typical 
American search for an external threat: 
 
(...) lost enemy in Cold War and had to find a new one (...) always people out there 
looking for rising threats, wanting to exaggerate threat of a country, but equal 
numbers who say not that simplistic. Policy towards China has reflected a threat or 
not to U.S. interest, structuralist realist position rising power inherently threat to 
status quo and incumbent power (030-GH).
1088
 
 
I am also arguing that this typical reading and key finding (‘ontological political 
lens’) is further substantiated and validated by contemplating on that bilateralism1089 
is by default a primarily political realm. These two facets of ‘American-ness’ are 
dialectic; the ‘political’ increases due to the tendency to think bilaterally, and the 
focus on the ‘bilateral’ increases because of principal focus on the ‘political’. I have 
phrased this as ‘ontological’ due to arguing that it is relating to how world-views are 
                                                          
1087 Ollapally, recording: 42.50 (031-IJ). 
1088 Interview with Bruce Dickson (GWU), recording: 22.08 (030-GH). 
1089 In the preceding Chapter Five, I argued that the bilateral trajectory represented ‘American-ness’.  
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organised. Furthermore, it is deflective in terms of Othering as the interests and 
strategising for maintaining the “pure” or “good” (American) Self, indeed is 
entwined with a particular reading of China.  
 
The above argument further exemplifies the relevance for operating with a 
dialectical and relational Self/Other constellation – and furthermore – the nuances 
between Otherness (boundary-markers) and Othering (process). Issues relating to 
mutual understanding become more convoluted when there is no opposite and 
equivalent boundary-marker (applicable to the other country), as articulated by 
Ollapally (GWU): 
 
India and China see themselves as civilizational powers, not normal states. I think 
the U.S. sees them both as normal states. The U.S. does not really understand this 
notion of civilizational states. That is a common assumption about India and China. 
They are difficult to deal with, who are these guys: get off. These upstarts, who do 
they think they are. But in the region, you may not like it, but you do understand, in 
some sense, where these countries are coming from. It may be that over time the 
U.S. will understand this notion of civilizational power and the way the Chinese see 
themselves, the U.S. might have to adjust, but I doubt it, it is very difficult for 
countries who do not have the same sort of historical background to put themselves 
in the other countries’ shoes. (031-IJ).1090 
 
As already announced, I am arguing that the ‘ontological political lens’, as 
‘American-ness’ constitutes a qualitative aspect of American exceptionalism – 
opposed to the quantitative outlook which was highlighted in Chapter Five; the 
sentiment that America (identity) is being quantifiably unique/exceptionally 
different, for example, in terms of comprable size of GDP and the military.
1091
 In the 
present Chapter, however, I am proposing that the ‘ontological political lens’ 
signifies the flipside of the coin; the notion of America (identity) is being 
                                                          
1090 Ollapally (GWU), recording: 14.45 (031-IJ). 
1091 See Buzan 2005, op.cit; Lepgold & McKeown 1995, op.cit. 369-84; Lipset 1996, op.cit; McCrisken 2002, 
op.cit. 
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unique/exceptionally different and qualitatively better. In effect, I am painting a 
conscious and unconscious, respectively, aspect of American exceptionalism, where 
the political reading, unconsciously, makes the performativity of ‘American-ness’ a 
normative one – in crude terms saying to other countries; “you ought to become what 
we are” – both in terms of end point, pace, and scope. In concert, this showcases why 
self-reflexivity, and thus Bourdieu’s epistemic outlook (and Maton’s extensions) is 
important; policy-researchers also need to investigate the relationships between 
themselves (and organisations) and their study subjects and themes, as well as 
scientific knowledge-claims and own intellectual biases.  
 
Feffer concurs with relating the above normative aspect (‘American as the ultimate 
democracy’) as an epitome of ‘American-ness’: 
  
(...) absolutely, absolutely and you know, we are suspicious of models which don’t 
look like ours, we speak [inaudible: negatively] of Italy for instance – we say that 
they practically don’t have a government, because so much changes in the 
parliament system there. But yes, we believe, I mean it cuts across not just 
politically but understanding of American economy as well, the way their economies 
should be (…) And culturally, there are expectations in American culture of being 
the ultimate achievement through globalisation of culture where other countries 
become more like the America whether it is they are eating McDonald’s, listening to 
our rock music – or their rock music sounding as ours, whatever it is, it is heading 
towards our system, and if pointing out that in many ways our system is deficient – 
that falls on death ears (…) naval gazing is similarly to what we do, we don’t think 
of us as that as we always look outwards, engaged in the world, active. But our 
exceptionalism does essentially make us parochial not perspectives. So few 
examples from outside this country that enrich ours. Mind you many do as 
immigrants [laughter], but they basically have to leave their country at the border 
when they come here: “yeah language but get rid of”. I’ll, give you an example in 
our legal system, perennial supreme court discussion, just to use a foreign law as an 
argument – not to follow that law – God forbid – only if another country does have 
this law and if we should think about that and the argument used when taking about 
a similar issue NO, very strong legal tradition here, cannot even use those foreign 
laws in our argument. That is telling about our refusal of other examples that might 
enrich us or push us in a better direction. (013-M).
1092
 
                                                          
1092 Feffer, recording: 01.04.19. 
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It is at this juncture where I link Bourdieu’s social theory with the qualitative aspect 
of exceptionalism, which can be explained by Bourdieu’s conceptual “thinking tool” 
of ‘doxa’. My presupposition entails that policy-researchers are taking this 
ontological posture to the international system and what constitutes ‘American-ness’ 
as taken-for-granted knowledge as well as axiomatic norms and beliefs.
1093
 Such 
stance harmonises with Dickson’s (GWU) modern version of unconscious 
exceptionalism: “most not thought it through, instinct notion. More evident outside 
than within the country [laughter]” (030-GH).1094 
 
6.5 Chapter conclusion 
In this Chapter, four narrative-clusters served as the discursive frame. Five key 
findings were delineated through juxtaposing empirical data with relevant bodies of 
literatures, including Bourdieu’s ‘epistemic reflexivity’, understanding and learning 
imbalances relating to China’s rise, perspectives on ‘national interest’ and ‘power’ – 
traversing IR realist and constructivist paradigms, and the importance of meaning-
construction. In addition, the overarching argument as the final key finding, related 
to how ‘China’ is being “read” through particular ontological ‘political lenses’. 
Collectively, the inquiry also showcases the relevance of culture, the dialectical and 
relational Self/Other constellation, as well as Bourdieu’s doxa. This ‘doxa’ 
(unconsciousness), I argue is the “mechanism” which enables making sense of the 
qualitative aspect of ‘American exceptionalism’: as a social construction, 
‘American-ness’ is expressed, unconsciously, as what is deemed to be the “better 
country”. The present Chapter also has incorporated key findings and arguments 
                                                          
1093 See Pouliot and Mérand 2013, op.cit. 30. 
1094 Dickson, recording: 44.00. 
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from the two foregoing analysis chapters, and also coined new terms derived from 
‘deflective meta-narrative”, i.e. deflective Other and reversed deflective Othering. 
 
As with the previous chapter, the current one ensues with highlighting the relevance 
of ethnographic research where primacy is given to the policy-researchers and their 
narratives, in addition to the explanatory-power of Bourdieu’s embedded “thinking-
tools”. For example, the “bottom-up” approach discovered the ontological ‘political-
lenses’, and the pertinence to include ‘epistemic reflexive’1095 deliberation for both 
myself as the researcher as well as for policymakers.  
 
This final paragraph concludes the analytical and empirical Section B. The 
remaining Conclusion chapter will briefly (due to each separate chapter containing a 
conclusion) reiterate the main elements of the thesis: main purpose and overarching 
research question, structure of the thesis and components, key findings, main 
contributions, main arguments, limitations, proposed future research avenues, and 
some last self-reflexive remarks concerning the undertaken journey of completing 
this study, metaphorically speaking. 
                                                          
1095 My italicisation. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
Writing the final words for the Conclusion chapter does not only mark the end of the 
PhD thesis as a document, but also – contemplating on Bruno Latour’s notion of 
‘movement within movement’1096 – the experiences of being part of several 
metaphorical journeys coming to an end: for example personal development, 
intellectual challenges, socialisation into professional life within the academe, as 
well as the physical journey of travelling to the U.S. where I spent three exciting 
months in Washington, DC, and New York, NY. And from a Bourdieusian 
‘epistemic reflexivity’ perspective – how do my ‘researcher habitus’ and 
‘Norwegian-ness’ influence the research process and my analysis? The contents of 
this Conclusion reflect the above. As a chapter, I will focus on summarising the main 
components of the doctoral research project – rather than elaborating about the 
holistic enterprise of the study in its entirety. I argue that such an approach is 
justifiable due to each chapter has featured a conclusion section where linkages have 
been made between empirical data and main arguments as well as proposed 
contributions.  
 
I have structured this Chapter into the following sub-sections: summarising of the 
scope of the study and the overarching research question, depicting the crux of the 
thesis chapters, listing key findings, elucidating main arguments and proposed 
contributions, highlighting limitations of the study and presenting fruitful avenues 
                                                          
1096 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (Oxford: University Press, 
2005). 
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for future research, and finally, I shall offer some self-reflexive deliberative 
thoughts. 
 
7.1 Scope of the study and research question 
The study examines the role of culture, investigating how China policy-research 
experts in U.S. think tanks socially construct ‘American-ness’ through ‘China’ as the 
Other. Empirical data comprises in-depth interviews across 26 internationally 
leading think tanks. Data was collected as part of a multi-method, social 
constructionist embedded ethnographic research strategy, and analysed by utilising 
interpretive/ethnographic contents analysis conducted in an inductive, iterative, 
hermeneutical fashion. The transdisciplinary investigation utilises Bourdieu’s Theory 
of Practice as the theoretical framework. The thesis argues that ‘American-ness’ is 
socially constructed and ought to be understood within a Self/Other dialectic; 
suggests the need for establishing a third ‘school of analysis’ in the think tank 
literature focusing on policy-researchers’ conceptualisations; and proposes that 
meaning and context-based explorations can profit from deploying Bourdieu’s 
conceptual “thinking tools”. Contributions include expanding the Bourdieusian 
sociological ‘turn’ in IR research with new empirical data from the think tank realm, 
and providing an important perspective on a significant bilateral relationship (U.S.-
Sino relations) and think tanks as a key player in U.S. Foreign Policy and Politics. 
 
In my study, I have addressed the following overarching research question:  
 
How and why are cultural and social boundaries of ‘American-ness(es)’ 
dialectically drawn by policy-research experts in China-related areas within 
U.S. think tanks through their social construction of narratives on ‘China’ as 
the Other?  
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7.2 Focal aspects of the chapters 
In Chapter One (Introduction), the elements of the overarching research question 
were “unpacked”. The premise of the investigatory scope of the study, and the 
delimitation of the transdisciplinary social theoretical application, were signposted. 
The chapter emphasised the Bourdieu’s dialectical outlook relating to how policy-
researchers socially construct ‘American-ness’ as Self through China as the cultural 
Other – as two inseparable social phenomena.  To the best of my knowledge, the 
conducted research study is the first ethnographic study (drawing especially upon the 
aspects of the ‘cyclic’ research process as well as the social anthropological and 
social constructionist heritage related to this methodology) of a particular think tank 
community and of its policy-researchers regardless of geographical location and 
policy-area. With the added, principal, endeavours of deploying Bourdieu’s Theory 
of Practice as the theoretical framework, I argue that the study offers both originality 
and novelty. 
 
Chapter Two elaborated on the theoretical framework devised for this particular 
investigation. The framework merged, predominantly, traditional social 
anthropological approaches, such as a social constructionist embedded ethnographic 
methodology and meaning-based approaches to understanding ‘culture’ on the one 
hand – with Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice (especially the conceptual “thinking-
tools” of habitus, doxa, field, capital, interests and strategising) and sociological 
relationalism on the other. In addition, I have also engaged in self-reflexive 
interrogation by offering my own viewpoints as well as having questioned my own 
assumptions. Arguably, to achieve transparency and credibility during interpretive, 
qualitative research endeavours is likely to be enhanced when evaluating the role of 
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my own social background, social positions in the intellectual field of knowledge 
production, and intellectual biases.
1097
 
 
Chapter Three provided an explorative literature review. The first part surveyed the 
application of Bourdieu’s social theory in IR research. This undertaking established 
the ongoing exploration of coupling Bourdieu’s sociology of sociology with IR, via 
the Bourdieusian ‘sociological turn’ in IR research – which is experiencing an 
expanding research focus and agenda within the discipline. The other part of the 
review related to the specific think literature – and secondary, the role of think tanks 
in U.S. Foreign Policy (specifically, towards China) and in IR research. When 
examining cross-overs in the literature, Medvetz’ work on think tanks emerged as 
having a foothold in Bourdieusian social theory.
1098
 Thus, it made sense to juxtapose 
the present study with his lines of inquiries and findings. The review identified the 
relevance of applying Bourdieu’s sociology of sociology as a methodological 
vocabulary – and consequently broadening the empirical contexts within the above-
mentioned ‘turn’ (i.e. think tanks). Bourdieu’s emphasis on relationalism also 
facilitated for proposing contributions beyond the IR discipline – as the conceptual 
“thinking tools” are often employed separately in the wider social sciences.1099 
 
Chapter Four serves as a bridge chapter between the three theory chapters and the 
three empirical ones. Think tanks and the China policy-research experts were 
construed as a Bourdieusian ‘social field’, which offered opportunities for richer and 
                                                          
1097 See Maton, “Reflexivity, Relationism and Research”, op.cit. 52; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, op.cit. 39. 
1098 See Medvetz 2012, op.cit. 
1099 See Schwartz 2008, op.cit. 
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contextualised explanations, partly due to incorporating impinging macrostructures 
as part of the sociological meso-level set-up of the current study. 
  
In Chapter Five, the first part of “China-Narratives” relayed by the policy-
researchers was presented, with a particular focus on the U.S.-Sino bilateral 
relationship. I organised the empirical data into cohesive clusters of narratives and 
proposed boundary-markers, which served as the discursive frame. By juxtaposing 
the narratives with subjectively selected relevant bodies of literature, I identified ten 
key findings, including an overarching argument linked to the lack of 
‘internationality’, in addition to a quantitative facet of the theory of ‘American 
exceptionalism’. 
  
Chapter Six presented additional narratives relating to China, but moving beyond the 
bilateral trajectory – and rather focusing on China’s motivations, intentions, and 
behaviours. I identified five additional key findings, including an overarching 
argument which addressed a qualitative facet of ‘American exceptionalism’. 
 
7.2 Summary of key findings 
Aligned with ‘cyclic’ research process integral to ethnographic research, I have 
identified the key findings as a result of interfacing data with subjectively selected, 
relevant bodies of literature in a “bottom-up” fashion. Thus, the key findings are also 
contributions in their own right – and I have established them in relation to the 
proposed main areas of contributions. Collectively, the key findings are related to 
empirical, conceptual, methodological, and theoretical forms of contributions. 
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Inspired by Bourdieu, I have also explored modifications of Bourdieu’s own 
concepts – when warranted by the empirical data. 
 
In chapter Four, the key findings expand on Medvetz’ work by establishing a cross-
over ‘social field’ with think tanks and China policy-researchers as the main actors 
and both featuring hybridity. The field is multi-directional, non-linear, and 
asymmetric constructed, and I identified multidimensionality due to the multitude of 
fields in both horizontal and vertical directions contemplating on Bourdieu’s 
hierarchy of fields. The most influential think tanks exercise ‘symbolic power’ due 
to the elevated importance of “consolidated capital”. In terms of ‘influence’ – central 
in the specific think tank literature – I proposed ‘positioning’ as a more relevant 
construct for comprehending think tanks’ and policy researchers’ abilities to exercise 
influence. The inquiry strengthened the proposal for establishing a ‘third ‘school of 
analyses’ in the above area. I also identified the need and relevance for grasping that 
Bourdieu’s capital has an ‘imaginary’ facet; actual capital versus imagined capital 
which is not in the possession of a policy-researcher or think tank, but rather 
portrayed as controlling such capital. 
 
In Chapter Five, empirical data supported the relevance for incorporating self-
reflexive interrogation, in order to become more aware of the influence of own 
subjectivity during the analysis process (and designing the research project in 
general). I argued that policy researchers tend to engage less with self-reflexive 
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thinking.
1100
 I found narratives to be performing in two layers, which is contrary to 
the mainstream approach for understanding the processes of comprehension, 
conceptualising, structuring, and analysing narratives; conceptual boundary-
production reflects the motivation for uttering a particular form of narrative beyond 
the actual contents. Furthermore, a focus on boundary-markers of narratives moves 
beyond what “merely” is ‘different’. These markers are dictated by interests and 
strategies within the field – and subsequently become part of the identity 
construction (policy-researchers as individuals and think tanks at the organisational 
level). Moreover, this line of inquiry also illustrated the importance of appreciating 
the meaning-attribution to boundary-markers, and the varied strength, salience, and 
relationality between them.  
 
I also identified a “post-Cold War” generation of policy-researchers, in their 30s and 
with more long-term exposure to China (its people and culture) and abilities to 
converse in Mandarin. This may have policy implications, as their more diverse 
backgrounds plausibly would influence the nature of their policy-advice and 
reactions against ‘China threat’ notions and interaction with the Chinese socio-
political system. 
 
In terms of bilateral relations, the narratives reflected a fairly unison and non-
contradictory views on the relationship between the two countries. No credit is given 
to the notion of America in decline, and somewhat surprisingly, policy researchers 
are predominantly taking radical stance against IR realist power-balance theory. The 
                                                          
1100 Ann Cunliffe uses the notion of an ‘unquestioning culture’ (“Assessing Reflexivity in Professional Doctorate 
Practice and Research” (paper presented at a The Higher Education Academy event, University of Bedfordshire, 
Luton, 14 March, 2014)). 
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overarching argument related to lack of internationality, and that ‘American-ness’ is 
constructed through China principally from a bilateral perspective. I argue for a 
quantitative facet of American exceptionalism – as a theory which explains the 
argument of the dominant bilateral trajectory as the “ontological lens”. 
 
When establishing key findings applicable to Chapter Six, I was building upon 
discoveries in previous chapters. The relevance of Bourdieu’s ‘epistemic reflexivity’ 
is strengthened, and I proposed expansion of such enterprise by also focusing on the 
relationship between the researched and the social scientific knowledge claim 
itself.
1101
   
 
I identified narratives concerning the lack of understanding between the two 
countries and their populations, as well as the evident role of meaning-attribution 
which operates in symbiosis with Bourdieu’s media, political, and economic ‘field of 
powers’. The narratives also assumed that a clear strategy have been developed by 
Beijing, and exhibited a somewhat lack in appreciating that China’s development 
trajectory does not necessarily correspond to conventional historical pathways (for 
example, having multiple identities, and not a fixed, innate, national-interest). In 
essence, the narratives take a critical stance with IR realist thinking within the above 
area – but also IR’s constructivists who assume the primacy of ideas/constructions 
over physicality/materiality/structure. I argued for a qualitative facet of American 
exceptionalism as an overarching argument, herein how China is being evaluated on 
a basis essentially restricted to those political values permeating the American 
political culture and society: an ontological “political lens” wherein the world is 
                                                          
1101 In accordance with Maton 2003, op.cit. 52-65. 
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gazed though, as an element of ‘American-ness’ (normatively; how the world should 
evolve). 
 
Across Chapters Five and Six, I developed new concepts relating to Othering. 
Specifically, in terms of “enemy-Othering”, I have made a case for expanding the 
frontier in this regard within IR research; traversing multiple countries and beyond 
the notion of a fixed, dichotomous Other – hence expanding on the work of Hansen 
and Campbell.
1102
 I coined the term “twin-Other”, which relates to good/bad 
Othering beyond one/single country (for example India is good, China is bad) where 
behaviour is detached from that Other’s (aka Beijing’s) behaviour and reasoning, and 
thus justifying the Self. The ‘deflective meta-narrative’ entails the internalisation by 
the majority of a narrative which is actually only hold of the few. This results in the 
‘deflective Other’, and the ‘deflecting Othering’ as the underlying process. 
‘Reversed deflective-Othering’ extends the concept of ‘deflective Othering’, in this 
that the meta-narrative is upheld due to the pursuit of maintaining a desirable Self – 
in addition to that same narrative being internalised by the majority but applying to 
only a few.  
 
7.3 Main arguments and proposed contributions 
Proposed arguments and contributions are intertwined, and based on the various key 
findings across the analysis/empirical chapters – serving as evidence-based sources 
for formulating an argument, and subsequently claiming a contribution. 
 
                                                          
1102 See Hansen 2006, op.cit. 42, 46-51; and Campbell 1998, op.cit. 
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As far as the overarching research question is concerned, the main argument consists 
of three elements. First, ‘American-ness’ is constituted through a Self/Other dialect, 
therefore, comprising multiple Selves, Othering, and boundary-markers as 
Otherness. Furthermore, the cultural influence plays an evident role, relating to how 
the boundaries and meaning-attributions are socially and culturally constructed. 
Second, ‘American-ness’ is a contested socially constructed phenomenon where 
some boundary-markers are shared whereas others are distinct for a particular 
produced conceptual boundary. Third, the contested nature of ‘American-ness’ 
depends on the think tank’s (including the individuals working within them) 
association on the domestic political and ideological spectrum in the U.S. (and/or 
other dynamisms). Subsequently, in essence, this is the basis for identity-formation, 
and can thus provide improved contextualised understanding of work-activities, 
positions and behaviour in the ‘field’, in addition to developed perspectives in the 
policy-arena amongst policy-researchers and think tanks. 
 
I argue that Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice is highly relevant for achieving deeper 
and richer understanding of social phenomena. Its application therefore enriches the 
conceptual and methodological vocabulary in IR research and achieves more 
rigorous meaning- and context-based studies. Culture plays a profound role in these 
processes. The study also facilitates for a more empirically sound exploration where 
the field-research informs the relevance for the various “thinking tools” through 
deploying Bourdieu’s social theory in conjunction with ethnography. The study 
elucidates the interplay and relationality between his various conceptual “thinking 
tools”, which is shown to be much underexplored – not only within IR but in the 
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wider social sciences in general.
1103
 Thus, the relational aspect of the present study 
contributes with a new empirical case of such application, which is relevant also 
beyond the IR discipline. 
 
I am further arguing for the relevance of establishing a third ‘analytical school’ 
within the specific think tank literature, which makes conceptualisations of the 
thinkers (aka policy-research experts) its focal point. Moreover, in terms of think 
tanks in the IR literature, I argue that the study has the potential to widen the 
platform of non-state key players in the international system, including the 
organisational and individual levels (think tanks and think tank policy-researchers as 
individuals respectively). Similarly, positioning think tanks as non-state actors 
within the context of U.S.’ relations with China links the think tank literature with 
the constructivist research programme in IR. Furthermore, it also marries the 
perspectives of policy-researchers with U.S.-Sino relations – and in particularly 
U.S.’ foreign policies towards China. This has shown, from the policy-researchers’ 
perspectives, that the empirical soundness of IR’ realist embedded China-threat 
notions and power-balance theories, are assigned little credibility. 
 
I find that the empirical data facilities for claiming the following contributions.
1104
 
First, the study contributes with novel theoretical synthesis. Employing Bourdieu’s 
Theory of Practice, and additional social theory from Sociology and Social 
Anthropology, combines different bodies of literature in a rather unconventional way 
in IR research. It further explores the Bourdieusian sociological ‘turn’ in IR as well 
                                                          
1103 Swartz 2008, “Bringing Bourdieu’s master concepts into organizational analysis,” op.cit. 
1104 I am here making use of Professor Matthew Watson’s (University of Warwick) ‘list of ten’ ways to make a 
contribution. 
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as increasing transdisciplinary IR research. Simultaneously, though, it facilitates for 
examining the relevance of the Bourdieu’s social theory as method (theoretical 
framework). Synthesis is also made between the specific think tank and IR literatures 
as well as methodologically by employing in-depth field-research drawing upon 
ethnographic research traditions.  
 
Second, the research has also elicited new primary data collection (in-depth 
interviews), which cannot be replicated due to changing contextuality and 
intersubjectivity. To the best of my knowledge, my research project is the first 
ethnographic study of think tanks and policy-research experts – and thus offers 
novelty. Third, the research endeavour also facilitates for developing propositions 
which can be investigated in future research ventures, interlinked with identified key 
findings (see below). 
 
7.5 Limitations and future research 
Every study comes with limitations and trade-offs in terms of its research design, or 
methodological or theoretical frameworks. The claims relating to ‘American-ness’ 
could have been strengthened if drawing upon comparative studies of policy 
researchers who work in other policy-areas. As an ethnography, my research 
endeavour is heavily depending on in-depth interviews – and more insights, 
observations, nuances, and contextualisation might have been captured if having 
observed interviewees over longer time within their organisations – and other arenas. 
As already discussed at length, my own cultural background might have made me 
more predisposed for noticing particular elements when collecting and analysing 
data, as well as developing and formulating findings. 
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In terms of fruitful future research avenues, some suggestions correspond with the 
above identified limitations –  for example to replicate the study but within another 
policy context, such as the Middle East or universal health care, which could assist in 
contesting and expanding the notion of ‘American-ness’ further. Replication, and 
comparing, with think tanks in other countries regarding perceptions of China would 
be fruitful. Furthermore, the “Self-ness” and its boundary-markers could be 
compared – in the same vein that boundary-construction could be scrutinised in 
terms of how think tanks in different cultures construct their own identity, and 
exercise influence. 
 
It would particularly be interesting to carry out a study of Chinese think tanks’ 
narratives on the U.S., and their responses to the established narratives identified in 
the present study. Other potential investigations could address the eschewed gender 
balance and knowledge-transfer between staff members and interns – especially 
across country borders (for example, overseas offices). The nature of funding 
(especially from private and corporate donors) would be worthwhile research for 
further examining possible influence on ‘independent advice’, which think tanks and 
policy-researchers often promulgate being a core capability and activity in their 
work. Furthermore, it would be interesting to interface the specific think tank 
literature with Strategic Management literature (for example, in relation to 
organisational and management aspects of think tanks). 
 
7.6 Self-reflexive concluding remarks 
In addition to learning from key components from the undertaken academic study, 
my experiences with conducting a self-reflexive deliberation throughout the thesis, 
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have made me more alert to why I have interpreted data in a particular way – 
including the knowledge-production linkages between policy-researchers and the 
scientific claims that I make about their analysis. This endeavour also, I find, is 
having a value for achieving personal development and research skills, as well as 
enticing to challenge “common-sense”, tacit boundaries, power in terms of 
definitions, politicisation, monopolisation of meaning-construction, and 
compartmentalised disciplinary boundaries, through transdisciplinary inquiry. To 
constantly questioning myself is healthy from a methodological point of view, but 
such efforts also tends to unveil further nuances in the data – which I argue rings true 
also beyond the academe and into the world of policy-making processes, policy-
researchers knowledge-production, academics, as well as developing methodological 
curriculum in Higher Education. 
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